Turkey in turmoil

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 31 March 2025

        On March 19 the popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, was arrested just as he was about to register to run in Turkey’s next presidential election. At the same time, in a series of coordinated raids, more than 100 individuals were detained, including journalists and business figures. The charges ranged from corruption to alleged links to terrorism.

        Despite a government ban on street gatherings, thousands of people began to rally in protest against Imamoglu’s detention, accusing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of a blatant attempt to remove the man likely to be his main opponent in the next presidential election.

        Prosecutors announced that Imamoglu had been arrested for "establishing and managing a criminal organization, taking bribes, extortion, unlawfully recording personal data and rigging a tender." In addition to this shopping list of alleged crimes and misdemeanors, Imamoglu also faced allegations of "aiding an armed terrorist organization", namely Turkey’s proscribed Kurdish autonomy party, the PKK.


        The next day government media announced that the police were investigating the Imamoglu family’s construction business on a separate suspicion of financial irregularities. Imamoglu is being harried on another front. A day before his arrest, Istanbul University announced it was revoking Imamoglu's degree due to alleged irregularities, a measure which, if upheld, would put his ability to run as president in doubt. According to the Turkish constitution, to hold office presidents must have completed higher education.

        As mass protests against Imomaglu’s detention erupted across the nation, on March 23 he and four of his aides were, by order of a Turkish court, imprisoned pending trial.

        Now Turkey is in turmoil. The Turkish government has been unable to control the popular defiance of its clampdown on street gatherings. Each day tens of thousands of people have been taking to the streets in cities and towns across the nation, denouncing Imamoglu’s detention as politically motivated and a further step away from the democratic origins of modern Turkey. As March drew to an end the protests continued to erupt, day after day.

        Last year Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered a major defeat in local and mayoral elections. It seems obvious to many that the current moves are aimed at removing serious contenders ahead of the next presidential election. However, since it is not scheduled until 2028, one might ask why the issue has surfaced so early. There is a very good reason.

        In the 2017 constitutional referendum which transformed Turkey’s system from a parliamentary to a presidential one – a change championed by Erdogan and his AKP party – a president may serve a maximum of two terms, but there is an exception. If parliament calls for an early election during a president’s second term, that president is allowed to run for a third term.


        The year scheduled for the next Turkish presidential election is 2028. Nominally it should mark the end of Erdogan’s second consecutive term, and he would not be eligible to run again. However, should the parliament (which has a three-fifths AKP majority) call for early elections, Erdogan would be able to seek another term.

        İmamoğlu has accused the government of “weaponising the judiciary” to stay in power, and his Republican People’s party (CHP) called his detention “a coup against the next president”. A message posted on his X account called on judges and prosecutors to “stand up and take action against a handful of your colleagues who are ruining the Turkish judiciary, disgracing us before the whole world and destroying our reputation . . . You cannot and must not remain silent”.

        Erdogan's actions against Imamoglu are part of a broader crackdown on opposition figures in Turkey – a campaign that has intensified in recent months, targeting various political adversaries and dissenting voices.

        Since March 19 some 2000 people have been arrested, among them at least seven journalists, presumably on account of their political opinions. Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency recently reported that Turkish police are detaining people for posting messages on social media that allegedly incite unrest. On March 27, BBC news reporter Mark Lowen was arrested, detained and deported after covering the public protests.

        Erdogan has been on television to accuse the opposition of blowing Imamoglu’s arrest out of all proportion. It will be up to the courts, he said, to determine if the allegations against him are valid, but “they know full well that all of it is true”.

        Imamoglu has been a thorn in Erdogan’s flesh for many years, but back in the 1990s, during Erdogan's tenure as Istanbul's mayor, their relationship was cordial. In those days a young Imamoglu hosted Erdogan at his family's restaurant, ”on the house”.

        Imamoglu, always popular with the public, decided to try his luck in the 2019 election for mayor of Istanbul. it was a bold, almost cheeky, move because not only had Erdogan virtually started his political career as Istanbul’s mayor, but the post had subsequently been held consistently by members of Erdogan’s AKP party.

        Shattering all predictions, Imamoglu won the election, albeit by a very narrow margin – 28,000 votes in a city with more than 10 million voters. The ruling AKP immediately challenged the results, alleging irregularities and fraud.

        Under pressure from the AKP, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) took the unprecedented step of annulling the election and ordered a re-run –a decision heavily criticized both within Turkey and internationally. It backfired spectacularly.

        On June 23, 2019, Imamoglu inflicted a stunning defeat on Erdogan and the AKP. He won the re-run election by a much larger margin – some 800,000 votes (54.2% vs. 45%). This was widely interpreted as a significant blow to Erdogan’s political dominance. His famous and well-remembered remark came back to haunt him: "Whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey."

        To safeguard his future he is now clearly taking the sort of pre-emptive steps open to him in a country that retains vestiges of its secular democratic past. Yet he appears more vulnerable than for many a year both economically and politically.

        The Turkish lira has experienced a sharp depreciation, plunging to a record low of 42 to the US dollar, its most substantial decline since July 2023.
Simultaneously, the Istanbul stock market has been facing considerable losses. Moreover recent public opinion surveys show that Erdogan's approval ratings are in decline – overall 55%of Turkish adults hold an unfavorable opinion of him.

        Yet when it comes to elections, Erdogan has consistently demonstrated the ability to intimidate his opponents and rally his supporters.

        The first stage of his winning strategy is clearly in progress.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Turkey in trouble:  Erdogan's arrest of Imamoglu is the first move in a power grab", 31 March 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-848172

A brighter future for Syria’s Kurds?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 March 2025

It is now common practice to refer to Ahmad al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president.  Following the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad, Sharaa was appointed on January 29, 2025 by the Syrian General Command – the collective leadership of the rebel factions that had coordinated Assad’s overthrow.  Tasked with forming a temporary legislative council and overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, he was given a timeline of up to three years to rewrite the constitution, and up to four to hold elections.

