Lebanon’s make or break election

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 29 April 2022

Lebanon is preparing to go to the polls on May 15. Many observers believe that this parliamentary election promises to be one of the most significant in the country’s modern history (“crucial” and “decisive” are among the terms used).  Three vital issues hang on the result.

First, Lebanon’s failing economy depends on the radical reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) being enacted before their essential financial package is put in place. Nothing can be done until the new government is up and running.  Secondly, President Michel Aoun’s term of office has ended, and the new parliament will have the task of electing and confirming his successor in office.  Thirdly, and perhaps most critical of all, this election campaign has produced a significant weight of anti-Hezbollah political feeling among a number of disparate political groups.  Given a modicum of leadership, they could be brought together to reduce the baleful influence of the Iran-supported extremist group once and for all

The elections come as Lebanon’s currency has lost more than 90 percent of its value in the past two years, plunging more than half of the 6 million Lebanese population into poverty.  The economic crisis was aggravated by the massive explosion at Beirut Port on August 4, 2020, when a large part of the capital was destroyed, more than 200 people killed, thousands injured, 300,000 people left homeless and billions of dollars in material damage was caused. Responsibility is yet to be determined, as powerful figures linked to Hezbollah do their best to frustrate the public Inquiry.

The World Bank has described Lebanon’s financial and economic crisis as among the worst in the world in 150 years. The IMF requires, among other measures, that the Lebanese government approve a restructuring of the banking system that takes account of the large losses in the sector, while protecting small depositors and limiting their recourse to public resources.  

Lebanon's political and financial elite have been at odds over such a plan for two years, particularly on how to distribute some $70 billion of losses between banks, the state, and depositors.  Lebanon's banking sector maintains that the government and central bank should bear the lion's share of losses.  Goldman Sachs has said the most challenging reform would be the restructuring of the local banks, “The distribution of losses between the government, bank shareholders and depositors is…unlikely to be resolved easily."  All the same resolved it will have to be after the election, if Lebanon is to be assisted by the IMF to regain a degree of financial stability.

Since his return to Lebanon in 2005 from France, where he lived in exile for 14 years, President Michel Aoun, aided by his son-in-law Gebran Bassil, both allied with Hezbollah, has been a destabilizing force in Lebanese politics.  In 2016 Hezbollah’s support for Aoun’s presidential bid was the primary factor leading to his election.

Once in office Aoun allowed, if he did not positively encourage, Bassil to engage in lucrative patronage activities. In addition the president and his son-in-law have been trying to ensure that Bassil succeeds Aoun in office. These aspirations were dealt a severe blow in November 2020 when the US sanctioned Bassil, accusing him of being at the forefront of corruption. Nonetheless Bassil is trying to lead his party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to victory in the parliamentary elections, and no doubt hopes to capture the presidency if he does. At least he is a Maronite Christian, an essential prerequisite for holding that office.

Modern Lebanon, founded in 1944, was established on the basis of an agreed "National Pact".  Political power is allocated on a religious or "confessional" system, with seats in the parliament allocated 50-50 as between Muslims and Christians. The top three positions in the state are allocated so that the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim.

Theoretically no system could seem more designed to satisfy all parties in a multi-sectarian society. Theory, however, has had to bow to practical reality.  Lebanon has been highly unstable for much of its existence, and its unique constitution has tended to exacerbate, rather than eliminate, sectarian conflict.

Hezbollah’s many opponents from within both Christian and Muslim parties accuse the Iran-supported organization of running a mini-state within Lebanon, disregarding the nation’s sovereignty. They are treating these elections as an opportunity to end what they see as its domination of the country’s political decision-making and Iran’s occupation of Lebanon through its powerful proxy.

As a result, two opposing camps are jockeying to gain the majority in the next parliament:  the anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces party and its allies, who are determined to challenge Hezbollah’s influence and its dominance of the country’s administration; and Hezbollah and its supporters, who will fight to retain the majority they currently hold in parliament, and counter efforts to normalize ties with Israel.

Earlier this year, Fares Souaid, an outspoken critic of Hezbollah, established what he termed “a national council for ending Iranian occupation” of Lebanon. The council includes Muslim and Christian politicians, academics and key figures of civil society opposed to Hezbollah’s influence.

Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces party, which has the second largest Christian bloc in Parliament and is an arch enemy of Hezbollah, is campaigning with the outright aim of wresting the country’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s clutches. Geagea hopes to overturn the majority won in the last election by the pro-Hezbollah group, which includes the Free Patriotic Movement founded by Aoun, and the Amal Movement led by parliamentary Speaker, Nabih Berri.  Geagea argues that a solution to the economic crisis begins with defeating Hezbollah, which he blames – with some reason – for Lebanon ‘s economic collapse.

This parliamentary election offers the Lebanese people a real chance to cast off the dead weight of the past, regain its sovereignty under a new president, and implement the reforms that will enable the IMF to sign off on a financial package designed to revitalize the country’s economy.  It is all up to them.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 29 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-705384

Published in Eurasia Review
https://www.eurasiareview.com/30042022-lebanons-make-or-break-election-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanons-make-or-break-election/

Published in Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/29/lebanons-make-or-break-election/

When will the Saudi-Israeli connection go public?

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 24 April 2022 

           Israel and Saudi Arabia have no diplomatic relations with each other – a situation that normally means hostility between nations. Yet on March 3, 2022, Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) said: “We don’t look at Israel as an enemy.” It was scarcely a surprising remark, since for several years extensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been an open secret, including a covert visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2020 by then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

            MBS went on to describe Israel as “a potential ally, with many interests we can pursue together. But,” he added, “we have to solve some issues before we get to that.”

            What are the issues that inhibit Saudi Arabia from joining its main Gulf allies —the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain — in normalizing relations with Israel, as those Gulf states did in September 2020 in the Abraham Accords?  

   One main consideration is that Saudi Arabia, guardian of Islam's two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, is viewed by vast numbers of Muslims the world over as the custodian of Islamic values.  Inevitably this makes the idea of normalization with Israel a more sensitive issue for Saudi than for other Gulf states.  However there would be nothing shocking or unprecedented in Saudi Arabia taking this step.  The precedent has been set with the Abraham Accords. 

            Another restraining factor is that Saudi’s King Salman is acutely aware that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was conceived and proposed by his half-brother (and predecessor on the throne), then-Crown Prince Abdullah.  

           The Plan, endorsed on three occasions by the Arab League, advocates a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute, requiring the establishment of a sovereign Palestine on territories overrun by Israel during the Six-Day War, namely the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.  Given that, and a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, the Plan promises full normalization of relations between the Muslim world and Israel.

            In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Salman – ignoring the fact that the Abraham Accords have breached the one-time Muslim consensus on the Initiative – again committed Saudi Arabia to it, asserting that it offers a "comprehensive and just solution" to the Palestine-Israel conflict

More recently MBS, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and other Saudi spokespeople, have not referred to the Initiative, but all have said repeatedly that normalization would not be possible until the Israel-Palestine dispute is resolved.

"The priority now,” Saudi foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud told Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv recently, “is to find an arrangement so that Israelis and Palestinians can sit together and have a peace process…This will make it easier for all countries that do not yet have relations with Israel.  For us, this will happen when a just solution is found." 

He went on to acknowledge: "The integration of Israel in the region will be a huge benefit not only for Israel itself but for the entire region."

   Yet MBS must be aware that the Palestinian Authority’s advocacy of the two-state solution is not its real objective.  The true aim of the Palestinian leadership, like that of Hamas and a substantial proportion of Palestinian opinion, is to remove Israel and acquire the whole of mandate Palestine “from the river to the sea”. It is an objective repeated again and again to  the domestic audience.

However the two-state tactic is itself a flimsy device. Supporting the concept fulfils a useful public relations function, but no Palestinian leader would be foolhardy enough to sign up to two states, which is why every attempt at a peace deal over the years – and there have been many – has foundered.  Acknowledging Israel’s legal rights in the region would bring a charge of treachery to the Palestinian cause down on his head.  Hamas would exclude Gaza from any such deal, and internal political upheaval might well follow. Yet along with the UN, the EU and much of the Western world, the official Saudi line is to persist in believing that an Israel-Palestinian deal which recognizes Israel’s legitimate status in the region is a practical possibility. 

