Lebanon – fantasy and reality

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2026

      The three-way US-Israel-Lebanon deal, agreed and signed on June 26, brings clarity to what has been ​the ​somewhat obscure situation ​produced by ​the US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), agreed on June 17.

            It ​has certainly seemed that, when it comes to Lebanon, US President Donald Trump and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu were pulling in somewhat different directions.

            The published text of the MoU states that the US, Iran “and their respective allies involved in the current conflict” declare an “immediate and lasting cessation of military actions across all fronts, including Lebanon.”  Opening a 60‑day window for negotiating a fuller agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the MoU declares a ceasefire, implicitly including Israel and Hezbollah in the truce.

But neither Israel nor Hezbollah had been involved in negotiating the agreement, which embodies the fantasy that the US and Iran ​completely control their “respective allies”.  They ​do not, and for the US to​ have assume​d ​it could take Israel for granted was presumptuous.  Although ​Israel could scarcely be considered bound by its terms, ​it has chosen to abide by the MoU, though not abdicating the right to defend itself against any breach of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.

For its part, Iran has been unable to restrain Hezbollah, which has ignored the MoU and mounted a whole series of armed assaults on the IDF.  There have been at least two major, lethal Hezbollah attacks since the MoU was signed, with five Israeli soldiers killed (four in a tank strike on June 18, and one in a drone strike on June 20), plus several additional non‑fatal attacks.  For example, a Hezbollah explosive‑drone attack in southern Lebanon on Saturday June 20 wounded 13 Israeli soldiers.

Despite earlier calls from the White House for Israel to observe the ceasefire, basic justice for the soldiers who lost their lives demanded a response. Israel characterizes these retaliatory actions as self‑defense against clear Hezbollah violations, essential to deterring further attacks.  On June 18, performing something of a volte-face compared with the recent past, Trump publicly warned Tehran that it is responsible for reining in Hezbollah, and must ensure the group fully respects the truce. 

Iran retaliated on June 20, declaring that Israel was breaching the agreement by attacking Hezbollah, and itself promptly proceeded to violate the MoU by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The Lebanon situation is full of anomalies.  In demanding that Israel cease its military activity in Lebanon, the US, the UN and Western nations, providing no background, declare they are protecting the country and its people from the effects of air strikes. But Hezbollah’s very raison d’être is to attack Israel in pursuit of its declared aim, and that of its Iranian sponsor, to annihilate the state and its people. This basic truth is too often ignored or ​discounted by Western politicians. 

​            The reality is more nuanced, for what is often ignored is that the Lebanese government has taken matters into its own hands and for many months ​has been in a deal of its own with Israel​, predicated on containing and eventually disarming Hezbollah.  The latest round of talks was held in Washington on June 23-26.  And the historic three-way agreement of June 27 is the result.

Joseph Aoun was elected Lebanon’s president on January 8, 2025.  His top priority was to restore national sovereignty – and that meant reining in the overmighty Hezbollah organization that had become “a state within a state”, and in particular disarming it.

        In August 2025 Aoun and his cabinet instructed the army to develop a plan to bring all weapons in the country under the control of state security forces, thereby ending Hezbollah’s autonomy.

One month later Lebanon’s army chief, Rodolphe Haykal, presented the cabinet with a multi‑phase plan to achieve just that.  The first phase aimed at disarming all Hezbollah personnel south of the Litani river.

The cabinet authorized the army to put the plan into operation. But it soon became clear that government forces lacked the military capacity to achieve the desired result.  Despite some success in dislodging Hezbollah from a few areas of southern Lebanon, it became clear that the plan was not viable. The state on its own could not bring Hezbollah to heel.  It needed help if it was to regain national sovereignty.

So from March 2026 Aoun began pushing the idea of face‑to‑face ceasefire talks with Israel, as part of a broader strategy that would ultimately bring Hezbollah’s weapons, and therefore Hezbollah itself, under state control.

The first 2026 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire deal was agreed on April​ 16.  It was extended by 45 days on May​ 15, following US-mediated talks in Washington, and then renewed and expanded again on June​ 3.  Under this arrangement, a conditional ceasefire was agreed, contingent on a complete halt to Hezbollah’s military strikes against Israel, the evacuation of Hezbollah forces from the South Litani sector, and the creation of “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese Armed Forces ​(LAF) would exercise exclusive control to the exclusion of non‑state actors.

By moving into key areas in southern Lebanon and clearing them of Hezbollah, Israel has laid the groundwork for implementing this agreement.  Under the new and historic deal, Israel has agreed to withdraw from two areas that will be taken over by the Lebanese army as pilot zones.  Now Israel and Lebanon are in effect acting hand-in-hand to degrade Hezbollah, and restore national sovereignty to the Lebanese state itself.  The US has agreed to improve the capabilities of the LAF and support its anti-Hezbollah operations.

           Aoun has to tread very carefully in implementing this policy.  Hezbollah commands considerable support among Lebanon’s Shi’ite community – roughly a third of the population – even if recent reports indicate a degree of disillusionment setting in.  Memories of the 1975-1990 civil war are still fresh, and Aoun is determined to avoid reigniting it. 

           He is also well aware that tens of thousands of the residents of northern Israel’s border are still displaced, and that Israel’s policy is to remove Hezbollah’s offensive capability – by military action if necessary – before a full return is possible.

            The Lebanese government is as anxious as Israel to see that day.

Erdogan – an uncomfortable fact of life

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23June 2026

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is preparing to host the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 – a high‑visibility platform, if ever there was one. 