Al-Sharaa is not a man to let grass grow under his feet.  He decided to start the process by producing an interim constitution.  On March 13 he signed a 44-article document, possibly pointing the way toward the new draft constitution when it finally emerges for consultation.

The interim document commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, and explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression.  It establishes a People's Committee to function as an interim parliament, and extends the timeline for organizing elections from four to five years.  

Despite the claimed good intentions of the new leadership, skepticism persists among religious and ethnic minorities about ​how inclusiv​e the new structure ​will be – fears possibly enhanced by the ruthlessness with which Sharaa crushed an insurgency launched on March 6 by local militias loyal to Assad.  Rights groups say that hundreds of civilians, mostly from the Alawite minority sect to which Assad belongs, were killed in retaliatory attacks.  Conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite adherents of Islam – which this was – can be truly brutal and bloody.

One minority group, however, has real cause to rejoice at al-Sharaa’s declared commitment to inclusivity in the new Syria – the Kurds.

Back in 2012, with Syria's civil war in its early stages, ​government forces ​were withdr​aw​n from ​facing ISIS in the north​ and deployed to counter the anti-Assad rebels​​.  Kurdish forces​ flooded in to fill the power vacuum and began attacking ​the ISIS caliphate.  By 2014-2015, with ISIS ​in retreat, the Kurds’ battle for Kobani drew US support. Soon after, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurdish troops, was established with American backing to complete the defeat of ISIS.  In 2019 the SDF captured the final ISIS stronghold in Baghouz.

Now the SDF governs a large, semi-autonomous region in north-east Syria called Rojava.   ​Most of its population, numbering up to 4 million, ​are of Kurdish origin​ ​though it also accommodates a variety of other sects.  It occupies ​some 25% of what was originally sovereign Syria.

On March 10, three days before Sharaa signed his new interim constitution, he signed a formal agreement with the SDF leader, General Mazloum Abdi.  It stipulates that the Kurdish-led SDF is to be integrated into the nation’s military forces. In addition the agreement calls for the integration of all “civil and military institutions” in north-eastern Syria.

That commitment has potentially vast implications.  The “civil institutions” in north-eastern Syria encompass the semi-autonomous Rojava region, and include oil and gas fields, border crossings and airports.  Syria’s new constitution, when it eventually appears, could propose a situation akin to that in Iraq, where a Kurdish-majority area has been recognized as a federal entity and accorded autonomy within the constitution.  

Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the Kurds of Iraq had pressed for autonomy, if not independence. In 1970, after years of conflict, the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders reached an Autonomy Agreement, but it was never fully implemented.  Following the 1991 Gulf War, a US-led coalition granted the Kurds virtual autonomy, and this status was ratified after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

In 2005, the new Iraqi constitution formally recognized the Kurdistan Region, which stretches across the north of the country, as an autonomous federal entity with its own government, parliament, and security forces (the Peshmerga). The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was granted authority over internal matters, while Baghdad retained control over foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy.

That something similar could eventually be offered to the Kurds of Syria becomes a real possibility with the agreement reached between al-Sharaa and the SDF.  Such an outcome would be a nightmare from the point of view of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey, a long-time supporter of the rebel movement that overthrew the Assad regime – the HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) – now has strong political influence with al-Sharaa, its leader.  Erdogan no doubt hopes to use it to control his perennial Kurdish problem by continuing to occupy the swaths of Syria that he has overrun.  But despite his dominant political position in post-Assad Syria, it is far from certain that he will be able to do so.

   Erdogan has consistently viewed the People's Protection Units (YPG), the dominant force in the SDF, as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group that has been a constant political irritant with its demand for Kurdish autonomy within Turkey.

Accordingly in 2016 Erdogan instituted Operation Euphrates Shield, capturing an area  in north Syria.  He followed this two years later with Operation Olive Branch during which he overran Afrin.  In 2019, after the US announced its withdrawal from parts of northern Syria, he launched Operation Peace Spring, establishing a so-called "safe zone" on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border.  He aimed to use it to resettle Syrian refugees currently in Turkey.

 Erdogan has more or less annexed all the areas he has overrun.  They are now governed by Turkey-backed local councils, use the Turkish lira as currency, and are heavily influenced by Turkish infrastructure projects, including schools, hospitals, and post offices.  It is doubtful if these could survive a new Syrian constitution.

Even more disturbing from Erdogan’s point of view, is that Rojava in northern Syrian abuts the KRG in northern Iraq, and that the idea of their amalgamating at some point in the future to form a Kurdistan Free State becomes a real possibility.

 The implications for Turkey of such a development would be profound, and present Erdogan with one of the biggest geopolitical challenges of his presidency. The most likely scenario would be for him to take a hardline military approach, but this could come at the cost of worsening Turkey’s relations with its allies and deepening domestic unrest.

Meanwhile it certainly looks as though Kurdish autonomy could be recognized and ratified in Syria’s new constitution.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "How can there be a brighter future for Syria's Kurds?", 24 March 2025
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-847213

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 March 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/29032025-a-brighter-future-for-syrias-kurds-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 March 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/a-brighter-future-for-syrias-kurds/

Egypt’s power play

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 March 2025

Egypt is currently playing a crucial role in two of the most significant efforts related to the Gaza conflict.

