Jordan and the Palestinians

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 29 September 2026

On September 23, King Abdullah of Jordan addressed the UN General Assembly. He devoted much of his speech to lambasting Israel. He maintained that what he called “one of the world's longest running occupations” broke international law, and that the world had ignored it for decades.

   Of course he had nothing to say about the Jordanian monarchy’s​ unhappy relationship with the Palestinians, ​with its own history of violence, repression and unresolved grievance, nor of the several charges of flouting international law that Jordan has been accused of over the years.

In the 1948–49 war, for example, Jordan’s Arab Legion took control of the West Bank. On April 24, 1950, the Jordanian parliament approved its annexation, declaring “complete unity between the two banks of the Jordan” in a single Hashemite kingdom ruled by King Abdullah’s great-grandfather, Abdullah I. ​ Arabs resident in the West Bank became Jordanian citizens.

 The Arab League refused to recognize Jordan’s annexation.  So did the rest of the world, with the sole exception of Britain and, it has been suggested (though details remain unclear), Pakistan.

​The UN characterized Jordan’s annexation as lacking international legal validity.  International law does not recognize the acquisition of territory through the use of force as a lawful basis for acquiring sovereignty.

If Jordan flouted international law when it annexed the West Bank, it compounded its disregard for the legal niceties when it reversed its decision.

Until July 31, 1988 ​most Arabs living in the West Bank were, as a matter of Jordanian law and practice, Jordanian citizens.  On that day King Hussein, Abdullah’s father, announced that Jordan was ending its legal and administrative relationship with the territory with immediate effect.​  Under the disengagement regulations, some one million Arab​s resident in the West Bank were ​suddenly stripped of their Jordanian citizenship.​  All at once they were no longer Jordanian.      

​Human Rights Watch describes them as becoming stateless Palestinians under Israeli occupation.​  Over time their Jordanian passports were replaced with temporary Jordanian travel documents that did not confer citizenship.  

Loss of nationality had serious legal consequences.  They had no right of residence in Jordan.  Non-citizens could not vote or stand for office. They were excluded from state employment and faced serious obstacles in accessing work, education, health care and other services.

International human rights law prohibits​ the arbitrary deprivation of nationality.  Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.”  

The fact that Jordan’s 1988 disengagement stripped a whole defined population of its existing nationality, without an individualized process and without a replacement nationality, makes the charge against Jordan of arbitrary illegality a powerful one.

In his speech​ to the UN, Abdullah called on world opinion to denounce Israel for Palestinian deaths.  He might also have acknowledged that Yasser Arafat once accused King Hussein, his father, of killing 25,000 Palestinians – a figure generally believed to have been wildly exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

The episode is usually called Black September, although it lasted from September 1970 until the following July, and the death toll remains disputed.  The commonly cited estimate of Palestinian deaths is in the low thousands, including both fighters and civilians.  Jordanian soldiers also died. What is not disputed is that the events of 1970–71 left a deep and bitter Palestinian-Jordanian legacy.

​After the Six-Day War​ in 1967,​ it was from Jordan that Palestinian​ fighters began mounting guerrilla operations against Israel​. ​ By 1969 ​Arafat was leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella body in which his Fatah movement was dominant.  The organization and its constituent groups ​started functioning increasingly from within Jordan.  Armed groups established bases and checkpoints in and around cities and refugee camps ​acting as a law unto themselves, sometimes defying the police and civil authorities.

​Soon King Hussein ​ was fac​ing an armed Palestinian movement operating inside his kingdom ​ and challeng​ing the authority of the state.​ He decided to move against Arafat's​ PLO and its armed forces, the fedayeen. ​

The crisis came to a head in September 1970.  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)​, a constituent body of the PLO,  hijacked several international passenger aircraft. Three aircraft were eventually taken to Dawson's Field near Zarqa, Jordan, where passengers were removed and the aircraft blown up before the world's television cameras – a spectacular display that humiliated the Jordanian authorities.​ 

For Hussein, the question was no longer how to restrain the fedayeen, but who governed Jordan. ​ On September 16 he declared martial law.​  The following day the Jordanian Army opened a major offensive against Palestinian positions in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid and elsewhere.​​

The operation was considerably more than a simple expulsion.  For a ​time it amounted to a civil war between the Jordanian state and heavily armed Palestinian organizations.  The fighting was intense and involved artillery, tanks and infantry.  Jordanian forces attacked PLO positions.  Palestinian fighters resisted and, in some places, effectively controlled territory.

A ceasefire ​hammered out in Cairo on September 27 ​proved totally ineffective.  ​The Palestinian militias remained entrenched and operative within Jordan.   In early 1971 Hussein resumed the campaign against the​m.  ​Finally the Jordanian Army ​succeeded in driving the fedayeen out of their remaining urban strongholds. The ​last major ​encounter took place in July 1971​, and ​organized ​Palestinian resistance in Jordan was effectively destroyed.​  Arafat and senior PLO figures​ ​fled.