The occasion will emphasize how central Turkey has become in Western planning,  following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  ​Turkey faces Russia across the Black Sea.  ​In the light of NATO’s new ten-year Russia-focused strategy, adopted in 2022​, Turkey's geography and capabilities ​have assumed key significance​.  ​

In elevating Erdogan to the chair of this NATO summit, however, Western leaders have had to turn a blind eye to a number of uncomfortable facts.  For example their host​ – a key frontline member of NATO which is totally opposed to Russia’s war in Ukraine​ – is helping to fund that very war by purchasing Russian gas in enormous quantities.  Russia is Turkey’s largest gas supplier, providing more than half of Turkey’s pipeline imports. 

Nor is Erdogan in any way moderating his position.  ​Turkey had already renewed two gas supply contracts with Russia in December​, but in the last few weeks it has ​actually enhanced them.  ​The expansion agreement with Gazprom, Russia’s energy corporation​, was announced on May 31 at the Baku Energy Forum​ ​​by Turkey’s  energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar​. ​  

At a time when Moscow has lost most of its European customers​​ and is wag​ing war on Europe’s doorstep​,​ NATO’s leaders will once again have to look the other way as Erdogan ​engages with their principal adversary. ​ 

In fact, they have been indulging Erdogan’s erratic​ behavior for years​.  For example, they have long turned a blind eye to Erdogan’s disdain for democratic norms.  

Erdogan has been leading Turkey since 2003, first as prime minister and latterly as president.  Over those 23 years he has constructed a highly autocratic system within the country.

His key method, honed by long use, is to mount prosecutions against political opponents, often charging them under critical speech legislation.  He has not only increased the use of existing speech crimes, but has introduced new categories, notably “insulting the president” and “disinformation”.  These steps were justified as essential when the nation’s security was threatened.  Turkey has endured a succession of such crises under Erdogan, some genuine, some exaggerated, some manufactured.

Between 2014 and 2020 tens of thousands of investigations and over 35,000 prosecutions were mounted under the critical speech provision.  Nearly 13,000 people were sentenced, including children.  Comparable, detailed official statistics for the period after 2020 are difficult to obtain.  Researchers rely on monitoring undertaken by journalists’ unions and human rights groups.  

Between late 2022 and late 2024 the government introduced a new offence of “disinformation.”  It led to some 4,100 investigations involving 4,590 people, including at least 56 journalists.   At the end of 2025 more than 20 journalists were still in prison.

The CHP is Turkey’s main center‑left, secular political party.  It led the decisive 2019 victories in the Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races, marking an unprecedented electoral setback for Erdogan.  Under the leadership of Ozgur Ozel, the CHP frames itself as a defender of social justice against Erdogan’s dictatorial presidency.

In May 2026, an Ankara appeal court annulled the 2023 CHP congress at which Ozel was elected leader, effectively ousting him and reinstating the previous leadership.  This ruling is widely seen as an attempt to neutralize Turkey’s largest opposition party.  Ankara’s mayor Mansur Yavas said the decision was aimed at “breaking” the CHP and rendering it ineffective.

Ekrem Imamoglu, the CHP mayor of Istanbul and widely seen as Erdogan’s most formidable rival, was arrested in March 2025 on corruption and terror‑related accusations just days before he was expected to be nominated as a presidential candidate. 

         Authorities accused him of leading a “criminal organization”, committing fraud and extortion, and assisting the PKK, the armed Kurdish militant organization that Erdogan’s government has long designated a terrorist group.  In November 2025, prosecutors filed a nearly 4,000‑page indictment charging Imamoglu with 142 offences, including running a criminal enterprise, bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and money laundering. The combined potential sentence is calculated at up to 2,430 years in prison.

With the main opposition leader facing legal disqualification and the most popular rival detained under the threat of a multi‑millennium sentence, the field of credible challengers to Erdogan is being drastically narrowed.  This contributes to what some now describe as a transition from “competitive authoritarianism” to outright autocracy, in which elections remain but the regime systematically removes viable opponents before they can contend for power.

Turkey’s economic deterioration is a crucial backdrop to understanding why Erdogan finds external crises politically useful.

For years Erdogan pressured Turkey’s central bank to maintain very low interest rates arguing, contrary to orthodox economics, that high rates cause inflation.  By 2023 inflation was around 40%, the lira had lost over 80% of its value in five years, and foreign reserves were critically low.  By 2025 Turkey had technically entered recession, with GDP contracting 0.2% for two consecutive quarters, household consumption falling and annual inflation near 49 percent.  This combination of recession and high inflation has severely eroded living standards and public support, and fueled public protests.

Erdogan systematically downplays domestic economic problems as global phenomena, often deflecting blame on to foreign conspiracies.

Autocrats do not relinquish power easily.  Under Turkey’s 2017 constitutional changes – actually engineered by Erdogan – his period in office should end in 2028.  The constitution created an executive presidency with a two‑term limit of five years each.  Erdogan was elected under this system in 2018 and again in 2023.

The constitution allows a president to run again if early elections are called by parliament during the second term.  Some opposition figures fear he could engineer just such a snap poll to reset the clock.  He would need 360 MPs out of 600 to call a referendum, or 400 for direct adoption in parliament.

His current bloc falls short of both.  Nevertheless his main nationalist ally, Devlet Bahceli, has recently been calling for a constitutional amendment to let Erdogan stand again in 2028.  It is clear that his own camp is already preparing arguments to keep him in play.

