What’s the future for Hamas?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2025

​            The US and most of the Middle East now want to get on with disempowering Hamas, installing effective governance in Gaza, and starting to rebuild the Strip. There is no evading the fact, though, that many of the Arab nations that supported US President Donald Trump’s peace initiative did so relying on point 20 of his 20-point plan:

“…as Gaza redevelopment advances and Palestinian Authority reforms are carried out, the conditions may be established for a credible pathway toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”

The Iranian regime has no interest in any version of the two-state solution; nor do its pawns – Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, to name its main protagonists. Their raison d’être remains what it always has been: the destruction of the State of Israel.

In Iran’s case, that undisguised intention extends to the annihilation of democracy itself, as exemplified by the US, to be followed by the dissemination of its version of Shi’ite Islam across the whole world. Trump’s offer of an olive branch to the Iranian regime, made during his speech to the Knesset on October 13, was rejected out of hand.

Following the Gaza ceasefire and the completion of the hostage-prisoner exchange, Hamas faces a narrow set of strategic choices, with its options greatly reduced because of its weakened position and the upsurge of armed clan opposition.

First, despite the peace plan, Hamas is likely to attempt to rehabilitate its military capacity. Boosted by the return of around 2,000 prisoners and detainees, it will surely seek every opportunity to re-entrench itself within Gaza.

Regarding disarmament, the relevant point in the Trump plan reads: “All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure (including tunnels and weapons manufacturing) will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization under independent monitors…”

Yet demilitarization has yet to be defined. Hamas may reluctantly agree to hand over its heavy weaponry, but it is most unlikely to denude its personnel of their sidearms.

Hamas will surely aim to preserve its resistance credentials and its continued military presence in Gaza. Confidential Hamas strategy documents, some captured on the computer of deceased Hamas leader Yayha Sinwar, and some from elsewhere, suggest its leadership has always been focused on survival, reconstitution, and the maintenance of leverage over Israel and the Palestinian public. The loss of the hostages as its major bargaining chip largely reduces its leverage, but not entirely.

There is, for example, Hamas’s formidable propaganda machine, highly structured and technologically well-equipped, with at least 1,000 specialists operating out of Gaza and beyond. It exploits every available media channel, from TV and radio to encrypted social network platforms, blending true, exaggerated, and manipulated content in a coordinated campaign to promote its strategic goals. The widespread dissemination of anti-Israel propaganda has been Hamas’s major success in the post-October 7 period.

The network was developed over several years and was, until recently, overseen by Abu Obeida (Samir Abdallah al-Kahlout), the masked spokesman for Hamas’s military wing, who was killed in August 2025.

Propaganda operatives were embedded within combat units throughout Gaza, and their roles included filming, editing, distributing content, and monitoring Israeli media.

Hamas will undoubtedly attempt to retain control over its propaganda operation and the personnel running it, hoping to continue influencing global opinion by way of traditional as well as its social media.

Its principal broadcast outlets are Al-Aqsa TV and Al-Aqsa Radio, through which it targets both local and broader Arab audiences. In addition, the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera network, particularly its Arabic service, consistently promotes a pro-Hamas line.

As for social media, Hamas posts on platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and, in some operations, Instagram, in order to spread messages internationally and interact with constituencies in the West Bank, diaspora communities, and even Israeli society through psychological operations.

In addition, Hamas disseminates its propaganda via several websites in Arabic, English, French, and Hebrew, and has attempted cyber operations using social engineering apps to target Israeli soldiers.

The Trump peace plan makes no mention of this major asset operated by Hamas. The organization will certainly make every attempt to retain control of it. If it succeeds, this sophisticated propaganda operation will continue to provide Hamas with a highly effective soft-power base that could ensure its continued influence within Gaza, despite its loss of support among Gaza’s population.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), a respected polling organization, carries our regular surveys of Palestinian opinion.  Its Poll No. 95, undertaken in May 2025, records a sharp decline in public confidence in Hamas. The poll it carried out a year earlier, in May 2024, showed 71% of the Gazan population approving Hamas’s onslaught on Israel on October 7, 2023.  By May 2025 that support had shrunk to 38%. In fact, overall support for armed struggle itself fell, and the survey revealed increased openness to negotiation.