All four Muslim states that have so far signed up to the Abraham Accords maintain their support for Palestinian aspirations, but they have decided that solving the intractable Israel-Palestinian dispute should no longer be a pre-requisite for normalizing relations with Israel.  They will support efforts to reach an accord, but they prioritize developing a flourishing Middle East for the benefit of all its citizens.

Each of the four had particular reasons for joining the Accords. The UAE is intent on countering the regional dominance sought by Iran and Turkey, but it is also developing commercial and hi-tech scientific links with Israel, increasing defense cooperation, and obtaining from Washington weapon systems like the F-35 fifth-generation fighter jet. Bahrain, too - its leaders Sunni, its population majority Shia - appreciates Israel’s strength in opposing not only Iran, but also the violent extremist groups supported by Iran in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.  On joining the Accords Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, while Morocco gained US recognition of its claims over Western Sahara.

When Saudi Arabia weighs the pros and cons of normalizing its relationship with Israel, or formally joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s determination to counter Iran’s ambitions to dominate the Middle East would be a major consideration.  MBS would also hope the move would help repair Saudi’s strained relations with Washington.  The murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. continues to reverberate in US political circles.  Normalizing relations with Israel could change perceptions about Saudi Arabia in both main parties, and help restore MBS’s status among the US elite.

So MBS has been careful to keep the normalization option open. Far from condemning its neighboring Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has signaled tacit support for the UAE and Bahrain. It has allowed unprecedented access to Saudi airspace for Israeli commercial planes, and reports of high-level meetings between Saudi and Israeli representatives continue to appear in the media. It was no doubt a source of regret that it could not participate along with the UAE and Bahrain in the so-called Negev Summit on 28 March.

The omens for Saudi Arabia and Israel soon formalizing what is already something close to a partnership seem good. 

Published in Jerusalem Post, 24 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-704889

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 April 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042022-when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 23 April 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public/

Published in Jewish Business News, 22 April 2022

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/22/when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public/

Hope at last for Yemen

 

The two-month truce between the combatants in the Yemen civil war, brokered by the UN on April 2, has been swiftly followed by dramatic action calculated to bring about a more permanent end to the hostilities, and even the start of a reconstruction program. 

On Thursday, April 7 Yemen’s ineffective, unpopular and largely absent president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, dismissed his vice president and went on TV to announce that he was abdicating in favour of a new presidential council that had been established for just that purpose. “I irreversibly delegate to the Presidential Leadership Council my full powers,” he said.

According to his statement, the new body will assume the duties of both the president and his deputy, and will carry out political, military and security duties for the Yemeni government during what he refers to as a "transitional period".

No sooner were details of the unprecedented political changes in the public domain than Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced a support package for the new Yemeni presidential council to the tune of $3 billion – a vast sum, but arguably only enough to start the immense task of repairing the ravages of seven years of conflict.

Seven years of civil war left Yemen divided between an internationally-recognised government led by Hadi and backed by Saudi Arabia based in the southern city of Aden, and the Houthis based in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, which they captured back in 2014, controlling a fair chunk of territory in the west of the country.

The new 8-member Leadership Council is chaired by Rashad Al-Alimi, a minister during the presidency of Hadis’s predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi has the support of Saudi Arabia, but he also has a close relationship with Yemen’s major political group, the Islamist Islah party.

Yemen’s misery started during the sadly misnamed “Arab spring” of 2011. Its political activists responded to the wave of protest sweeping the Arab world with its own mass protests and a near-assassination of the then president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Saleh was eventually forced to step down in favour of his vice-president, Hadi, who attempted to meet some of the activists’ demands.  In 2015 he tried sponsoring a draft constitution which proposed a federal system split between northerners and southerners, but the Iran-backed Houthi rebels rejected it.

The Houthis are a fundamentalist Shia group supported by Iran.  Saleh, although a Sunni Muslim, gave up the presidency with great reluctance, and then sought to manoeuvre a return to power in collaboration with his erstwhile enemies. It was through Saleh that the Houthis were able to gain control of most of the Yemeni military, including its air force. As a result, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, they overran large tracts of the country.

Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from consolidating a strong presence in the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to beat back the Houthis. The fighting has continued ever since, with neither party able to gain a clear advantage.

When Hadi took over the presidency in 2012, he was supposed to be in power for two years and serve as a transition to a full, inclusive Yemeni democracy.  He proved a sad disappointment, and the end of his period in power is not being mourned by many Yemenis.  Hadi never rose to the challenge of being a wartime leader.  He was a silent president who spoke to his people on camera only a handful of times. As Saudi Arabia launched its attack on the Houthis in March 2015, he fled to Saudi Arabia, and holed up in its capital, Riyadh.

As for the new Presidential Leadership Council, seeds of disunity are unfortunately already sown within in.  One of the eight members is Aidarous al-Zubaydi, who supports an independent South Yemen and labels himself its president. 

South Yemen has a checkered history. Back in 1967, just after Britain left its South Arabia protectorate, South Yemen became an independent communist state backed by the USSR. It was only in 1990, with the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, that South Yemen agreed to unite with the north to form the Unified Republic of Yemen.  The glue binding the two quickly became unstuck. It took only four years for the south to try to break away again. A short civil war ended with the south being overrun by northern troops and the national government back firmly in control. In 2020 South Yemen again declared independence. It is now governed by a Southern Transitional Council (STC), but there is cooperation and dialogue with the Yemeni government.   

To be successful the new Council will need to set aside their differences and cooperate in the interests of the nation as a whole.  It has clearly won the confidence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the task of disbursing its windfall $3bn to best effect is likely to occupy a good deal of its time and attention. 

As for the Houthis, they refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the establishment of the presidential council, and have subsequently denounced it as a foreign and illegitimate imposition.  This reaction is perhaps not unexpected, but the current two-month ceasefire is a reality, brought about by extensive Saudi-Houthi negotiation.  If negotiations continue, the ceasefire could be extended into something approaching a truce. 

What Yemen needs are elections, an inclusive government, and a new structure for the state. UN Resolution 2216 aims to establish democracy in a federally united Yemen. The Houthis must be given the opportunity to choose. Do they wish to remain an outlawed militia permanently, or would they prefer to become a legitimate political party, able to contest parliamentary and presidential elections and participate in government? The price would be serious engagement in negotiations aimed at a peaceful transition to a political solution for a united Yemen.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and Jerusalem Post on-line, 13 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-703979

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 April 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/15042022-hope-at-last-for-yemen-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 April 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/hope-at-last-for-yemen/

Lebanon's dilemma

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post of 7 April 2022

The good news is that a two-month truce between the warring parties in Yemen, brokered by the UN, went into effect on April 2.  At last there is some hope of relieving the humanitarian disaster that has overwhelmed the Yemeni people. The issues that led to the conflict, however, remain unresolved.

The bad news, from Lebanon’s point of view, is that the truce will do nothing to solve the political dilemma facing Lebanon, caught as it is between a rock and a hard place.  Its weak and vacillating government finds itself trapped between two warring and irreconcilable forces, Iran and Saudi Arabia – the one supporting the Houthis in Yemen, the other battling to defeat them.

Lebanon’s situation is exacerbated by the dire state of its economy. The Lebanese lira has lost more than 90 per cent of its pre-crisis value, and this has led to soaring inflation and widespread hardship. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of Lebanon’s population now live in poverty. Gasoline stations have run dry, medicine and many basic foods are in short supply, and critical social infrastructure is shutting down.   

In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) boosted the Lebanese economy with a massive loan. In 2020, in the face of a financial system spiralling out of control, the government again appealed to the IMF for help.  A rescue plan was approved by the majority parties in parliament.  Then a parliamentary committee, supported by the Banque du Liban and the other Lebanese banks, advocated a diametrically opposite approach, on the grounds that it was defending the interests of depositors. It was clear to the IMF that administrative reforms were needed before necessary economic measures could be implemented.

It is against this background that Lebanon’s political dilemma is being played out. Iran-backed Hezbollah is so entrenched in the country’s institutions that it would require close to a revolution to dislodge it. Moreover, the nation’s ruling cliques have been infiltrated by Hezbollah and its allies.  Lebanon’s current difficulties stem from comments made by Information Minister George Kordahi in October 2021, criticizing Saudi Arabia’s role in the conflict in Yemen.