​They escaped across the Jordanian-Syrian ​border​, and regrouped in Lebanon.  Thousands of Palestinian fighters were ​driven out of Jordan and followed them. ​

It had been a bloody encounter.  As well as Jordanian soldiers, thousands of Palestinians, including civilians​, had been killed. The episode produced a particularly bitter Palestinian-Jordanian legacy.  In 1971 a militant  Palestinian group, which subsequently called itself the Black September Organization, assassinated Jordan’s prime minister Wasfi al-Tal.

None of this ​unhappy history disposes of any moral or legal questions raised by the current situation, but it does complicate Abdullah’s posture of unqualified moral denunciation of Israel.

          In short, standing at the UN podium vilifying Israel, King Abdullah might have borne in mind the old adage:  “People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "King Abdullah’s UN attack on Israel overlooks Jordan’s own troubled history," 29 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-909962

 

Israel’s electoral system: Room for improvement?

 This article appears in the forthcoming edition of the Jerusalem Report, dated 12 October 2026:

 This is an unusual moment in Israeli politics.  For the first time since 1988 the Knesset has completed its statutory four-year term (between 2019 and 2022 the nation went to the polls no less than five times).

The general election on October 27 gives Israelis the opportunity to say how, in their opinion, the nation should progress in the next four years.  They will vote for the party advocating the policies closest to their heart.  But the national mood will emerge from a highly fragmented vote. Given the number of parties competing in the election, no clear winner can emerge.   

As a result each general election is followed by weeks of negotiations, as the party with the largest mandate attempts to assemble a majority in the Knesset and form a coalition government.  

A coalition is by its very nature a compromise.  Usually the smaller parties use their prospective support to secure policy concessions or ministerial posts. The party seeking to govern may in turn press potential partners to moderate or defer some demands. As a result many electors find that the policies they originally voted for are so modified that, even if they are pursued, they are pale shadows of what they were.

In short, the policies ultimately pursued by the governing coalition may bear only a limited resemblance to the political programs that voters endorse at the ballot box. 

This is one of the democratic deficits of the present system.

Another is that the people voted into the Knesset are virtually anonymous to most Israeli electors.  Apart from the party leaders, most of the candidates on party lists are totally unknown to most voters. Once they become members of the Knesset they have no connection, and feel no obligation, toward the electors who voted them into power.

This is because Israel’s electoral system differs from that of most other Western democracies, including the US, in one vital respect – it lacks any constituency-based element.  It is, for example, radically different from that of the UK, the system favored by David Ben Gurion in the 1950s but never introduced.

Britain is divided into 650 constituencies.  Each elects one member of parliament.  Any political party may put up a candidate, but party lists are an unknown phenomenon.  The candidate who wins most votes is elected, regardless of how many votes were cast for others. In this system, known as “first past the post”, proportional representation does not feature. The idea of instituting PR was put to the UK electorate in 2011 in a national referendum, and overwhelmingly rejected.

Britain’s system nearly always results in one or other of the two major parties – Conservative or Labour – obtaining a clear majority.  Its leader becomes prime minister. Except in rare cases, which do arise from time to time, there is no need for the leader of the winning party to negotiate with anyone about anything.  The day after the election, the winning party takes power.

As for elected members of parliament, each is regarded by their constituents as “their” MP, whether or not they voted for him or her. All MPs hold regular “surgeries” in their constituency where members of the public with problems can speak personally to them and ask for advice or help. The personal connection between MPs and their local areas is very strong.

This electoral system, like all electoral systems, is far from perfect.  Its main disadvantage is its failure to match the national voting pattern with seats in parliament – undoubtedly a democratic deficit.

Ben Gurion had advocated dividing Israel into 120 single-member constituencies – but he never had a sufficiently large coalition to overcome the parties that benefited from proportional representation.

His idea was revived in June 1980 by MKs Yigael Hurvitz and Zalman Shoval, and was subsequently embodied in a bill introduced in February 1981.  It did not survive the legislative process.

Proposals for reform that combined the constituency concept with the proportionality of the present system were advanced in 1958, 1972 and 1988. The 1988 proposal, sponsored by MK Mordechai Virshubski and supported by 43 other MKs, included a model in which 60 MKs would be elected in constituencies and 60 through the current system. Under that arrangement, voters would effectively cast two votes – one for a constituency candidate and another for a party list. The bill passed a first reading but subsequently foundered.

In 2005, the President himself – Moshe Katsav – took the initiative.

He set up a commission containing the country's leading political scientists and chaired by Hebrew University President Menahem Magidor.  It met regularly for more than a year, and it too finally favored a combined system. Highlighting the lack of “clear linkage between an elected person’s performance and their chances of being reelected,” its report recommended that half of the Knesset should be elected directly in 17 regional constituencies based on Interior Ministry districts, while the other 60 would continue to be elected through the nationwide proportional system.

