Syria’s lost democrats

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 December 2024:

Well before the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia found itself victorious in its struggle against the Assad regime, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, its head, told CNN:  “The goal of the revolution remains the overthrow of this regime.”

But Julani omitted to say what he wished to replace it with. Despite all his softly spoken reassurances about his liberal intentions, all the evidence points to a political takeover ​of the country by the leader of the military coup – in fact a Sunni jihadist replacement of Assad.  ​Despite talk of inclusivity, there is little sign of the political presence of the many other Syrian groups and organizations scattered across the country. 

The interim prime minister that Julani has appointed, Mohammed al-Bashir, was plucked from administering an HTS-held area in northwest Syria​.

In recent years, HTS has attempted to gain local legitimacy by governing in a less extreme manner than, say, the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Through the Salvation Government, an HTS-influenced  civilian administrative body, it has – on the lines of ISIS in its heyday – established bureaucratic institutions for education, healthcare, and public services, funded by taxes, tolls, and fees.​  

HTS is rooted in a Salafi-jihadist ideology, and although Julani has renounced his former connection with al-Qaeda and attempts to present himself in a more moderate light, his organization is essentially Islamist.​  What is likely to emerge ​in Syria is a Sunni Islamist state, governed according to its own interpretation of Islamic Sharia law.   

With HTS in the ascendant, it is salutary to remember that the Syrian armed conflict began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the dictatorial government of President Bashar al-Assad​, with the establishment of democracy as its key demand.  

In March 2011 a few teenagers – fired no doubt by the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Middle East at the time – daubed some inflammatory slogans on a school wall in the southern Syrian city of Daraa.  Unfortunately for them, the Syria that President Bashar al-Assad had inherited in 2000 from his autocratic father was a tightly controlled police state, in which a powerful and all-encompassing security machine ensured that the slightest hint of opposition to the régime was ruthlessly crushed.

The youngsters were hunted down, arrested​, tortured​ in unspeakable ways, and killed. When details of their ordeal became known, protesters took to the streets. The security forces, unable to break up the demonstration, eventually fired into the crowd. That was enough to spark widespread rebellion. Groups antagonistic to Assad’s government began nationwide protests. Gradually, popular dissent developed into an armed revolt.

After months of crackdown by the government's security forces, various armed groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) began forming across the country, marking the beginning of the Syrian insurgency.  By mid-2012, the uprising had escalated into a full-blown civil war with the aim of overthrowing the despotic Assad régime and substituting a democratic form of government.

Had assistance of any sort been forthcoming from the US or other Western governments at that early stage, Assad could have been defeated.  But US President Obama hesitated, and then continued vacillating even after it was clear in August 2013 that Assad had used chemical weapons against his opponents, utterly indifferent to the extensive civilian casualties that ensued.  Obama hesitated because he was intent on forging links with Iran leading to a nuclear deal, and Iran regarded Syria as a vital component in what was known at the time as its “Shia Crescent.”

Meanwhile the shining sword of democracy, the weapon the rebels in 2011 hoped would bring down Assad’s dictatorial regime, had become heavily tarnished. Those who are now labelled “Syrian rebels” are not fighting for democracy. The original FSA, once dedicated simply to establishing democracy in Syria, has over the nine years of civil conflict lost its cohesion and been transformed into an amalgamation of different groups for many of whom establishing an open democratic form of government is far from their aim.

Will a second democratic casualty of the civil war be Kurdish hopes of autonomy in the region they have established in north-eastern Syria?  The Kurd-occupied ​territory, which is about 25-30 percent of the old Syria, is currently a semi-autonomous region formally designated the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria or, more simply, Rojava.  It is, however, in the sights of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has said he will never accept a Kurdish quasi-state ruled by the PYD party, which he considers a terrorist organization, along the Turkish border.

Speaking to reporters on December 6, Erdogan endorsed and supported the HTS advance into Syria.  “Our wish,” he said, “is that this march in Syria continues without accidents or disasters”– another voice with little or no interest in ensuring a democratic future for Syria. 

Erdogan is wedded to the Muslim Brotherhood, and has every sympathy with the HTS’s objectives.

Even as Assad was fleeing the country, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) began offensive operations against the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are mostly ethnic Kurds.  The SDF had stormed Deir Ezzor city, situated on the river Euphrates​ and part of Iran’s supply corridor connecting to Lebanon – a facility the regime has now lost.​   ​They were ousted by the HTS on December 10​, and a mini civil war was only prevented when​, on December 11, the US ​intervened to mediate a deal between the​ SNA and the SDF.

So what has happened to the original democratic Syrian opposition of 2011, made up of activists, intellectuals, and defectors pressing for a transition to democracy and an end to Assad’s authoritarian rule?  It consisted of the Syrian National Council, which later became part of the Syrian National Coalition,  Local Coordination Committees, which organized protests and civil resistance, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an informal group of defected soldiers and armed civilians.

It was a loosely allied group, and its component parts struggled with ideological, political, and ethnic divisions, resulting in a lack of unified leadership and goals.  Elements like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) capitalized on the chaos and perverted their cause. As a result the original democratic opposition has largely been sidelined, while efforts to achieve a political resolution through UN-mediated peace talks, such as the Geneva process, made little progress and have now been overtaken by events.

In short the original Syrian democratic opposition has been overshadowed by the militarization of the conflict, the rise of extremist groups, and the intervention of foreign powers. It still exists in a fragmented form, but can it reorganize itself into some sort of cohesive entity in time to claim a seat at the table, ​should an opportunity actually arise to negotiate Syria’s future?  ​Is it realistic to hope for a democratic state of Syria emerging from ​the military coup?  ​The more probable outcome is that Syria’s future will be some sort of autocracy headed by HTS leader Julani.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's lost democrats were overshadowed by the rise of extremist groups", December 16, 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-833561

Iran and the ceasefire

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 December, 2024

Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, agreed on November 26 and implemented in the early hours of the following day?  ​Opinion is divided, views differing according to the holder's perception of Iran’s complex geopolitical interests in the region.