   As a mediator, along with the US and Qatar, of the arms-length discussions between Israel and Hamas, Egypt has hosted many rounds of ceasefire and prisoner exchange negotiations.  Now, strengthened by its central role in the ceasefire talks, it has master-minded a detailed $53 billion reconstruction initiative for Gaza, which has received strong backing from Arab nations, western governments and the UN.  It has provided a credible alternative to US President Trump’s “Riviera of the Mediterranean” concept, which proposed the displacement of most of Gaza’s Palestinian population into neighboring Arab states.

In late 2023, Egypt did allow the immigration into Egypt, via the Rafah crossing, of a limited number of foreign nationals, dual citizens, and wounded Palestinians.  Subsequently, however, it has strongly opposed extending this program, holding firmly to the belief that Gazan citizens should not be displaced from their homeland.  Early in February Israel accused Egypt of expanding its military presence near the border, perhaps to guard against an influx of refugees from Gaza.  Egypt said its soldiers were there to fight extremists, who are certainly active in the Sinai peninsula.

Total rejection of the idea of displacing large numbers of Gazan citizens lies at the heart of Egypt’s proposals for post-war Gaza. Egypt is shaping the region’s response to the crisis and positioning itself at the forefront of regional diplomacy, making it a central actor in shaping the future of Gaza and broader Middle East stability.

Egypt’s initiative would carry real conviction if it emanated from an economically flourishing nation state, but Egypt is not flying high on the domestic front.  It is one of the world's most indebted emerging markets. Servicing its debts, especially to the IMF and Gulf states arising from previous financial rescue packages, is a major burden. 

As a condition of accepting these loans, Egypt's president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was obliged to restrict public spending and impose heavier taxes. This resulted in soaring inflation and the persistent depreciation of Egypt’s currency.  This, at least, Sisi has been attempting, with some success, to remedy.

Egypt’s annual inflation rate in 2020 was about 5.4%.  By 2023 it had surged to some 34%, and in September 2024 it peaked at 38%, plunging large parts of the population into real penury.  Since then it has been brought under control, and is now declining.   A Reuters poll projects that the inflation rate in February will have fallen to 14.5% - much too high for comfort, but on the correct trajectory.

As for the Egyptian pound, in 2022 its trading rate was about E£16 to the dollar.  In 2023 it traded at around E£31.  By the end of 2024 the Egyptian pound had devalued to E£50.64 per US dollar.

However Sisi is succeeding in reversing the downward economic spiral.  As of March 2025, Egypt's economic indicators show definite signs of improvement. Its GDP growth rate recorded 3.5% in the first quarter of the fiscal year 2024/2025, reflecting the positive impact of economic reform policies.  Looking ahead, the ratings organization Moody's Analytics forecasts a 5% growth for Egypt's economy by the fiscal year 2025/2026, with average inflation expected to fall to 16% in the next fiscal year, before further decreasing to 13% by 2026.

Sisi's political standing at home, at a particularly low ebb during the worst of the economic hardship, has not yet shown much sign of improvement.  Egypt’s enhanced international standing, following from acceptance by the Arab world and the UN of its plan for Gaza’s future, may start to turn the popularity ratings in Sisi’s favor.

 What could effect a sea change in both Sisi’s and Egypt’s standing would be for its economic development program, Egypt’s Vision 2030, to achieve some of its goals in the next five years.

 Saudi Vision 2030, the ambitious program to revolutionize Saudi Arabia economically and socially, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has received a fair degree of publicity.  Egypt’s Vision 2030, about which much less has appeared in the media, is no pale copy.  On the contrary, it was launched in February 2016, two months before MBS announced his plan for Saudi Arabia.

 Egypt's Vision 2030 is a long-term economic development program aimed at achieving sustainable growth and improving the country's global competitiveness. It focuses on key areas such as economic diversification, infrastructure development, education, healthcare, and environmental sustainability. The plan aligns with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and aims to position Egypt as a leading economy in the region by enhancing investment and digital transformation.

Despite Egypt’s economic difficulties in recent years, the program has achieved a degree of success  With a population of 115 million, Egypt has been capitalizing on its skilled workforce, prime location, and rich resources to strengthen its position as a key economic hub within Africa.

A key component of Vision 2030 is the Digital Egypt strategy, focusing on fostering artificial intelligence and digital innovation.  In 2024 Egypt’s tech sector recorded a 16.8% year-on-year growth. 

Central to the program is Egypt’s construction sector, growing at an annual rate of 7.4%.  Vision 2030 has driven several ambitious projects, including New Alamein City,

the high-speed rail and urban railway networks, critical seaport and road infrastructure, and the $45 billion New Administrative Capital.  This massive urban development project, intended to house some 6.5 million people eventually, is designed to ease congestion in Cairo and serve as the country’s new government and financial hub.  Estimated to cost over $58 billion, it was started in 2015. Government offices began to relocate there in 2024, while the designated business district, which contains Africa’s tallest skyscraper, the Iconic Tower, is growing rapidly.  A new rail and monorail system connects it to Cairo, and an international airport is under construction.

Vision 2030 envisages 42% of Egypt’s energy coming from renewable sources by 2030.  Prioritizing wind, solar, and green hydrogen production, the country is expanding its renewable capacity to 45,000 megawatts from projects already under construction.

In 2024, Egypt attracted 15.7 million tourists, breaking its own record for the second consecutive year. Sherif Fathy, Minister of Tourism & Antiquities, projects that Egypt is on track to reach 30 million tourists by 2030.