The commission’s recommendations, like the earlier parliamentary bills proposing electoral reform, were not followed up.  Nor indeed were subsequent attempts, such as the determined effort by Professor Menahem Ben-Sasson.   Appointed Chair of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in 2006, Ben Sasson set to work with a will.

Undeterred by all the previous unsuccessful attempts, he declared: “This generation might be ready. At least I have to try”. Try he did, but his bill, presented to the Knesset in 2008, was blocked by those who feared a loss of influence in any revised system.

Vested interest is the great enemy of change in any electoral system. For those benefitting from any current procedure, reform carries with it the danger of a loss of power. Even though there has been for many years a general recognition that Israel’s electoral system is far from perfect and that change is desirable, time and again the parties in power have declined to grasp the nettle of reform.  And so we journey on, as Shakespeare has it, “with all our imperfections”.

Israel-Saudi security links revived

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 September 2026

On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement, known as the Mecca Pact.  At its public core is a political commitment modeled in part on NATO’s Article 5 – namely an armed attack on one party is to be regarded as an attack on all.

On September 8, the Houthis launched a major wave of attacks against Saudi Arabia, striking civilian and economic sites and energy infrastructure in several southern cities. Subsequently the country has been attacked time and again by the Houthis.  Civilian and economic facilities have been struck, King Khalid air base and Aramco facilities have been targeted. 

Why have Turkey and Pakistan not rushed to Saudi’s defense?

Rather like the small print on insurance policies, the Mecca Pact seems to exclude as much as it offers.  The publicly released description of the agreement, while making much of the NATO-like commitment, does not specify an automatic military response should one of the parties be attacked.  Nor does it publicly stipulate the circumstances in which troops must be deployed.  In fact, the full text of the agreement has not been released, so important questions about its scope and implementation remain obscure.

Rather late in the day, on September 19, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudry, chief spokesman for Pakistan’s military, is reported as saying “Pakistan fully stands with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both diplomatically and physically…We will go to any extent.”

But the statement, whatever it meant, was too late. Given the ambiguities inherent in the Mecca Pact, and the obvious reluctance of either Pakistan or Turkey to become involved in a military operation in Yemen, it is not surprising that Saudi Arabia turned to Washington for support that subsequently connected it to Israel.  

CENTCOM is the US military command responsible for the Middle East and parts of Central and South Asia.  It directs US military operations and security partnerships in that area.

Some time during the week of September 7, at a secluded ski resort in Germany (rumored to be Garmisch-Partenkirchen), CENTCOM’s commander, Admiral Brad Cooper, hosted a conference of senior military leaders from eight countries. 

It is extraordinary, but the fact, that sitting round the same table were Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the  IDF chief of staff, and military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt.  CENTCOM, functioning as an intermediary, had succeeded in connecting Israel with Arab militaries that do not have diplomatic relations with it – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular. 

 According to a report by Axios, the respected digital news outlet, the central purpose of the conference was to discuss the continuing US–Israeli war with Iran, and the broader regional-security situation.  Cooper reportedly assured those present that, despite Iranian attacks on US bases, the US would retain forces in the Middle East.  He also primed the group on plans to expand maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Zamir is said to have briefed the participants on IDF operations on several fronts.

Axios further reports, citing “a source with knowledge of the matter,” that Israel and Saudi Arabia, with CENTCOM assistance, began discussing how Israel could assist Saudi military operations against the Houthis. The possible support mentioned is ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), on the lines of the assistance that Israel has reportedly provided to the UAE.

On September 14, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) met Cooper in Jeddah, amid the rapidly worsening Houthi offensive. The next day Reuters reported that Washington, while declining to conduct direct US strikes against the Houthis, had agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with targeted assistance.

That same day, September 15, the Jerusalem Post reported that Israel and Saudi Arabia had held CENTCOM-mediated discussions about Israeli intelligence assistance to Riyadh against the Houthis. Regional diplomatic sources had told the paper that the Saudi side was seeking intelligence that could help build a picture of Houthi deployments, and thus anticipate future operations.  

A similar report emanated from the Institute for the Study of War in a document published jointly with the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. It commented that this prospective arrangement would: “…resemble Israel’s current intelligence support relationship with the United Arab Emirates.”

There is no doubt that the Iran war is creating an unusually powerful common-security denominator.  The countries represented in CENTCOM’s conference have very different political relationships with Israel, but they share an immediate security problem: Iran.  Iranian-aligned armed groups have acted against some of them, and are capable of threatening all.

