Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2025
They told him that Iran has lost control of the Houthis – that the fighters in Yemen who regularly attack global shipping lanes have stopped taking orders from Tehran.
“The Houthis have gone
rogue,” one senior Iranian official told Madadi, “…and are now
really rebels.” Then he added: “It’s not just the Houthis. Some groups in Iraq
are also acting as if we never had any contact with them.”
The revelations went even
further. Between them the officials maintained that the Iranian
leadership is struggling to hold together what is left of its “axis of
resistance” forces all around the Middle East – in other words that the regime
is also losing control in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.
The Institute for the Study of War
analyzed Madadi’s report. In its evaluation it described his contacts
as "unspecified Iranian officials", the suggestion being that
limited credence should therefore be placed on what they said.
The Telegraph article, however, strongly suggests that these were senior confidential sources speaking on the very
condition they remained anonymous and unidentifiable.
Given the situation within Iran,
no whistle-blower or informant could allow their identity to be revealed. The regime treats unauthorized communication
with foreign media, particularly Western outlets, as treasonable offenses liable
to the death penalty.
Madadi provides no
information about how contact was made with these officials or why they
agreed to talk to him, but despite the known dangers, Iranian officials do reach
out to Western journalists and also to anti-regime organizations sited abroad.
GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) is an independent Netherlands-based research foundation. In June 2024, it conducted a survey to measure support within Iran for regime change. It found that more than 80% of those polled were in favor.
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It is not, therefore, surprising
that internal politics can result in moderates leaking information damaging to
hardliners, especially those aligned with the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps). Moreover some officials
cultivate Western media contacts as insurance in case they need to flee Iran or
seek asylum in the future. Given Iran's
systematic persecution of anyone suspected of providing information to Western
media, the personal courage required for these officials to talk to the outside
world, even if under the cloak of anonymity, should be recognized.
As for the
revelations passed on to Madadi, available evidence suggests there is indeed some
substance to them.
The Houthis’ rift with Iran goes back to April, when the ayatollahs, fearful of being drawn into direct conflict with America, failed to come to their aid during heavy US strikes. Ever since the Houthis, by broadening alliances and augmenting supply lines, have been trying to wean themselves off full blown Iranian support.
In response, Iran dispatched a senior IRGC commander, Abdolreza Shahlaei of the Quds Force, to Sana'a in mid-November in a bid to restore Iranian influence.
According to the Telegraph report,
an Iranian official told journalist Madadi that Shahlaei was tasked with
encouraging the Houthis to "cooperate more than before, as they are the
only operational group left" in Iran's weakened proxy network. The fact
that Tehran felt compelled to send such a high-ranking commander to Yemen highlights
both the strained relationship and Iran's desperate attempt to maintain
influence over its last major functioning proxy.
The
Iranian officials who told Madadi about Houthi defiance also revealed
that Iraqi militia groups are increasingly ignoring Tehran's
directives. These militias, according to
recent reports, are being subjected to ever greater control by Iraq’s prime minister,
Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, backed by an Iraqi electorate increasingly favoring
sovereignty over Iranian patronage. To
prevent Iraq from being drawn into the Israel-Iran conflict in June, Sudani
reportedly blocked dozens of attempted attacks on Israel by his Iran-backed
militias.
Hezbollah, once the steel spine of
Iran’s Axis of Resistance, is still reeling from Israel's September 2024
escalation which decimated its command structure and weapons stockpiles. The
group lost its leader Hassan Nasrallah (killed September 2024), his presumed
successor Hashem Safieddine, military commanders Ibrahim Akil and Ali Karaki,
and most recently chief military commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai (killed
November 23, 2025). Hezbollah, which
retains a fair amount of political power in Lebanon, is attempting to counter
the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm the organization altogether.
Syria under its once-president
Bashir Al Assad was often described as the lynch pin of the Axis of Resistance.
As well as serving as a base for IRGC
operations, it provided Iran's essential land corridor for supplying weapons
and materiel to Hezbollah in Lebanon. After
investing massive military support and billions of dollars to prop up Assad
since 2011, Iran's abrupt withdrawal from Syria exposed Tehran's strategic and
military weakness.
In Gaza, the long-term viability
of Hamas remains an open question. There
is evidence of attempts by the remaining leadership to re-establish control in
the areas vacated by the IDF, but the organization as a whole has nominally
signed up to the Trump 20-point peace plan which requires them to abandon any
attempt to have a say in the governance of Gaza, and to disarm.
The Gaza ceasefire has effectively cut off what remains of
Hamas from operational coordination with Iran.
Finally,
and perhaps most telling of all, the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June 2025 fully exposed
the disintegration of the Axis. Israel conducted approximately 360 airstrikes
across 27 Iranian provinces, targeting military installations, air defense
systems and nuclear facilities, and killing at least 30 senior IRGC commanders
and 11 nuclear scientists.
Throughout this direct assault on
Iranian territory, Iran's proxy network was nowhere to be seen. Despite decades
of rhetoric about the Axis providing "forward defense" and
deterrence, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis took virtually no
offensive action against Israel or the US throughout the period Iran's nuclear
facilities were under attack.
What was once a relatively
coherent strategic network under Iranian guidance seems to have devolved, for
the moment at least, into a collection of entities pursuing parochial interests,
while maintaining loose ideological and material ties to Tehran.
Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's axis of resistance is crumbling", 8 December 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-879462
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