One way to square the two-state circle

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2024:

            Christmas and the New Year celebrations had come and gone, and still the phone lines between US President Joe Biden and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, remained ominously  silent.  Very nearly a full month without contact had elapsed when, on January 19, Biden picked up the White House phone and asked to speak with the Israeli prime minister.

            The call was occasioned by remarks made by Netanyahu the day before, in which he stated, perhaps more clearly than ever before, his rooted opposition to the US’s vision of the post-war future for Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied territories.  Ever since the Israel-Hamas war started Washington had made it clear that it wished to see a post-war Gaza returned to the governance of a reformed and strengthened Palestinian Authority, as a first step toward establishing a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian dispute. This vision was subsequently reiterated time and again by US officials from Secretary of State Anthony Blinken down.

            After speaking with the president, Netanyahu gave a televised news conference and said that he had made it clear that Israel "must have security control over all the territory west of the Jordan…This is a necessary condition, and it conflicts with the idea of [Palestinian] sovereignty."

            For his part Biden, in discussing the conversation later that day at a conference of US mayors in Washington, demonstrated how easy it is for two people to carry away entirely different understandings of a conversation between them.  Biden told reporters he believed that Netanyahu would support Palestinian statehood, particularly if that state was a demilitarized one.  “I think we will be able to work something out,” he told reporters.

In its formal report of the discussion, the White House said, “The president also discussed his vision for a more durable peace and security for Israel fully integrated within the region, and a two-state solution with Israel’s security guaranteed.”

Netanyahu was swift to disabuse him.  On the day following their phone conversation, he posted on X, formerly Twitter: ““I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of the Jordan – and this runs contrary to a Palestinian state.”

            A riposte to that last assertion is available.  It is to be found in the one message from Biden that got lost in the welter of claim and counter-claim – a quiet throwaway remark, reported in the media but not picked up: “There are a number of types of two-state solutions.”

   What can Biden have meant by that remark?

            Perhaps he had in mind the suggestion of Israel’s then President, Reuven Rivlin, in a newspaper interview on August 7, 2015.  An Israeli-Palestinian confederation, said Rivlin, might be the best means of settling the perennial Middle East conflict.  According to a recording of the interview, Rivlin also said that a future confederation could feature two parliaments and two constitutions, but only one army — the Israel Defense Forces.

            Rivlin might have been referring back to an article by Israeli elder statesman, Yossi Beilin, in the New York Times three months earlier, titled: “Confederation is the Key to Mideast Peace.”

“This idea isn’t new,” wrote Beilin. “For a brief time in the 1990s, it animated some of my earliest discussions about peace with a spokesman whom Palestinians revered, Faisal al-Husseini. But that was before the Oslo Accords of 1993…In hindsight, it is clear that we should have been looking all along at confederation – cohabitation, not divorce.”

What is a confederation?  It is a form of government in which constituent sovereign states maintain their independence while merging certain aspects of administration, such as security, defense, economic or administrative matters.  A good example is the confederation formed by the seceding states during the American Civil War.  In a federation on the other hand, such as the modern United States, the constituent parts may be fiercely independent, but they are not sovereign, and the emphasis is on the supremacy of the central government. 

The vision of achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians through the mechanism of a confederation has its passionate supporters. Some conceive it as including Jordan which, after all, was originally within the British Mandate.  In 2018, when the Trump peace proposals were being drawn up, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was asked his views on the idea. He is on record as favoring a three-way confederation of Jordan, Israel and a sovereign Palestine.  The idea of a three-state confederation covering the whole of what was originally Mandate Palestine might open a hitherto unexplored path leading away from unending Israel-Palestinian discord.

       A fundamental issue militates against the classic two-state solution. Hamas is massively popular among the Palestinian population, and its central message – that the whole of what had been Mandate Palestine is rightfully the property of Palestinian Arabs – leaves little room for compromise. In the most recent poll of Palestinian opinion, no less that 64% of those questioned were opposed to a two-state solution. It would mean abandoning any hope of gaining control of the area occupied by Israel.

