Lebanon-Israel maritime talks still all at sea

Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, in power for 30 years, faces an acute dilemma.  On the one hand, Hezbollah cannot possibly endorse the formal negotiations now in progress between Israel and the Lebanese government, of which it is a part. On the other hand, it cannot be the one to torpedo an agreement that could rescue Lebanon from the economic problems that are almost overwhelming it.

The crisis is so severe that people have taken to staging armed bank hold-ups to recover their savings.  At least five such bank “heists” were reported on September 16, two days after a young woman stormed a central Beirut bank with fuel and a plastic gun to demand the deposits of her sister, who needed to pay for cancer treatment.  The woman made off with around $13,000 and became an instant hero on social media.  The severity of Lebanon's crisis has been widely blamed on a self-serving political elite dominated by Hezbollah, and decades of corruption.

Lebanon and Israel have been locked in US-mediated negotiations for some two years in an effort to agree on a maritime border that would determine which oil and gas resources belong to which country. The struggle is over a gas-rich area of the Mediterranean with an estimated value reaching billions of dollars.

US envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in the region in the first week of September to help overcome the issues still standing in the way of a settlement, and to try to push the parties closer to an agreement.  The three principals – the US, Israel and the Lebanese government (even though Hezbollah has a place in it) – have indicated a willingness to get a deal concluded as soon as possible, while Hezbollah itself has been ratcheting up its threats to launch a military attack on Israel’s Karish gas reserve field, to protect what it regards as Lebanon’s rights.  

            The dispute goes back to 2007, when Lebanon and Cyprus reached an agreement over the limits of their maritime borders. The southern boundary in that agreement represented Lebanon’s maritime border with Israel. Cyprus has ratified the agreement; Lebanon has not.

In 2010, Israel signed an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Cyprus, using the coordinates within the Cyprus-Lebanon agreement as its northern boundary.  Israel lodged these coordinates with the UN in July 2011.  Lebanon refused to accept them, claiming at the time that its maritime border with Israel lies well to the south, along a boundary known as Line 23.  An official document issued by the UN in 2011 confirmed that this was Lebanon’s view, and Lebanon has made no move to amend it.  And yet Lebanon has subsequently shifted its claimed maritime boundary even further south to a position known as Line 29, and this cuts across Israel’s Karish gas reserve field.

The dispute first turned toxic in late 2017, when Lebanon signed a gas exploration and production agreement with a French-Italian-Russian consortium.  Seismic surveys showed promising results for what is known as Block 9, which extends beyond Israel’s claimed northern border into disputed waters. The French company, Total, announced that it would not start operations in Block 9 until the Israeli-Lebanese maritime dispute was resolved.

Back in June Hezbollah warned Israel against extracting gas from the Karish field, saying it was prepared to act, “including force”.  Threats and counter-threats between Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces continued throughout the summer and showed no signs of slackening, even when the US-brokered talks appeared to be on the verge of a positive outcome.

On September 13 the head of Lebanon's general security agency, Abbas Ibrahim, told local TV channel Al-Jadeed that the maritime border talks are close to concluding.  "We're talking about weeks - actually, days - to finish the delineation issue,” he announced. “I'm hopeful that the situation is positive."

The next day Lebanese President Michel Aoun said there had been “major progress” in the US’s mediation efforts. “Lebanon has achieved what enables it to exploit its resources in its waters.”  He added: “There are technical details that are currently being studied in order to realize Lebanon’s interest, rights and sovereignty.”

What might the “major progress” amount to?  According to Israeli and Lebanese officials, an Israeli proposal would allow Lebanon to develop gas reserves in the disputed area provided it agreed to retain Line 23, or something close to it, as the maritime Lebanon-Israel border. This would open Block 9, and its promising Gana prospect, for exploration and exploitation by Lebanon.  At the same time it would guarantee the Karish gas reserve field remaining in Israeli waters. According to one media report, Lebanese officials demanded a written version of the proposal before providing a final answer.  At the time of writing no final answer was forthcoming.