Given Hamas’s priorities, its battered and depleted infrastructure, and its declining but still resilient base, Hamas will most likely attempt to undertake a period of calm under the ceasefire terms.

Without openly accepting disarmament or exclusion from Gaza’s future governance, it will probably use the time to probe for any ambiguity in the ceasefire’s terms, attempt to rebuild its organization covertly, and seek to rehabilitate itself. It will most likely resist efforts to install Arab or Palestinian Authority governance in Gaza unless it is involved in some way.

In this period, Hamas probably sees itself walking a fine line – attempting to maintain its militant identity intact without provoking Israel into renewed conflict. Unlikely to accept voluntary exile, the Hamas leadership will hope to survive the transitional period and remain relevant within Gaza.

As for the future, several Palestinian spokesmen, while declaring an undying commitment to the anti-Israel struggle, have suggested the organization might agree to a cessation of hostilities for up to 10 years – an unattractive prospect that would enable the total refurbishment of its military capacity in preparation for its next onslaught on Israel.

Trump’s plan specifically excludes Hamas from any role in the future governance of Gaza. That is not likely to deter the organization from seeking involvement in its administration, either directly or covertly by way of influence, subterfuge, or corruption. Indeed, rumors are circulating about the idea of Hamas launching a political party, under some new innocuous name, ahead of the elections envisaged in the Trump plan.

According to the UK’s Daily Telegraph, Hamas insiders have confirmed that discussions are ongoing about establishing a “civil movement” as a vehicle for participation in future Palestinian elections.

The dragon is wounded, not slain.


Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "A narrow set of choices for Gaza: What's the future for Hamas?", 27 October 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-871664

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 November 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/31102025-whats-the-future-for-hamas-oped/

Gang war in Gaza

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 October 2025

The past few weeks have seen the emergence within Gaza of armed factions challenging Hamas.  Simmering for some time, this intra-Palestinian conflict came to the boil after the ceasefire on 10 October.  Hamas is now facing open ​defiance from ​not just one or two, but multiple armed groups emboldened by the power vacuum and security chaos within Gaza​.  

Hamas propaganda ​seeks to downplay talk of the growing Palestinian opposition, and prefers to report operations directed against individuals accused of collaborating with Israel. 

On October 12 the Palestinian Home Front, a Telegram news distribution channel affiliated with Hamas, announced: “The security services and the resistance are conducting a wide-scale field campaign across all areas of the Gaza Strip, from north to south, to locate and arrest collaborators and informants.”  A number were apprehended in Gaza city, it said: “after they were proved to be involved in spying for the enemy [and] participating in the assassination of several resistance members.”

The statement made no mention of what happened to them.  ​However, multiple independent accounts confirm that ​shortly afterward​, in full view of the public​, they were blindfolded, made to kneel on the sidewalk, and shot dead.​  More video footage circulated in October shows Hamas's armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, executing individuals by shooting them in the head in the streets of Gaza City.  These individuals undergo no judicial procedure or legal process.  They are simply accused and then assassinated in public with the aim of instilling the greatest possible fear in any who might be tempted to oppose Hamas​'s rule.

These field executions of ​Palestinians accused of treason and collaboration ​with Israel​ are part of a wider campaign by Hamas’s so-called “security forces”​.   ​Not only are they ​making a determined effort to ​restore ​their authority by regaining control of that part of Gaza from which Israeli forces have withdrawn​.  They are sending a message to the powerful ​Palestinian gangs and clans that are openly challenging ​Hamas​.  If it is to retain any presence in Gaza, Hamas must try to counter the upsurge of attacks aimed at undermining its rule. ​​​

Early in October Hamas conducted a large raid in Khan Yunis on the al-Mujaida clan which had previously been involved in assassinating Hamas operatives, and was accused by Hamas of collaboration with Israel. Dozens of Hamas gunmen stormed a clan stronghold, resulting in deaths on both sides.