Erdogan is not likely to go quietly.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Erdogan's grip on Turkey deepens as NATO gathers in Ankara," 23 June 2026: 

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-900103

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 June 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26062026-erdogan-an-uncomfortable-fact-of-life-oped/

Abraham Accords partner in trouble

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 June 2026

        When Sudan signed up in 2021 to the Abraham Accords, they had been presented to the world as the foundation stone of a new architecture for the Middle East, bringing the prospect of peace, cooperation and stability to the region. That vision is being tested in Sudan, where General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan, the man who authorized Sudan’s Abraham Accords agreement with Israel, now presides over a country shattered by civil war.​ It is one of the deadliest and most destructive conflicts globally​, and has created the world’s largest and most devastating displacement and humanitarian crisis​. There is no end in sight, and it is getting worse.

        Having embraced Burhan as a normalization partner, Israel and the other Abraham Accords states have at least a moral obligation to regard Sudan’s agony as a problem in which they have an interest. A member of the pact is in serious trouble. Joint action might help.

        For three years the Sudan civil war has been inflicting intolerable suffering on the nation, resulting in “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” according to the UN. Rigorous estimates suggest that tens of thousands, and possibly well over a hundred thousand, people have already died in Sudan’s war, putting it among the deadliest conflicts of our time.

        The nation’s basic infrastructure – water, electricity, transport, health care – has more or less collapsed. Over 11 million people are internally displaced, and roughly 4 million have fled to neighboring countries, including South Sudan, where refugee camps also face severe food and water shortages. Outbreaks of malaria, respiratory illnesses and diarrheal diseases, linked to very poor sanitation and hygiene, are reported rampant in displaced-population areas.

        How has this desperate situation come about?

        It all began with Sudan’s popular revolution in April 2019 – described at the time as Sudan’s “Arab Spring moment” – and the collapse of the 30-year-long regime of the authoritarian Omar al-Bashir. In the transitional democratic government that followed, Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), became head of the ruling Sovereignty Council. Its members jointly pledged to move the country toward democracy, and to parliamentary elections in 2023.

        After some two years the administration was clearly making no progress toward any form of democracy. It was, moreover, clearly failing to deal with the country’s severe economic problems. On October 22, 2021 national frustration erupted in a mass protest in the capital, Khartoum, in support of civilian rule.

        Burhan, together with his deputy, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (often referred to as Hemedeti), orchestrated a military coup and took over control of the country.

        However it was not long before the two fell out. Dagalo headed the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Burhan considered such a strong force outside the army a source of instability, and announced plans to merge the RSF with the nation’s formal armed services. This was enough for the two former colleagues to take up arms against each other.

        On April 15, 2023 the RSF launched coordinated attacks on key SAF sites in Khartoum, claiming early control of major airports. By early 2025 the SAF had pushed the RSF out of Khartoum and most of Omdurman, giving Burhan control of the greater part of Sudan, including the capital region. In February 2025, Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council announced the formation of a new transitional government. In May, Kamil Idris, a civilian, was appointed prime minister. This administration is accepted by the UN, the African Union, Egypt and a number of other states as the legitimate government of Sudan.

        In April Dagalo, still in control of significant parts of western and southwestern Sudan, established a rival “Government of Peace and Unity” to administer the territories under their control. This body lacks international recognition.

        Meanwhile the civil conflict continues to inflict unprecedented misery on the people.

        International humanitarian agencies, reporting in mid-April 2026, put the number of people in need of assistance at roughly 34 million, with about 26 million facing acute food insecurity, over 20 million requiring health assistance, and around 14 million displaced.

        In a report published in March 2026 by Doctors Without Frontiers, sexual violence was found to be “part of everyday life” in large areas of Sudan. Researchers documented more than 3,396 cases of sexual violence in 2024 and 2025. Women or girls reported being assaulted by armed individuals. In South Darfur 41 children under the age of five were assaulted.

        A report published by the Mercy Corps on May 4 traces how disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is affecting Sudan. The country is already inside the planting periods that will shape harvests through late 2026 and into 2027. If farmers have to reduce fertilizer use, switch crops or plant less land, those losses cannot be reversed by a later political settlement. The result will be even greater food insecurity.

        After more than 1000 days of civil war the two sides are entrenched​. The SAF appears to have the upper hand in central Sudan, but the RSF remains resilient in its western strongholds. ​There is no effort to achieve a ceasefire​. It seems like a fight to the death by the warlords, who apparently remain indifferent to the horrendous impact of their conflict on the people they both claim to represent.

        Efforts have been made by some states to intervene. The Jeddah process (a US‑ and Saudi‑led mediation platform to broker ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements) produced several short‑lived agreements but failed to stop the war. The “Quad” of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and US failed to secure even a temporary ceasefire. Could the Abraham Accords nations, in a collaborative partnership, exercise a stronger influence and achieve a positive outcome?

        Israel has maintained contacts with both Burhan and Dagalo; the UAE is known to have direct channels to Dagalo. In principle, a joint push for de‑escalation by Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco might carry weight with both camps, especially if accompanied by a package of tangible political and economic benefits for a post‑war Sudan.

        The Abraham Accords are undoubtedly much more than a mere branding exercise. Given an unprecedented crisis, the signatories should surely be willing to act together to foster peace and regional stability.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem post online titled: "Sudan's war poses a challenge for Abraham Accords partners", 16 June 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-899442

Testing EU-Israel relations

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 June 2026

 A major EU summit, a meeting of the full European Council, is scheduled for June 18–19 in Brussels. The European Council brings together the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states.  According to the draft agenda and a report in the UK’s Daily Telegraph, EU leaders are expected, under the Middle East subject heading, to accuse Israel of a long list of misdemeanors and worse, and issue a series of rebukes and censures.   