Meanwhile Israel insists that natural gas extraction from the Karish field will go ahead despite the drones launched by Hezbollah at it in July, and their blood-curdling threats.  “The hand that reaches for any of this wealth will be severed,” warned Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

An Israeli official reiterated: “We are planning on starting extraction the moment the work there finishes.” On September 8 the London-listed Energean company, licensed by Israel to extract gas from the Karish field, announced that it would begin yielding output within weeks.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz said late last month that any attack by Hezbollah on Israel’s gas assets could reignite war between the two sides.

Despite the tub-thumping, political imperatives are favoring an agreement.  Lebanon’s foreign minister, Abdallah Bouhabib, in a press interview, pointed out that Lebanon’s president, Michel Aoun, is due to step down in October, and that Israeli elections in November could see the return to power of Benjamin Netanyahu. If that happened, opined Bouhabib, “he may blow up the agreement.  Here [in Lebanon], a president with a different approach and vision may come. Therefore, the time is right for an agreement.”

Let us hope this particular ship, after a stormy passage, sails into a safe haven.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 September 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-718249

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 October 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/02102022-lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-still-all-at-sea-oped/

Published in Jewish Business News, 30 September 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/09/30/lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-still-all-at-sea/

Published in the MPC Journal, 6 October 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-still-all-at-sea/

The Truss era begins: Britain and Israel seek an ever-closer relationship

 This article appears in the edition of the Jerusalem Report dated 3 October 2022

            On September 5 Liz Truss emerged as the winner of the bruising contest she had been engaged in for leadership of the Conservative party, and thus became Britain’s new prime minister.  Liz Truss it was, as UK foreign secretary, who met Yair Lapid back in November 2021 to sign the UK-Israel agreement that heralded the negotiations for a new Free Trade Agreement.  She is on record as saying: “Israel and the UK are already closely intertwined with deep relationships in trade, security, culture and tourism. If I am elected as the next prime minister I will set about ensuring that alliance grows even closer.”

On August 6, just after Israel had responded to the rocket strike on Ashkelon by targeting launch sites in Gaza, Truss issued a statement: “The UK stands by Israel and its right to defend itself. We condemn terrorist groups firing at civilians, and violence which has resulted in casualties on both sides.  We call for a swift end to the violence.”

The deep UK-Israeli trade relationship seems to stem from Britain’s general election in 2010, which resulted in a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government headed by David Cameron.  Within a year of his taking office as prime minister, UK-Israel bilateral trade witnessed a hitherto unprecedented growth of 34 percent, and in 2011 it amounted to £3.75 billion ($6 billion).

One key component behind this explosion of business activity was the little-known UK Israel Tech Hub – a highly innovative concept born out of an agreement between Cameron and Israel’s then prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.  Launched in 2011, it was to be a proactive UK-Israel hi-tech partnership, based in the British Embassy in Tel Aviv. Nothing of the kind had ever been attempted before by the British government. 

The UK-Israel Tech Hub aimed at a win-win partnership – to provide Israel with the benefits of a close working relationship with the UK in developing its rapidly expanding technology and start-up sectors, but also to ensure that the UK market could benefit from the breadth and quality of Israeli R&D and innovation.  

Announcing the appointment of its head a little later, Cameron said: “We want to work much more closely with Israel on innovation and technology.  That’s why a year ago we launched the UK-Israel Tech Hub at our Embassy to link up with UK Israel Business, the Israeli Embassy here in London and countless talented young people in both our countries.”

What followed was years of slog, determination and entrepreneurship by scores of British and Israeli business executives and officials, and the result has been the flourishing bilateral UK-Israeli trade figures that show no sign of having peaked, or how high any peak might reach.

            The UK has been under Conservative administration for the past twelve years.  Despite some difficult trading conditions, the mushrooming of UK-Israel bilateral trade has continued.  In the year ending March 31, 2022 total trade in goods and services between the UK and Israel stood at £5.4 billion ($6.5 billion), an increase on 2021 of 19%.

   These ever-expanding trade figures reflect a UK-Israeli trade relationship in excellent shape.  In January 2019, anticipating Britain’s departure from the EU, Israel was among the first countries to sign a free trade agreement in principle with the UK (a full-scale agreement was impossible until Britain had actually left the EU).  Now the UK-Israel trade relationship covers all Britain’s major industries, but with a natural focus on the technology and services of the future.