Israel possesses substantial intelligence and surveillance capabilities concerning Iran and its regional partners.  Saudi’s cities and energy infrastructure have been struck repeatedly by Houthi missiles and drones.  CENTCOM possesses the command-and-control machinery that can connect Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Although Saudi Arabia still has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the emerging arrangement potentially constitutes a major step in Saudi-Israeli military normalization.  Israeli intelligence is being used to help defend Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, even without diplomatic normalization.

This arrangement gives Saudi Arabia considerable political cover.  Publicly, its relationship with Israel can remain highly constrained; operationally, cooperation can become increasingly sophisticated.

So the present position, according to media reports, is that Saudi Arabia is being offered direct targeted support by the US, while CENTCOM is mediating Saudi–Israeli discussions on intelligence assistance against the Houthis.

Saudi-Israeli collaboration is nothing new.  There is a 60-year history of covert strategic cooperation. But the Saudi-Israel connection remains as delicate as it has ever been. It is not any form of military alliance, nor has there been any change in Saudi policy on formal normalization.  In fact reports emanating from Saudi sources suggest that Riyadh, even while seeking Israel’s help against Houthi attacks, is still resisting movement on normalization.

            Meanwhile, the law of unintended consequences is in full play. While the Houthis continue their strikes on Saudi Arabia and make territorial gains in areas surrounding one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints, the Bab el-Mandeb, they are inadvertently fostering greater military cooperation than ever before between Israel and Arab states, and both reviving and strengthening Israel’s covert security links with Saudi Arabia.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Saudi Arabia turns to Israel as Houthi attacks expose limits of the Mecca Pact," 23 September 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-909254

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 September 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26092026-israel-saudi-security-links-revived-oped/

The end of the SDF

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2026

            The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was formed back in 2015.

A year earlier ISIS had proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate, claiming religious and political authority over all Muslims. It then proceeded to conquer and absorb great swathes of Syria and Iraq, and was designated a terrorist organization by the UN, the US and many countries, including Muslim-majority states.

            Opposing ISIS in northern Syria were the Kurdish-led YPG (People’s Protection Units).  Together with the closely linked YPJ (Women’s Protection Units), they joined with Arab, Assyrian and other local armed groups to create a broader coalition, and this became the SDF.

            The US had already begun supporting the YPG, particularly during the battle for Kobani in 2014–15.  After the SDF was formed, Washington began arming, advising and providing air support to it as its principal ground partner against ISIS.

Backed by Washington, the SDF proved remarkably successful in combating ISIS.  It conquered stronghold after stronghold, and finally, with the capture of Baghouz in 2019, ended the ISIS caliphate in Syria.

In the years that followed, the SDF developed its own security forces and civilian administration, and became the military and governing authority across much of north-eastern Syria.

Because the SDF was Kurdish-led and YPG-dominated, its powerful presence was opposed by Turkey.   

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regards the YPG as closely linked to the PKK, a political and militant element within the Kurdish autonomy movement that Turkey and the US designate as a terrorist organization.

He was doubtless delighted with the announcement on  August 25 by Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF.  Speaking in a televised press conference in Damascus,  he declared that, following an agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF's mission had ended and that it was being dissolved “as an independent military force” and was being integrated as brigades into the Syrian army.

His announcement covered not only the military functions of the SDF, but also the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its affiliated military and civilian institutions.  Abdi said these structures had likewise been integrated into Syrian state institutions.

As president of the post-Assad government in Syria, Sharaa is attempting to bring the disparate political, military and social forces that have been operating independently under the authority of a unified Syrian state.

On 10 March 2025 Sharaa and Abdi hammered out a deal.  The SDF's civilian and military institutions, including border crossings, oil and gas facilities, and airports, would come under state control.  In return the Kurds would be recognized as an integral part of Syria, be granted citizenship, political participation and other rights.

The deal lacked detail and was too fragile to hold.  In January 2026 government forces launched a lightning offensive against the SDF, rapidly capturing substantial SDF-held territory.  The SDF’s hopes of US protection, as in the past, were dashed, but a generous ceasefire deal saw SDF personnel entering Syria’s defense and interior ministries, while the government took over the border crossings, oil and gas fields and civilian institutions.

            The integration process continued over the next few months leading, eventually, to Abdi’s dissolution announcement which was not, of course, simply a voluntary decision by the SDF to disband. It was the end-point of a negotiated political settlement whose terms were progressively reshaped by the dramatic change in the military balance. The SDF leadership ultimately calculated that incorporation into the new Syrian state offered a better prospect for preserving Kurdish interests than trying to maintain an autonomous armed enclave against Damascus, Turkey and a less dependable US patron.

A few days after the SDF's dissolution Sharaa appointed Mazloum Abdi as a presidential adviser.  The appointment was widely read as a sign that Sharaa, far from trying to destroy the Kurdish leadership, was intent on integrating it into the nation’s governance.