The Telegraph apparently gained access to “draft conclusions” to be discussed at the summit.  They reveal an extensive list of charges that EU leaders intend to aim at Israel, starting with condemnation of the “persistent and devastating” humanitarian crisis in Gaza and proceeding to a declaration of support for Lebanon’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity”.

The bloc’s 27 prime ministers and presidents will apparently express “serious concern” about “continued ceasefire violations” in Lebanon, and call for a “permanent end” to hostilities. They will commit the EU to the welfare of the Lebanese people and their state-building efforts, and offer to provide emergency aid to the more than one million displaced by the conflict.  The possibility may also be raised of sending a mission of civilian and military experts, as well as financial support, to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

The EU seems unaware that the Lebanese government is as anxious to degrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities as Israel, which explains the recent Lebanon-Israel ceasefire negotiations.  Any intervention by the EU seems even less appropriate in light of the agreement reached on June 3 between Lebanon and Israel, when they moved from their previously announced truce toward an actual implementation framework for a ceasefire.

The ceasefire will come into effect, the agreement specifies, provided there is a “complete cessation” of fire by Hezbollah and the withdrawal of its operatives from the sector south of the Litani River.  Once those conditions are met, Israel commits to halt its offensive operations.

The agreement envisages the LAF exercising sole security control in ”pilot zones” in southern Lebanon from which all non‑state actors, explicitly including Hezbollah, are to be excluded.  Any sort of intervention by the EU would appear to run counter to that provision.

The details obtained by the Telegraph indicate that EU leaders are about to call on Israel to reopen border crossings to Gaza, allow in “unimpeded” humanitarian aid “at scale”, and permit the UN, its agencies and non-governmental organizations to work freely there.  “Freely” presumably means not checking whether staff have Hamas connections.

They will further demand the immediate repeal of the new “discriminatory” death penalty law for terrorism introduced in March, because they fear it will be used exclusively against Palestinians.

EU chiefs will condemn Israel’s “mistreatment” of activist detainees following the interception of the Global Sumud lotilla, which attempted to break the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.  They will, moreover, apparently call for EU sanctions to be prepared “against extremist ministers”.

This probably refers to Itamar Ben-Gvir, the national security minister, widely criticized for posting a video of himself taunting the detained campaigners as they knelt with their hands tied behind their backs.

The EU will apparently tell Israel to stop the expansion of settlements, condemn “unlawful, unilateral actions”, and urge it to protect Palestinians from settler violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

 In a direct rebuke to Benjamin Netanyahu, the EU will also say it “firmly rejects Israel’s announcement that it will seize 70 per cent of Gaza’s territory.”

In short it looks as though those who regard Israel as the fount of all evil are about to have a field day.

The summit will be chaired by the Council’s president, Antonio Costa. 

Both Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EC, and its High Representative for foreign affairs, Kaja Kallas, will be present.  The EU-Israel relationship has been under significant strain ever since May 20, 2025, when the EU began conducting a review of whether Israel is complying with the human-rights obligations contained in Article 2 of the long-standing EU–Israel Association Agreement.

            The relationship is now characterized by three simultaneous trends:  Continued strategic and economic cooperation; growing criticism from many EU governments regarding Gaza and settlement policy; and increasing willingness to use sanctions and other restrictive measures against Israel.

For the past sixteen years Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, consistently blocked EU measures directed against Israel. That veto disappeared following Hungary's change of government in April.  As a result, EU foreign ministers agreed in May 2026 to impose sanctions on the more extremist Israeli settlers and related organizations, while simultaneously expanding sanctions against Hamas figures.

There is still no consensus among member states for the most far-reaching criticisms or anti-Israel measures. Countries generally favoring stronger pressure include Spain, Ireland and Belgium, and also to varying degrees, France and some Nordic countries. These governments have been among the strongest advocates of sanctions, trade measures, or review of the Association Agreement.

Countries generally favoring caution include Germany, Italy and several central European governments.  These states often support criticism of settlement violence and humanitarian concerns, while remaining cautious about broader economic or diplomatic penalties.

Realistically, the political mood across much of Europe is too far gone for the EU’s strong criticism of Israel, as predicted by the Telegraph, to be completely averted.  But forewarned is forearmed.  Back from her ambassadorial post in the UK, Tzipi Hotovely, the new head of Israel’s hasbara (public relations), now has the opportunity for a pre-emptive strike. 

She and her team have the chance, ahead of a storm of adverse criticism, to explain that Israel is engaged in protecting itself and its people against forces intent on their destruction.  Iran has explicitly declared its purpose is to eliminate Israel and its population from the Middle East, and its proxies have demonstrated their willingness to carry through on that intention.  Hamas committed a genocide of its own on October 7, 2023; Hezbollah refuses to abide by the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire deal and continues to strike into northern Israel; the Houthis proudly wave a flag inscribed with “Death to Israel; a curse upon the Jews”.

The EU must be made to understand that Israel will not subscribe to its own annihilation.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 9 June 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-898692

A new Sunni axis

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 2 June 2026

           “Sunni axis” is a term that is gaining currency.  It refers to a new security alliance of Sunni states that seems to be emerging.  At its heart is a Pakistan-Saudi Arabia mutual defense pact signed on September 17, 2025  – the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA).

            One noteworthy feature of the SMDA pact is an explicit collective‑defense clause that closely echoes NATO’s Article 5, namely that “any attack on one country will be viewed as an attack on both.” This has led some commentators to dub the agreement an Islamic NATO.