Some 500 Israeli companies are currently operating in the UK, employing thousands of people, while a surprising number of UK companies have major operations in Israel, including Unilever, Barclays bank, pharmaceutical giants GlaxoSmithKline, and Rolls Royce. Rolls-Royce was responsible for the UK’s largest ever export deal to Israel back in 2016, when it signed a £1 billion agreement to provide Trent 1000 engines for El Al’s new fleet of Dreamliner aircraft.

The rapid expansion of UK-Israel trade over the last decade has closely followed Israel’s emergence on the world scene as a global leader in high tech. Israel is now home to the highest density of start-ups anywhere in the world.  It also houses the hubs of some of the world’s major technology powerhouses, including Google, Microsoft, Intel and Motorola.  Meanwhile Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the UK in Israel in 2020 was £1bn, most in financial and professional services, electronics, and Information and Communications technology.

The term “tech unicorns” is not yet in common usage, but these business entities are a real measure of the extent of hi-tech activity in any nation.  Tech unicorns are privately owned technology-based startup companies with a valuation of over $1 billion. As of August 2021, there were more than 800 unicorn companies globally, and the number was growing.  The UK boasts some 115, while Israel’s 53 secured £18.5 billion of new funding in 2021.

Israel’s coalition government was keen to build on the UK-Israel success story.  November 2021 saw visits to the UK by President Isaac Herzog, then-prime minister Naftali Bennett, and then-foreign minister Yair Lapid.  Lapid’s purpose was to launch a new initiative aimed at even closer trade relations between Israel and Britain.  He found an enthusiastic ally in the UK’s new foreign secretary, Liz Truss.

On the day after Lapid arrived, November 29, the Daily Telegraph achieved a journalistic coup – an article written jointly by the British and Israeli foreign ministers, Liz Truss and Yair Lapid.  Headed: “Together we can propel both our nations to safety and prosperity”, the piece heralded a new UK-Israel agreement, to be signed later that day, which they described as “a major step forward, transforming our close friendship into an even closer partnership by formally agreeing a new strategic plan for the next decade spanning cyber, tech, trade and defense.”  Lapid later described this UK-Israel Strategic Partnership as “a major moment in the relationship between the United Kingdom and Israel.”

That declaration has recently been transformed into full scale negotiations for a new UK-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  On July 20 Britain’s then-International Trade Secretary, Anne-Marie Trevelyan – she visited Israel early in 2022 – met with Israel’s ambassador to the UK, Tzipi Hotovely, to launch negotiations for a new “innovation focused” FTA aimed at creating new opportunities for tech firms and professional services in both countries. 

“It will seek,” states the official UK government release, “to establish a modern, revamped trading relationship between two of the world’s services superpowers.”

To accompany the formal launch of negotiations, the UK Department for International Trade issued a 40-page document explaining the strategic approach to the proposed new Free Trade Agreement.

“The UK is proud of its deep and historic relationship with Israel,” it declares.  “As open, innovative and thriving economies, the UK and Israel are close allies and strategic partners. Israel is one of the largest, most vibrant economies in the region, with which we already enjoy a strong trading relationship. But there is scope to go further, and we have a golden opportunity to do just that through a new FTA.”

It goes on to explain: “Israel’s economy is growing rapidly, with its service sector growing by 45% over the last 10 years. A new FTA will allow us to take advantage of this growth, generating ever more opportunities for UK firms to export their goods and services. Upgrading our trade deal with Israel will help unlock a stronger, more advanced partnership. The new deal will play to our strengths, reflecting the realities of trading in the 21st century and allowing us to take advantage of future innovations.”

The benefits to Israel are equally real, paralleling those outlined in the UK document.  In particular, perhaps, the proposed trade agreement for services, as well as encouraging mutual investments, will provide Israeli companies with access to UK government and public projects.