  ​Some ​of the media speculate that Iran saw the ​proposed ceasefire as conflicting with its strategic interests by undermining its leverage against Israel,​ and opposed it.​  Some argue that that an enfeebled and disheartened Hezbollah​, ​desperate for a respite from Israel's onslaught, proceeded to negotiate the deal without a green light from Tehran.  ​

Most opinion takes a contrary view.  The defense editor of the UK’s Daily Telegraph  believes Iran has been so weakened ​through the defeats inflicted on its proxies that it was forced into the ceasefire, and that it represents a major setback​ for the ayatollahs.  Given the destruction that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have wreaked on the infrastructures of both Hezbollah and Hamas, he writes, “the Iranian regime, which finds itself increasingly under pressure from a disaffected populace, had little option but to bring hostilities to an end. All the indications are that Iran, not Hezbollah, was the driving force behind diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon, as it feared that its standing in the region would be further eroded the longer the conflict carried on.”

Some commentators have perceived a split developing between Iran and its two main proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah.   They believe that a much weakened Hezbollah and the rump of Hamas are both more than willing to prolong the conflict with Israel, believing that the longer it lasts, the more pressure Israel will come under from world leaders to make concessions. This, they think, is what is behind the Hamas leadership’s constant refusal to accept ceasefire terms brokered by the Biden administration. 

There are, in fact, reports that dissatisfaction with Iran’s agreement to a ceasefire is morphing into talk of betrayal. It has certainly resulted in numerous breaches of the ceasefire terms by Hezbollah, requiring an appropriate military response by the IDF.  If Hezbollah is indeed determined to resume hostilities against Israel, the chance of extending the 60-day truce will eventually turn on a struggle of will​s with Iran.    

  Hamas’s savage assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, was probably intended to mark the start of a new era of Iranian strength.  If so, subsequent events seem to demonstrate that it was the exact opposite – namely, that October 7 marked ​the  highwater mark​ of Iran's power, and it was all downhill from then on. From the moment that Israel chased Hamas back into Gaza, Iran’s power base began to decline. 

Over the past year the ayatollahs have had to watch their Hamas allies suffer huge losses of manpower and facilities, culminating in the elimination of its leader, Yahya Sinwar.  I​n a long, hard struggle​ Hamas as a military entity has been all but destroyed.  It has also been ousted from the governance of Gaza, which can no longer be regarded by Iran’s ayatollahs as a launching pad for the invasion and destruction of Israel.  Israel’s determined and effective self-defensive action in response to October 7​ has clearly reduced Iran's strength and influence.  The regime has also proved powerless to prevent the decimation of Hezbollah’s senior command structure, including the assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

Some commentators are linking the military successes ​in Syria by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), referred to by the media as the “Syrian rebels”, to Iran’s evidently weakened state and Russia’s preoccupation with its struggles in Ukraine.  Neither could offer Bashar al-Assad much support as HTS forces advanced into the streets of Damascus, greeted by jubilant crowds. Assad’s dictatorial regime has collapsed, while Iran’s “ring of fire” has blown back on itself.  Syria, Lebanon, Hamas and Hezbollah now represent not an unassailable Iranian  regional powerhouse, but a diminished and flagging regime..  

Iran​ appears to have made a serous, perhaps fatal, strategic miscalculation in April, 2024, when it decided to escalate its conflict with the West by launching its first-ever aerial onslaught on Israel.  That first attack was a humiliating failure since some 99% of the missiles and drones were destroyed in flight and failed to reach Israel.

The ayatollahs compounded their failure by essaying a second bombardment on October 1.  Although more powerful missiles were deployed, the results were only minimally more effective.  The ultimate humiliation, perhaps, was that Iran’s direct assaults on Israel triggered retaliatory airstrikes which prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated struck Iran’s nuclear program.

While the regime has managed to win some victories in the propaganda war – successfully persuading many young, Left-wing people in the West that Israel is the aggressor in this conflict – it has been discomfited on the battlefield. and diminished geopolitically.  The strategic goals it has worked toward for years have become pipe dreams in a matter of months. Iran’s aim of regional domination seems less attainable than ever. 

The disintegration of Iran’s carefully-constructed terrorist network in the Middle East could even have profound implications for the survival prospects of the regime itself and its ruling ayatollahs.

         Openly calling for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic are Iranian opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son and heir of the last Shah of Iran, who heads a body called the National Council of Iran for Free Elections, and his rival, Maryam Rajavi, the head of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Both claim to be acting as a government-in-exile.  In November Pahlavi called on Iranians to take the country back, adding that he was ready to lead any interim rule.

Having expended billions of dollars supporting terrorist proxies throughout the region, the ayatollahs are likely to find themselves under increasing pressure from disaffected voters.  Inflation is currently running at 35 percent, and more than 20 percent of young people are unemployed.   Apart from the failing economy, the regime is holding the lid on a seething cauldron of discontent about the restrictions imposed on women by the religious police.  Every so often the people’s frustration explodes in the form of public protests which are invariably put down ruthlessly by the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).

With the Trump administration, which is likely to take a hard line on Iran, soon to assume power in Washington, the ceasefire deal in Lebanon could be the first indication that the ayatollahs’ days are numbered.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2024, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire?":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-832571

Published in Eurasia Review, 17 December 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13122024-iran-and-the-ceasefire-oped/#google_vignette

Published in the MPC Journal, 18 December 2024

https://mpc-journal.org/iran-and-the-ceasefire/

Reviving the 'Deal of the Century'?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 2 December 2024

            On his first time around the presidential election circuit, Donald J Trump placed such emphasis on his desire to broker a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians, that once he was elected I decided to follow his progress on this matter with especial care.  The result was my book “Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020” (see right), which I brought to a conclusion with a summary of the Israel-Palestinian peace plan that had been assiduously put together over the preceding four years by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

With prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his side, Trump presented the plan to the world on January 28, 2020.  It was greeted with howls of derision from Palestinian​s and their supporters around the Middle East and beyond, all vowing to thwart it if any attempt was made to put it into effect.  

Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, appeared on television a few minutes after the Trump presentation, rejecting it root and branch:

“I say to Trump and Netanyahu​," he declared, "Jerusalem is not for sale, all our rights are not for sale and are not for bargain…We say a thousand no’s to this deal.”​  He was referring to the extraordinarily generous economic element of the plan, which aimed to create a vibrant, flourishing Palestinian state over ten years. 

Abbas’s reaction was far from the view of some influential figures in the Middle East and across the world. Bahrain and Oman signaled their approval by actually sending representatives to the White House ceremony.  Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE all issued statements welcoming the plan.

For example, the statement issued by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs ran: "The kingdom appreciates the efforts of President Trump's administration to develop a comprehensive peace plan between the Palestinian and the Israeli sides, and encourages the start of direct peace negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, under the auspices of the United States."

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a similar statement: "Egypt recognizes the importance of considering the US administration's initiative from the perspective of the importance of achieving the resolution of the Palestinian issue, thus restoring to the Palestinian people their full legitimate rights through the establishment of a sovereign independent state in the Palestinian occupied territories in accordance with international legitimacy and resolutions."

The UK offered typically restrained approval.  Trump said that then-UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, had called him earlier to offer support.  Dominic Raab, Britain’s then-foreign secretary, welcomed the plan as “a serious proposal” and urged the Palestinians not to reject it out of hand.  The Australian government also welcomed the peace proposal, calling it a positive move and encouraging both parties to consider it as a basis for dialogue.

So the plan certainly had a degree of regional and international approval in 2020.  Much water has flowed under the bridge since then.  In 2024’s changed circumstances. with the Hamas organization decapitated and Gaza on the verge of reconstitution, Trump’s "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People" would certainly need amendment, but could it provide the basis for a renewed peace process? 

The  plan is divided into two parts: economic and political.  The economic portion was the first to be released, in June 2019.  Subtitled “A New Vision for the Palestinian People,” the 40-page document set out in considerable detail a scenario under which, with a huge input of funding, prospects for the Palestinians would be immeasurably transformed for the better.  In present circumstances what would additionally be required is a fully-funded program – to which, no doubt, Israel would contribute in full measure – designed to reconstruct Gaza’s cities in as short a timeframe as feasible.

As for the original program, in the document’s words: “with the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over 10 years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive effort for the Palestinian people to date.  It has the ability to fundamentally transform the West Bank and Gaza, and to open a new chapter in Palestinian history – one defined not by adversity and loss, but by freedom and dignity.”

            A main goal  was to connect Palestinian-occupied areas to regional and global markets, included integrating Gaza and the West Bank “through an efficient, modern transportation network, including a transportation corridor directly connecting” the two areas.  “Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy,” said the document, which also detailed how “hospitals, schools, homes and businesses will secure access to affordable electricity, clean water and digital services.”

Additionally the plan envisaged improving the well-being of the Palestinian people through educational programs, vocational and technical training, expanding the female labor force, reducing Infant mortality  and increasing average life expectancy.

            The details were no sooner released than they were rejected out of hand by Palestinian spokespeople.  Abbas declared: “there can be no economic solution before there’s a political solution.”  Demonstrations opposing the plan were held in the West Bank and Gaza.

The political component of the plan, unveiled in 2020, while asserting that “any workable peace agreement must address the Palestinians’ legitimate desire for self-determination,” sweeps aside the issue of the “occupied territories” – namely the areas conquered from the Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian armies in the Six-Day War of 1967.  Maintaining that the succession of UN Resolutions claiming these areas as Palestinian are self-contradictory and demonstrably ineffective, the plan proposes its own path to a peaceful compromise. Israel would be allowed to incorporate West Bank settlements into Israel proper, and in compensation would yield an equivalent amount of territory adjacent to, and south of, the Gaza Strip.

So the plan envisages the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank on the areas outside the settlements, plus a greatly expanded Gaza.  All the Palestinian territories would be made contiguous by way of a network of highways, bridges and a road tunnel linking the West Bank to Gaza.  Additionally the Palestinians would have a capital in eastern Jerusalem based on northern and eastern neighborhoods that are outside the Israeli security barrier.

This prospect is made dependent on the Palestinian leadership renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel as the Jewish state.  The plan allows four years for these conditions to be met.

Back in 2016 Trump said: “I would love to be the one who made peace with Israel and the Palestinians.  That would be such a great achievement.”  If he remains as wedded to the idea in his second term, he would surely base his renewed effort on the painstaking work already undertaken by Jared Kushner.  With the bones of a plan already devised, and the political landscape much changed, he might find the Palestinian leadership more amenable to negotiation than in 2020.  Trump may yet act as honest broker in bringing a “Deal of the Century” to fruition.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Can Trump's  'deal of the century' be revived and bring Middle East peace?", 2 December 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-831551

Published in Eurasia Review, 7 December 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/06122024-will-trump-revive-the-deal-of-the-century-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 8 December 2024

https://mpc-journal.org/will-trump-revive-the-deal-of-the-century/

The ICC’s bizarre ruling

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 November 2024 

            The French have a saying: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose – namely, the more things change, the more they stay the same.  It applies with peculiar force to the Jewish people.  Regardless of time, place or circumstance, when disaster strikes or things go wrong, history demonstrates that the Jewish people are the world’s chief scapegoats. Those who have swallowed the ancient tropes and hate Jews on account of some supposed global conspiracy, or excessive economic power, or imagined hostility to Christianity or Islam – such people will believe Jews capable of anything, no matter how ludicrous.

   On November 21 the International Criminal Court (ICC) declared to the world that it believed Israel, under the direction of Benjamin Netanyahu, deliberately set out to slaughter the civilian population of Gaza.  Anything less likely it would be difficult to imagine.