            The SDF's disappearance is a major piece of Sharaa's state-consolidation project, but it is not the last, or necessarily the hardest, piece.  Major steps are still required.  He has to complete acquiring state monopoly of armed force.  The SDF was the biggest remaining autonomous military structure, and its dissolution is therefore a major breakthrough, but there are a fair number of former rebel and militia formations, and all need to be subordinated to the state.

He has to resolve the problem of the semi-autonomous Druze community in Sweida, which remains largely outside effective central-government control.  His challenge is to negotiate a restoration of state authority without provoking another major sectarian conflict.

Then there is the problem of building a genuinely national political settlement.  Ideally he would like Syria's Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians and other minorities to accept that their future security lies within a central Syrian state. The Kurdish settlement illustrates the model Sharaa appears to favor – recognizing communal rights, but eliminating autonomous armed and quasi-state institutions.

Sharaa needs, within a reasonable period of time, to complete the transition from revolutionary government to a fully functioning state – national ministries, judiciary, police, taxation, public services and a unified economic administration. It is currently a fragile transitional administration dependent on concentrated presidential power.

Finally there is his declared objective to establish a permanent constitution and elected government.

On  March 13, 2025, Sharaa signed a Constitutional Declaration establishing the legal framework for a five-year transitional period leading to a permanent constitutional settlement and democratic elections.

The People’s Assembly, which first convened in Damascus in July 2026, is a transitional legislature rather than a fully elected parliament.  Two-thirds of its 210 members were selected by regional electoral colleges, while Sharaa appointed the remaining 70.  

The roadmap is to move from this interim framework to a permanent constitution, followed by parliamentary elections. The Constitutional Declaration provides for a five-year transition from March 2025, ending only when both the permanent constitution has been adopted and elections held under it.  March 2030 is currently the outer horizon. The immediate next step is to establish the body that will be charged with drafting the new constitution. 

The absorption of the SDF’s military and administrative functions into the state was a vital step toward the eventual achievement of a fully functioning, democratic, constitutional Syria.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The end of the SDF: What the dissolution means for the Kurds and Sharaa's state", 14 Sep 2026: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-908532

Published in Eurasia Review, 19 September 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19092026-the-end-of-the-sdf-oped/

The Two-State Solution

 This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today, 11 September 2026:

Sir

Ed Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said: “securing the two-state solution in its fullest form is the North Star of this government’s policy.”

Palestinian leadership has been offered a two-state solution on six separate occasions – first by Britain in 1937. The Peel Commission proposed the separation of Mandatory Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. Zionist leaders accepted the principle; Arab leadership rejected it.

In 1947 the UN Partition Plan, which proposed independent Arab and Jewish states, was accepted by the Jewish leadership and rejected by the Arab.

Two-state offers were made at Camp David in 2000, and later that year by Bill Clinton. Neither was accepted by Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

In 2008 Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, rejected the two-state solution offered by Ehud Olmert, then Israel’s prime minister,. He also refused to consider the two-state plan in 2020 that emerged from the efforts of Donald Trump’s team during his first term in office.

The West seems determined to thrust the two-state solution down the throat of a Palestinian leadership for whom it has no appeal.

 

Russia ditches its Syrian bases

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 September 2026

On August 9, the Syrian foreign ministry announced that, following approximately 18 months of negotiations, Syria and Russia had concluded a memorandum of understanding. The Russian presence at the Tartus naval facility, and at the Hmeimim air base adjacent to Latakia International Airport, would be “reorganized”.  The bases would pass into Syrian civilian administration, and their military facilities would be redefined as joint Syrian-Russian training and qualification centers.

As a result the Russian naval base at Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, operational for 55 years, is now virtually defunct.  A Nato official is reported as saying: “There has been nothing there since June. That’s the first time in more than 10 years. This is pretty significant.”  

Russian vessels previously stationed in the Med have been diverted to protect Putin’s armada of sanctioned oil tankers which operate principally on Baltic-to-ocean routes, passing through the Danish straits, the North Sea and, in some cases, the English Channel.

Immediately after the announcement, Syrian foreign minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani traveled to the coast with an official delegation.  He inspected both Tartus Port and the Hmeimim air base, established in 2015 by agreement between Russia’s president Vladimir Putin and Syria’s then-president, Bashar al-Assad.

SANA (the Syrian Arab News Agency) described the visit as “a tour of the facilities covered by the newly concluded memorandum.”  

The official Syrian accounts of the tour make no mention of any Russian representative being present.  But two days later, on August 11, Reuters reported the Russian Foreign Ministry's spin on the agreement:  “We regard the signing on August 9 of the memorandum between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on the operation of our bases in Hmeimim and Tartus as an important step aimed at further improving bilateral cooperation in the military sphere.”

So the focus of the Russian narrative is not abandonment of its Mediterranean presence, but continued military cooperation – and a Syrian source subsequently told Reuters that some Russian forces would indeed remain at the newly designated joint training centers.  But by August 12 Russian personnel were observed vacating buildings around the previously Russian-controlled commercial berth at Tartus, while Syria had already begun using it for civilian shipping.