One of the major problems facing Liz Truss as she takes up the reins of the UK premiership is how to ensure continuity of gas supplies over the coming winter.  Most of Britain’s needs are met by pipeline from Norway, direct from the North Sea, and liquid natural gas (LNG) imports from Qatar.  Given the global energy crisis, experts estimate the UK could be facing a shortfall during the winter of 2022-23.  In June 2022 the EU, Israel and Egypt signed an agreement that would see Israel exporting LNG to Europe via Egyptian facilities. In view of the close relationship between Truss and Lapid, and the ever-tighter trade bonds to which both the UK and Israel are committed, perhaps Britain’s new prime minister might turn to her Israeli friend to help close the UK’s looming energy gap – and perhaps Israel might find a way to do so.

          A commitment to ever-closer ties between the UK and Israel, both in trade and more generally, was common ground between both candidates competing as the UK’s new prime minister – a post Truss is likely to hold until the next general election, scheduled for 2024.  The future beyond that is shrouded in mystery, but the ties binding the UK and Israel are particularly strong. They are not only likely to stand the test of time but, given a fair wind, to become even stronger to the benefit of both nations.

A world without the Queen

 This article is published in the Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, 16 September 2022

Born and raised in England, I am one of the rapidly reducing number of people who remember the world before the second Elizabethan age.  Unlike the vast majority of fellow Brits, the sound of “God Save the King” is no novelty in my ears.  In fact in my 91 years I have witnessed five monarchs on the British throne, four of them kings.  The most recent, of course, is Charles III.

   I was four years old in 1935 when my parents took me to join the crowds to see King George V and Queen Mary drive through the East End of London to celebrate their Silver Jubilee, and I remember to this day seeing them sweep by us – a full 15 seconds-worth of contact with royalty.  Then followed the disastrous year of 1936, which witnessed not only the death of King George, but the brief reign of his son as Edward VIII which ended in abdication.  Before 1936 ended, however, we had witnessed the accession of King George VI, the late Queen’s father.

   When I joined the British Army in 1950 to undertake my National Service, which was compulsory in the post-war UK, I pledged my loyalty to His Majesty, the King.  By the time I left  in 1952 the new Elizabethan age had started.  As the Queen began her reign, many remembered the extraordinary broadcast she had made back in 1947, the year she became 21.  As Princess Elizabeth, heir to the throne, she spoke to everyone in the UK and what was still the British empire but also a developing Commonwealth – a vast agglomeration of peoples spread across the globe.

   Broadcasting from Cape Town in South Africa, she spoke long and feelingly especially to “all the young men and women who were born about the same time as myself and have grown up like me in the terrible and glorious years of the Second World War.”  She asked for their support in carrying the burden she was preparing herself to bear.  

Reiterating the motto borne by many of her ancestors, “I serve”, she said: “I declare before you all that my whole life, whether it be long or short, shall be devoted to your service and the service of our great imperial family to which we all belong….God help me to make good my vow, and God bless all of you who are willing to share in it.”

Never was an intention more completely fulfilled.  The world witnessed a life dedicated to the service of the peoples under her rule, and to the wider world.  As decade followed decade. she was increasingly a steady, permanent presence in turbulent times.  It was her inner strength of purpose that assured people of her unshakable determination to continue serving them, no matter what.

She made no secret of the fact that the rock on which her strength of purpose was based – however out of tune with the times this may have been – was her profound religious belief as a practising Christian.  Throughout her reign, with only one exception, the Queen broadcast to the nation and the world on Christmas Day, and each and every such talk made reference to the religious significance of the occasion.  And this is why, back in 1947, she had asked God to “help me make good my vow.”

            Queen Elizabeth’s life can truly be described as one of duty done – duty as a monarch, certainly, but also, as we learned thanks to the media spotlight increasingly focused on her and the royal family over the years, duty as a mother, grandmother and great grandmother.  She died fulfilling her duty to the very end.  Two days earlier she was pictured in the media appointing a new UK prime minister.  In her death, she exemplified her life.

            I began on a personal note.  Let me conclude on one, for it chances that I came a good deal closer to the late Queen than I had done to her grandfather as a four-year-old.  One morning in 2006 I received a letter with the ominous “On Her Majesty’s Service” emblazoned across the envelope.  Certain that I had a nasty surprise awaiting me from the tax authorities, I opened it only to discover, to my utter astonishment, that the prime minister was minded to recommend me for an honour in the Queen’s forthcoming Birthday Honours List, and was I minded to accept?

