Israel-Saudi security links revived

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 September 2026

On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement, known as the Mecca Pact.  At its public core is a political commitment modeled in part on NATO’s Article 5 – namely an armed attack on one party is to be regarded as an attack on all.

On September 8, the Houthis launched a major wave of attacks against Saudi Arabia, striking civilian and economic sites and energy infrastructure in several southern cities. Subsequently the country has been attacked time and again by the Houthis.  Civilian and economic facilities have been struck, King Khalid air base and Aramco facilities have been targeted. 

Why have Turkey and Pakistan not rushed to Saudi’s defense?

Rather like the small print on insurance policies, the Mecca Pact seems to exclude as much as it offers.  The publicly released description of the agreement, while making much of the NATO-like commitment, does not specify an automatic military response should one of the parties be attacked.  Nor does it publicly stipulate the circumstances in which troops must be deployed.  In fact, the full text of the agreement has not been released, so important questions about its scope and implementation remain obscure.

Rather late in the day, on September 19, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudry, chief spokesman for Pakistan’s military, is reported as saying “Pakistan fully stands with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both diplomatically and physically…We will go to any extent.”

But the statement, whatever it meant, was too late. Given the ambiguities inherent in the Mecca Pact, and the obvious reluctance of either Pakistan or Turkey to become involved in a military operation in Yemen, it is not surprising that Saudi Arabia turned to Washington for support that subsequently connected it to Israel.  

CENTCOM is the US military command responsible for the Middle East and parts of Central and South Asia.  It directs US military operations and security partnerships in that area.

Some time during the week of September 7, at a secluded ski resort in Germany (rumored to be Garmisch-Partenkirchen), CENTCOM’s commander, Admiral Brad Cooper, hosted a conference of senior military leaders from eight countries. 

It is extraordinary, but the fact, that sitting round the same table were Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the  IDF chief of staff, and military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt.  CENTCOM, functioning as an intermediary, had succeeded in connecting Israel with Arab militaries that do not have diplomatic relations with it – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular. 

 According to a report by Axios, the respected digital news outlet, the central purpose of the conference was to discuss the continuing US–Israeli war with Iran, and the broader regional-security situation.  Cooper reportedly assured those present that, despite Iranian attacks on US bases, the US would retain forces in the Middle East.  He also primed the group on plans to expand maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Zamir is said to have briefed the participants on IDF operations on several fronts.

Axios further reports, citing “a source with knowledge of the matter,” that Israel and Saudi Arabia, with CENTCOM assistance, began discussing how Israel could assist Saudi military operations against the Houthis. The possible support mentioned is ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), on the lines of the assistance that Israel has reportedly provided to the UAE.

On September 14, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) met Cooper in Jeddah, amid the rapidly worsening Houthi offensive. The next day Reuters reported that Washington, while declining to conduct direct US strikes against the Houthis, had agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with targeted assistance.

That same day, September 15, the Jerusalem Post reported that Israel and Saudi Arabia had held CENTCOM-mediated discussions about Israeli intelligence assistance to Riyadh against the Houthis. Regional diplomatic sources had told the paper that the Saudi side was seeking intelligence that could help build a picture of Houthi deployments, and thus anticipate future operations.  

A similar report emanated from the Institute for the Study of War in a document published jointly with the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. It commented that this prospective arrangement would: “…resemble Israel’s current intelligence support relationship with the United Arab Emirates.”

There is no doubt that the Iran war is creating an unusually powerful common-security denominator.  The countries represented in CENTCOM’s conference have very different political relationships with Israel, but they share an immediate security problem: Iran.  Iranian-aligned armed groups have acted against some of them, and are capable of threatening all.

Israel possesses substantial intelligence and surveillance capabilities concerning Iran and its regional partners.  Saudi’s cities and energy infrastructure have been struck repeatedly by Houthi missiles and drones.  CENTCOM possesses the command-and-control machinery that can connect Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Although Saudi Arabia still has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the emerging arrangement potentially constitutes a major step in Saudi-Israeli military normalization.  Israeli intelligence is being used to help defend Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, even without diplomatic normalization.

This arrangement gives Saudi Arabia considerable political cover.  Publicly, its relationship with Israel can remain highly constrained; operationally, cooperation can become increasingly sophisticated.

So the present position, according to media reports, is that Saudi Arabia is being offered direct targeted support by the US, while CENTCOM is mediating Saudi–Israeli discussions on intelligence assistance against the Houthis.

Saudi-Israeli collaboration is nothing new.  There is a 60-year history of covert strategic cooperation. But the Saudi-Israel connection remains as delicate as it has ever been. It is not any form of military alliance, nor has there been any change in Saudi policy on formal normalization.  In fact reports emanating from Saudi sources suggest that Riyadh, even while seeking Israel’s help against Houthi attacks, is still resisting movement on normalization.

