Published in the Jerusalem Post online, 21 December 2025
The interdependence
between the various provisions of the plan, together with the lack of a clear
deadline for the achievement of each stage, have together resulted in its
progress being slowed to a snail’s pace.
Under the plan, the
first phase required a cessation of hostilities and then, over the next 72
hours, the release by Hamas of all living hostages together with the
remains of the deceased. Meanwhile Israel would free Palestinian
prisoners, aid and relief would flow into Gaza under international supervision,
and most IDF troops would withdraw to an agreed “yellow line”.
This yellow line refers to a
non-physical demarcation boundary, drawn on a map of the region, marking the
initial phase of Israel's partial withdrawal from parts of the enclave. This
line divides Gaza into two roughly equal zones – Hamas to the west; the IDF to
the east. In some areas Israeli forces have marked the line with yellow
concrete blocks, but because the blocks do not precisely align with the agreed
demarcation, a certain amount of confusion reigns on the ground.
Unfortunately, without a built-in
requirement to complete the various stages of phase one within a given period,
or sanctions against failure to comply, the plan as a whole has simply lost
impetus. Nor is there any incentive for either Hamas or the Israeli
government to remedy the situation. Both are using ambiguity over these
conditions to preserve leverage ahead of talks on stage two, where the core
disputes over Hamas disarmament, the interim governance
of Gaza, deployment of an international armed force, and further
IDF withdrawal are featured.
Hamas decided to maintain its
bargaining power by spreading the release of the deceased hostages over several
weeks. It still holds the remains of Ran Givili, the Israeli police
officer who reportedly eliminated 14 terrorists before he was killed and his
body taken to Gaza. While it does so, stage one of the ceasefire
is not completed.
At the same time, Hamas continues to tell the world about civilian deaths – “civilians” or “women and children” is how they classify those killed in Gaza, never enumerating the deaths of fighters as such. Fighters aged 17 or under are classed as children. Israel, for its part, continues to report daily clashes with Hamas.
Meanwhile difficulties are
emerging which threaten the success of later stages of the plan.
Phase two envisages the creation
of a council of independent Palestinian technocrats to run the day-to-day
affairs of Gaza under international supervision. It also
provides for the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) made up
of US, Arab and European personnel to oversee demilitarization and
maintain security.
To take the last matter first, as
of now many countries asked to contribute troops or personnel have failed to
respond or are hesitating, citing concerns about an unclear mandate,
or the risk of confrontations with Hamas fighters.
On November 29, the Washington
Post reported that Azerbaijan, which had been among the countries
expected to contribute troops, is now tying any participation to a complete
halt in fighting and a clear mandate. Indonesia, which had earlier
indicated it could provide up to 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, has clarified
that this figure represented overall capacity rather than a firm commitment and
is now considering a very much reduced initial contribution.
Meanwhile, despite the force being
described diplomatically as “Arab-led,” to date not a
single Arab government has formally committed troops. Several
Arab countries previously mentioned as potential contributors, including the
UAE and Saudi Arabia, have either declined or expressed increased reluctance to
deploy forces, citing political sensitivities. Even for states keen
to win favor with the US administration, the Post reports,
many uncertainties remain, including the thorny question of how the force would
go about de-weaponizing Hamas, which has sent mixed signals about its
willingness to disarm.
The US “want the
international stabilizing force to come into Gaza,” said a senior official in
Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “and restore, quote
unquote, “law and order”, and disarm any resistance. So that’s the
problem. Nobody wants to do that.”
So while Trump’s ceasefire plan
has broad regional and international backing, especially from the mediators
Qatar, Egypt and Turkey, its long-term prospects remain
uncertain. The situation was not improved by the disappointing and
inconclusive results of the large US‑led planning conference, held on
December 16 under US Central Command
auspices, on the International Stabilization Force for post‑war
Gaza. More than 25 nations were represented, but it ended without
firm decisions on the force’s mandate or concrete troop pledges. In
addition to that issue, many of the most controversial or sensitive
components of phase two, including the disarmament of Hamas, transitional
governance, the future status of Gaza and wider Palestinian political
questions, also remain unresolved and contentious.
If the international force never
deploys, or deploys in a limited, ineffective way, there is a real danger the
ceasefire becomes a “frozen conflict” — and Gaza is subjected to a prolonged
stalemate, a hark back to the “managed instability” that marked the pre-October
7 period. History has already demonstrated what that situation finally
leads to.
If Hamas refuses or delays disarmament, or Israel is unwilling to withdraw fully, the underlying structural problems – the vacuum in governance and security, and the humanitarian crisis– will remain, and the truce could collapse. In those circumstances, the ceasefire may only delay, not end, the conflict.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-880885
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