It was on May 20, 2024 that Karim Khan KC, a British jurist and chief prosecutor of the ICC, applied to the court to issue international arrest warrants against three Hamas leaders (all now dead), and also against Netanyahu and then-defense minister Yoav Gallant.  His request in respect of the Israeli leaders was backed by a catalogue of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In  issuing arrest warrants for Israel’s prime minister and his former defence chief, the ICC seem to have adopted Khan’s accusations as fact.  The court charged them with being criminally responsible for a "widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Gaza".  They claim that an Israeli blockade on Gaza resulted in a lack of food, water, electricity, fuel and medical supplies which "created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children, due to malnutrition and dehydration".

In short the judges appear to believe that Netanyahu engaged in a “systematic” operation “calculated” to slaughter the civilian population.

Together with the warrants, the ICC issued a press release setting out the rationale for the judges’ decision. It contains not a single indication that, in attacking Hamas, Israel was engaged in a justifiable act of self defence, in accordance with international law, following the barbarous onslaught by Hamas on Israel on October 7, 2023.  That, too, was not mentioned.

Even more to the point, the judges’ justification does not refer to the established fact that Hamas had embedded itself within the civilian structure of Gaza.  It says nothing, either, of the extraordinary steps taken by Israel to warn the population of impending military operations.

            The ICC’s legal proceedings bear a remarkable similarity to those portrayed by Gilbert and Sullivan in their comic opera “Trial by Jury”. In its opening moments the Usher sternly instructs the jury: “from bias free of every kind this trial must be tried.”  A moment later, totally enamoured of the young lady bringing the case, he tells them to pay no heed to the “ruffianly” defendant: “What he may say you needn’t mind.”

Israel’s case, to which the ICC judges paid no heed, was convincingly placed before them on August 5 by Dr Rafael Bardaji on behalf of the High Level Military Group (HLMG), an association of military leaders and officials from NATO and other democratic countries.  It tore Khan’s case to shreds.

 In Khan’s application to the ICC he states as a fact that Israel indulged in “collective punishment of the civilian population”.  He substantiates this by asserting that Israel “deliberately” starved them, “wilfully” caused them great suffering, serious injury and death, and “intentionally” directed attacks against them, murdering and persecuting them.  He makes these assertions without offering any proof that the actions he lists were deliberate, wilful or intentional.

As the HLMG made clear in the first paragraph of its 28 paragraph submission, its observations were based on solid, first-hand evidence.   “The HLMG conducted an in-country assessment of the Gaza conflict in July 2024, visiting IDF military HQs from the top level; humanitarian aid installations and operations; units down to battalion level of command; and a visit inside Gaza.”   

 It first tackles Khan’s allegations that Israel blocked food supplies from reaching the Gazan population, deliberately starving them.  The HLMG describes visiting crossing points built by the IDF since the war began specifically to facilitate increased volumes of aid entering the Gaza Strip. The Erez Crossing was completely destroyed by Hamas on 7 October,  “Since then two vehicle crossing points in Erez were established by the IDF. We observed roads inside the Gaza Strip that were built by the IDF specifically to enable delivery of aid laterally and south to north.”

   The submission continues: “The IDF operates according to a clear chain of command. The directives and commands we reviewed did not include any order to starve civilians, or to use issues related to humanitarian assistance as a method of warfare, and in fact, included clear statements regarding the IDF’s legal obligations towards the civilian population.”

Its conclusion:  “Our assessment shows that the IDF is operationalizing the Israeli government’s stated policy to ‘flood Gaza with aid’… we believe this is counter indicative of and inconsistent with any plan or intent to employ starvation as a method of warfare at any stage in this conflict.”

The submission then turns to Khan’s assertion in his arrest warrant application that Israel imposed “a total siege over Gaza”, demonstrating from known and provable facts that at no stage was Gaza under siege.

Finally the submission describes the IDF military justice and accountability mechanism which the HLMG found “consistent with the highest standards of our own armed forces.”  The group singled out for praise the IDF Fact Finding and Assessment Mechanism (FFAM), which examines any incident that could raise a charge of possible illegal conduct or military procedural misconduct.  “There are currently approximately 300 incidents being actively investigated by the FFAM,” it says, “with many more which they have received initial information about. To our knowledge no other armed forces have established such a permanent system but would benefit from doing so.”

The ICC describes its own remit in these terms.   “The ICC intervenes only in situations where States themselves are either unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

The HLMG submission states:  “We do not believe there is a credible basis to conclude Israel lacks the ability or will to implement national investigatory and judicial processes that are comparable to other countries and their militaries.”  

In short the judges of the ICC have not only ignored compelling evidence from an impeccable source which challenges the charges brought by their prosecutor, but they have misdirected themselves as to the court’s competence to act against the leaders of a democratic state with a fully functioning judicial system of its own.

         The ICC has shot itself in the foot.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled "ICC accuses Israel of genocide, ignoring evidence and self-defense claims", 25 November 2024 :
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-830547

Lebanon's future

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 19 November 2024

          No doubt Israel would ideally like to see Hezbollah completely removed as a military presence in Lebanon, and its dominance within the nation’s political life ended. Neither seems fully achievable in the present circumstances.

          Hezbollah is a significant presence within Lebanon. Its military strength and capabilities are larger and more powerful than Lebanon’s armed forces. It draws popular support from its vast network of schools, clinics, youth programs, and other social services.

          Financed partly by Iran, it is also funded by sympathetic Lebanese business interests, by the business enterprises that it runs itself, and via the financial institutions that launder the money it earns from organized criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking and counterfeiting European currency.

          Politically, also, it is a force to be reckoned with. The group has participated in Lebanese elections since 1992. It entered the cabinet for the first time in 2005 and has held seats in each Lebanese government since. The situation in which current government is an interim one, and the country lacks a president, is very largely, though not entirely, the result of Hezbollah manipulation. Although Israeli policymakers want to clip Hezbollah’s political wings, they know better than to become entangled in the arcane complexities of Lebanon’s political system.