With its own multi-million development program showing every sign of succeeding, Egypt is particularly well placed to master-mind an international effort to reconstruct Gaza.  Its plan has been widely endorsed.  Will that be enough to see it launched?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Egypt's Gaza strategy: Ceasefire talks and a bold reconstruction plan", 18 March 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-846247

Published in Eurasia Review, 21 March 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/21032025-egypts-power-play-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 27 March 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/egypts-power-play/

Gaza's future

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 March 2025

         The Arab League held a summit in Cairo on March 4 with the sole intention of considering a comprehensive plan for Gaza’s future, master-minded by Egypt.  Costed at some $53bn, it focuses in a 112-page document on emergency relief, rebuilding shattered infrastructure and long-term economic development.  The conference endorsed the plan, as far as it went.  The later stages will require more detailed consideration.                      

It was on February 4 that US President Donald Trump announced his proposal to turn the Gaza Strip into a US-run “Riviera of the Middle East”, having first evacuated the population to any nearby Arab states willing to accept a total of some 2 million people. 

The Arab world, as well as much of the rest of the globe, greeted the idea with a mixture of astonishment and ridicule.  Some commentators, claiming to know Trump’s methods, maintained that he had deliberately used shock tactics to goad the Arab world into playing a more active role in considering Gaza’s future and how to achieve it.

If this was indeed the method in Trump’s madness, it produced results.  A couple of weeks later, on February 17, news media worldwide reported that Egypt was preparing an alternative to Trump’s proposal in which evacuating the territory and relocating the Gazan population would play no part.

In the event the Egyptian proposal called for establishing “secure areas” within Gaza, where Palestinians can live temporarily while Egyptian and international construction firms reconstitute the Strip’s infrastructure.  More than two dozen Egyptian and international firms would take part, and the reconstruction would provide tens of thousands of jobs for Gaza’s population.

Winding up the summit on March 4 Egypt’s President Abdel el-Sisi welcomed “the consensus among the Arab countries to support the reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip, which allows the Palestinian people to stay on their land without displacement.”

In a social media post after the conference, Sisi said he looked forward to working with Trump, other Arab nations and the international community “to adopt a plan that aims for a comprehensive and just settlement of the Palestinian Issue, ends the root causes of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, guarantees the security and stability of the peoples of the region and establishes the Palestinian State.”

The Egyptian plan outlines a three-phase process taking five years, starting with a six-month "early recovery period" involving the establishment of "safe zones".  Some 1.5 million displaced Gazans would be moved into 200,000 prefabricated housing units and 60,000 repaired homes. This stage is estimated to cost some $3bn

The second phase, lasting two years and costing $20bn, would see housing and utilities rebuilt.  During the third phase, which would take another two years, an airport, two seaports and an industrial zone would be built at a cost of $30bn.

As for the Strip’s governance, a key aspect of this plan is the establishment of a temporary Governance Assistance Mission from which Hamas would be excluded.  This interim body would oversee humanitarian aid and initiate reconstruction efforts until a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) can assume control. Despite this exclusion, Hamas has publicly welcomed the Egyptian plan as signaling strong Arab alignment with the Palestinian cause.

Arab League chief Ahmed Aboul Gheit said the summit’s final communique calls on the UN Security Council to deploy an international peacekeeping force in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.  In addition, the communique said Egypt will host an international conference in cooperation with the UN to agree on Gaza’s reconstruction.

Funding will probably require investment from oil-rich Gulf governments including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. A trust fund, overseen by the World Bank, will be established to handle pledges and donor-provided funds.

A final stage, still open for Arab discussion and refinement, would start the process of creating a sovereign Palestinian state.  Establishing inter-connectivity between the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip would be an early priority.  In tackling this conundrum the planners need look no further than Trump’s own comprehensive plan, "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People", issued on 28 January 2020.

The result of years of intensive diplomatic effort by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, the plan envisaged the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank, excluding the settlements, plus a Gaza greatly expanded by a swath of Israeli territory south of the Strip.  All Palestinian occupied territories would be made contiguous by way of a network of highways and a road tunnel linking the West Bank to Gaza.  The published plan contained maps illustrating how all enclaves of a sovereign Palestine could be inter-connected.

Trump’s plan was no sooner unveiled than it was vehemently rejected by Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and other voices in the Arab world.  But not universally.  Significantly, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt seemed prepared to give the plan a fair hearing.

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "Egypt recognizes the importance of considering the US administration's initiative from the perspective of the importance of achieving the resolution of the Palestinian issue, thus restoring to the Palestinian people their full legitimate rights…”

            Egypt’s new plan for Gaza’s future, while carrying the whole-hearted approval of the Arab League, has not fared so well in US and Israeli circles.  The AP news agency reported that White House National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes has dismissed the Egyptian proposal as unworkable.

“The current proposal does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable,” said Hughes on March 4, “and residents cannot humanely live in a territory covered in debris and unexploded ordnance. President Trump stands by his vision to rebuild Gaza free from Hamas. We look forward to further talks to bring peace and prosperity to the region.”

A spokesperson for Israel’s foreign ministry, Oren Marmorstein, posted on X that the Egyptian plan “fails to address the realities of the situation”. The plan, he said, remains “rooted in outdated perspectives.”

Nevertheless Egypt’s plan garnered backing from the UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, who attended the Arab summit. 

“I welcome and strongly endorse the Arab-led initiative to mobilize support for Gaza’s reconstruction,” he said. “The UN stands ready to fully cooperate in this endeavor.”

Initial knee-jerk reactions by US and Israeli spokesmen to the Arab-endorsed plan may yet be modified, especially as the White House announced on March 5 that the US was engaged in direct talks with Hamas.  The door is open for discussion and negotiation.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in Jerusalem Post online titled:"Egypt or Donald Trump - whose plan for Gaza's future is better?"
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-845461

Implementing Phase Two

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 March 2025

 Will the Gaza ceasefire deal survive its first phase? That was the unanswerable question hanging over the formal end of phase one on March 2 and the scheduled start of phase two.