          It will require an Arab consensus – perhaps the Arab League, perhaps an alliance of the Abraham Accord states – to bring the Palestinian leadership to discuss an accommodation which recognizes Israel’s legitimate place in the Middle East. Given Jordan’s collaboration, a post-war conference could be dedicated to establishing a sovereign state of Palestine, but only within the framework of a new three-state confederation of Jordan, Israel and Palestine. This new legal entity – the Jordan, Israel and Palestine Confederation – could be established simultaneously with the state of Palestine.

          Dedicated to defending itself and its constituent sovereign states, it would undertake to cooperate in the fields of commerce, infrastructure and economic development. There would be no need for a sovereign Palestine to be a militarized state.  Defense of the confederation would be undertaken by the IDF in collaboration with Jordan’s military.

Such a solution, based on an Arab-wide consensus, could absorb Palestinian extremist objections, making it abundantly clear that any subsequent armed opposition, from whatever source, would be crushed by the combined defense forces of the confederation.  

A confederation could set as its objective the transformation of the region within, say, ten years, into a thriving financial, commercial and industrial hub to the benefit of all its citizens – Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian alike. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem post online, 30 January 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-784240

South Africa’s case against Israel – the world’s view

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 22 January 2024

On January 14 Euronews, the multi-lingual European TV and online news network, published a wide-ranging survey of where many of the world’s sovereign states stood as regards the accusation of genocide brought by South Africa against Israel. 

South Africa instituted the proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on December 29, 2023, and on January 11 and 12 public hearings were held at the Peace Palace in The Hague.  The charge alleges that Israel has committed, and is committing, genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, in violation of the Genocide Convention, and asks the court to order provisional measures requiring Israel to cease all military activity in the Strip.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.  It defined genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”

South Africa's request for provisional measures to be ordered against Israel does not require the court to determine whether Israel has actually perpetuated genocide, but simply that it is "plausible" that genocide has occurred.  Of course if the court grants the provisional measure request, it would be a strong signal that it is minded to accept South Africa’s case against Israel.

The nation that has most firmly rejected South Africa’s genocide charge while proposing to do something about it is Germany.

On January 11 a spokesman for the German government announced that Germany is planning to intervene in support of Israel in the ICJ case.

“The German government firmly and explicitly rejects the accusation of genocide that has now been made against Israel before the International Court of Justice,” said spokesman Steffen Hebestreit. “This accusation has no basis whatsoever.”

He made it clear that Germany accepts special responsibility for Israel because of the Nazi genocide of Jews during World War II.  “In view of Germany’s history, crimes against humanity, and Shoah, the government is particularly committed to the UN Genocide Convention,” he said. Emphasizing Germany’s support of the ICJ, he announced that “the government intends to intervene as a third party in the main hearing.”

Under the court’s rules, if Germany files a declaration of intervention in the case, it would be able to make legal arguments on behalf of Israel.  One of the 17 judges hearing the case is Germany’s Georg Nolte.

Almost as explicit in rejecting South Africa’s genocide accusation – though not proposing to intervene actively – is the UK.  Foreign minister, Lord Cameron. said: “We don’t agree with what the South Africans are doing,”

while a spokesperson for prime minister Rishi Sunak said he believed South Africa's case was "completely unjustified and wrong," continuing: "The UK government stands by Israel's clear right to defend itself within the framework of international law."  

Visiting Israel a day before the court proceedings began, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that South Africa's allegations are “meritless" and that the case “distracts the world” from efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflict.  US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said genocide is “not a word that ought to be thrown around lightly, and we certainly don’t believe that it applies here.” The President of the ICJ and Chief Justice is Joan Donoghue, a US lawyer.

The Euronews analysis maintains that no Western country has declared support for South Africa's allegations against Israel, and that the EU also hasn't commented..  The majority of countries backing South Africa's case, it says, are from the Arab world and Africa, while in the Eurozone only Turkey has publicly stated its support.

Euronews notes that neither China nor Russia have said much about the case.  This is not, perhaps, surprising in view of the fact that both are themselves facing accusations of genocide. A case against Russia, arising from its activities in its war against Ukraine, is pending in the ICJ, and while China has not been formally charged, it has been accused of genocide against its Muslim Uyghur population.   Both nations are represented on the judges’ bench (China by Xue Hanqin, and Russia by the ICJ Vice-President Kirill Gevorgyan), and neither may feel comfortable about supporting the charge of genocide against Israel. If actions by Israel clearly falling short of the "intent" requirement of the Convention are sustained, their own countries’ interests could be at risk. 