On October 12, violent confrontations erupted between Hamas security forces and the Doghmush clan, a powerful local family with members connected to different political factions. Some 300 Hamas fighters were reported to have stormed a residential area where the clan gunmen had taken refuge. The clashes killed at least 27 people, including eight Hamas members and 19 clan members.

The Doghmush and al-Mujaida clans are major players in Gaza's internal power struggles. Their distinct leadership structures and political-militant affiliations have shaped recent armed conflict.

Leadership of the Doghmush clan is centered around Mumtaz Doghmush, who has led the Army of Islam, a militia linked to Al-Qaeda.  Doghmush family members have in the past been active in Fatah, Hamas, and other militant circles.  Despite past collaboration with Hamas on high-profile operations – notably the kidnapping and subsequent prisoner exchange for Israeli sold​ier Gilad Shalit – relations have soured due to competition over smuggling networks, local authority, and postwar power.

Other Doghmush elders and warlords operate semi-independently, each commanding armed gangs or criminal cells, making the clan a loose confederation. The ​Doghmush clan is reportedly involved in arms smuggling and extortion networks throughout Gaza's black market ecosystem.

The al-Mujaida clan is led by several prominent family elders in Khan Yunis, holding sway through extensive family networks.  Affiliated primarily with the Fatah movement, the al-Mujaida clan occasionally supports other Palestinian groups opposed to Hamas, especially in southern Gaza. They have resisted Hamas-imposed security measures and are accused by Hamas of collaborating with Israeli and Egyptian officials, particularly when it concerns smuggling or resource distribution.

These two clans continue to be the main flashpoints of intra-Palestinian factional rivalry, blending local leadership traditions and criminal syndicate models with political-militant operations.  But they are far from the only centers of clan-based anti-Hamas activity.  Numerous smaller armed groups and coalition factions have also appeared, usually linked to local clans or neighborhoods in Gaza. As of the end of September 2025, over a dozen new anti-Hamas armed groups had emerged, reflecting a widespread societal breakdown and the virtual collapse of Hamas's monopoly on territorial control and security.

To name but a few, there is the Rafah-based Bedouin clan Abu Shabab.  Its head, Yasser Abu Shabab, currently recognized as a leading anti-Hamas clan leader, commands a personal militia of about 400 fighters. Hamas accuses Abu Shabab of collaborating with Israel – a charge he denies.

Then there is the Hellis clan, led by Rami Hellis.  Operating in the Shejaia neighborhood of Gaza City, it has formed a coalition with other local families specifically aimed at resisting Hamas's attempts to reassert control. 

The Fatah-affiliated Khalas clan, based in eastern Gaza City and led by Ahmed Khalas, has received Israeli protection and military aid.  It is notable for having openly resisted Hamas from the moment it took control of Gaza in 2007.  Khalas serves on the Fatah Central Committee, and through him anti-Hamas clan activity as a whole is plugged into the Palestinian Authority and its structures.  In fact Khalas serves as the representative of PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Gaza.

Centered in Khan Yunis, the Khanidak clan, led by Yasser Khanidak, has also benefited from Israeli support and weaponry.  Although not as large as the Doghmush, Khanidak clan fighters have actively opposed Hamas forces during recent battles in southern Gaza.

Other militant clans who have opposed, or are currently opposing Hamas, include the Barbakh clan based in Khan Yunis and Rafah, the Abu Ziyad clan located in Zawaida near Deir al-Balah, and the Abu Werda clan based near the Port of Gaza, which frequently leads smaller, neighborhood-based defense groups that join larger clan battles as needed.

It is clear that the Hamas regime now faces widespread opposition from Palestinian leaders at the grass roots.  The organization is understandably being held accountable not only for ​the decision to mount ​its barbarous assault on Israel on October 7 2023, but crucially for underestimating the force, extent and persistence of the Israeli reprisal that followed, and the consequential devastating result for Gaza and its people.