            Meanwhile, the law of unintended consequences is in full play. While the Houthis continue their strikes on Saudi Arabia and make territorial gains in areas surrounding one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints, the Bab el-Mandeb, they are inadvertently fostering greater military cooperation than ever before between Israel and Arab states, and both reviving and strengthening Israel’s covert security links with Saudi Arabia.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Saudi Arabia turns to Israel as Houthi attacks expose limits of the Mecca Pact," 23 September 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-909254

The end of the SDF

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2026

            The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was formed back in 2015.

A year earlier ISIS had proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate, claiming religious and political authority over all Muslims. It then proceeded to conquer and absorb great swathes of Syria and Iraq, and was designated a terrorist organization by the UN, the US and many countries, including Muslim-majority states.

            Opposing ISIS in northern Syria were the Kurdish-led YPG (People’s Protection Units).  Together with the closely linked YPJ (Women’s Protection Units), they joined with Arab, Assyrian and other local armed groups to create a broader coalition, and this became the SDF.

            The US had already begun supporting the YPG, particularly during the battle for Kobani in 2014–15.  After the SDF was formed, Washington began arming, advising and providing air support to it as its principal ground partner against ISIS.

Backed by Washington, the SDF proved remarkably successful in combating ISIS.  It conquered stronghold after stronghold, and finally, with the capture of Baghouz in 2019, ended the ISIS caliphate in Syria.

In the years that followed, the SDF developed its own security forces and civilian administration, and became the military and governing authority across much of north-eastern Syria.

Because the SDF was Kurdish-led and YPG-dominated, its powerful presence was opposed by Turkey.   

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regards the YPG as closely linked to the PKK, a political and militant element within the Kurdish autonomy movement that Turkey and the US designate as a terrorist organization.

He was doubtless delighted with the announcement on  August 25 by Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF.  Speaking in a televised press conference in Damascus,  he declared that, following an agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF's mission had ended and that it was being dissolved “as an independent military force” and was being integrated as brigades into the Syrian army.

His announcement covered not only the military functions of the SDF, but also the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its affiliated military and civilian institutions.  Abdi said these structures had likewise been integrated into Syrian state institutions.

As president of the post-Assad government in Syria, Sharaa is attempting to bring the disparate political, military and social forces that have been operating independently under the authority of a unified Syrian state.

On 10 March 2025 Sharaa and Abdi hammered out a deal.  The SDF's civilian and military institutions, including border crossings, oil and gas facilities, and airports, would come under state control.  In return the Kurds would be recognized as an integral part of Syria, be granted citizenship, political participation and other rights.

The deal lacked detail and was too fragile to hold.  In January 2026 government forces launched a lightning offensive against the SDF, rapidly capturing substantial SDF-held territory.  The SDF’s hopes of US protection, as in the past, were dashed, but a generous ceasefire deal saw SDF personnel entering Syria’s defense and interior ministries, while the government took over the border crossings, oil and gas fields and civilian institutions.

            The integration process continued over the next few months leading, eventually, to Abdi’s dissolution announcement which was not, of course, simply a voluntary decision by the SDF to disband. It was the end-point of a negotiated political settlement whose terms were progressively reshaped by the dramatic change in the military balance. The SDF leadership ultimately calculated that incorporation into the new Syrian state offered a better prospect for preserving Kurdish interests than trying to maintain an autonomous armed enclave against Damascus, Turkey and a less dependable US patron.

A few days after the SDF's dissolution Sharaa appointed Mazloum Abdi as a presidential adviser.  The appointment was widely read as a sign that Sharaa, far from trying to destroy the Kurdish leadership, was intent on integrating it into the nation’s governance.

            The SDF's disappearance is a major piece of Sharaa's state-consolidation project, but it is not the last, or necessarily the hardest, piece.  Major steps are still required.  He has to complete acquiring state monopoly of armed force.  The SDF was the biggest remaining autonomous military structure, and its dissolution is therefore a major breakthrough, but there are a fair number of former rebel and militia formations, and all need to be subordinated to the state.

He has to resolve the problem of the semi-autonomous Druze community in Sweida, which remains largely outside effective central-government control.  His challenge is to negotiate a restoration of state authority without provoking another major sectarian conflict.

Then there is the problem of building a genuinely national political settlement.  Ideally he would like Syria's Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians and other minorities to accept that their future security lies within a central Syrian state. The Kurdish settlement illustrates the model Sharaa appears to favor – recognizing communal rights, but eliminating autonomous armed and quasi-state institutions.

Sharaa needs, within a reasonable period of time, to complete the transition from revolutionary government to a fully functioning state – national ministries, judiciary, police, taxation, public services and a unified economic administration. It is currently a fragile transitional administration dependent on concentrated presidential power.

Finally there is his declared objective to establish a permanent constitution and elected government.

On  March 13, 2025, Sharaa signed a Constitutional Declaration establishing the legal framework for a five-year transitional period leading to a permanent constitutional settlement and democratic elections.

The People’s Assembly, which first convened in Damascus in July 2026, is a transitional legislature rather than a fully elected parliament.  Two-thirds of its 210 members were selected by regional electoral colleges, while Sharaa appointed the remaining 70.  