The Muslim countries that declared support for South Africa as soon as it filed its case at the ICJ were almost all represented by the 57-member strong Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Its statement condemned “mass genocide being perpetrated by the Israeli defense forces” and accused Israel of “indiscriminate targeting” of Gaza's civilian population.  Support also came from the Arab League and from Pakistan, Malaysia and Namibia.

Brazil, which is represented among the ICJ judges by Leonardo Nemer Caldeira Brant, has indicated that its president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, backs South Africa's case.  The Brazilian foreign ministry  said it hoped the case would get Israel to “immediately cease all acts and measures that could constitute genocide."

Other countries, while strongly supporting a cease-fire in Gaza, can see that accusing Israel of intending to destroy the Palestinian people is a step too far.  For example Ireland’s premier, Leo Varadkar – far from Israel’s best friend – has said he hoped the court would order a cease-fire in Gaza, but that the genocide case was “far from clear cut.”

Innocent civilians suffering the effects of a conflict which is none of their making naturally arouses feelings of deep compassion.  No matter that Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) operate under strictly enforced rules of engagement restricting military action to the targeting of Hamas and its strongholds, collateral deaths and injuries are inevitable in a war situation – and even more so in the particular circumstances of the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has deliberately positioned itself in and among the population. 

But calling for a ceasefire ignores a key consequence.  Were the ICJ to order one and were Israel to comply, Hamas would be under no obligation to stop sending rockets, missiles and drones into Israel (as it is still doing); nor would it be deterred from repeating the massacre of October 7 “again and again”, as it has undertaken to do. Hamas would continue to hold 132 Israeli hostages, and Israel would be barred from trying to rescue them or effect their release.  In short, Israel would be prohibited from fulfilling its obligations under international human rights law to protect and defend its citizens.

One can only hope that South Africa’s case will fail to stand up. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online as "The world's view: Reactions to South Africa vs Israel" , 22 January 2024:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-783122

A ceasefire in Gaza would only work one way

 This letter appears in the UK's Daily Telegraph, 16 January 2024 

SIR – South Africa has charged Israel in the International Court of Justice with genocide, and asks the court, as an interim “provisional measure”, to order a ceasefire in Gaza.

Charles Moore (Comment, January 13) says that if the court orders this and Israel refuses, it could become a pariah nation, and if it accepts, an endangered one. He leaves the consequences of the latter course to readers’ imagination.   

Were Israel to comply with an ICJ demand for a ceasefire, Hamas would be under no obligation to stop sending rockets, missiles and drones into Israel (as it is still doing); nor would it be deterred from repeating the massacre of October 7 “again and again”, as it has undertaken to do. Consequently 110,000 internally displaced Israelis, domiciled adjacent to the Israel-Gaza border, would be unable to return to their homes. Hamas would continue to hold 132 Israeli hostages, and Israel would be barred from trying to rescue them or effect their release. 

In short, Israel would be prohibited from fulfilling its obligations under international human rights law to protect and defend its citizens. One can only hope that South Africa’s case will fail to stand up. Lord Moore will be aware that Israel is pretty well inured to being a pariah state.

Neville Teller
Beit Shemesh, Israel

Hezbollah – Iran’s pawn

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 January 2024  

                 Iran's Supreme Leader meets the head of Hezbollah         

          A war with Israel is the last thing that Lebanon needs. The Lebanese people are in the midst of a severe economic downturn, facing soaring prices and severe shortages of food and basic commodities. Hezbollah-allied political, financial and business leaders, the source of the graft and corruption at the heart of the nation, have allowed Lebanon’s economy to deteriorate to crisis level. The nation is in a catastrophic economic situation which has lasted for years. If Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, were to initiate a full-scale conflict with Israel, he would find little support from the hard-pressed Lebanese.

          Even the continuous armed skirmishes over the Lebanon-Israel border serve little purpose beyond administering an Israeli tit for a Hezbollah tat. They achieve nothing of any value for either side. Initiated by Hezbollah at the behest of its paymaster, Iran, their true function is to fulfil Iran’s desire to cause as much trouble in the Middle East as possible.         