         This ​upsurge in armed opposition, which has undoubtedly weakened Hamas’s former iron grip on the governance of Gaza​, must have influenced its decision to pay lip-service to the Trump plan. Gang warfare may yet play a crucial part in determining Hamas’s future role, if any, in Gaza.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled "Gang War in Gaza:  Determining the Future of Hamas's rule", 20 October 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870943

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 October 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/24102025-gang-war-in-gaza-oped/

Britain succumbs to the anti-Israel lobby

 Published in the Jerusalem Report, 16 October 2025

        It is the pressure of domestic politics, rather than any firm conviction, that has led Britain’s prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, into formally recognizing a State of Palestine.  It is true that a long-term intention to do so was embedded in the manifesto on which the Labour party fought the last general election, but the pledge was conditional, to be timed appropriately within a peace process.

That was a sensible qualification, and nothing has changed since it was published except the rapid rise in Britain of hard-left opinion following the election, and a torrent of Hamas-inspired propaganda on social and public media.  The relentless onslaught of disinformation from Gaza, swallowed in whole or in large part by the media, incorporated concocted death and casualty figures, orchestrated fatal incidents presented so as to make Israel appear responsible, and staged photographs depicting a vastly worse situation than the reality which, in all conscience, was bad enough.  

Britain’s general election in July 2024 resulted in a massive win for the Labour party.  Starmer came to power with a huge majority.  The results also threw up a few anomalies.

 Traditionally, general elections in Britain turn on domestic issues.  The economy and health are usually to the forefront of voters’ minds, together with the record of the incumbent government.  This time around, though, for one bloc of ethnic minority voters a foreign war taking place 3000 miles away was more important than all the usual domestic concerns.  

The activities of a brand new organization calling itself The Muslim Vote cost the Labour party five seats, slashed Labour majorities in a fair number of other constituencies, and placed a caucus of rabidly anti-Israel MPs in the House of Commons.  

The Muslim Vote was set up in December 2023 by an activist named Abubakr Nanabawa.  It was a response to the Labour Party’s initial decision to support Israel’s right of defense, following Hamas’s horrifying pogrom on October 7, 2023.  Any support for Israel, justified or not, is anathema to pro-Palestinian activists.   The Muslim Vote was an alliance of 23 such organizations.  Its purpose was to unseat those MPs deemed insufficiently hostile to Israel, particularly Labour party members.  Its candidates would stand in opposition to Labour, advocate immediate recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state and demand the banning of all arms sales to Israel.

They succeeded beyond their expectations.  In five constituencies its candidates beat their Labour opponents, and were voted into parliament.  Once there they formed themselves into a new pro-Palestinian bloc – the Independent Alliance – headed by Jeremy Corbyn, one-time leader of the Labour party.   

Suspended from the party in 2020 by its new leader, Keir Starmer, for antisemitic attitudes and remarks, he stood as an independent and trounced his Labour opponent, winning 49% of the votes compared to Labour’s 34%. 

The other four pro-Palestine MPs were elected in areas with among the highest proportion of Muslim voters in the UK.  One of Labour’s biggest shocks on election night was when the party’s shadow Treasury minister, Jonathan Ashworth, lost his Leicester South seat by around 1,000 votes to Shockat Adam.

“This is for Gaza!” declared Adam, as he made his victory speech.

Then came a surprising development – the launch on July 24 of a new left-wing party.  Founded jointly by Jeremy Corbyn and MP Zarah Sultana, who resigned from the Labour party to assume her new role, the new party started life with no name.  Even though widely labelled by the cheeky and irreverent “the fruit and nut party” (Sultana being the fruit and Corbyn the nut case), the four remaining members of the Independent Alliance immediately backed it.

The public response, too, was rapid and positive, with supporter sign-ups quickly running into the hundreds of thousands.  By mid-September they were pushing a million.

Gaza and pro-Palestine sentiments featured strongly in the party’s founding principles –both Corbyn and Sultana, as well as the independent MPs who back them, have repeatedly cited the Gaza conflict and Israeli policy as a key reason for creating the new party.  Their platform explicitly includes opposition to arms sales to Israel and support for Gaza and for Palestinian statehood.

Faced with these pressures, Starmer and the lacklustre David Lammy, UK foreign secretary until the Cabinet reshuffle of September 6, sacrificed principle for appeasement.  Because their early support for Israel’s right to defend itself was continuously challenged by strident left-wing voices, their backing soon merged into muted, then ever-stronger, anti-Israel sentiment and action.  