             I was. So some months later my wife and I, accompanied by my son and daughter-in-law, found ourselves inside Buckingham Palace.  While they disposed themselves in the audience, I joined the queue of some hundred people also receiving an honor that day, and eventually found myself face to face with the Queen. After she had pinned the medal on my lapel, we exchanged a few words.  I discovered that she knew about and was interested in the broadcasting career that had brought me before her.  We shook hands and, stepping backwards so as not to turn my back on her, as is the etiquette, I left her, but of course those few minutes in the presence of the sovereign remain with me, and always will.

            That is precisely the feeling shared by hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of people the world over who have had some sort of contact, personal or not, with the Queen. She had a unique ability to engage with individuals and enthuse multitudes.  People like this are rare indeed.  Those of us who mourn her passing do not believe we shall see her like again.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online under the title "What does a world without Queen Elizabeth look like?", 16 September 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-717248

Published in the International Jerusalem Post, 16-22 September 2022.

Morocco-Israel friendship flourishes

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 13 September 2022

Beach Sambo is a little-known martial art that engenders huge enthusiasm among its adherents.  This year the World Beach Sambo Championships, incorporating contests in eight weight categories, took place over August 26 to 29 on the sands of Bat Yam in Israel.  And this year Morocco’s Beach Sambo team, led by Dalil Skalli, who also heads the African Sambo Federation, travelled to Israel for the first time to compete – a situation that would have been impossible two short years ago, for Morocco had severed diplomatic relations with Israel back in 2000.

The visit of Morocco’s Sambo team, an apparently minor event in the great scheme of things, in fact symbolizes the extent to which relations between Morocco and Israel have warmed since December 2020, when Morocco signed the Abraham Accords and began the process of normalization.

This past year has seen an acceleration of the normalization process, marked by a succession of visits to Morocco by leading Israeli figures. The first ever official visit to an Arab state by Israel’s top soldier in uniform occurred on July 19.  IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi arrived for a three-day stay, during which he met with Morocco’s senior military and security officials.

Three days after he departed, Israel’s Minister for Regional Cooperation, Esawi Frej, arrived in Morocco on a mission to expand cooperation in the field of higher education.   He was accompanied by a group of seven Israeli Jewish and Arab journalists. During his time in Morocco Frej gave a number of interviews in Arabic to leading media outlets.

That same week Israel’s Justice Minister, Gideon Saar, visited Rabat. On July 26, he signed a judicial memorandum of understanding with his Moroccan opposite number, Abdellatif Ouahbi, aimed at promoting mutual understanding on judicial issues, including cooperation between the Sharia courts in both countries.  On July 27 Saar and the president of the Moroccan Football Federation, Fouzi Lekjaa, agreed to hold a friendly game between the national youth teams.  Later that day the Israeli and Moroccan national volleyball federations signed a cooperation agreement.

No sooner had Saar left than Israel’s top cop, Police Commissioner Yaakov Shabtai arrived for a first official visit to Morocco.  He was received in Rabat on August 2 by his Moroccan counterpart, Abdellatif Hammouchi. 

According to the Moroccans, the goal of the meeting was to strengthen bilateral cooperation and "lay the foundations for a partnership in the security field, serving the common interests of Morocco and Israel." Media reports claimed that the parties had agreed in principle on significant steps never been formalized between the two countries, including on extraditing criminals and the exchange of professional knowledge on security technologies and fighting crime and terrorism.

This blossoming of the Moroccan-Israeli relationship has not occurred without some negative consequences.  Relations between Morocco and its neighbor, Algeria, have historically been strained over Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara. Algeria has long supported the Sahrawis of Western Sahara who, backed by their militant body the Polisario Front, are seeking independence from Moroccan rule.

The price the US paid to secure Morocco’s signature under the Abraham Accords, announced by US President Donald Trump in December 2020, was to recognize Morocco’s claim. In doing so America was defying the UN, the African Union and most world opinion, which holds that Western Sahara’s future should be settled by a UN-supervised referendum of the Sahrawi people.  