Some commentators believe that Israel simply wants to extend phase one for the time being. They point out that, under the terms of the agreement, Israel was supposed to begin withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor – the strip of land on the Gaza side of the border with Egypt – on the last day of the first phase and complete their evacuation within eight days. But on February 27 an Israeli official told the media that to prevent weapons smuggling, the IDF will be remaining in position.

That decision may have been in reaction to an announcement by Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem on February 18. He suddenly declared that Hamas was interested in speeding up the hostage release process – but in return for a major concession.

Hamas, he said, had submitted a new proposal to the mediators offering to release all the remaining hostages in phase two. The quid pro quo, said Qassem, would be for Israel to agree to an immediate permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor.

This “offer” would place Hamas in a much stronger position to secure its long-term intention of remaining the ruling power in Gaza.

On February 19, Rami Igra, former head of the Mossad’s Prisoners and Missing Persons Division, warned in a radio interview that Hamas is seeking to establish a Hezbollah-style rule in Gaza. Using the PA as a front, Hamas aims to retain effective control; to be, in effect, “the power behind the throne.

By infiltrating the government in Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to build itself into a formidable power bloc, rivaling the state itself and its institutions.

“They want to continue ruling Gaza,” said Igra. “They will do everything to make that happen.”

Israel is unlikely to be wooed into a premature withdrawal from Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said repeatedly that the IDF will not evacuate the Strip completely until it is clear that Hamas’s military and political capabilities have been so degraded that it can no longer rearm or govern Gaza.

The mediators – the US, Egypt, and Qatar – will soon have to grapple with the problem of how Gaza is to be governed when the war ends – and get both sides to agree about it.
There is no support from the Arab world for Hamas to stay in control. Some Arab states wish to see neither Hamas nor the PA controlling a post-war Gaza; some Arab commentators have favored a role for a perhaps reformed PA.

Trump’s proposal for the US to take over the Gaza Strip and evacuate the population generated instant rejection from the Arab world. In reaction, some Arab nations initiated substantive discussions aimed at developing a comprehensive plan for Gaza’s future governance and reconstruction, but based on upholding the rights of the Gazan population. Some speculate that it was Trump’s intention from the start to goad the Arab world into considering Gaza’s future and how to achieve it.

It is significant that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio seems far from wedded to Trump’s vision of Gaza’s future. On February 13, he said on an American radio show “If the Arab countries have a better plan, then that’s great.”

On February 20, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit in Riyadh, bringing together leaders from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its primary purpose was to consider Egypt’s counter-proposal to Trump’s suggested solution.

After intensive diplomatic activity, Egypt presented a comprehensive three-phase reconstruction plan for Gaza, and has apparently garnered support from European nations, including France and Germany, as well as regional Arab countries. It favors the creation of “secure areas” within Gaza to house displaced residents temporarily as essential infrastructure is rebuilt.

A significant aspect of the proposal is the establishment of a new Palestinian administration in Gaza, distinct from both Hamas and the current PA, to oversee the reconstruction efforts. A police force composed of former PA officers would be established. Egypt’s plan maintains that Hamas has agreed to a governance structure that excludes its participation. Financial backing for the reconstruction, estimated at $53 billion, is expected to come from the oil-rich Gulf states.

Some, but not all, of the proposals in Egypt’s plan received instant endorsement from the conference participants. The leaders reached a consensus on the necessity of sidelining Hamas, but some apparently favored reinstating the authority of the PA in Gaza during the reconstruction phase.

A follow-up summit, scheduled for March 4 in Cairo, is aimed at finalizing a unified Arab plan for Gaza’s reconstruction, crucially reaffirming opposition to any forced displacement of its population.

Since Egypt, along with Qatar and the US, is acting as a mediator in the indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas over the Gaza ceasefire deal, the Arab “day after” plan being constructed under Egypt’s leadership will probably be put to both sides in due course.
How Israel will react is far from clear. During a joint press conference with Rubio on February 16, Netanyahu said: “We have a shared strategy, which cannot always be detailed to the public – including when the gates of hell will open. And they will open if all our hostages are not returned, every last one of them.”

Two days later, following a meeting of Israel’s Security Council, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar told reporters: “We need a total demilitarization of Gaza and no presence of the Palestinian Authority.”

So it seems clear that, as part of phase two, if it eventually comes into effect, Israel will be demanding the release of all hostages in addition to the dismantling of the Hamas military and, possibly, the expulsion of the Hamas leadership from Gaza. Only then would Israel consider withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor.

Hamas is not likely to accept these demands. However, while keeping its true long-term aims under wraps, Hamas might go along with the Egyptian proposals, especially if they emerge as a unified Arab plan.

All in all, the auguries for a successful outcome to phase two – even if negotiations get under way – are not good.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The challenges of implementing phase two of ceasefire, hostage deal", 3 March 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-844364

Published in Eurasia Review, 7 March 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/07032025-implementing-phase-two-oped/ 

Published in the MPC Journal,

https://mpc-journal.org/implementing-phase-two/

Leaving Lebanon

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 February 2025

            The unhappy truth is that, despite Hezbollah having received a military thrashing at the hands of the IDF, the organization still possesses considerable political power within Lebanon. On February 7, during a visit to Beirut, US deputy Middle East envoy, Morgan Ortagus, highlighting concerns over the group's influence and activities, stated that the US had set a "red line" against Hezbollah's inclusion in Lebanon's forthcoming government. Speaking after a meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, she emphasized the US view that Hezbollah should not be part of the new administration in any form.

            Aoun, beset by intense internal political pressure, simply ignored the US’s wishes.  The very next day Lebanon’s prime minister, Nawaf Salam, announced a 24-member cabinet that indeed includes representatives from the political alliance known as the “Shia duo” – that is Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement. Together, they have secured four ministerial portfolios in the new government, and are negotiating for a potential fifth.