The roadmap is to move from this interim framework to a permanent constitution, followed by parliamentary elections. The Constitutional Declaration provides for a five-year transition from March 2025, ending only when both the permanent constitution has been adopted and elections held under it.  March 2030 is currently the outer horizon. The immediate next step is to establish the body that will be charged with drafting the new constitution. 

The absorption of the SDF’s military and administrative functions into the state was a vital step toward the eventual achievement of a fully functioning, democratic, constitutional Syria.

 

The Two-State Solution

 This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today, 11 September 2026:

Sir

Ed Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said: “securing the two-state solution in its fullest form is the North Star of this government’s policy.”

Palestinian leadership has been offered a two-state solution on six separate occasions – first by Britain in 1937. The Peel Commission proposed the separation of Mandatory Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. Zionist leaders accepted the principle; Arab leadership rejected it.

In 1947 the UN Partition Plan, which proposed independent Arab and Jewish states, was accepted by the Jewish leadership and rejected by the Arab.

Two-state offers were made at Camp David in 2000, and later that year by Bill Clinton. Neither was accepted by Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

In 2008 Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, rejected the two-state solution offered by Ehud Olmert, then Israel’s prime minister,. He also refused to consider the two-state plan in 2020 that emerged from the efforts of Donald Trump’s team during his first term in office.

The West seems determined to thrust the two-state solution down the throat of a Palestinian leadership for whom it has no appeal.

 

Russia ditches its Syrian bases

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 September 2026

On August 9, the Syrian foreign ministry announced that, following approximately 18 months of negotiations, Syria and Russia had concluded a memorandum of understanding. The Russian presence at the Tartus naval facility, and at the Hmeimim air base adjacent to Latakia International Airport, would be “reorganized”.  The bases would pass into Syrian civilian administration, and their military facilities would be redefined as joint Syrian-Russian training and qualification centers.

As a result the Russian naval base at Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, operational for 55 years, is now virtually defunct.  A Nato official is reported as saying: “There has been nothing there since June. That’s the first time in more than 10 years. This is pretty significant.”  

Russian vessels previously stationed in the Med have been diverted to protect Putin’s armada of sanctioned oil tankers which operate principally on Baltic-to-ocean routes, passing through the Danish straits, the North Sea and, in some cases, the English Channel.

Immediately after the announcement, Syrian foreign minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani traveled to the coast with an official delegation.  He inspected both Tartus Port and the Hmeimim air base, established in 2015 by agreement between Russia’s president Vladimir Putin and Syria’s then-president, Bashar al-Assad.

SANA (the Syrian Arab News Agency) described the visit as “a tour of the facilities covered by the newly concluded memorandum.”  

The official Syrian accounts of the tour make no mention of any Russian representative being present.  But two days later, on August 11, Reuters reported the Russian Foreign Ministry's spin on the agreement:  “We regard the signing on August 9 of the memorandum between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on the operation of our bases in Hmeimim and Tartus as an important step aimed at further improving bilateral cooperation in the military sphere.”

So the focus of the Russian narrative is not abandonment of its Mediterranean presence, but continued military cooperation – and a Syrian source subsequently told Reuters that some Russian forces would indeed remain at the newly designated joint training centers.  But by August 12 Russian personnel were observed vacating buildings around the previously Russian-controlled commercial berth at Tartus, while Syria had already begun using it for civilian shipping.

So the former Russian naval base at Tartus is being dismantled as a military facility and is being converted into a joint Russian-Syrian training facility, and the same is true of Russia’s former air base at Hmeimim.  Arguably Hmeimim is the more consequential loss for Russia.  It was the hub for Russia's air operations in Syria, supported its wider military activities, and  enhanced its regional standing.

The effective end of Russia’s military presence at Tartus and Hmeimim is a strategic gain for Israel. When Russia established its air base at Hmeimim in 2015 to support the Assad regime, there was a risk that Israeli and Russian air operations over Syria could come into conflict. Jerusalem and Moscow consequently developed a deconfliction mechanism under which each side was given advance notice of planned air operations. With Russia no longer maintaining a significant aerial presence in Syria, Israeli air operations will face fewer constraints.

Israel’s current concerns in Syria are disrupting attacks against its troops in the south, preventing hostile forces from consolidating near the Golan Heights, and frustrating any attempt by Turkey to gain a military foothold that could threaten Israel.

For Turkey is increasingly filling the vacuum caused by Russia's withdrawal.  The post-Assad Syrian government has developed a close military relationship with Turkey, which has been helping rebuild Syrian military capabilities.  Israel has warned Turkey officially against embarking on what defense minister Israel Katz called “dangerous adventures in Syria.”

Israeli media reports have described Israel’s negotiating “red lines” as: no Turkish military activity in Syria; demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan; security for Syria’s Druze community; and limits on certain Syrian strategic weapons systems.  These would include ground-based air-defense systems, missiles, armed drones and military aviation infrastructure such as radar networks.

On August 18, shortly after a Turkish delegation visited Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase, Israel carried out airstrikes on the facility.  Israel said the action was intended to prevent an impending Turkish military deployment there.