After the normalization deal, violently opposed by the Algerian regime, its relationship with Morocco deteriorated badly.  Since mid-2021 the two countries have severed diplomatic relations, recalled their ambassadors, closed their borders, and blocked their airspaces.  Recent  Moroccan-Israeli military agreements have especially infuriated Algeria.  Its violent condemnation of them incorporated a strong antisemitic element – the same spirit that moved the Algerian government to demand that the Chief Rabbi of France, Haïm Korsia, be excluded from the delegation accompanying French President Emmanuel Macron in his recent visit to Algiers.

Algeria’s intelligence services have proved largely ineffective in their denunciations of Morocco and its sovereign, King Mohammed VI.  Mohammed, extremely popular with Moroccans both at home and abroad, has shown himself to be a progressive ruler, open to new ideas. He cherishes the historic Jewish connection to his country. In a speech on August 20 he said: “Morocco, by the grace of the Almighty, has an expatriate community of about five million people, in addition to hundreds of thousands of Moroccan Jews around the world.  Moroccans abroad are quite special in that they are deeply attached to the homeland,” and he called upon Moroccans the world over, including Jews with their roots in Morocco, to support their country of origin in whatever way they can.

Meanwhile trade between Israel and Morocco is booming. The various economic and trade cooperation agreements since normalization resulted in a 200 percent increase in Israel’s exports to Morocco in 2021 compared with 2020. Overall, trade between the two countries reached $117 million in 2021, and the target for 2022 is $250 million.

However the implications of Morooco-Israel normalization go far wider, and embrace the possibility of enhancing security and countering terrorism in the whole of north-west Africa and across the Sahal.  An important element has been the groundbreaking air defense deal in February 2020, when Morocco agreed to pay $500 million to acquire Israel Aerospace industries’ Barak air and missile defense system.

The authoritative Defense News points out that Morocco has long distinguished itself among the Islamic and African nations as a leader in counterterrorism. Properly paired with Israeli counterterrorism expertise and backed by US financial support, it believes that Morocco is uniquely positioned to oppose, and if necessary act against, terrorism in the Sahal and Francophone Africa.  Meanwhile, acting together Israel and Morocco can lead the way for a partner-led security strategy for the region as a whole.

It is regrettable that such a promising environment has been soured by several allegations of misconduct – including the sexual harassment of Moroccan women – at Israel’s Liaison office in Rabat, leading to the recall on September 6 of Israel’s ambassador, David Govrin.  Whether the allegations are sustained or disproved, this episode should surely not be allowed to disrupt the solid foundations laid in the past two years of genuine Moroccan-Israeli friendship and cooperation. 

            The visit to Israel of Morocco's chief of the Royal Armed Forces in early September confirmed the continuing strength of the Israeli-Moroccan friendship.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 13 September 2022, and in the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "Morocco and Israel: The highs and lows of a blossoming friendship"
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-716991

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 September 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/24092022-morocco-israel-friendship-flourishes-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 28 September 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/morocco-israel-friendship-flourishes/

Iraq faces a Shia-Shia civil conflict

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 8 September 2022            

When Western politicians announce they are retiring, their supporters normally express regret and wish them well.  Iraq (to misquote the well-known aphorism) is a foreign country – they do things differently there.  

 When the powerful Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced his "final retirement" from politics on August 29, his supporters took to the streets and subjected Baghdad to its worst bout of violence in years.  Many of his followers had been holding a sit-in inside Baghdad’s Green Zone, where government offices and diplomatic missions are located.  On hearing of their leader’s decision, they scaled the gates of the Republican Palace that used to be Sadam Hussein’s powerhouse, and paraded through it, sharing the scenes on social media.

Soon afterward, sounds of live ammunition echoed round the streets as Iran-backed opponents of al-Sadr, including the security forces, descended on the protesters.  The two sides traded gunfire all night and well into the next morning, and at least 47 people were killed. 

What is not entirely clear is what was motivating al-Sadr’s supporters.  In protesting against their leader’s decision, were they trying to get him to change his mind?  After all, he had threatened to retire from politics on eight previous occasions, and relented.  Were they simply letting off steam, frustrated at the possibility of losing their leader?  Or were they expressing their resentment at the establishment that had forced al-Sadr to this extremity? 