In 2011 Yemen’s president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, a victim of the so-called Arab Spring, gave up the keys of office with a very bad grace.  He allied himself with his erstwhile enemies, the Houthis, in an attempt to maneuver his way back to power. Supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Houthis overran large tracts of the country, including the capital city, Sanaa. 

Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from extending its footprint into the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to help beat them back.  Saudi’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, assembled a coalition of Arab states, obtained the diplomatic backing of the US, UK, Turkey and Pakistan, and launched a series of air strikes against the rebels. Civilian casualties were high, and Yemen degenerated into a humanitarian disaster area.  Seven years later both parties remain entrenched in various parts of Yemen.

Appearing on an Al Jazeera TV show on October 25, 2021, Kordahi was asked his views of the war in Yemen.  Mirroring the Iranian point of view, he said the Houthi rebels fighting the Saudi-led coalition were acting in self-defence. “They are defending themselves against external attacks launched for years against Yemen."

In subsequent media conferences Kordahi refused to apologize.  Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were outraged. Saudi expelled Lebanon’s ambassador and said it was ending all imports from the country. The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain followed suit and recalled their ambassadors.  George Kordahi resigned.

Saudi Arabia and its fellow wealthy neighbors once spent billions of dollars in aid in Lebanon, and still host a huge Lebanese diaspora. But the friendship has been strained for years by the growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The powerful Iranian-backed Shia movement, which has come to dominate Lebanon‘s political  and economic establishment, represents a vital building block in Iran’s bid to dominate the region. Hezbollah and its allies are integrated into the ruling elites, which are mired in venality, corruption and self-interest.  Arab News warned recently that their unwillingness to put Lebanon's interests ahead of their own could destroy the nation.

A major issue uniting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is their determination to thwart Iran’s effort to undermine and overturn Sunni Muslim states, acquire a nuclear arsenal and dominate the Middle East.  In this they are at one with Israel, which is also the object of Iran’s visceral hatred.  The Abraham Accords, which may yet be expanded, is a sign of their common purpose.

Despite Iran’s strong influence within Lebanon through its proxy, Hezbollah, ministers have tried hard to mend fences with Saudi and the Gulf.  Very recently a green shoot has surfaced.  On March 19 Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati visited Doha Forum in Qatar, met the Emir, Sheikh Tamim al-Thani, and discussed ties between Lebanon and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

In a press conference later Mikati said: “Lebanon is meant to always have excellent relations with the Arab countries and the Gulf states. Lebanon is one of the founders of the Arab League and we strongly believe in such ties.”

Speaking about Lebanon’s diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Mikati stressed: “It was a summer cloud that passed. God willing, it will entirely fade out with the visits that I will make to the Arab countries, and with the restoration of diplomatic ties between Lebanon and the Gulf states. We need these ties, especially with Saudi Arabia.”

On March 22 the Saudi ministry welcomed Mikati’s statement, and said it hoped it would “contribute to the restoration of Lebanon’s role and status on the Arab and international levels.”

It was a first step, but the way out of the forest for Lebanon is likely to be long and difficult.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-703436

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 April 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/09042022-lebanons-dilemma-oped/

Published in Jewish Business News, 8 April 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/08/lebanons-dilemma/

Published in the MPC Journal, 9 April 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanons-dilemma/

The IRGC in Iranian politics

IRGC stands for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian armed forces.  It was founded shortly after the Iranian revolution in 1979 specifically to consolidate the ayatollahs’ grip over post-revolutionary Iran. Starting small, it has mushroomed into an enormously powerful organization, deeply entrenched in Iran’s body politic and highly influential both at home and across the Middle East.  Forty-two years on from the revolution, the IRGC is now operating as a state within a state with its own military, economic, cultural, political and intelligence arms.

          In April 2019 then-US President Trump designated the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).  Officials explained that the IRGC was an “active and enthusiastic participant in acts of terror,” including the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in which 241 American serving people lost their lives, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, in which 19 US Air Force personnel were killed and 498 of many nationalities wounded.