            This Pakistan-Saudi arrangement, according to Pakistani ministers, is not only capable of being expanded, but action is in hand to do so. Turkey and Qatar have been mentioned as the first states to turn the bilateral pact into a collective‑security grouping.  Egypt is a fifth potential member.

   Back in January Turkey was said to be in advanced discussions to join the SMDA pact. It seemed a natural and appropriate extension of an existing partnership. Turkey is Pakistan’s second‑largest arms supplier, and the military‑industrial connection is flourishing in terms of aircraft, drones, and naval assets.  

In an interview with Reuters, reported on January 15, 2026, Pakistan’s Minister for Defense Production, Raza Hayat Harraj, said: “The Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey trilateral agreement is something that is already in the pipeline.” 

His words presaged an axis that grouped key Sunni powers (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, potentially Egypt) on one side of a regional balance, with Iran’s mainly Shi’ite, but essentially anti-Israel, network (Iran, Iraq‑based pro-Iran militias, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) on the other.

However, something of a change of tone seemed to emerge in a interview given to the Bloomberg news agency by Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif on May 13. While discussing the idea that Turkey and Qatar may join the mutual defense cooperation pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Asif said “if Qatar and Turkey also join this existing agreement, it will be a welcome development” – a comment that clearly viewed their participation as a possibility rather than “in the pipeline,” as his ministerial colleague had claimed back in January.

Whether there has been a cooling of enthusiasm on Pakistan’s part is difficult to assess.  It is just possible that the glitch is caused by the prospect of a tighter Turkish-Saudi connection.  They remain, in many arenas, competitors for leadership of the Sunni world. Moreover, despite the recent rapprochement,  relations have been anything but warm over some of the past eight years. 

It was on October 2, 2018 that Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated inside the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul.  Turkey reacted with fury.  In a series of speeches and leaks, Turkey’s President Erdogan called the murder “savage,” said it was ordered from the “highest levels” of the Saudi state, and demanded the extradition of the Saudi suspects.

Turkish authorities opened a criminal investigation, searched the Saudi consulate and the consul’s residence, and leaked detailed allegations to the media about Khashoggi’s strangling, dismemberment and the pre‑planned nature of the operation.  Turkey then launched a trial in absentia of 26 Saudis, deepening the rift with Saudi Arabia, which insisted its own courts had jurisdiction.

 The thaw took a few years to develop.  Finally on April 7, 2022 an Istanbul court halted the trial and transferred the Khashoggi case to Saudi Arabia.  On the 28th Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia, met King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and said he hoped “to launch a new era”.  On June 21, 2022, MBS paid his first visit to Turkey since 2018.

On the face of it, Turkish-Saudi relations should be firmly re‑established, but negotiations aimed at bringing Turkey into the Pakistan–Saudi security pact have been dragging on now for half a year, and the arrangement is still not ready to be implemented.  Instead, the political narrative has drifted toward a flexible framework in which Turkey​ would be less than a full partner.

If ​actually completed on the lines originally envisaged, the new Sunni axis would amalgamate four formidable components: Saudi and Qatari financial resources and arms‑procurement; Turkey’s NATO‑standard conventional forces and advanced defense‑industrial base; Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and ballistic‑missile capabilities; and Egypt’s massed conventional army, control of the Suez corridor, and diplomatic weight in Arab and Gulf security affairs.

​These powerful elements could theoretically give it the ability to deter conventional attacks and influence conflicts across the Middle East and beyond.  In reality, however, ​converting the security pact into a tightly disciplined combat-ready military alliance is less than likely.  Internal divergences, domestic constraints, and each state’s ties to Washington, Beijing, Moscow and Brussels would rule​ it out​.

Even so, several interested parties and groupings perceive this Sunni axis as at least potentially threatening.

Iran and its allies would naturally be apprehensive about the emergence of a Sunni power bloc​ opposed to the Iranian regime’s bid for regional and religious dominance in the Middle East, and widely seen as a counterweight to Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

Indian analysts have already warned that a consolidated Pakistan–Saudi–Turkey security structure, backed by oil wealth and Pakistani nuclear capability, would upset the current security balance and challenge India’s defense environment.

Some Israeli strategic commentators believe that a more cohesive Sunni military grouping involving Turkey and Qatar could constrain Israel’s operational freedom.  Both Turkey and Qatar have a history of supporting Hamas.

Some eastern Mediterranean states, such as Greece, Cyprus and Armenia, are already at odds with Ankara, and view with concern the prospect of Turkey being backed in the future by Gulf money and Pakistani deterrence.

​But all this calculation seems premature.  Extending the Pakistan-Saudi defense and security pact to embrace other Sunni states, such as Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, ​seems far from imminent. Even Turkey, apparently on the verge of full accession back in January, is still hovering in the wings, talking about ​the possibility.

In short, if the enhanced ​alliance emerges it would ​indeed be a significant new factor in the region’s political alignment. Even in prospect it is enough to shape calculations in Tehran, New Delhi, Jerusalem and Washington. 

But ​a new Sunni axis simply does not yet exist.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Will a new Sunni axis reshape the Middle East?" 2 June 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-897859

The bid to recapture Lebanon’s sovereignty

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 26 May 2026

Ever since he was elected Lebanon’s president in January 2025, Joseph Aoun has emphasized that his primary aim is to end the humiliation of Hezbollah acting with impunity as “a state within a state”.  The nation, he decided, will no longer allow its sovereignty to be leased out to Iran or its proxy.  He will reclaim it.