According to the terms of the November 2024 Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire agreement, the IDF was required to have withdrawn completely from southern Lebanon by January 26.  But by then Hezbollah forces were to have moved out of the region between the Litani river and the so-called Blue Line – that is, the boundary between Lebanon and Israel. – and been replaced by the Lebanese army.

Achieving this desirable state of affairs, an objective first set out in UN Resolution 1701 back in 2006, has been frustrated for nearly 20 years by a combination of Hezbollah’s growing dominance within Lebanon, and the weakness of successive Lebanese governments in countering it. In the event Hezbollah continued to operate in the region, maintaining weapons stockpiles and military infrastructure. 

Now, while the Lebanese army has made significant strides in deploying south of the Litani, it seems clear that Hezbollah has still not fully withdrawn from the area. It was this that led Israel to request an extension to the agreed withdrawal deadline.

The ceasefire agreement is overseen by a supervisory committee under the chairmanship of the US, additionally comprised of representatives from the UK, France and Germany.  This committee is responsible for monitoring compliance and assisting in the enforcement of the agreement's terms.

Acceding to Israel’s request, the committee agreed to extend the IDF withdrawal deadline to February 18.  A few days before the 18th, in view of Hezbollah’s continued military presence south of the Litani, Israel asked to remain in five posts in the south for a further 10 days.  Shortly afterward, Israel’s public broadcaster KAN reported that the US, without specifying a new deadline, had granted Israeli troops permission to stay "in several locations" in Lebanon beyond February 18.

Meanwhile it seems that France’s primary concern is to ensure that Israeli forces quit Lebanon as soon as possible.  On February 13 French foreign minister Jean-Noel Barrot announced a proposal that would involve UN peacekeepers replacing Israeli forces at key points in order to ensure that the IDF leaves Lebanon by the deadline.

"It is now up to us,” said Barrrot, “ to convince the Israelis that this solution is likely to allow a complete and final withdrawal."

 Unfortunately Israel’s confidence in the UN’s peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) is at a low ebb after 47 years of its total inability to control Hezbollah.  Israel cannot endorse a situation which leaves Hezbollah forces still controlling areas of south Lebanon, and in a position to recommence its bombardment of northern Israel.  This would simply perpetuate the situation that brought Israeli forces over the border in the first place.

It is bad enough that Hezbollah has reasserted its political power within Lebanon’s government, but ​it is demanding a return to its blatant and malign control over Beirut’s Rafic Hariri airport.  For a long period Hezbollah personnel treated the airport like a private domain​.  The organization was ​accused of having operatives embedded within airport security and customs, allowing them to oversee and control the movement of goods and personnel. ​Ignoring continual allegations of corruption​ and security risks​, Hezbollah was able to smuggle weapons, drugs, and cash through the airport at will, bypassing official customs inspections.

Hezbollah is in desperate need of Iranian weapons to restock its depleted military supplies.  On February 14 Israel informed the Lebanese government that Iran was about to dispatch a civil aircraft to Beirut loaded with military equipment and weaponry.  In an effort to assert its authority, the Lebanese government barred that flight from landing in Beirut, Iran and in addition  imposed a ban on the import of Iranian military equipment and supplies.   

In response, in an overt challenge to the government, Hezbollah began organizing scenes of public disorder in Beirut.  On February 15 Reuters reported that the Lebanese army used tear gas to disperse Hezbollah supporters protesting at Beirut airport.

In response to the blocked flight, Iran barred Lebanese planes from repatriating citizens stranded in Iran, escalating tensions between the two countries.  Iranian officials have called for constructive talks with Lebanon to resolve the situation, while also condemning alleged Israeli threats against an Iranian passenger plane as violations of international law.

While Hezbollah retains significant military and political power in Lebanon, as it appears to do, any formal return to their homes by the dispersed inhabitants of the Israel-Lebanon border region stays on hold.  In December 2024 the Israeli government extended the evacuation period for the approximately 60,000 northern residents by an additional three months, pushing the potential return date to March.

The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire in December 2024 led to some cautious optimism among the citizens of the north, and some, particularly from communities like Kibbutz Manara and Kibbutz Metula made the return journey.  Unfortunately, many found their properties extensively damaged or destroyed.  Some reconstruction has started, but it is expected to take years and cost a great deal.  Rebuilding Kibbutz Manara alone is estimated to cost at least NIS 150 million (approximately $40 million)

Many of the evacuated families, fearing a renewal of the violence, are reluctant to return. Surveys indicate that nearly half of the displaced families are reluctant to go back under current circumstances.

          With the fears and concerns of the displaced inhabitants of the north in mind, Israel is certainly right to exercise the utmost caution before deciding it is safe to leave Lebanon for good.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Israel is right to be cautious about Lebanon withdrawal", 24 February 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-843417

UK-Israel relations in Trump’s second term

 Published in the issue of the Jerusalem Report dated 3 March 2025

            Rather like Marley’s ghost in Charles Dickens’s “A Christmas Carol”, Britain’s Labour government is dragging behind it a long, heavy chain to which is attached a great collection of anti-Israel initiatives.    It’s a cumbersome burden to explain away as Donald Trump, a staunch friend of Israel, enters on his second term as US President.

            His first term more or less coincided with the descent of the Labour party into unprecedented anti-Israel, and indeed anti-Jewish, bias under the leadership of extreme left-winger Jeremy Corbyn.  Since Sir Keir Starmer, now the UK’s prime minister, was a leading light in Corbyn’s shadow Cabinet throughout the period, Trump must have had strong reservations about him from the start.

It was in September 2015 that the Labour party voted Corbyn as its leader. His pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel stance (he once notoriously called Hamas and Hezbollah his “friends”) led to charges of antisemitism and to resignations from the party.