          In any case, there is every sign that the Lebanese themselves are becoming disillusioned with Hezbollah. An Arab Barometer survey published in September found that 70% of the Lebanese population does not trust Hezbollah, and the 30% who do are almost entirely Shi’ite citizens. Only 9% of Sunnis and Druze, and just 6% of Christians have any trust in Hezbollah.

          The best that Israel can hope for in the short term is to push Hezbollah’s armed forces far enough from the border to allow the displaced Israeli families of the North to return to their homes.

          Lebanon's Litani river runs north to south through the country, then takes a sharp turn toward the Mediterranean sea. Hezbollah operates from the territory between the river and Israel’s northern border, known as the Blue Line. Varying in width between 6 and 28 km., it also houses 10,000 UNIFIL troops engaged in ineffective attempts to control an openly defiant Hezbollah.

          A word about the Blue Line: Since Lebanon never signed a peace treaty with Israel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, no international border separating them has ever been agreed. In 2000, however, a demarcation line was drawn by the UN to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon following the 1978 and 1982 conflicts.

          Along certain sections, UNIFIL has marked the position of the line on the ground with blue barrels – more than 270 of them – giving rise to the “Blue Line” designation.

Stretching for about 120 km. from the Mediterranean coast in the west up to the Golan Heights in the east, it has been serving as a de facto border.

         On October 30, Lebanon’s MTV website reported that intensive ceasefire talks had been taking place led by Amos Hochstein, US President Joe Biden’s special envoy to Lebanon.

As a result, the website claimed, Hezbollah had agreed to move all its weapons to north of the Litani and establish a demilitarized zone in the area south of the river.

          It also claimed that Hezbollah was no longer insisting on being directly connected to events in Gaza. The group’s late leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had insisted that Hezbollah’s assault on Israel was in support of Hamas, and that a ceasefire in Lebanon would be tied to a ceasefire in Gaza.

          Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri is reported to have insisted that the terms of UN Resolution 1701 must be the basis of any agreement: “It’s out of the question to change the wording of UN Resolution 1701 even by one word,” he said. Hochstein has been traveling between Lebanon and Israel seeking an agreement that abides by the resolution.

          Adopted unanimously in 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 notably does not mention Hezbollah. It refers directly only to the two UN member states, Lebanon and Israel, maintaining the fiction that Lebanon is in a position to control rogue militias operating within its sovereign territory. In the UN’s fantasy world, the Lebanese government can order Hezbollah to stop attacking Israel and enforce its order.

          So the resolution calls for all armed groups in Lebanon to be disarmed, maintaining that the only armed force in the country must be that of the Lebanese state. As for an agreed border between Israel and Lebanon, the resolution says that ultimately it is up to the states concerned to determine its exact path but that in the interim the Blue Line must be respected. UNIFIL was charged with ensuring compliance.

          That, of course, was where the well-intentioned resolution failed. Like the Lebanese government, UNIFIL found itself impotent against the rampant Hezbollah military machine. Starting on October 8, 2023, Hezbollah started firing missiles indiscriminately into Israel. With tens of thousands of residents being evacuated from their homes, the least Israel could do was to try to deter Hezbollah by meeting fire with fire.

          At the same time, Israel began effectively weakening both Hezbollah and Hamas by eliminating its leaders, destroying its command and control centers, and depleting its manpower. Now, with the whole of Hezbollah’s senior command structure, including its long-time leader Nasrallah, removed, the organization may well be prepared to negotiate a deal.

          Hochstein must have been heartened to receive a call from president-elect Donald Trump on November 8. Israeli media, quoting a Lebanese MTV channel report, said Trump told him: “Go and finish your work and make a deal with Lebanon.”

          On November 11, the media reported that Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer had flown to the US for talks with senior White House officials regarding a Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire deal.

Washington officials had already confirmed that there had been progress in the Hochstein-led discussions. “The chances are increasing for a settlement in Lebanon,” they told Ynet.

          Then on November 13, The Washington Post reported that Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, had been told by one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s close aides that Israel is intent on finalizing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon. The idea is to provide an early foreign policy win to the president-elect as he assumes office. Two days later, sure enough, Reuters reported that the US ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, had submitted a draft truce proposal to Lebanon’s speaker Berri.

          As the saying goes: “Half a loaf is better than no bread.” If the half-loaf includes an end to Hezbollah’s missiles and its troops being removed to north of the Litani river, then it is a compromise worth accepting.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "How will Hezbollah factor into Lebanon's future?", 19 November 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-829692

Behind the Iran-Israel conflict

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 12 November 2024 

However many charges of aggression, mass murder and worse the Iranian regime chooses to level against Israel, there is no disguising the fact that it is Iran that seeks to destroy Israel, not the other way around. 

On April 13, 2024 Iran – which essentially means the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – committed a major strategic blunder.  Israel’s audacious attack on the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus on April 1, 2024 had taken out seven Iranian military advisers, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the élite Quds Force of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).  Such an operation would normally have provoked Iranian ire and an armed response on northern Israel from Hezbollah.  Not on this occasion.  Instead the incident was used as the trigger for a fundamental shift in Iranian policy which has led to negative consequences for Iran. They are still to be fully worked through and may, in the final analysis, prove existential.   

  

         For 45 years – namely, since its foundation in 1979 – the Iranian regime had pursued its self-imposed mission of encompassing the destruction of Israel and its people through funding, arming and supporting organizations, groups and militias prepared to attack the Jewish state. At some point in the period leading up to April 13 Khamenei decided that the time had arrived to change tack. It must have been intense analysis and calculation by his advisers that led him to break the principle that had guided Iran’s foreign strategy for so long, and finally launch Iran’s very first direct onslaught on Israel.

  How must the figuring have gone?  “Israel has never been weaker.  It is bogged down in its war in Gaza.  It hasn’t succeeded in eliminating Hamas or recovering its remaining hostages.  It is being condemned on all sides for vast numbers of civilian deaths. Hezbollah is attacking it daily on its northern border.  Houthi missiles are getting through its defenses. It is the subject of an investigation by the International Court of Justice on a charge of genocide.  Imagine the effect of a direct Iranian attack.  Think of bombs falling on Israeli cities.  Think of Israelis in their hundreds slaughtered and injured.  Israel will be humbled.  The Abraham Accords will disintegrate, and any hope of their extension will be snuffed out.” 