Recently rumors emanating from Vienna, where a revitalized nuclear deal with Iran is being negotiated, suggested that President Joe Biden is considering removing the IRGC from the US’s terror blacklist.   Accounts of what the quid pro quo might be for this major concession are vague – which might explain remarks made recently by ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov, head of Russia’s delegation to the Vienna talks: “Iran got much more than it could expect, much more…This is a matter of fact.” 

The rumors were backed by former US Vice President Mike Pence, when he visited Israel recently and told prime minister Naftali Bennett and foreign minister Yair Lapid that a delisting of the IRGC as a terrorist organization was on the table.  Pence claimed that the delisting would be in return for a commitment that the IRGC would not target Americans.

          Accordingly, on March 18 Bennett and Lapid issued a joint statement deploring the idea of delisting the IRGC. They described the IRGC as: "Hezbollah in Lebanon, they are Islamic Jihad in Gaza, they are the Houthis in Yemen, they are the militias in Iraq, The IRGC is responsible for attacks on American civilians and American forces throughout the Middle East, including in the past year…They are an integral part of the brutal machine of oppression in Iran. Their hands have on them the blood of thousands of Iranians…The attempt to delist the IRGC as a terrorist organization is an insult to the victims.”

The IRGC has become a major military, political and economic force in Iran, with close ties to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many other senior figures including, significantly, the recently elected president, Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi. 

The IRGC controls the Basij Resistance Force, an Islamic volunteer militia of about 100,000 men and women. The Basij are loyalists to the revolution who are often called onto the streets to use force to dispel dissent. The IRGC and Basij are active in suppressing the mass opposition protests that erupt from time to time, for example in 2009 after the disputed re-election of then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Dozens of opposition supporters were killed and thousands detained.

With some 190,000 active personnel, the IRGC is considerably smaller than the regular military, but it is considered the dominant military force in Iran.  It operates its own armed, naval and air forces, and is behind many of the country's key military operations.

The IRGC navy is tasked with patrolling the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which 20% of the world's oil supply passes. The force's small boats have intercepted US warships that it says have approached Iran's territorial waters, and detained or diverted international shipping. Its air force is responsible for Iran's missiles. Iran is believed to have more than 10 ballistic missile systems either in its inventory or in development, and a stockpile of hundreds of missiles.

The IRGC also has a powerful presence in Iran's civilian institutions. It controls around a third of Iran's economy through a series of charitable foundations and trusts known as the bonyads, which run a considerable part of the economy.  Apart from military industries, the IRGC is active in housing development, dam and road construction, oil and gas projects, food, transportation, engineering and even educational and cultural activities.

The most prominent IRGC entity in recent years has been the Quds Force, used to implement its foreign policy goals. Considered Iran's primary instrument for cultivating terrorist groups across the Middle East, Quds actively supports Lebanon's Hezbollah movement and Palestinian Islamic Jihad with funding, training, weapons and equipment. Iran has acknowledged its role in the conflicts in Syria, where it has advised forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and armed thousands of Shia Muslim militiamen fighting alongside them, and Iraq, where it has backed a Shia-dominated paramilitary force that helped defeat IS.

Iranian president Raisi is intent on further empowering the IRGC. The ageing Supreme Leader, in dubious physical health, is seeking to ensure a hardline Islamist regime after his death. His chosen successor, it is widely believed, is Raisi.  Raisi is fully aware that if he is to become the next supreme leader, he will need the IRGC’s backing, since anti-regime sentiment is rising among the Iranian population   In expanding the power of the IRGC, Raisi will be seeking to boost his support when the time comes to select Khamenei’s successor.

The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change believes that the IRGC will be a critical element in any possible scenario for Iran’s future. Understanding the dynamics of the IRGC’s higher echelons, it asserts, is therefore of the utmost importance. Western and international policymakers must be able to read the Guard’s inner workings, it says, and the Institute has accordingly published a new model to aid understanding of the internal structures, relationships and intra-elite alliances and rivalries within the IRGC. 

“Know your enemy,” said the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu, “and know yourself; and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-702557

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 April 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01042022-the-irgc-in-iranian-politics-oped

Published in the MPC Journal, 3 April 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/the-irgc-in-iranian-politics/

Published in Jewish Business News, 1 April 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/01/the-irgc-in-iranian-politics/