Damascus condemned the attack as a violation of Syrian sovereignty, arguing that Syria was entitled to rebuild its armed forces and ally with whatever foreign partner it chooses. Meanwhile the US, in the person of Tom Barrack, has been trying to establish a deconfliction process among Israel, Syria and Turkey.

Barrack, whose official title is lengthy and perhaps a trifle excessive (he is currently US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq) described the Abu al-Duhur strike as an “unnecessary escalation” that did not advance regional stability.

His increasingly critical stance towards Israeli policy in Syria has itself attracted criticism, particularly following recent remarks on Israel’s military stance in Syria and equivocal statements, later clarified, about the Golan Heights.

Russia’s loss of exclusive military control at Tartus and Hmeimim changes the geopolitical landscape.  For roughly 55 years, a Soviet/Russian military presence on the Syrian coast has been part of Israel's strategic environment.  The Soviet Union was one of Israel's principal military adversaries during the Cold War; Putin's Russia subsequently became a partner of sorts in managing the Syrian battlefield. Now that presence is being reduced to a joint training role under Syrian sovereignty.

For Israel, therefore, this is much more than the closure of two Russian bases. It is evidence of the collapse of the geopolitical system that existed along Israel's northern frontier for half a century.

While Russia’s effective withdrawal from Syria, and therefore from the Middle East as a whole, appears a net positive for Israel diplomatically and militarily, strategically it seems to be fostering the emergence of a Turkish-influenced Syria. 

Turkish military penetration of Syria is a substantially more serious problem than the Russian presence that it is replacing.  For Turkey, close alignment with Damascus offers the prospect of curbing Kurdish autonomy on its border, facilitating refugee returns, winning a large share of Syria’s reconstruction and trade, reopening overland routes to Arab markets, and consolidating Ankara’s regional influence at the expense of rival powers.

          Israel will need to be vigilant.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online, 8 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-907793

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 September 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/12092026-russia-ditches-its-syrian-bases-oped/

  

Disabling Hamas

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 September 2026

Sunday, November 15, 2026 – a date to circle in your diary.  By then – precisely 90 days since a meeting in Jerusalem on August 17 to discuss the Board of Peace’s plan for Gaza – Hamas should be demobilized and the IDF should have begun withdrawing from the Strip.

            That August 17 meeting brought prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu together with the three-man team of Jared Kushner, Nickolay Mladenov and Sir Tony Blair.  They had just returned from an unprecedented negotiating session in Egypt with Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya.  The significance of November 15 lies in what was agreed in Cairo – a handover by Hamas of weaponry and tunnels within 90 days. 

As Kushner told Fox News, following the meeting:  “For Israel we think this is a win-win situation, because if Hamas actually gives over the weapons and the tunnels willingly over the next 60 to 90 days that obviously would be the elimination of a huge security threat for Israel, almost an unthinkable achievement.”

            To advance the Board of Peace’s aim of reconstructing Gaza, the August meeting agreed to set up two working groups.  One would facilitate the disarmament and demilitarization process which, according to a statement from Netanyahu’s office, “both Israel and the Board of Peace are determined should be prompt and completed before any reconstruction happens.”   The second would focus on sanitation, clean water and public health in Gaza.

While Israel has consistently supported the 20-point peace plan produced by US President Donald Trump and endorsed by the Board of Peace, there seemed to be a problem regarding sequencing.  The plan requires both the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza, and for a time both Hamas and Israel were asserting that they would indeed act, provided the other party acted first.

Initially the Board of Peace planned to connect incremental disarmament with gradual Israeli withdrawals. The August meeting seems to have established a way through the impasse.  It now seems there will be no IDF withdrawal until Hamas has disarmed. The IDF’s withdrawal is linked to agreed standards, milestones, and timeframes as the​ International Stabilization Force​ (ISF​) establishes control and stability, although an Israeli security perimeter may remain until Gaza is judged secure.

​Under the UN-endorsed Trump peace plan, the ISF is envisaged as a temporary multinational security force, operating alongside Israel, Egypt, and a newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force.  Its mandate includes helping to secure borders, supporting Gaza’s demilitarization, dismantling military and terrorist infrastructure, permanently decommissioning non-state armed groups’ weapons, and protecting civilians.

At Israel’s request, the parties agreed that in the initial stage of disarmament Hamas’s weapons would not be turned over to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.

          Why did Israel make this a condition?  Because the National Committee is a wholly Palestinian body – and even though it is specifically apolitical, Israel was taking no chances.   Concerned principally with civil administration, it is led by Dr. Ali Shaath, a civil engineer and former deputy minister, and composed of independent Palestinian technocrats and experts. 

Israel and the US are reported to have agreed that Hamas weapons surrendered during the opening phase would be placed under the control of the ISF for destruction.  Maj.-Gen. Jasper Jeffers, the US commander of the ISF, would oversee the process.  Precise operational details and sequencing remain for the moment unresolved.

​However the viability of the ISF as a credible military force is far from assured.  Five countries have made provisional commitments to provide troops to the ISF:  Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco.  These commitments are at different levels of firmness, and some have subsequently been delayed or narrowed.