So the former Russian naval base at Tartus is being dismantled as a military facility and is being converted into a joint Russian-Syrian training facility, and the same is true of Russia’s former air base at Hmeimim.  Arguably Hmeimim is the more consequential loss for Russia.  It was the hub for Russia's air operations in Syria, supported its wider military activities, and  enhanced its regional standing.

The effective end of Russia’s military presence at Tartus and Hmeimim is a strategic gain for Israel. When Russia established its air base at Hmeimim in 2015 to support the Assad regime, there was a risk that Israeli and Russian air operations over Syria could come into conflict. Jerusalem and Moscow consequently developed a deconfliction mechanism under which each side was given advance notice of planned air operations. With Russia no longer maintaining a significant aerial presence in Syria, Israeli air operations will face fewer constraints.

Israel’s current concerns in Syria are disrupting attacks against its troops in the south, preventing hostile forces from consolidating near the Golan Heights, and frustrating any attempt by Turkey to gain a military foothold that could threaten Israel.

For Turkey is increasingly filling the vacuum caused by Russia's withdrawal.  The post-Assad Syrian government has developed a close military relationship with Turkey, which has been helping rebuild Syrian military capabilities.  Israel has warned Turkey officially against embarking on what defense minister Israel Katz called “dangerous adventures in Syria.”

Israeli media reports have described Israel’s negotiating “red lines” as: no Turkish military activity in Syria; demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan; security for Syria’s Druze community; and limits on certain Syrian strategic weapons systems.  These would include ground-based air-defense systems, missiles, armed drones and military aviation infrastructure such as radar networks.

On August 18, shortly after a Turkish delegation visited Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase, Israel carried out airstrikes on the facility.  Israel said the action was intended to prevent an impending Turkish military deployment there.

Damascus condemned the attack as a violation of Syrian sovereignty, arguing that Syria was entitled to rebuild its armed forces and ally with whatever foreign partner it chooses. Meanwhile the US, in the person of Tom Barrack, has been trying to establish a deconfliction process among Israel, Syria and Turkey.

Barrack, whose official title is lengthy and perhaps a trifle excessive (he is currently US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq) described the Abu al-Duhur strike as an “unnecessary escalation” that did not advance regional stability.

His increasingly critical stance towards Israeli policy in Syria has itself attracted criticism, particularly following recent remarks on Israel’s military stance in Syria and equivocal statements, later clarified, about the Golan Heights.

Russia’s loss of exclusive military control at Tartus and Hmeimim changes the geopolitical landscape.  For roughly 55 years, a Soviet/Russian military presence on the Syrian coast has been part of Israel's strategic environment.  The Soviet Union was one of Israel's principal military adversaries during the Cold War; Putin's Russia subsequently became a partner of sorts in managing the Syrian battlefield. Now that presence is being reduced to a joint training role under Syrian sovereignty.

For Israel, therefore, this is much more than the closure of two Russian bases. It is evidence of the collapse of the geopolitical system that existed along Israel's northern frontier for half a century.

While Russia’s effective withdrawal from Syria, and therefore from the Middle East as a whole, appears a net positive for Israel diplomatically and militarily, strategically it seems to be fostering the emergence of a Turkish-influenced Syria. 

Turkish military penetration of Syria is a substantially more serious problem than the Russian presence that it is replacing.  For Turkey, close alignment with Damascus offers the prospect of curbing Kurdish autonomy on its border, facilitating refugee returns, winning a large share of Syria’s reconstruction and trade, reopening overland routes to Arab markets, and consolidating Ankara’s regional influence at the expense of rival powers.

          Israel will need to be vigilant.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online, 8 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-907793

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 September 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/12092026-russia-ditches-its-syrian-bases-oped/

  

Disabling Hamas

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 September 2026

Sunday, November 15, 2026 – a date to circle in your diary.  By then – precisely 90 days since a meeting in Jerusalem on August 17 to discuss the Board of Peace’s plan for Gaza – Hamas should be demobilized and the IDF should have begun withdrawing from the Strip.

            That August 17 meeting brought prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu together with the three-man team of Jared Kushner, Nickolay Mladenov and Sir Tony Blair.  They had just returned from an unprecedented negotiating session in Egypt with Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya.  The significance of November 15 lies in what was agreed in Cairo – a handover by Hamas of weaponry and tunnels within 90 days. 

As Kushner told Fox News, following the meeting:  “For Israel we think this is a win-win situation, because if Hamas actually gives over the weapons and the tunnels willingly over the next 60 to 90 days that obviously would be the elimination of a huge security threat for Israel, almost an unthinkable achievement.”