          Hezbollah was established in 1982 specifically to counter Israel’s invasion of  Lebanon, undertaken in response to constant attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory by Palestinian militants.  But when the subsequent Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon ended in 2000, Hezbollah’s aim was achieved.  What purpose can the constant armed interchanges have now?

One truth, long unacknowledged in the western world but the cornerstone of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, is that the Iranian regime is in relentless pursuit of its own agenda, namely to dominate the Middle East as a first step toward spreading the Shi’ite tradition of Islam eventually to the whole world. This was clearly spelled out by the instigator of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, on more than one occasion: “We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no god but Allah' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.”

 As essential stages in this process, the revolutionary leaders envisaged the overthrow of Zionism (ie Israel) and of capitalism (ie the US) – a fact which one-time US President Obama, and now President Biden, have seemed peculiarly reluctant to acknowledge.  Time and again attempts at mollifying the Iranian regime have proved useless – its ultimate aim remains unaltered.  It still regards America as the Great Satan, and Israel as its smaller manifestation – both destined for obliteration.

In pursuit of their objective Iran’s leaders recognize no bounds.  They sponsor terrorist activities and deploy their puppet organizations – among others, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon – to undertake them. In Lebanon Iran has nurtured, financed and equipped Hezbollah ever since 1982 to harry Israel.  UK media reported on January 12 that Iran is paying Hezbollah fighters a wage of $1300 per month.

 Lebanon’s problem as a sovereign state has been its inability to prevent the accretion of political, social and above all military power by Hezbollah over the past 40 years – a process that has left the sovereign state of  Lebanon in thrall to Hezbollah. 

In 2024 Hezbollah is virtually a state within a state, sucking the lifeblood out of Lebanon at the instigation of Iran.  It has effectively brought Lebanon’s political process to a standstill ­– since October 31, 2022 the nation has been without a president. and has hobbled along with only caretaker government ministers.  Every attempt to resolve the political difficulties has been frustrated by Hezbollah and its political allies.

As for Hezbollah’s armed forces, it is generally believed that they are larger and more powerful than the Lebanese national army.  The Hezbollah military has, after all, been in receipt of sophisticated technology from Iran for years, and has built up a formidable state-of-the-art armory directed at Israel.  The two armed forces exist side by side within the same state, and although under the previous president, Michel Aoun, there was often a degree of collaboration between them, Hezbollah steers its own course, and is not answerable to Lebanon‘s political leaders for its activities.

 Hezbollah’s last full-scale clash with Israel was brought to an end in August 2006 by UN Security Council Resolution 1701.  One main purpose of the resolution was to keep Hezbollah troops far from the Israel-Lebanon border, thus forestalling any future conflict.  In accordance with the resolution 15,000 UN international troops, operating alongside the Lebanese army, were deployed to police the Lebanon-Israel border. There are currently just over 9,500.  Known as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), they have been in place for the past 18 years, their authority largely ignored by Hezbollah. 

Another provision of Resolution 1701 that neither Iran nor Hezbollah had any intention of meeting was the UN’s strong demand, laid down in previous resolutions, that all armed groups in Lebanon, other than those of the Lebanese state, should be disarmed. 

On the day that Resolution 1701 passed unanimously in the UN Security Council, Hezbollah secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, said that Hezbollah would honor the call for a ceasefire provided Israel agreed to end its military actions. Resolution 1701 was approved by the Lebanese government one week after it was passed by the UN. As it did so, Nasrallah reiterated his pledge that once the Israeli offensive ceased, Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel would also stop.

In practice, of course, 1701 has failed utterly to maintain stability along the Israel-Lebanon border.  Hezbollah, marching to the beat of Iran’s drum, has prevented UNIFIL from performing its mission.  It has used its militia to control the area, has deployed its forces there, has launched thousands of rockets into Israel, and has constructed tunnels under the border to enable its terror units to penetrate Israel.  Its bombardment of Israel with rockets, missiles and drones has been unceasing.  UNIFIL has proved ineffective, unwilling to confront Hezbollah head-on.  It has failed to prevent Hezbollah’s continuous activity along the border in blatant violation of 1701.