Indonesia offered up to 8,000 troops but subsequently put the commitment on indefinite hold. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev publicly committed the country to fully supporting the ISF.  Subsequent reports, however, indicate that Kazakhstan does not envisage its contribution as a combat contingent, but primarily as a humanitarian component, including medical units and a field hospital. 

As for Kosovo and Albania, though they both committed to contributing troops, as yet no figures for their contingents have been released and no troops have been sent.

On  August 6 Uganda’s parliament approved the potential deployment of Ugandan forces to Gaza as part of the US-backed ISF, if required. The size, timing, command arrangements, and final operational deployment of any Ugandan contingent have not been publicly settled.  Burundi​,​ too, has been engaged in active preliminary discussions – including a reported pre-deployment site survey – but has not publicly made a final commitment to contribute troops.

 Around the time of the August 17 meeting, senior military officers from Uganda and Burundi are reported to have visited the Civil Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat to prepare for the deployment of hundreds of troops in the Gaza Strip as part of the ISF.  They met with officers from the IDF and the US Army, who presented the operational plans to them.

In late July, Israel authorized the entry into areas of Gaza outside its control of an
initial multinational contingent of approximately 200 personnel, reportedly from Morocco and Uganda. Despite the international commitments, that appears to be the current extent of the ISF – namely 1% of its projected strength of 20,000 troops. All the same the Board of Peace says recruitment and deployment efforts are "well advanced".

          Meanwhile the ISF is functioning primarily as a command, planning, liaison, force-generation and limited pilot-deployment operation.

The 200 personnel are, among other tasks, reported to be establishing the first ISF headquarters, securing a limited humanitarian zone and preparing the logistics and command infrastructure for subsequent troop arrivals. One report says a 150-person Moroccan military outpost is being constructed in Gaza as an initial facility which will eventually be substantially larger.

There is evidence that the ISF infrastructure is beginning to materialize. A US funding notification reported by Reuters on August 19 commits $200 million for ISF equipment, vehicles and operations, plus about $6 million to adapt US armored vehicles for the force.

Surely the troops themselves will have materialized by November 15.


Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The Board of Peace plan for Gaza: Will it really disempower Hamas?", 1 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-907115

Published in Eurasia Review, 5 September 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/05092026-disabling-hamas-oped/

Iran’s other army

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2026

A network of Iran-linked Shiite militias is operating in Iraq.  Taken together, they are an extremely powerful military force.

When the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) launched ballistic missiles at US forces in Jordan on July 28, the US, in association with Saudi Arabia, did not aim its response at the IRGC direct.  They struck a number of​ the Iraq-based militias​ instead, accusing them of past attacks on US forces and carrying out drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities, acting under the direction of the IRGC.   

In short the US and its allies have recognized that the militias are in effect an integral part of the Iranian military, a functioning wing of the IRGC.

This network of Shiite militias, spread across Iraq, was put together by Qassem Soleimani, the one-time commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.  Responsible for Iran’s external operations and covert activities, it took him roughly 17 years – from the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq until his death in 2020 by a US drone​, on the orders of US President Donald Trump. 

His network has since become an invaluable adjunct to Iran’s military potential. The militias, with Iranian financial and military support, have accrued arsenals which include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons.  They are, in short, a formidable proxy army capable of engaging the US and Arab countries in long, costly conflict.

That was precisely Soleimani’s intention.  The militias were built to fight Iran’s enemies beyond its borders, dragging conflict away from the Islamic Republic itself.  With the US and Saudi Arabia striking Iraq instead of Iran, Soleimani’s plan appears to be working.

The UK’s Daily Telegraph reported a Tehran-based analyst’s opinion of the militias.  “They have the potential to expand the war to Iraq and add more actors into it. Their main job is to move the war from Iran to Iraq…If America wants to destroy them, it is a matter of one week. But that would officially bring the war to Iraq, and this is what Iran wants. More actors and fronts will make it expensive and hard for Trump to carry on.”

Most of these Iran-aligned factions are nominally part of the Iraqi state's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF as a whole is an umbrella organization comprised of dozens of militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS. In 2016, Iraq formally incorporated the PMF, which numbers well over 200,000 personnel, into the state's security structure. It remains separate from the army and operates through its own command framework under the Iraqi government. In practice, however, the framework is loose and the main factions retain their own chains of command, intelligence networks, missile and drone arsenals, and political organizations, giving them ​substantial autonomy from the Iraqi state.​

The principal Iran-aligned militia organizations operating within Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They are estimated to field around 50,000 frontline fighters.

Despite recent US and allied strikes, which have damaged their facilities and killed commanders, they remain militarily formidable. They possess rockets, ballistic missiles, armed drones, anti-tank weapons and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Several have extensive combat experience from Iraq, Syria and, more recently, operations linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation.

Moreover, rather like the position that Hezbollah in its heyday achieved within Lebanon, the militia organizations have embedded themselves deeply in Iraq’s political, economic and social fabric.  Many militia leaders also head political parties represented in parliament, hold ministerial portfolios or influence appointments throughout the security bureaucracy.  Moreover they command substantial financial resources through various economic enterprises, border crossings and reconstruction contracts.