            To advance the Board of Peace’s aim of reconstructing Gaza, the August meeting agreed to set up two working groups.  One would facilitate the disarmament and demilitarization process which, according to a statement from Netanyahu’s office, “both Israel and the Board of Peace are determined should be prompt and completed before any reconstruction happens.”   The second would focus on sanitation, clean water and public health in Gaza.

While Israel has consistently supported the 20-point peace plan produced by US President Donald Trump and endorsed by the Board of Peace, there seemed to be a problem regarding sequencing.  The plan requires both the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza, and for a time both Hamas and Israel were asserting that they would indeed act, provided the other party acted first.

Initially the Board of Peace planned to connect incremental disarmament with gradual Israeli withdrawals. The August meeting seems to have established a way through the impasse.  It now seems there will be no IDF withdrawal until Hamas has disarmed. The IDF’s withdrawal is linked to agreed standards, milestones, and timeframes as the​ International Stabilization Force​ (ISF​) establishes control and stability, although an Israeli security perimeter may remain until Gaza is judged secure.

​Under the UN-endorsed Trump peace plan, the ISF is envisaged as a temporary multinational security force, operating alongside Israel, Egypt, and a newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force.  Its mandate includes helping to secure borders, supporting Gaza’s demilitarization, dismantling military and terrorist infrastructure, permanently decommissioning non-state armed groups’ weapons, and protecting civilians.

At Israel’s request, the parties agreed that in the initial stage of disarmament Hamas’s weapons would not be turned over to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.

          Why did Israel make this a condition?  Because the National Committee is a wholly Palestinian body – and even though it is specifically apolitical, Israel was taking no chances.   Concerned principally with civil administration, it is led by Dr. Ali Shaath, a civil engineer and former deputy minister, and composed of independent Palestinian technocrats and experts. 

Israel and the US are reported to have agreed that Hamas weapons surrendered during the opening phase would be placed under the control of the ISF for destruction.  Maj.-Gen. Jasper Jeffers, the US commander of the ISF, would oversee the process.  Precise operational details and sequencing remain for the moment unresolved.

​However the viability of the ISF as a credible military force is far from assured.  Five countries have made provisional commitments to provide troops to the ISF:  Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco.  These commitments are at different levels of firmness, and some have subsequently been delayed or narrowed.

Indonesia offered up to 8,000 troops but subsequently put the commitment on indefinite hold. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev publicly committed the country to fully supporting the ISF.  Subsequent reports, however, indicate that Kazakhstan does not envisage its contribution as a combat contingent, but primarily as a humanitarian component, including medical units and a field hospital. 

As for Kosovo and Albania, though they both committed to contributing troops, as yet no figures for their contingents have been released and no troops have been sent.

On  August 6 Uganda’s parliament approved the potential deployment of Ugandan forces to Gaza as part of the US-backed ISF, if required. The size, timing, command arrangements, and final operational deployment of any Ugandan contingent have not been publicly settled.  Burundi​,​ too, has been engaged in active preliminary discussions – including a reported pre-deployment site survey – but has not publicly made a final commitment to contribute troops.

 Around the time of the August 17 meeting, senior military officers from Uganda and Burundi are reported to have visited the Civil Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat to prepare for the deployment of hundreds of troops in the Gaza Strip as part of the ISF.  They met with officers from the IDF and the US Army, who presented the operational plans to them.

In late July, Israel authorized the entry into areas of Gaza outside its control of an
initial multinational contingent of approximately 200 personnel, reportedly from Morocco and Uganda. Despite the international commitments, that appears to be the current extent of the ISF – namely 1% of its projected strength of 20,000 troops. All the same the Board of Peace says recruitment and deployment efforts are "well advanced".

          Meanwhile the ISF is functioning primarily as a command, planning, liaison, force-generation and limited pilot-deployment operation.

The 200 personnel are, among other tasks, reported to be establishing the first ISF headquarters, securing a limited humanitarian zone and preparing the logistics and command infrastructure for subsequent troop arrivals. One report says a 150-person Moroccan military outpost is being constructed in Gaza as an initial facility which will eventually be substantially larger.

There is evidence that the ISF infrastructure is beginning to materialize. A US funding notification reported by Reuters on August 19 commits $200 million for ISF equipment, vehicles and operations, plus about $6 million to adapt US armored vehicles for the force.

Surely the troops themselves will have materialized by November 15.


Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The Board of Peace plan for Gaza: Will it really disempower Hamas?", 1 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-907115

Published in Eurasia Review, 5 September 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/05092026-disabling-hamas-oped/

Iran’s other army

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2026

A network of Iran-linked Shiite militias is operating in Iraq.  Taken together, they are an extremely powerful military force.

When the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) launched ballistic missiles at US forces in Jordan on July 28, the US, in association with Saudi Arabia, did not aim its response at the IRGC direct.  They struck a number of​ the Iraq-based militias​ instead, accusing them of past attacks on US forces and carrying out drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities, acting under the direction of the IRGC.   