  Finally in May 2019 the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a body legally charged with enforcing the UK’s equality and non-discrimination laws, launched an unprecedented investigation into whether Labour had "unlawfully discriminated against, harassed or victimized people because they are Jewish."

Sir Keir Starmer took over the leadership of the Labour party in April 2020, pledged to clean it up from the stigma of antisemitism.  However the EHRC In its report, published in October 2020, determined that the Labour party had indeed been "responsible for unlawful acts of harassment and discrimination", and required it to draft a clean-up action plan.  

Immediately after the EHRC issued its report,  Corbyn issued his response, asserting that antisemitism within Labour had been “dramatically overstated for political reasons”.  A  storm of media comment resulted in Starmer suspending him from the party.   Corbyn became a free-floating MP (Member of Parliament), and it was still as an independent that he fought and won his seat in the general election of July 2024. 

            Meanwhile Starmer rehabilitated himself with the UK Jewish community, and MPs who had resigned returned to the fold.  In his four years as Leader of the Opposition Starmer succeeded so well, and the country became so disillusioned with the Conservative government, that he won an overwhelming victory in the general election of July 2024. 

            It was at that point that a new tranche of anti-Israel problems not likely to sit well with Trump began to emerge.

One of Starmer’s first appointments to the new Labour government was of his longstanding friend and former legal colleague, Richard Hermer.  Because Hermer was not an MP, Starmer raised him to the peerage.  He thus became a member of the House of Lords, and it was as Lord Hermer that he took up the post of Attorney General.

Hermer had made his reputation as a lawyer by defending human rights, sometimes in controversial causes.  Early in February 2025 a leading UK newspaper revealed that back in 2011 Hermer had helped write a handbook whose purpose was to “prove useful in the fight against Israeli war crimes, occupation and apartheid.”  The text, entitled Corporate Complicity in Israel’s Occupation, drew together contributions from pro-Palestinian lawyers and academics including Hermer.

Hermer’s chapter set out ways in which “Palestinian victims” could use UK courts to sue companies that sold arms to Israel.  He writes critically of British “export licenses for weapons used by Israel in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.”

There is therefore little cause for surprise that in September 2024, on Hermer’s advice, the UK government suspended 30 out of approximately 350 arms export licenses to Israel. This decision was nominally justified by concerns that UK-supplied arms could be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law.  This explanation, plainly, took it for granted that Israel – one of the UK’s closest allies – was believed likely to commit such crimes.

The US, of course, not only maintained but enhanced its sale of arms to Israel, and on February 4 it was announced that the Trump  administration had sought congressional approval to transfer nearly $1 billion in bombs and military equipment to Israel.

Hermer was also vocal in urging the Government to comply with the International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and Yoav Gallant, its then defense minister.  It was duly made clear that if either Israeli leader were to set foot in the UK, they would run the risk of being arrested. 

Trump, on the other hand, immediately condemned the ICC for issuing the warrants, and Washington is reported to be preparing sanctions to be issued against the ICC and its chief prosecutor.

In response to widespread criticism of Hermer for these and other controversial aspects of his career and conduct in office, a groundswell of feeling against him is rising in the media, and there has been a call for his resignation.  So far, Starmer has expressed his full support for his Attorney General.  A government spokesman said: “The UK continues to support Israel’s right to self-defense in accordance with international law.  The Attorney General is the Government’s chief legal adviser and provides impartial legal advice.”

However Starmer has adopted other positions in regard to Israel and the Middle East not calculated to endear himself to Trump.  For example, the Labour government has expressed strong support for UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees), despite the fact that Israel has barred them from operating from within Israeli sovereign territory.  Following Hamas’s bloodthirsty incursion into Israel on October 7, 2023, when its followers massacred some 1200 people and took 240 hostage, evidence emerged of the actual involvement of Hamas officials in the pogrom.  Following the revelation the UK’s then-Conservative government suspended its funding.  On taking office, Starmer’s government immediately resumed UK payments to UNRWA.

The US also stopped funding UNRWA at the time, and on February 4 it emerged that Trump is to maintain the suspension and, moreover, to stop US engagement with the UN Human Rights Council.   There seems little meeting of minds between the UK and the US on that issue.

Meanwhile Starmer is anxious to strengthen the UK’s economic and trade relations with the US during Trump's second term.   He would like to side-step any punitive US tariffs, like those imposed on China, still hanging over the heads of Canada and Mexico, and threatened against the EU.   Starmer’s aim is to secure a major deal with the US that supports economic growth, focusing on areas such as defense, security, trade, crime, and migration.  

From time to time Trump makes remarks indicating that he cherishes a soft spot for the UK, but he is above all things a deal-maker, and is likely to make certain demands in exchange for any favorable trade arrangement with the UK.  He may, for example, demand that the UK aligns more closely with US foreign policy, particularly concerning relations with Israel. He could pressure the UK to lift the suspension of arms export licenses to Israel, emphasizing the importance of supporting a key ally in the Middle East.  He might expect the UK to withdraw support for ICC investigations targeting Israeli officials, or he could urge the UK to align with his critical stance on UNRWA.

 Starmer, saddled with his less than solid record in support of Israel, may find the coming months something of a nightmare.

Published in the Jerusalem Report and the Jerusalem Post online, 2 March 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-843563

Will Hamas evade justice?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 17 February 2025

Regardless of how the Gaza conflict is resolved – through the ceasefire, or by way of some version of President Donald Trump’s more radical suggestions – a fundamental question has yet to be answered.  Are the remaining Hamas leaders, and those Hamas personnel who participated in the murderous outrage on October 7, 2023, to get away with their monstrous crimes or will they be brought to justice?          