​National sovereignty was being flouted on a daily basis by Iran’s ambassador-designate to Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Sheibani​.   Not yet formally accredited, ​he had distinguished his brief period in office by ​continually interfering in the​ nation's internal politics.  Moreover, he used his diplomatic cover to support Hezbollah’s military operations.  On March 24 the government declared him persona non grata and gave him until March 29 to leave the country.

"The ambassador will not leave Lebanon,” an Iranian diplomatic source told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on the 28th. This decision, he informed them, was in accordance with the wishes of Hezbollah and the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri.  Berri, a Shi’ite Muslim, is a known supporter of Hezbollah. 

So Sheibani remained in his residence in Beirut, and on March 30 Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson, Esmail Baghaei, told a press briefing in Tehran: “Our embassy in Lebanon remains operational.”

No greater affront to a nation’s sovereignty could be envisaged. Iran was telling the world that the Lebanese government was not the master in its own house.  Aoun took action.  He wrote to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the Security Council President. 

The complaint, which was filed officially on April 21, accused Sheibani of taking action, including issuing statements to the media, that amounted to direct interference in the nation’s internal affairs. It went on to charge Iran with multiple violations including "interfering in Lebanon's sovereign decision-making and entangling the state in a war it never chose". Moreover Lebanon accused Iran of "deploying Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps personnel in Lebanon under the guise of diplomatic activity.”

The letter challenges Iran’s accounts to the UN about Israeli strikes in Beirut, arguing that Tehran’s narrative is “full of falsehoods”.  And it accuses Iran of violating the Vienna Convention and international diplomatic norms by refusing to comply with Lebanon’s sovereign decision to expel Sheibani.  The 1961 Vienna Convention sets out the rules governing diplomacy between states.

Lebanon invited the UN to recognize and condemn these actions as breaches of international law, and to confirm that its order to expel Sheibani is legally valid and must be respected.  A response is awaited.  Unfortunately, effective action from the Security Council on this issue, as on so many, is less than assured. 

This effort to assert Lebanon’s national sovereignty is only the most recent of Aoun’s attempts.  Parliament elected him on January 8, 2025, after more than two years of a presidential vacancy.  With the restoration of national sovereignty his priority, in August 2025 Aoun and his cabinet instructed the army to develop a comprehensive plan to bring all weapons in the country under the control of state security forces, thereby ending Hezbollah’s autonomy.

 One month later Lebanon’s army chief, Rodolphe Haykal, presented the cabinet with a multi‑phase, region‑by‑region plan for disarming Hezbollah and other non‑state armed groups, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that all military hardware in Lebanon would be held exclusively by the state.  It began with a first phase aimed at removing Hezbollah’s weapons south of the Litani river by the end of 2025.

The cabinet authorized the army to begin enacting it at once. But it soon became clear that government forces lacked the capacity to implement the scheme. The army made some progress in dislodging Hezbollah from areas of southern Lebanon, but the plan was basically unviable. The state could not regain national sovereignty without help.

So from March 2026 Aoun began pushing the idea of face‑to‑face ceasefire talks with Israel, as part of a broader strategy that would ultimately bring Hezbollah’s weapons, and therefore Hezbollah itself, under state control.

The first 2026 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire deal was agreed on April 16, announced by US President Donald Trump following discussions with prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Aoun. Initially set to last ten days, the ceasefire was subsequently extended by three weeks on April 23, and then, on May 15, by an additional 45 days. 

There had been no official contact between Israel and Lebanon for four decades, so these negotiations were to be welcomed.  But what is the point of a ceasefire between two countries not in conflict with each other?  It is not the Lebanese armed forces but the uncontrollable Hezbollah that, at Iran’s behest, is attacking northern Israel, while Israel is trying to degrade its capacity to do so.

Aoun is in a difficult position.  On May 18 Lebanon’s al‑Jadeed TV channel published “a rare glimpse into Lebanese public opinion,” undertaken by the Beirut‑based statistics firm Information International.  It showed that Hezbollah still enjoys the support of much of the Muslim population – as against Christian, Maronite and Druze citizens, who are overwhelmingly opposed – and Aoun is fearful that too obvious an alliance with Israel could stir up civil conflict.  So for public consumption he steers clear of any suggestion of a Lebanon-Israel collaboration to disempower Hezbollah. He presents it as an effort to end further civilian casualties and structural damage.

In reality, however, preventing further devastation within Lebanon is dependent not on a pointless ceasefire agreement, but on Hezbollah’s actions, and Aoun has been unable to dissuade Hezbollah from continuing its armed attacks.  The ceasefire has therefore had no effect on Israel’s response.  On May 17 the media reported IDF strikes at nearly 100 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.

Israel also acts, when the opportunity arises, to eliminate known senior Hezbollah officials.  For example on May 6, in an airstrike on the southern suburbs of Beirut, a commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, Ahmed Ali Balout, was targeted and killed.

          It may be inexpedient for Aoun to admit it, but the truth is that the more Israel weakens Hezbollah, the more the president moves towards his objective of re-establishing Lebanon’s sovereignty over the terrorist organization.

Published in the Jerusalem Post titled "Recapture Lebanon's sovereignty", and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 26 May 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-897227

Published in Eurasia Review, 3 June 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052026-the-bid-to-recapture-lebanons-sovereignty-oped/

 

Two states – Macron’s final effort

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 19 May 2026

France has announced that it will host an international meeting in Paris on June 12, 2026, dedicated to realizing the two‑state solution.  With barely a year left in office, French president Emmanuel Macron is making a final bid to become the power broker who secures a sovereign state for the Palestinian people.  

This will be Macron’s second attempt at seizing the initiative in the Israel-Palestinian dispute.  