For its part, the UN has failed to insist that its UNIFIL forces actually enforce adherence with its Resolution 1701.  As a result Iran, through its Hezbollah pawn, has been empowered to disrupt regional stability, just as it has done by fortifying Hamas in Gaza and using the Houthis in Yemen to attack shipping in the Red Sea and deploy missiles directly into Saudi Arabia.  The perpetual Hezbollah-Israel skirmishes across the Lebanon border serve no-one’s purposes except those of the Iranian regime. In the end it will be necessary to tackle the organ-grinder rather than his monkey.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online as "Hezbollah - a pawn in Iran's aim to obliterate Israel", 16 January 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-782309

Published in Eurasia Review, 19 January 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19012024-hezbollah-irans-pawn-oped/#:~:text=In%202024%20Hezbollah%20is%20virtually,with%20only%20caretaker%20government%20ministers.

Published in the MPC Journal, 24 Januay 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/hezbollah-irans-pawn/

Erdogan - back to square one

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2023

          Ever since Recep Tayyip Erdogan gained power as Turkey’s prime minister in 2003, Turco-Israeli relations have been on a see-saw, now up, now down – though more often down than up.  This is scarcely surprising since Erdogan is a deeply committed devotee of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization whose DNA is imbued with antagonism towards Jews.  However, he is also a consummate politician, well aware of the need, from time to time, to temper his aversion to Israel with sweet words and conciliatory gestures.

            On December 27 Erdogan announced to the world that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was Adolf Hitler reborn, comparing Israel's campaign to destroy Hamas in Gaza to the systematic annihilation of the Jewish people by the Nazis.  In a speech at an event in Ankara, he demanded of an absent Netanyahu: “How are you any different from Hitler?” adding, to rapturous applause: “What Netanyahu is doing is no less than what Hitler did.”

A riposte was readily to hand.  Netanyahu resorted to the social media platform X (once Twitter), and accused Erdogan, with some justification, of carrying out "genocide against the Kurds."  Erdogan, he wrote, “is the last one to give us a lesson in morals…He holds the world record of imprisoning journalists who object to his regime."

Anyone familiar with the to and fro of interchanges between Ankara and Jerusalem would have experienced a feeling of déjà vu.  This particular exchange of insults was nothing new. In July 2028, roundly condemning Israel’s just-passed  “nation state law”, Erdogan asserted: "Hitler's spirit has re-emerged in some Israeli leaders."  Netanyahu’s response?  "Erdoğan is slaughtering Syrians and Kurds and imprisoning tens of thousands of his fellow citizens,” adding “Turkey is becoming a dark dictatorship under Erdogan.”

During his early years as prime minister, back in the early 2000s, Erdogan was careful not to promote too radical an agenda too soon. Despite his Islamist views, he made an official visit to Israel in 2005 to be feted by Israel’s then-prime minister, Ariel Sharon.  However it was not long before the previously close relations between Turkey and Israel began to sour. The turning point came in 2009 with the first conflict between Israel and Hamas, which had seized power in the Gaza strip and had been firing rockets indiscriminately into Israel.

In the annual international gathering at Davos that year, Erdogan could not restrain himself. Rounding on Israeli president Shimon Peres, Erdogan called the Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip a "crime against humanity" and "barbaric." 

Wagging his finger at Peres, he declared: "When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill. I know very well how you hit and killed children on beaches." Then, infuriated by the moderator's refusal to allow him more time in response to Peres's emotional rebuke, he stalked off the stage.

What followed was the great barren waste of the Mavi Marmara affair.  On May 31, 2010 an encounter on the high seas between Israeli soldiers and a Turkish flotilla nominally on a humanitarian mission to Gaza, ended with nine of those on board the leading vessel, the  Mavi Marmara, losing their lives.  Erdogan manipulated the event into a rupture of Turkish-Israeli relations lasting six years. The affair was finally put to rest only in June 2016.  

When on May 14, 2018 then-US President Donald Trump formally confirmed his intention to relocate the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Erdogan declared three days of national mourning.  The next day Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador and withdrew its ambassador in Tel Aviv.  In response, Israel expelled Turkey's consul in Jerusalem.