Khamenei’s military advisers must have convinced him that a massive fleet of kamikaze UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) would overwhelm Israel’s defenses, and at least some 50% of the missiles would get through. The aerial assault involved hundreds of drones, cruise and ballistic missiles.  

In the event Khamenei’s anticipated military and propaganda triumph turned into a humiliation.  What Iran’s military strategists perhaps failed to take into account was the united support of Israel’s allies, and Iran's own unpopularity in the Arab world (Iranians may be Muslim, but they are not Arabs).  They surely did not count on Jordan and Saudi Arabia helping to block Iran's UAVs from reaching Israel, nor that the UK and France would join the US in backing Israel's Iron Dome in shooting down the Iranian missiles. 

Their subsequent failure was to underestimate both the chutzpah and effectiveness of Israel’s security and armed forces. Following the aerial assault of April 13, the Iranians were taken by surprise time and again. Within a week Israel had responded with airstrikes on Iranian military sites in Syria and Iran itself, while against a background of continuing tit-for-tat skirmishes, Israel pursued its hunt for the Hamas leaders responsible for the barbaric attack of October 7, and the Hezbollah leaders who supported them.

The targeted elimination of Mohammed Deif, head of Hamas’s military wing, on July 13 was followed by the even more telling retribution visited on Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s political wing.  In an especial humiliation for the regime, he was killed in the heart of Iran’s capital, Tehran, by an explosion in his guesthouse, on July 31. 

Then came September 17-18, when hand-held communication devices, such as pagers and walkie-talkies, manufactured specifically for Hezbollah and distributed widely to its operatives, were detonated remotely.  At least 42 fatalities and over 3,000 injuries, the vast majority of them Hezbollah operatives, was the result.  Though Israel made no claim, the world assumed it was responsible.

Albert Einstein is reputed to have said: “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.”  Whatever Khamenei's thinking – perhaps he believed his first aerial assault on Israel had been under-powered – he opted for a second, bigger and more focused attempt.  He decided to use some 200 advanced Fattah-1 and Kheibar Shekan missiles, and to target military and intelligence locations. 

In the event this second Iranian attack, launched on October 1, was only marginally more damaging than the first. Once again most missiles were intercepted by Israeli and US defense systems, including support from US naval vessels stationed nearby. 

How and when Israel would retaliate became the subject of intense media speculation. The theorizing was temporarily suspended when Iran’s prize collaborator, the head of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar, was shot dead by the IDF on October 16.

While welcoming the news as “a good day for Israel, for the United States, and for the world,” US President Joe Biden made it clear that he did not want Israel to target Iran’s nuclear and oil installations for fear of triggering all-out war.  

When it came, Israel’s response, delivered on October 25, respected his wish and consisted of heavy air strikes on Iranian military targets in Syria and on Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. 

So Israel and Iran are undoubtedly in conflict, if not formally at war.  Anyone who cares to look into the matter can see why no truce can be meaningful. 

The objective of the Iranian regime, from its foundation in 1979, has been to acquire as much power and influence as possible in order to achieve the key objectives laid down by the regime’s original Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He affirmed repeatedly that the very purpose of his revolution was to destroy Western-style democracy and its way of life, and to impose Shia Islam on the whole world.  He identified the United States and Israel as his prime targets, but included what was then the USSR.

“We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, Capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world,” said Khomeini.  “We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet.”  By this he meant his strict Shia interpretation of Islam, for elsewhere he had declared that the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, situated in the heart of Sunni Saudi Arabia, were in the hands of “a band of heretics”.

These objectives have driven the regime ever since, and continue to be its raison d’être.  

“We shall export our revolution to the whole world,” declared Khomeini. “Until the cry 'There is no god but Allah' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.”

In short, Iran’s leaders want to destroy the world as we know it. They want to achieve political dominance in the Middle East, overthrow Western-style democracy of which America is the prime exponent, wipe out the state of Israel, and impose Shia Islam across the globe. 

 Whether the West wishes to acknowledge it or not, in combatting Iran, Israel is fighting for the free world as a whole. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "How Iran's attacks on Israel backfired, escalating regional conflict", 12 Nov 2024:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-828654

BRICS is no friend of Israel

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 4 November 2024

From October 22 to 24, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, as host of the 2024 BRICS summit, welcomed 36 world leaders to Russia .  This conference marked the first gathering of the BRICS group after its expansion to include, alongside the original five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  Other countries attended as partners or aspiring new members.  The expanded body brings together countries representing approximately 41% of the global population and 24% of the global GDP. 

BRICS aims to promote cooperation among major emerging economies and increase their economic and political influence. Its primary purpose is to provide an alternative to Western-led institutions like the G7 economic grouping.  It seeks to reduce reliance on the US dollar in international trade. The group's aims conform precisely to Putin’s domestic and international aspirations, which he does not seek to conceal.   At an open meeting on October 22, 2022 he said:  ““The unipolar world is being relegated into the past…The West is unable to rule humanity single-handedly, and the majority of nations no longer want to put up with this…. A future world arrangement is taking shape before our eyes.”

   BRICS is the perfect instrument for assisting Putin reach his goal.

   Given the inclusion of Iran and South Africa in its membership, the viscerally anti-Israel stance it has adopted is not, perhaps, surprising.  The summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan, so the statement issued on its conclusion is titled the Kazan Declaration. In it, the BRICS leaders devote 8 of its 35 paragraphs to denouncing Israel in one way or another.

   In paragraph 30, for example, without any reference to the horrifying events of October 7, 2023, or even one mention of the word Hamas, they express “grave concern” at the escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, which they ascribe to “the Israeli military offensive, which led to mass killing and injury of civilians, forced displacement and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure.”  They call for an immediate ceasefire and the release of all hostages and detainees “from both sides”, drawing no distinction between civilians illegally seized, and people imprisoned for their crimes.