On July 28–30, 2025 in New York Macron co‑chaired a UN conference on implementing the two‑state solution.  It was resumed during the UN General Assembly’s high‑level week in late September 2025, and it was there that Macron announced France’s recognition of a State of Palestine.

Macron is following a well-trodden path.  For decades French leaders have tried to position France as a prime mover in solving the Israel-Palestinian issue.  Time and again they have attempted to convene multilateral conferences to resolve the question. Their initiatives have invariably proved ineffective.

French presidents have aspired to lead the game in the Middle East ever since France assumed its colonial role there, after the First World War.  At first, following Israel’s independence in 1948, France emerged as one of its strongest allies in Europe. The close military and political ties binding the two countries culminated in joint operations against Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis.

Following Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, though, France’s then-president, Charles de Gaulle, dramatically changed policy. He condemned Israel as the aggressor, imposed an arms embargo, and reoriented French diplomacy toward the Arab world.

De Gaulle sought influence in the Middle East by trying to act as an independent power broker, balancing the US and the USSR.  In pursuit of this strategy France became a leading European advocate of a pro-Arab – and later pro-Palestinian – stance.

In 1980 France was central in an early European bid to shape a comprehensive peace process – the Venice Declaration, which pushed for Palestinian self-determination.

It is certainly true that while long advocating the creation of a Palestinian state, France has consistently defended Israel’s right to exist in security – though, belying the famed logicality of French thought, the possible incompatibility between these two positions has never been acknowledged.  

 A certain inconsistency is also apparent in the planned June event in Paris.  In a televised address on March 3, Macron emphasized that Middle East peace “can only be achieved through diplomatic talks,” yet this forthcoming meeting is framed as a gathering featuring charitable and humanitarian bodies and networks. 

The opening move, reported by France’s Le Monde on April 30, was a video message from the French foreign minister, Jean-Noel Barrot, played to a gathering of several hundred peace activists in Tel Aviv – the "People's Peace Summit".   It had been organized by "It's Time", a grouping of ​some 80​ Israeli peace​ and civil society organizations working to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict through a two-state political agreement.                           

"Your presence here,” said Barrot, “is an act of resistance against fatalism and resignation."

​  His choice of audience indicates that the French intend to draw heavily on established Israeli and Palestinian peace NGOs, dialogue groups, and civil‑society networks for their June gathering.  So far France has not released a list of the bodies invited to attend, nor a formal participants list, but it can be assumed that a core of Israeli and Palestinian civil‑society organizations have indicated their willingness to engage.

​  As for the agenda, based on official statements the meeting is explicitly “dedicated to the long‑touted two‑state solution,” tying France’s recognition of Palestine to a structured set of discussions on how to realize that vision politically and practically.  The design is for “Israeli and Palestinian civil societies” to make their voices heard.  So the meeting will not, apparently, be a direct one-track negotiation, but rather panels and working groups highlighting joint initiatives, confidence‑building projects and peace education.

 France’s view of itself as a possible facilitator of an Israel-Palestinian accord has led it into ​less than productive actions on more than one occasion.​ ​ In July 2008 former French President Nicolas Sarkozy induced more than 40 heads of state, including Israel’s then-prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and the president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, to attend a summit in Paris.  There he pushed through a concept grandiosely titled the “Union for the Mediterranean”.  ​It initiated some​ useful​ practical developments in its early years, but ​it attracts little public attention nowadays, ​and it is far from flourishing. ​ In 2024 its secretary-general stated that "the sole viable vision for the region" was the two-state solution. 

 In 2009 ​Sarkozy offered to host another international conference in order, as he said, to facilitate the peace process.  ​Newly elected US President Obama, however, intent on pursuing his own initiative, rejected the overture.​  Nothing daunted, Sarkozy tried again in January 2010 and was again rebuffed.

This nostrum of a Paris-based international conference seems to have become an idée fixe in French thinking.  It reappeared in December 2014, when then-President François Hollande took the lead in drafting a Security Council resolution outlining proposals for an Israeli-Palestinian final-status deal, initiated – of course – by an international peace conference to take place in Paris.

That came to nothing, but on January 15, 2017 Hollande actually achieved France’s long-held ambition.

He hosted an international peace conference in Paris attended by representatives from about 70 countries including then-US Secretary of State, John Kerry. Nothing of substance resulted.  The final communiqué reaffirmed support for a two-state solution, but the occasion was rather like a performance of Hamlet without either the prince or his father’s ghost.  Neither Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, nor PA president Mahmoud Abbas, had been invited.

The French have a saying: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (the more things change, the more they're the same).  Here we are in 2026 with France’s current president organizing a broadly based  conference seeking to rally international partners around the two-state solution.

The underlying reality, though, remains.  Whatever the French leadership may believe, France is not a principal in the perennial Israel-Palestine issue.  Its opinion, and therefore its influence, has historically counted for little.  That remains as true in 2026 as it always was.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "France’s latest bid to broker Israel-Palestinian peace not likely to work," 19 May 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-896508

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 May 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22052026-two-states-macrons-final-effort-oped/

Israel and the UAE – brothers-in-arms

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 12 May 2026

  On May 4 Iran fired 12 ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and four drones into the United Arab Emirates. This latest attack came in response to President Donald Trump’s effort to ensure free navigation for commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

            Initially kept secret, and later disclosed only through limited specialist reporting, is the interesting information that IDF personnel operated Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system to intercept the incoming Iranian missiles, but from within the UAE.  Not much has been made of it in the media, but this was the first time that Israel’s advanced technology has been deployed and used operationally in combat on foreign soil.