In short the US and its allies have recognized that the militias are in effect an integral part of the Iranian military, a functioning wing of the IRGC.

This network of Shiite militias, spread across Iraq, was put together by Qassem Soleimani, the one-time commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.  Responsible for Iran’s external operations and covert activities, it took him roughly 17 years – from the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq until his death in 2020 by a US drone​, on the orders of US President Donald Trump. 

His network has since become an invaluable adjunct to Iran’s military potential. The militias, with Iranian financial and military support, have accrued arsenals which include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons.  They are, in short, a formidable proxy army capable of engaging the US and Arab countries in long, costly conflict.

That was precisely Soleimani’s intention.  The militias were built to fight Iran’s enemies beyond its borders, dragging conflict away from the Islamic Republic itself.  With the US and Saudi Arabia striking Iraq instead of Iran, Soleimani’s plan appears to be working.

The UK’s Daily Telegraph reported a Tehran-based analyst’s opinion of the militias.  “They have the potential to expand the war to Iraq and add more actors into it. Their main job is to move the war from Iran to Iraq…If America wants to destroy them, it is a matter of one week. But that would officially bring the war to Iraq, and this is what Iran wants. More actors and fronts will make it expensive and hard for Trump to carry on.”

Most of these Iran-aligned factions are nominally part of the Iraqi state's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF as a whole is an umbrella organization comprised of dozens of militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS. In 2016, Iraq formally incorporated the PMF, which numbers well over 200,000 personnel, into the state's security structure. It remains separate from the army and operates through its own command framework under the Iraqi government. In practice, however, the framework is loose and the main factions retain their own chains of command, intelligence networks, missile and drone arsenals, and political organizations, giving them ​substantial autonomy from the Iraqi state.​

The principal Iran-aligned militia organizations operating within Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They are estimated to field around 50,000 frontline fighters.

Despite recent US and allied strikes, which have damaged their facilities and killed commanders, they remain militarily formidable. They possess rockets, ballistic missiles, armed drones, anti-tank weapons and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Several have extensive combat experience from Iraq, Syria and, more recently, operations linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation.

Moreover, rather like the position that Hezbollah in its heyday achieved within Lebanon, the militia organizations have embedded themselves deeply in Iraq’s political, economic and social fabric.  Many militia leaders also head political parties represented in parliament, hold ministerial portfolios or influence appointments throughout the security bureaucracy.  Moreover they command substantial financial resources through various economic enterprises, border crossings and reconstruction contracts.

Not all the money acquired is illicit.  Many PMF units are officially part of Iraq's security apparatus and receive government funding.  Salaries, equipment, and operational budgets come from the Iraqi state budget and are legal.

But Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, and other neighbors handle billions of dollars in trade annually. Reports from Iraqi officials, researchers, and international organizations have described militia influence at certain border crossings, where groups allegedly extract unofficial "fees" from importers and truckers, facilitate smuggling operations, manipulate customs procedures and gain control over transportation and logistics services.

After the war against Isis, Iraq set aside large amounts of finance for rebuilding damaged cities and infrastructure.  Militia-linked businessmen and companies have been accused of winning government contracts through political influence, demanding kickbacks from contractors seeking permits or security access, and controlling local economic activity in areas where the militia is dominant.

Consequently, the Iran-linked militias function not merely as armed groups, but as an entrenched political-economic network embedded within the Iraqi state.

This is a situation that Iraq’s recently elected prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi – very much like Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun – finds intolerable. 

Both have declared their intention to bring all non-state military groups within their respective nation‘s control.  Al-Zaidi has gone so far as to set September 2026 as a target for significant progress. His pledge enjoys support from Washington and from many Iraqis who wish to strengthen national sovereignty.

He faces formidable obstacles.  The strongest militias reject complete disarmament. With powerful parliamentary allies and independent sources of finance, they are in a position to frustrate any attempt by al-Zaidi to bring them under government authority.  In any case, many of those within the groups do not see themselves as part of Iraq’s security forces, but as integral to Iran's wider "Axis of Resistance".

A complete dismantling of these organizations therefore appears unlikely in the short term.  Al-Zaidi may succeed in reducing their autonomy, but not in eliminating their independent military and political influence. 

An Iranian official is reported in the Telegraph as describing the militias as “indispensable”. 

“They are the backbone of the resistance forces in the region,” he said, “and their nature of multiple groups and closeness to Iran are their biggest strengths.”  He added that “some of them were in Iran during the war to help our armed forces control the streets” – that is, to subdue anti-government protesters – an indication of how deeply the militias are woven into Iran’s war machine.

For the foreseeable future Iran can continue to rely on this substantial external military power to bolster its own military capacity.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's powerful militia network could expand war", 25 August 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-906410

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 August 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29082026-irans-other-army-oped/