The next two years saw Turkey’s international standing slump to a new low.  By the autumn of 2020 Erdogan was in the process of purchasing the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, designed specifically to destroy aircraft like US’s state-of-the-art multi-purpose F-35 fighter.  Reasonably enough, Trump refused to allow Turkey, a member of NATO, to acquire it ejecting Erdogan from the F-35 program and imposing sanctions on Turkey.

The EU had also sanctioned Turkey.  In this case it was in reaction to Erdogan continuing to explore for gas in what is internationally recognized as Cypriot waters.   The UK, now no longer in the EU, imposed sanctions on Turkey on the same grounds.

Turkey’s relations with Egypt had been frozen solid ever since 2013, when Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi was ousted by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.  Erdogan expelled Egypt’s ambassador, and Sisi reciprocated.  Relations with Saudi Arabia had been overshadowed for years by the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi’s consulate in Istanbul.

As for Israel, it had long been obvious that Erdogan seized every opportunity to denounce Israel in the most extravagant terms and to act against it whenever he could.  Not the least of his hostile moves was to support Hamas and to provide a base in Istanbul for senior Hamas officials, granting at least twelve of them Turkish citizenship.

In short Turkey, in pursuit of its own political priorities, had fences to mend with, inter alia, the US, the EU, the UK, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

This was the background to Erdogan’s sudden and dramatic change of tone on the international stage.  Erdogan, or his advisers, must have realized that to achieve his strategic objective of extending and stabilizing Turkey’s power base across the Middle East, a fundamental reassessment of tactics was called for.  Out of what must have been a root and branch analysis, came a plan to address the problem – Turkey would embark on a charm offensive, involving “reconciliation” or “rebooting” of relationships with one-time enemies, opponents or unfriendly states. 

Accordingly Erdogan set about making conciliatory overtures to Germany, the EU, Saudi Arabia and even Greece.  Israel, too, received indications that a rapprochement was sought and, doubtless despite misgivings, on March 9, 2022 President Herzog became the first Israeli president to visit Turkey in 15 years.

In an interview on Turkish TV at the time, Erdogan said: “This visit could open a new chapter in relations between Turkey and Israel,” adding that he was “ready to take steps in Israel’s direction in all areas.” 

The new chapter lasted about 18 months.  By October 25 he was praising Hamas as “liberators” and condemning what he described as “the Israeli regime’s unlawful and unrestrained attacks against civilians.”  In short, Erdogan had reverted to his default mode. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Erdogan reverts to old, inflammatory self-opinion" on 10 January 2024:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-781488

Published in Eurasia Review, 13 January 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13012024-erdogan-back-to-square-one-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 15 January 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/erdogan-back-to-square-one/

The Abraham Accords prevail

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2023

            On December 4, Time magazine published an article under the title “It’s time to scrap the Abraham Accords”.  The author, a director of a body called Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), argued that the Hamas attack of October 7 proved that the assumption on which the Abraham Accords were conceived – that the Palestinian issue was no longer important in Israel’s relationships in the region – was wrong.  She maintained that conditions for the Palestinian people had worsened since the Accords were signed, and that the Gaza war has projected the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of global concerns.  When signing the Accords, she claimed, the Arab leaders involved “hailed the agreement as a means to encourage and cajole Israel to take positive steps toward ending its occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory.”  And now, she wrote, “because continued Arab adherence to the Accords signals continued support for Israel,”  DAWN is calling on the Abraham Accords countries to withdraw from the agreement.

Both her assumptions and her conclusions are quite incorrect.  The Israel-Palestine dispute had no bearing on the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords and is unrelated to them.  The purpose of the Accords is to advance regional security and stability; pursue regional economic opportunities; promote joint aid and development programs; and foster mutual understanding, respect, co-existence and a culture of peace. 

All the Arab leaders concerned have indicated that normalizing relations with Israel has not affected their support for Palestinian aspirations. There is a brief reference to this in the Bahrain agreement, while the Morocco document mentions “the unchanged position of the Kingdom of Morocco on the Palestinian question.”  Sheer logic dictates that none of the signatories perceives their support as involving the elimination of Israel.  Since October 7 none of the four Abraham Accord signatory states has indicated any desire to withdraw from the Accords. 