Not all the money acquired is illicit.  Many PMF units are officially part of Iraq's security apparatus and receive government funding.  Salaries, equipment, and operational budgets come from the Iraqi state budget and are legal.

But Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, and other neighbors handle billions of dollars in trade annually. Reports from Iraqi officials, researchers, and international organizations have described militia influence at certain border crossings, where groups allegedly extract unofficial "fees" from importers and truckers, facilitate smuggling operations, manipulate customs procedures and gain control over transportation and logistics services.

After the war against Isis, Iraq set aside large amounts of finance for rebuilding damaged cities and infrastructure.  Militia-linked businessmen and companies have been accused of winning government contracts through political influence, demanding kickbacks from contractors seeking permits or security access, and controlling local economic activity in areas where the militia is dominant.

Consequently, the Iran-linked militias function not merely as armed groups, but as an entrenched political-economic network embedded within the Iraqi state.

This is a situation that Iraq’s recently elected prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi – very much like Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun – finds intolerable. 

Both have declared their intention to bring all non-state military groups within their respective nation‘s control.  Al-Zaidi has gone so far as to set September 2026 as a target for significant progress. His pledge enjoys support from Washington and from many Iraqis who wish to strengthen national sovereignty.

He faces formidable obstacles.  The strongest militias reject complete disarmament. With powerful parliamentary allies and independent sources of finance, they are in a position to frustrate any attempt by al-Zaidi to bring them under government authority.  In any case, many of those within the groups do not see themselves as part of Iraq’s security forces, but as integral to Iran's wider "Axis of Resistance".

A complete dismantling of these organizations therefore appears unlikely in the short term.  Al-Zaidi may succeed in reducing their autonomy, but not in eliminating their independent military and political influence. 

An Iranian official is reported in the Telegraph as describing the militias as “indispensable”. 

“They are the backbone of the resistance forces in the region,” he said, “and their nature of multiple groups and closeness to Iran are their biggest strengths.”  He added that “some of them were in Iran during the war to help our armed forces control the streets” – that is, to subdue anti-government protesters – an indication of how deeply the militias are woven into Iran’s war machine.

For the foreseeable future Iran can continue to rely on this substantial external military power to bolster its own military capacity.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's powerful militia network could expand war", 25 August 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-906410

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 August 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29082026-irans-other-army-oped/

Israel in Gaza

 This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today,  25 August 2026:

Sir

Tony Greenstein, seemingly endorsed by Gary Lineker, states as undisputed fact  that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza (report,  August 24). But “genocide” is a precise legal term, requiring proof of an intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. It should not be treated as a synonym for a high civilian death toll.

The demographic record is relevant to any alleged genocidal intent. When Israel captured the Gaza Strip in 1967, a census recorded about 355,000 residents. The latest Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimate puts Gaza’s population at about 2.11 million. The population has therefore increased roughly sixfold since 1967. It is difficult to reconcile this with the assertion that Israel’s aim has been the destruction of the Palestinian people.

In fact Israel’s declared objective since October 7, 2023 has been the defeat of Hamas, whose 1988 charter called for the destruction of Israel and contained virulently antisemitic language. Hamas’s extensive military infrastructure, including its tunnel network, was embedded within a densely populated civilian environment, making military operations extremely hazardous for civilians.  This is why  the number of Palestinian deaths cannot establish genocidal intent.

It is positively denied by Col. Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, who said during the Gaza conflict: “The IDF is also operating within the laws of armed conflict, doing its best to minimise civilian casualties, including by warning people to leave areas it is about to attack.”

Nor should Gaza casualty figures be treated as infallible. The records of the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health have been subject to methodological criticism and, it is now accepted, require careful interpretation.

The charge of genocide deserves evidence and argument, not constant assertion in the hope that the aphorism often attributed to Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, will prevail: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”

Published in the Daily Telegraph titled: "Israel's intent in Gaza":
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2026/08/25/letters-paralysing-effect-public-sector-productivity-crisis/

Gaza’s anti-Hamas militias

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 August 2026

        Hamas's internal security and counter-intelligence apparatus in Gaza includes a specialized unit known as the Radaa Force.  It is focused on monitoring threats to Hamas from rival factions, and in identifying dissidents, suspected informants and “collaborators” working with Israel.

The size, command structure, and exact responsibilities of the Radaa Force are uncertain; Hamas has revealed few details about it. Its name derives from an Arabic root meaning “deterrence” or “prevention”.

On August 6 Radaa issued an appeal to the Gazan public in general, and to members of anti-Hamas militia groups in particular, urging them to assassinate the leaders of those bodies.

“We say to all members of the collaborator gangs,” ran the Radaa Force statement, “that assassinating senior collaborators in these groups will be your salvation – before us, and before your people.”

What are these anti-Hamas militia groups, and who are their leaders?

The most internationally visible, and arguably most consequential, of the anti-Hamas armed network in Gaza is known as the “Popular Forces”.   Originally led by Yasser Abu Shabab until his death in December 2025, it is now under the leadership of Ghassan Duhine, his deputy.  It is the only anti-Hamas force that appears to have reached battalion-scale strength. Estimates in open sources range up to 700 fighters.  