One explanation is as follows.  Many of al-Sadr’s followers were adherents of Iraq’s Shia spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri.  Suddenly and surprisingly, on Sunday August 28, Al-Haeri had announced his resignation, and in doing so appealed to his followers to support Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  But al-Sadr’s political message, Shia though he is, is to oppose the excessive influence on Iraq’s internal affairs of both Iran and the US.  Their erstwhile spiritual leader’s defection to the pro-Iranian sector may have left al-Sadr’s supporters feeling betrayed.

The violence that ensued led influential Iraqi voices to express fears that a Shia-Shia civil conflict was about to erupt, but the pessimists had reckoned without the extraordinary influence al-Sadr exercises over his followers, even though it has been demonstrated more than once.  In the event, on August 30 al-Sadr went on television and called on his supporters to withdraw “within an hour” from the Green Zone.  “I apologize to the Iraqi people,” he said.

The armed group backing him, Saray al-Salam, made no use of the hour’s grace their leader had allowed them. They left the Green Zone within minutes, bringing calm to what had turned into a battlefield. If the whole episode illustrated anything, it is the enormous power that al-Sadr exercises over the thousands who support him. 

Iraq has been in political stalemate ever since a general election was announced in July 2021.  To start with, al-Sadr decided not to participate, but he was persuaded to change his mind. In the event his party won the largest number of seats, but the rival Iran-backed Coordination Framework prevented him from forming a government of his choice with Kurdish and Sunni allies. In a conciliatory gesture he offered the Coordination Framework some government seats. They refused to be conciliated.  Al-Sadr reacted by requiring all 74 of his bloc to resign their parliamentary seats, and his supporters staged protests and sit-ins in the Green Zone.

Under Iraqi law if an MP resigns, the second-placed candidate in the election takes the empty seat. The process of filling the Sadrists’ vacated seats led to a new wave of intense controversy, but finally the pro-Iran Coordination Framework became the majority group in parliament.  It then nominated Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as prime minister.

Iran-backed groups and militias welcomed the nomination; al-Sadr and his followers rejected it out of hand. On July 27, the country’s political crisis reached boiling point and al-Sadr supporters stormed the Iraqi parliament protesting against al-Sudani’s nomination.  Once again, a tweet from al-Sadr quelled the riot instantly.

In his latest televised address al-Sadr, despite taking some responsibility for the recent flare-up, condemned the violence by his supporters but refused any compromise. He declared that he would block any attempt by the Coordination Framework to impose their nominated prime minister on the nation, or set up a functioning government without his input.

On September 3 the Coordination Framework responded. It reiterated its determination to nominate al-Sudani as Iraq’s prime minister.  Moreover according to media reports, the Framework is planning to resume parliamentary sessions following the Shia religious commemoration of Arba’een, on September 17. 

Iraq’s political stalemate stems ultimately from the constitutional arrangements put in place by the US following the overthrow of Sadam Hussein.  It is a sectarian system, loosely akin to Lebanon’s, intended to ensure that the various minority groups that make up Iraqi society are given a share in government and the administration.  The end result – as in Lebanon – has been endless political instability and dysfunction.  Which is why al-Sadr has been calling for constitutional reform.

A dedicated user of social media, in recent tweets he has called on Iraqis “to rise up to demand reform.”  The protests mounted by his supporters, even though he has himself brought them to an end, he has characterized as “a major opportunity to radically change the political regime, constitution and elections.”

          The problem is that the stage seems set for yet another armed civil conflict, with no assurance that this time it can be switched off with a click of al-Sadr’s fingers.  The disputing sides refuse negotiation and compromise.  Moreover the violence is not confined to Baghdad.  During the last uprising al-Sadr’s supporters were blocking roads and government buildings elsewhere in Iraq, including Basra in the south where general lawlessness, organized crime and tribal conflicts are a prime breeding ground for uncontrollable armed struggle.  Iraq is facing the real danger of a Shia-Shia civil war.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 8 September 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-716582

Published in Eurasia Review, 17 September 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/17092022-iraq-faces-a-shia-shia-civil-conflict-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 18 September 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/iraq-faces-a-shia-shia-civil-conflict/