On February 6 Trump signed an executive order imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its leaders.  The order states that the ICC “has engaged in illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America and our close ally Israel,” in particular by issuing arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu and former minister of defense Yoav Gallant.

Justifiable though Trump is in punishing the ICC for acting with dubious legality, it would have been equally valid for him to reprimand the court for actions that it has not taken.

 In particular the ICC seems to have no viable plan in existence, or proposed, to bring to justice those Hamas leaders who conceived, and the Hamas personnel who carried out, the slaughter of 1200 civilians and the seizure of 250 people as hostages on October 7.  The nearest to any acknowledgment that such a step is necessary was the ridiculous issue by the ICC on November 21, 2024, of an international arrest warrant against the Hamas leader Mohammed Deif, who was presumed dead at the time it was issued, and has subsequently been confirmed so.  The court was apparently unable to unearth any living Hamas figure with responsibility for the pogrom and its consequences.   

 It may be that the court has no jurisdiction over what actually took place on Israeli soil.  But in respect of planning and launching an armed incursion into Israel, and of bringing back hostages to Gaza (considered by the court to be part of the non-existent State of Palestine), they most certainly do.

  Subsequently the ICC has taken no steps of any sort to bring Hamas leaders or personnel to account.  Meanwhile, free from any threat of judicial action, Hamas has continued to function as the de facto governing body in Gaza, using its Israeli hostages, seized in clear violation of international law, as bargaining chips to recover hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from incarceration in Israel.  

There is no secret about the individuals who now lead Hamas.  Following the death of Yahya Sinwar in October 2024, Hamas is now headed by a temporary five-member council comprised of Khaled Mashaal, Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, and Muhammad Ismail Darwish, plus an unnamed – if not unknown – senior member.

Mashaal, who previously led Hamas from 1996 to 2017, is currently overseeing the organization's international activities. He is believed still to be based in Qatar, despite some earlier reports that he had been expelled.

Within Gaza, Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya Sinwar’s younger brother, has assumed a significant leadership role and has been actively involved in rebuilding Hamas's military capabilities.

   These leaders are guilty of war crimes, as are the bloodthirsty Hamas operatives who actually carried out the October 7 pogrom.  War crimes under the 1949 Geneva Conventions include the murder and torture of civilians, and taking hostages.  Crimes the ICC can prosecute are set out in the treaty that established the court in 1998 (the Rome Statute of the ICC).  They include taking hostages, targeting civilians, and inhumane treatment.

    The Rome Statute also lays down quite clearly the court’s purpose.  The ICC was established to prosecute individuals (not states) for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. In addition it was charged with ensuring that serious crimes do not go unpunished.

  There is a near-universal consensus that on October 7, 2023 the Hamas organization carried into effect long-planned war crimes including the murder of civilians and taking hostages.  It is not unreasonable to ask how the ICC proposes to exercise its remit to ensure that the serious crimes committed by Hamas on that day do not go unpunished.  They have the names of the surviving leaders, and as a start they have the names of the nine staff dismissed by UNRWA  for having personally participated in the massacre of civilians and the taking and incarcerating of hostages.  

 No doubt Hamas leaders consider themselves, their organization and its operatives above international law, and feel no obligation to adhere to the rules of decency and humanity embedded in it and accepted by the civilized world.  They are wrong.  There is a positive obligation placed on the ICC to “ensure that serious crimes do not go unpunished.”  The requirement does not exclude members of terrorist-designated organizations like Hamas.

There are legal avenues open to the court to bring Hamas leaders and personnel to justice. For example, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could refer named Hamas personnel to the ICC, as it has done in past cases like Sudan and Libya. Such a move could be initiated by the US, but of course might be vetoed by other permanent members.  But would it be?  Would permanent UNSC members like Russia or China  wish to be seen supporting Hamas? This is a step the US might consider.

Another route might be a referral to the court by any ICC member state, urging an investigation specifically into Hamas, with a view to eventual prosecution. Since Palestine is recognized as a member of the ICC, the court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory.  The bringing into Gaza of captured people, depriving them of their liberty, and holding them hostage for extended periods seems, on the face of it, an obvious crime of international proportions.  France, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands – to name but four of the 120 states that are members of the ICC – could refer the case of Hamas to the court.  Perhaps one of them acting alone, or perhaps several acting jointly, or maybe some other state concerned with genuine international justice, might consider doing so.

In addition the ICC Prosecutor, Karim Khan, instead of seeking some bizarre equivalence between terrorism and a democratic state’s reaction to it, could initiate an investigation into Hamas’s potential war crimes with a view to issuing arrest warrants and prosecution.  While Israel is not an ICC member, it could provide evidence and intelligence to support ICC prosecutions.

The plain fact is that, if no action is initiated from some source or other, Hamas leaders and those of its adherents who carried out monstrous crimes on October 7 will go scot-free. Admittedly the well-established anti-Israel and antisemitic element within the UN and its organs might prove too strong to recommend action aimed at bringing Hamas criminals to justice via the ICC.  Even so, international legal proceedings against Hamas remain possible in a number of ways.

Some countries like Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands, allow their courts to prosecute individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity even if they were committed abroad.  Such prosecutions depend, of course, on the individuals concerned traveling to these countries and being apprehended there.  Israel undoubtedly holds a list of known and suspected persons involved in the October 7 pogrom.  That list should be made publicly available as soon as possible.

Terrorists captured by Israel could well be prosecuted under Israeli law for war crimes. As for Hamas leaders, if any were to be run to earth by Israel, they would doubtless receive the form of summary justice already meted out to a number of their partners in crime.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Hamas could evade justice if the ICC refuses to take action", 17 February 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-842401