The Popular Forces emerged in southern Gaza, especially around Rafah.  On June 5, 2025, in a video statement responding to allegations by former defense minister Avigdor Lieberman, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Israel had "activated" and supported clans in Gaza opposed to Hamas. Subsequent reporting by the Associated Press and other outlets identified Abu Shabab's Popular Forces as one of the groups receiving such support.

Reported assistance included weapons, intelligence, logistical support, access to Israeli-controlled areas, and protection from Hamas.  The reported activities of the Popular Forces include an attack on a Hamas facility near Khan Younis that the group alleged was being used to store aid confiscated by Hamas.  They also participate in intelligence gathering against Hamas, securing aid convoys and routes near Israeli-controlled areas, and protecting access routes to aid distribution points.

Unlike Fatah, the Popular Forces do not prioritize Palestinian nationalism or a state-building ideology.  Abu Shabab publicly condemned the brutal onslaught on October 7, 2023 and argued Hamas had brought catastrophe on Gaza.

Politically, this group is the least clearly ideological of the major formations. Its motivations seem to combine anti-Hamas hostility, tribal autonomy, economic interests, personal power, and dependence upon Israeli patronage. Its principal political proposition is effectively that Hamas must be removed and that local Palestinian actors should assume control.

The Popular Forces’ politics are moved partly by clan interests.  The Abu Shabab clan is a large family network in the Rafah area of southern Gaza, connected to the larger transborder Tarabin tribal network, which extends into Sinai. Its priorities are protecting its local influence, its territory, economic resources, and clan autonomy.

Hamas has traditionally sought to subordinate armed groups and local power brokers to its own authority.  During periods when Hamas's control has weakened because of war, some clans – the Popular Forces among them – have sought to expand their own security and political roles.

The second particularly important anti-Hamas organization in Gaza is the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force (CTSF), centered on Khan Younis and commanded by Hussam al-Astal. Al-Astal has a security service background within the Palestinian Authority, and his opposition to Hamas is more political and institutional than purely tribal.

The declared objective of the CTSF (sometimes known simply as the Anti-Terror Force), is the removal of Hamas and the establishment of an alternative security authority.  Al-Astal portrays his organization as an independent Palestinian anti-Hamas force, though there is significant evidence of operational cooperation with Israel. 

The group crossed an important threshold on January 12, 2026, when gunmen killed Mahmoud al-Astal, a senior Hamas police officer.  Hussam al-Astal's organization publicly claimed responsibility.  Hamas described the perpetrators as Israeli collaborators.

The common surname is almost certainly not accidental. Mahmoud al-Astal and Hussam al-Astal appear to have belonged to the same extended al-Astal clan, but they were aligned with opposing political-military camps.  Publicly available sources do not identify their precise familial relationship.

The Hellis clan represents a third category of anti-Hamas groupings.

The Hellis family, long associated with Fatah, has opposed Hamas's rule ever since the terrorist organization seized control of Gaza in 2007.  Its most important contemporary figure is Rami Hellis, who has reportedly formed an armed network with Ahmed Jundeya, another prominent local figure from Shejaiya, a large neighborhood in the eastern part of Gaza City.

Their forces have operated in areas under Israeli control, and have resisted Hamas attempts to re-establish its authority in the area.  Reuters describes the Hellis/Jundeya network as one of the principal armed challenges to Hamas following the 2025 ceasefire.

The al-Majayda clan is based around Khan Younis and it, too, has become involved in the struggle over postwar authority.  Members have clashed with Hamas during attempts by Hamas security forces to arrest suspects.  Although the clan has criticized Hamas's use of extrajudicial violence, its political position is notably ambiguous. At least one senior al-Majayda figure subsequently expressed support for Hamas's efforts to restore order.

The al-Majayda clan has been linked to the CTSF through local alliances and cooperation, although the clan and the militia are distinct entities.

The Doghmosh clan is somewhat different from the others. It is not primarily an Israeli-backed militia. It is one of Gaza's longstanding armed families and has historically shifted between relationships with Hamas, Fatah, Salafist groups, and independent activity.

Back in October 2025 armed members of the clan fought Hamas forces in Gaza City and it  was described as a significant armed rival to Hamas. Currently there does not seem to be a formal Doghmosh militia. 

As for the 20-point Trump peace plan for Gaza, there is no evidence that any major anti-Hamas militia has formally adopted the plan as its platform.  Some – especially the Popular Forces – have objectives that do overlap with key parts of the plan, particularly supporting a post-Hamas administration after ending Hamas rule.  Others – anti-Hamas though they are – seem more intent on pursuing their own more narrow interests.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Who are Hamas's adversaries in Gaza?", 18 August 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-905761

Published in Eurasia Review, 27 August 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/22082026-gazas-anti-hamas-militias-oped/

Iran’s last effective proxy

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2026

With Hamas and Hezbollah substantially weakened, Iran is increasingly relying on the Houthis as its principal remaining proxy capable of exerting sustained military and economic pressure on the US and its regional partners.  Currently, as a complement to Iran's campaign in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis are attempting to exploit their control of the Bab al-Mandab strait, situated at the foot of the Red Sea and controlling access to the Suez Canal. 