Sudan is in the throes of a devastating civil war.  Government forces are on the back foot, as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues its advance.  On December 19 it captured Sudan’s second largest city, Wad Madani.  The future of Sudan, and with it the future of its normalization with Israel, hangs in the balance.

In the other Accord countries – the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Morocco – public opinion undoubtedly favors Hamas, deplores the high civilian death toll in Gaza and calls for a ceasefire.  As a result all three states have been walking a tightrope as regards their official attitude toward the Israel-Hamas conflict.  All the same, the Accords are holding firm.

   At one time it seemed as though Bahrain might be wavering.  On November 2, Bahrain’s parliament issued an unusual statement saying that the ambassadors of Israel and Bahrain had each left their posts and economic ties had been cut.

"The Zionist entity’s ambassador has left Bahrain," parliamentarian Mamdooh Al Saleh said in parliament, “hopefully not to return.”

But the parliament has no responsibility for foreign affairs, and it soon became clear that Bahrain-Israeli diplomatic and economic relations were intact.  Israel issued a statement confirming that relations were stable, and one from Bahrain's government mentioned simply that the envoys had left, without giving any reason.

            Iran has long been engaged in stirring up Bahrain’s Shi'ite population against the Sunni monarchy.  But Bahrain is home to the US Navy Fifth Fleet, and close US relations through the Accords are a vital bulwark against Iran and too valuable to abandon.  They also bring Bahrain closer to the wealthy UAE.  So Bahrain is content to perform its balancing act – on the one hand seeking to keep the deal intact; on the other needing to reflect its disagreement with Israel's military campaign in Gaza.

The other two Abraham Accord states face the same problem.

Despite internal and international pressure over the mounting toll of the war in Gaza, the UAE does not plan to break diplomatic ties with Israel.  It has sponsored two resolutions within the UN Security Council of which it is currently a member.  The first, calling unequivocally for a ceasefire, was vetoed by the US.  The second, after days of intense diplomatic effort, concentrated on enhancing the flow of humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza, and was approved on December 22.

As well as maintaining its links with Israel, media reports indicate that the UAE has been working to moderate public positions taken by Arab states, so that once the war ends there is the possibility of a return to a broad dialogue.  In addition the UAE has been in talks with Qatar about the possibility of a further Qatari-brokered deal involving the release by Hamas of some hostages in return for a break in the fighting.

The Accords were partly based on a shared concern over the threat posed by Iran.  Despite an effort at rapprochement early in 2023, the UAE continues to sees Iran as a threat to regional security. So there seems no prospect of an end to UAE-Israel diplomatic ties.  They represent a strategic priority for the Emirates. 

As for Abraham Accords signatory Morocco, Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal recently scored a resounding own goal. 

           On November 19, speaking from his luxury villa in Qatar, he addressed the Moroccan people by way of a video.  Urging them to cut ties with Israel and expel its ambassador, he declared: “Morocco can correct its mistake,” and called on Moroccans to take to the streets.

The reaction was an outburst of fury on social media from Moroccans condemning the intervention as a breach of the kingdom’s sovereignty.  There have indeed been a wave of public demonstrations in Morocco supportive of the Palestinians and condemning the suffering of the Gazan population, but it is a curious fact of Moroccan life that they are all organized with the state’s blessing.  The government provides logistical and security arrangements for demonstrators every weekend, and itself calls for de-escalation, access to humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians in line with international law. 

On the other hand, Morocco has not the slightest intention of withdrawing from the Abraham Accords.  This became clear on November 11 when, at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Morocco together with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Jordan, and Egypt, blocked a proposal to cut ties with Israel.

          So in complex and shifting circumstances the Abraham Accords seem in good health.  They may yet come into their own in helping rebuild Gaza once the war has ended. That is when, in the recent words of Jared Kushner, one of their architects. they may become “more important than ever”.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in Jerusalem Post online as "Abraham Accords will outlast Gaza war", on 3 January 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-780487

Published in the Eurasia Review, 6 January 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06012024-the-abraham-accords-prevail-oped/#:~:text=So%20in%20complex%20and%20shifting,%E2%80%9Cmore%20important%20than%20ever%E2%80%9D.

Published in the MPC Journal, 11 January 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-abraham-accords-prevail/