Providing no evidence to support the charge, they denounce “Israeli attacks against humanitarian operations”.  Unsurprisingly they approve of the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in “the legal proceedings instituted by South Africa against Israel.” They call for a two-state solution based on what they term the “borders of June 1967,” and for the State of Palestine to be granted full membership in the United Nations.

In paragraph 31 the Declaration turns to Lebanon.  Here BRICS members, without once mentioning Hezbollah or making any reference to its ceaseless bombardment of northern Israel starting on October 8, 2023, “condemn the loss of civilian lives and the immense damage to civilian infrastructure resulting from attacks by Israel in residential areas in Lebanon and call for immediate cessation of military acts.”  

They move on to condemn, among other things, what they term “the premeditated terrorist act of detonating handheld communication devices in Beirut on 17 September 2024,” which, they claim, “resulted in the loss of life and injury of dozens of civilians.” They make no mention of the fact that the devices in question had been issued only to Hezbollah members and certain other VIPs like Iran's ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani.

The Kazan Declaration makes it clear that BRICS turns a blind eye toward terrorist activity aimed at eliminating Israel and its people, and has nothing but unreserved condemnation for the steps Israel takes to defend itself.

 The summit was undoubtedly a personal triumph for Putin.  Ostracized and sanctioned by the West, here he was able to straddle the world stage, host to a large gathering of global leaders.  At Kazan Putin demonstrated that he has been rehabilitated personally by a large section of the world, and that an alternative to Western dominance is a real possibility. The topics discussed included how emerging economies could cooperate more fully across a variety of fields. In addition it set the ball rolling on one of Putin’s pet projects – a new international payments system that would undercut the dominance of the US dollar.

The magazine Newsweek believes that the overarching ambition of BRICS leaders such as Putin and China's President XI Jinping is to accelerate and bolster the shift away from America as the sole superpower, and toward a multipolar world that counterbalances the US and its Western allies.

It points out that the Russian economy has managed to readjust following the sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It has done so with the help of its key partner China, aided also by Iranian weapons supplied for use in Ukraine. Putin is now seeking to expand trade with India through a strategic partnership, particularly in the areas of energy resources and defense.

“These partnerships,” says Newsweek, “are Putin's multipolar vision in practice, undermining the US-led West's ability to exercise its power and enforce its desired global norms through sanctions and other economic and diplomatic levers at its disposal.”  His overall aim is to dismantle the US-led transatlantic and global order so that Russia can exercise greater power regionally and internationally

Allied to the bid by BRICS for economic, financial and political independence from the West is a rejection of the principle, staunchly upheld by the US and most of the free world, that Israel has the right to defend itself against the genocidal and illegal terrorism of Iran and its axis of evil.  In fact, with Iran and South Africa as leading members, it is doubtful if BRICS as an organization regards Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iranian-supported militias in Iraq and Syria as terrorist bodies at all. It is this myopia that underlies its root and branch condemnation of Israel.

  However Israel need not submit to being blackened and isolated.  A closer look at the list of BRICS members reveals the presence of  Abraham Accord partner, the UAE, while hovering in the wings, invited to join but as yet uncertain, is Saudi Arabia.  Other countries enjoying good relations with Israel, such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus, are also possible new members.  Putin himself has a nuanced attitude toward Israel – a position that could be affected by the result of the forthcoming US presidential election. 

Self-interest could well override any demand by Iran, South Africa or Turkey (another possible new member) for a permanent anti-Israel stance.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "BRICS is no friend of Israel amid Putin's strategic vision", 4 November2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-827388

Published in Eurasia Review titled: "BRICS suits Putin but is no friend of Israel", 8 Nov 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/08112024-brics-suits-putin-but-is-no-friend-of-israel-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 13 Nov 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/brics-suits-putin-but-it-is-no-friend-of-israel/

Compromised UNRWA should be dissolved

 This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today, 30 October 2024

Sir

     The services that the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) supplies in Gaza are undoubtedly vital, but they should not be provided by UNRWA, a deeply compromised organization (“UNRWA banned from operating within Israel”, report, October 29).

      Around the time the state of Israel came into being, some 750,000 non-Jews left their homes – some from fear of forthcoming conflict, some as a result of fierce exchanges.  After the armistice, the UN set up UNRWA to assist them.  It  began work in May 1950.  Seven months later the UN set up the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), excluding Palestinian refugees from its remit.  Ever since, Palestinians have been treated differently by the UN – to their disadvantage.

       The 1949 UN resolution that established UNRWA said: “Constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief.”  In other words, the new agency’s mission was intended to be temporary, as the refugees under its wing were resettled.  But resettlement never occurred. UNRWA totally ignored this key aspect of its remit.

      On the contrary, UNRWA’s policy was to perpetuate the Palestinians’ refugee status.  It decided to regard as refugees all the “descendants of Palestine refugees” in perpetuity. 

      The number of Palestinians in camps registered by UNRWA as refugees has therefore ballooned from around 750,000 in 1950 to 5.9 million in 2023.  Its expanding client base is, of course, used by the “temporary” UNRWA to justify its transformation into an international bureaucracy with a staff in excess of 30,000 and an annual budget of around $1.6 billion. 

     While UNHCR concentrates on resettling refugees so they can rebuild their lives, UNRWA has converted nearly six million people into permanent charity-dependent clients.

     UNRWA should be dissolved, and its functions absorbed by UNHCR

Neville Teller

Published in the Daily Telegraph, 30 October 2024, titled: "The UN in Gaza":
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2024/10/29/experience-shows-nhs-cant-be-trusted-use-funds-efficiently/

The post-Sinwar scenario

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 October 2024

On October 21 two Hamas sources revealed to the media that the idea of appointing a leader to succeed Yahyar Sinwar, assassinated on October 16,  had been ruled out, at least for the present.  The Hamas leadership, operating at arm’s length from Gaza in the gulf state of Qatar, had decided that the organization would be run, at least until March 2025, by the 5-man committee set up in August after the assassination of political leader Ismail Haniyeh. 