Simultaneously with harrying the shipping in the strait, they are striking targets in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with Iran, whose 2023 pact with Saudi has been consigned to the trash. 

On February 28, 2026, in response to the US-Israeli attack, Iran launched missiles and armed drones against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, mainly because they harbored US bases, but also to punish and deter both Saudi and other governments for their close connection to the US.

Iranian strikes were reported to have hit energy facilities in Saudi, including igniting a fire at the Ras Tanura oil refinery. The Prince Sultan Air Base was also targeted by drone attacks, then and later.

On July 16, Reuters, citing multiple regional and Iranian sources, reported that Iran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab strait.  The directive to do so would be given if the US struck Iran's power grid or energy infrastructure.

Although the order was described as a contingency directive, the Houthis reportedly began positioning missiles and drones near the strait while awaiting any further authorization.

Four days later, on July 20, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree appeared on television to announce that "a maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy" would be imposed immediately.

He described it as an "eye for an eye" measure, in response to what the Houthis called Saudi Arabia's long-running blockade of Yemen, and a recent attack on Sanaa’s International Airport.

The result is a second maritime chokepoint, augmenting Iran’s pressure on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.  The Houthis are targeting Saudi oil exports and commercial tankers using Saudi ports, thus attempting to close off the principal alternative export route available after disruptions in Hormuz.  The operation as a whole is, in effect, a joint effort by Iran and its Yemeni ally to exert maximum pressure on global oil markets.

A few days later, in response, the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen.

In short, Iran-Saudi rivalry is being fought out mainly on the Houthi front, the crisis is being sustained by Houthi military action, and the Saudi coalition clearly regards the Houthis as part of Iran’s regional leverage network.

But Saree’s TV address clearly revealed that, from the Houthi’s point of view, two wars are overlapping, and in taking up the fight, the Houthis are killing two birds with one stone.  Saree referred to Saudi Arabia’s “blockade” of Yemen, and its strike against the airport at Sanaa, once Yemen’s capital.  So in attacking Saudi Arabia the Houthis are not only acting in direct support of Iran, but they are also striking at the ally of their main opponent in Yemen’s long-running civil war – the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

Since 2014 the Houthis, having overthrown the official government, have controlled Sanaa and much of north-western Yemen. That government – now based principally in Aden – continues to be recognized by the UN and receives military and financial backing from Saudi Arabia.

Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was alarmed at the prospect of Iran gaining a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula, and in 2015, with the civil war at its height, intervened militarily.  He formed a coalition whose declared objective was to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and prevent the emergence of an Iranian-aligned regime on his country’s southern border.

Although a UN-brokered truce in 2022 substantially reduced cross-border fighting, it never resolved the underlying political conflict. The Houthis retained control of the capital and most of Yemen's population centers in the northwest, while the recognized government retained international legitimacy but exercised authority over only part of the country.

Accordingly, from the Houthi perspective, Saudi Arabia remains not merely a regional rival, but the principal foreign military supporter of its domestic enemy.  Conversely, from Riyadh's perspective, the Houthis are an armed insurgent movement backed by Iran that displaced Yemen's legitimate government.

Most intelligence services and academic experts now reject earlier characterizations of the Houthis as merely "Iranian puppets."  They are currently seen more as partners with overlapping interests but independent agendas.  Iran provides support because the Houthis advance Tehran's regional interests, while the Houthis, retaining significant autonomy in decision-making, accept support because it enhances their military and political position.  Both sides derive substantial benefits.

Particularly since October 7, Iran has reportedly supplied the Houthis with missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology, including training, intelligence and financial support, and diplomatic backing.  The Houthis, meanwhile, provide Iran with pressure on Saudi Arabia and on Red Sea shipping, leverage against Israel and a relatively inexpensive means of projecting regional influence.

            Two possible developments might cause the mutually beneficial partnership to disintegrate. The first, and perhaps the more plausible, would be a decisive weakening or collapse of the Iranian regime following a renewed US military campaign, should the Trump administration in the future conclude that Tehran remained irredeemably hostile and that diplomatic options had been exhausted. Such an outcome could deprive the Houthis of their principal source of advanced military technology, training, and political backing, forcing them to pursue a more independent course.

          A second, less likely possibility would arise if sustained efforts by Hans Grundberg, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, succeeded in bringing the principal parties to the civil war into meaningful negotiations, securing a durable ceasefire and a comprehensive political settlement. Were the Houthis to become stakeholders in a recognized governing arrangement, their incentives could shift toward economic reconstruction, international legitimacy, and stable regional relations, reducing the strategic value of close alignment with Iran.

          For the moment, though, the liaison is firm, and the Houthis have become Iran's only major proxy capable of exercising direct international pressure by threatening world oil supplies.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Are the Houthis Iran's last gaming card?", 11 August 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-905067

Published in Eurasia Review, 14 August 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14082026-irans-last-effective-proxy-oped/