Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 January 2026
President Donald Trump’s Gaza
peace plan would appear to be stuck. Whatever
covert preparations may be in hand to implement its later stages, the clock
seems to have stopped.
The first stages of the 20-point “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza
Conflict”, signed by Israel and Hamas in Sharm el‑Sheikh on October 9, 2025, required
an immediate ceasefire, the return of all the hostages both alive and dead, the
transfer of Palestinian prisoners in exchange, and a substantial increase in
the flow of humanitarian aid. Having
released the live hostages, Hamas chose to eke out the return of the dead over
a period of six weeks, and still holds on to the remains of Ran Gvili.
So the first stage has not been completed and Gaza is effectively trapped. A fragile ceasefire is in place, the IDF have withdrawn to the “yellow line,” there is increased humanitarian access – but all are subject to ongoing violations.
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As for conditions in the Strip,
most media reports suggest that, rather than advancing the peace process, the
ceasefire has reduced Gaza’s significance on the world scene. It has changed little on the ground. Large parts of Gaza remain in ruins, hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians are still displaced, and aid distribution is even
more difficult because of new restrictions placed by Israel on some 37 humanitarian
agencies that refuse to reveal whether their staff are connected to Hamas.
The 20‑point Trump plan was not
originally issued as “three phases”. It
was first presented essentially as a single 20‑point framework, and the text
adopted as Annex 1 to UN Resolution 2803 is also structured as 20 numbered
points. It was media and policy coverage
that quickly reframed the 20‑point scheme into three phases:
Phase 1: immediate ceasefire,
hostage–prisoner exchanges, front‑line freeze, humanitarian surge.
Phase 2: demilitarization,
destruction of Hamas’s offensive infrastructure, progressive Israeli withdrawal
and deployment of the International Stabilization Force.
Phase 3: governance transition and
reconstruction, including the Board of Peace and multi‑year rebuilding of
Gaza. Finally, “when the PA reform
program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a
credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”
Any sort of progress is blocked by unfinished business from Phase One. The unresolved issue of hostage Ran Gvili’s missing body has become a precondition for any further Israeli withdrawals, for changes at the Rafah crossing, or for movement to the next stage. In practice, this traffic jam maintains the territorial “yellow line”– in other words, the continued presence of the IDF in eastern Gaza.
In any case implementation of
Phase Two is beset with obstacles. It
seems obvious that the bargaining positions of Hamas and Israel are mutually
incompatible. Hamas has declared that any
disarmament on its part is tied to the prior achievement of Palestinian
statehood and a restoration of Palestinian control over Gaza. Israel
rejects Hamas disarmament on that basis, or indeed any outcome that concedes Palestinian
statehood under pressure.
Hamas’s position is, of course,
quite at odds with the Trump plan which it has signed. That places the issue of Palestinian
self-determination at point 19 of the 20-point plan, namely well after the
total disarmament of Gaza in general and Hamas in particular. The result of Hamas’s intransigence is
deadlock as regards further progress. Hamas
will not voluntarily disarm and Israel cannot realistically force full
disarmament without collapsing the ceasefire.
On the face of it the Trump peace
plan is at an impasse. Despite reports
of negotiations in hand, there is as yet no agreed path to the demilitarization,
international force deployment, or new governance that would mark a genuine implementation
of Phase Two.
Trump, however, is unlikely to sit
idly by while Hamas plays fast and loose with a peace agreement it has
signed. The president has repeatedly
coupled the Gaza peace plan with threats that if Hamas does not comply, “all
hell” or direct military action will follow.
Trump’s Venezuela operation is no blueprint for what is likely in Gaza; US
or allied operations against Hamas are not currently in prospect. The characteristic Trump ambiguity, however,
is deliberate, and designed to coerce Hamas while keeping options open.
What is more relevant, perhaps is
Trump’s warning as he unveiled the 20‑point plan. If Hamas rejected it, he said, “Israel would
have the full backing of the US to proceed with any actions it sees fit.”
In subsequent posts and remarks,
he repeatedly referred to his peace proposal as Hamas’s “one last chance” and
warned that if agreement was not reached “all hell, like no one has ever seen
before, will break out against Hamas.” In
short, his consistent core message has been that refusal to comply with the
plan and disarm will bring severe, potentially direct, force against Hamas.
Several forms of action are more
plausible than a dramatic new US‑led offensive.
The most credible is Trump’s repeated assurances that, if Hamas blocks key steps like
disarmament or the transfer of authority, Israel will enjoy “full backing” to
intensify targeted operations against remaining Hamas infrastructure and
leadership. He has publicly pledged his “complete
support” to Israel to “finish the job” and “do what you need to do” against
Hamas.
An alternative scenario could
involve incremental coercive measures applied to Hamas, short of
invasion. These could include tighter financial and travel sanctions on
Hamas leadership, increased pressure on Qatar and other mediators to curtail
Hamas’s external operations, and further restrictions or conditioning of
reconstruction money and crossings on verifiable disarmament steps.
Trump observers will be aware that
the language about “all hell” functions as strategic ambiguity. Without any specified timelines or specific troop
deployments (both of which would be resisted by allies and Congress), it is
designed to convince Hamas that the US and its partners might ultimately
enforce disarmament militarily.
Taken together, these factors
suggest that Trump’s recent threats are best read as signaling, designed to
push Hamas toward implementing its disarmament, ahead of a greenlight to the
IDF to “finish the job” with Washington’s backing.
Hamas, well aware that world
opinion would castigate the US and Israel if the Gaza war was resumed, might
calculate its best course is to maintain the stalemate.
Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Hamas, Israel deadlock leaves Trump's Gaza plan in deadlock", 14 January 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-883080
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