It proves, if proof were needed, that Israel–UAE military cooperation is a rapidly maturing strategic partnership.  Embedded in the Abraham Accords framework, the collaboration is driven above all by a shared perception of the threat posed by Iran. 

Early in the war, at the request of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed in a direct conversation with Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel quietly deployed an Iron Dome battery plus IDF personnel to the UAE.  Reports indicate that Israeli crews have since intercepted dozens of Iranian missiles and drones aimed at UAE targets.

   In parallel, the IAF carried out strikes on short‑range missile launch sites in Iran that were assessed as threats to the UAE and other Gulf states, linking Israeli offensive operations directly to Emirati defense.  On May 14 the Jerusalem Post reported that Benjamin Netanyahu visited the UAE and met with Zayed while the fighting was going on.  The meeting yielded a “historic breakthrough” according to Netanyahu’s office.

   Yet even before the current Iran war, there was a clear trend of growing military and defense‑industrial cooperation between Israel and the UAE.

It was back in August 2025 that the Washington Institute for Near East Policy published a survey titled: “Israel-UAE Defense Cooperation Grows under the Abraham Accords”. It included reference to a possible forthcoming deal in which the UAE’s Edge Group would procure the Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from the Israeli company Elbit Systems—including transfer of technology and localized production.

That would, it said, potentially​ shift ​"the geopolitical balance in the Gulf.” If this deal was indeed finalized, ​it has not, on the grounds of industrial confidentiality, been made public​. Reports have appeared, though, of multi-million dollar sales of the Hermes UAV to undisclosed customers.   

What is known is that since normalization in 2020, the UAE has acquired Israeli‑made Barak and Spyder air‑defense systems, embedding Israeli technology in its force structure.  In October 2022 an Israeli‑made Barak system was deployed in the UAE, and by 2023 the two states conducted their first bilateral naval exercise and unveiled a jointly developed unmanned surface vessel.

In 2025, UAE Mirage 2000‑9s flew alongside Israeli and US aircraft in a multinational exercise in Greece, signaling that Emirati participation in exercises that openly include Israel has become routine.

Put together with the deployment of an Iron Dome system within the UAE itself, what emerges​, if not quite a mutual defense treaty​, is ​close to the ​collaboration expected in a ​signed and sealed security partnership​.

Way back in 2017, three years before the Abraham Accords, a senior UAE military figure publicly described the UAE and Israel as “like brothers”.  In an interview with the US outlet Defense & Aerospace Report, UAE Major General Abdullah al‑Hashmi went on to describe the US as the “older brother”, overseeing any differences between them.

​So can Israel and the UAE fairly be called “brothers‑in‑arms”?

Israeli and Emirati forces have now fought on the same side in the same live theatre, with Israelis directly defending Emirati territory from Iranian attack and coordinating offensive action against Iranian launch sites.​  The UAE hosts and operates Israeli air‑defense and early‑warning systems and trains regularly with Israeli forces, which is the kind of shoulder‑to‑shoulder activity many would intuitively associate with “brothers‑in‑arms”.

​The cooperation​, though, is framed around the specific threat posed by Iran. There is no formal or explicit public commitment that either state w​ould come to the other’s aid in future conflicts. Above all, the relationship remains constrained by wider Arab public opinion, and the UAE’s need to preserve maneuvering room with other regional actors. ​

​All the same Israel and the UAE have crossed a previously unbridgeable Rubicon.   Israeli troops, Iron Dome, and even – it is reliably reported – state-of-the=-art Israeli prototype Iron Beam and Spectro systems have been deployed in combat from Emirati soil, with real‑time Israeli intelligence guiding UAE and coalition responses.​  All of which makes it politically and operationally easier, next time, to set up joint structures previously almost unimaginable – the permanent basing outside of Israel of some Israeli systems, joint missile‑defense planning, and regularized trilateral planning with US Central Command. 

​In fact that model is already ​beginning to appear, in uneven ways, across the Abraham Accords bloc​.  It could, if the war drags on, become the basis of a looser regional security architecture focused on Iran and its projectiles rather than on broader Arab–Israeli peace.

Among the Abraham Accords states, the UAE and Bahrain are emerging as front‑line adopters of the new model.  They openly normalize with Israel, quietly integrate Israeli air‑ and missile‑defense, intelligence, and naval cooperation, and plug this into US‑led multilateral drills and emerging regional defense schemes aimed squarely at Iran and its projectiles.

By contrast, Morocco ​- and ​Sudan before the civil war - were “selective adopters”​,  taking Israeli UAVs, air‑defense systems, intelligence and doctrine sharing, but applying them primarily to their own local rivalries like Algeria and Western Sahara.

​Introduced in the US Senate in March 2026 ​was  an ​Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Act​. ​If passed it would create a formal Pentagon‑run “US–Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Initiative”, deepening military cooperation with Abraham Accords countries specifically to deter Iran and its proxies.​ 

​The Bill is still at the very start of the legislative process, but commentators believe that  current political dynamics in Congress give it a real—though by no means guaranteed—chance of being folded into this year’s annual US defense Bill.  

So ​a possible outcome of this Israel-UAE “brothers-in-arms” moment is a US‑enabled security ecosystem in which Israel and the UAE collaborate closely when Iran is the adversary, and other Accords states plug in more selectively – in short, a tighter, closer, more secure partnership.


Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Israel and UAE: A brothers-in-arms alliance against Iran's growing threat", 12 May 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-895776

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 May 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/15052026-israel-and-the-uae-brothers-in-arms-oped/