The committee, based in Doha, Qatar’s capital city, is comprised of Khalil al-Hayya, Khaled Mashaal, Zaher Jabareen, Mohammed Darwish and the political bureau’s secretary, whose identity remains anonymous for security reasons.

The internal dynamic of the Hamas organization had certainly been severely shaken, yet an informed source, well acquainted with its inner workings, struck an interesting note.  Interviewed by the Associated Press, Sadeq Abu Amer, head of the Turkey-based think tank Palestinian Dialogue Group, believed that the removal of Sinwar, whom he dubbed “one of the most prominent hawks within the movement,” was likely to lead to “the advancement of a trend or direction that can be described as dove[-like]”.  He indicated that with Sinwar out of the picture a hostage-prisoner exchange deal had become practical politics.

            Abu Amer was quick to discount any suggestion that Sinwar’s brother, Mohammed, if he is still alive, could replace him as overall leader of Hamas.  “Mohammed Sinwar is the head of the field battle,” he said, “but he will not be Sinwar’s heir as head of the political bureau.”

Although somewhat off the mark, as it has turned out, he believed that Hamas’s Qatar-based political leaders might decide to elect one of their number to head the organization.  He identified the two front runners as al-Hayya and Khaled Mashaal. 

Al-Hayya, aged 63, was Sinwar’s deputy and headed the Hamas delegation in cease-fire negotiations. In a media interview in April 2024, al-Hayya said Hamas was willing to agree a truce of at least five years with Israel, and that if an independent Palestinian state were created along 1967 borders, the group would dissolve its military wing and become a purely political party.

Mashaal, aged 68, served as the group’s political leader from 1996 to 2017.  Subject of an assassination attempt back in 1997, he now supports the forces opposed to President Bashar al Assad in the 13-year-old civil war still raging in Syria.  Consequently he is not on good terms with Iran, or indeed with Hezbollah.  He has good relations with Turkey and Qatar.

Jabareen, once sentenced to a 35-year prison sentence for the deaths of two Israeli police officers at the Temple Mount, was released on a prisoner exchange.  He headed the 2023 resumption of suicide bombings within Israel.  Mohammed Darwish, also known as Abu Omar Hassan, has been chairman of the Hamas Shura Council since October 2023.

            First reactions to the news of Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16 reflected hope in many quarters that a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of the hostages was now but a short step away. 

Such immediate expectations seemed to be quickly doused.  The first public statement after Sinwar’s death, made by his Qatar-based deputy al-Hayya, was that there will be no hostage release without “the end of the aggression… and the withdrawal from Gaza.” 

   Israel’s position immediately after Sinwar’s death was nuanced.  The first reaction of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was that the war was not over.   “Evil has suffered a heavy blow,” he said, “ but the task before us is not yet complete.”

Yet in a message issued via the media, Netanyahu offered Hamas terrorists free passage out of the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of hostages.  Anyone who laid down his arms and returned hostages, said Netanyahu, would be allowed to leave Gaza.

Could this formula provide the basis for a final hostage return deal?  Possibly – provided  Hamas’s new Qatar-based leadership committee is indeed that degree more pragmatic (more “dove-like” as Abu Amer put it) than its hawkish erstwhile leader.   A reassessment of Hamas’s situation and prospects might persuade the leadership that re-siting the organization outside the Gaza Strip might be the most effective way to recoup and recover.  Given the huge losses in manpower that Hamas has already sustained, it is certainly preferable to continue fighting inside Gaza to the last man.

This scenario, if played out, would not sit well with the aspirations of US President Joe Biden, presidential candidate Kamala Harris, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the many other western leaders who are so free with advice about how Israel should act.  The accepted international view has been that Israel should de-escalate on all fronts. negotiate a hostage-prisoner swap in Gaza involving an Israeli ceasefire, stop its attacks on Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut and the rest of Lebanon, and respond only minimally to Iran’s massive missile launch on Israel of October 1.  In the event Israel's response, though far from minimal, was effectively targeted.

Netanyahu’s policy of slowly but surely eliminating the leadership of the Iran-supported terror armies in Gaza, Lebanon and the rest of the axis of evil, while depleting their manpower and wearing them down, is clearly working.  The West’s continuous advocacy of unenforceable ceasefires, peace deals and de-escalation would never have succeeded.   Against jihadist enemies dedicated to its annihilation, any such appeasement by Israel would have served only to guarantee the continuation of the multi-directional existential threat.

In the strictly limited area of the war in Gaza, however, Sinwar’s disappearance may have opened up a chink of hope.  Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar is reported to have visited Cairo on October 20 to discuss a possible revival of hostage deal negotiations. Two days later US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Israel, where he reiterated his view that Israel should seek to exploit the advantage gained by Sinwar’s assassination and press on with negotiating a hostage deal.  Netanyahu is reported to have concurred.  Blinken went on to Egypt, where reports suggest that discussions included the future administration and rebuilding of Gaza, involving the establishment of an international force to oversee the process.

According to an October 19 report in the Wall Street Journal, Sinwar told Hamas negotiators in Qatar that if he were killed, Israel would offer concessions.  On this, if on nothing else, he was apparently not wrong.  On October 21, media reports indicate, Israel’s TV Channel 12 claimed that Israel had recently indicated to the US that it was ready to make concessions previously not considered feasible.  What such concessions might involve was not mentioned, but they could be based on Netanyahu’s free passage offer. If the report is true, their success might turn on how flexible Hamas’s reconstituted leadership might choose to be in the post-Sinwar era.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "A post-Sinwar scenario: What's next for Hamas and Israel now?", 28 Oct 2024:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-826351

Published in the Eurasia Review, 1 November 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/01112024-the-post-sinwar-scenario-oped/#google_vignette

Published in the MPC Journal, 3 November 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-post-sinwar-scenario/