Lammy’s period as foreign secretary was marked by his unquestioning acceptance of Hamas propaganda, and a vociferous anti-Israel stance. An early act as foreign secretary was to maintain that he was legally obligated to implement the International Criminal Court’s misguided arrest warrant against Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  His position contrasted with France's view that Netanyahu benefited from immunity from the ICC.

When Lammy publicly asserted that Israel had breached international law by blocking humanitarian supplies into Gaza, his statement was formally disowned by Starmer’s office.  Subsequently, Lammy restricted certain arms sales to Israel, and supported France in its intention to recognize  a non-existent Palestinian state.

Just a few words uttered by Lammy encapsulates the extent to which he and Britain’s Labour government was in thrall to the extremist pro-Palestinian elements now dominating the parliamentary party.

   Speaking to the UN Security Council on July 29, he said that the Balfour Declaration, in which the British government said that it viewed with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, “came with the solemn promise that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Palestinian people as well. And colleagues, this has not been upheld, and it is a historical injustice which continues to unfold.”

He used much the same language in a House of Commons debate on September 1.

But of course the Balfour Declaration said no such thing.  It contained no mention of “the Palestinian people”, because no such entity existed in 1917.  What it does say is: “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”  And there were a fair number of them, including Muslim and Christian Arabs, Druze, Bedouin, Circassians, Samaritans and Armenians.

Lammy’s replacement as Britain’s foreign secretary, Yvette Cooper, is cause for cautious optimism.  Based on her long ministerial experience – she was a junior minister in Tony Blair’s Labour administration in 1997 – she is likely to adopt a more nuanced approach to the complex challenges facing today’s Middle East.  During her term as Home Secretary in the current government, one of Cooper’s more notable actions was to proscribe the hard-left, anti-Israel group, Palestine Action. 

She did so after Palestine Action activists broke into a military airfield on June 20 and caused damage valued at around £7 million to two planes, by spraying red paint into their turbine engines and attacking them with crowbars. Four people were subsequently charged with conspiracy and criminal damage. 

When a Palestine Action protest was staged outside parliament in August, Cooper publicly defended the UK police authorities who arrested more than 500 people.  Nearly 900 were arrested in a pro-Palestine Action gathering in September.  Cooper said that many sympathizers did not “know the full nature” of those running the group.

Palestine Action was doubtless celebrating on the day that Britain recognized a state of Palestine, even though the gesture was nothing but symbolic.  Palestine has no legal existence as a state, no government, no control of its borders, and is currently split into two entities, one of them still partly controlled by a terrorist organization. 

To say that recognition was seen by Hamas as a reward for its genocidal attack on Israel on October 7 is to state the obvious  – the organization said as much.  Britain’s act of recognition, unrelated to any peace process, was truly shameful.

Published in the Jerusalem Report, and on the Jerusalem Post website titled: "Keir Starmer’s Palestinian state recognition: Sacrificing principle to domestic politics", 16 October 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-870647

Palestinian leadership post-Gaza war

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 13 October 2025

          Whether Trump’s peace plan for Gaza is implemented partially or fully, the end-game is in sight. However we reach the final outcome, paragraphs 9 and 10 of his 20-point plan will shortly come into play. To quote:

          “9.  Gaza will be governed under a temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for day-to-day services and municipalities. This committee will include qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight by a new international “Board of Peace,” chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members (including former Prime Minister Tony Blair) to be announced.

 “10.  This “Board of Peace” will set the framework, handle funding, and supervise Gaza’s redevelopment until the Palestinian Authority completes its reform program and can safely assume control.”

In short, no matter how hostilities end, the Board of Peace will be seeking suitable Palestinian candidates to fill the “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” that will provide Gaza with its temporary transitional governance.  At the same time, suitable Palestinians will be required to people the reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) that will eventually “assume control”.  A successor to its president, 89-year-old Mahmoud Abbas, could possibly be installed, or at least announced.

Where are these prospective Palestinian leaders of the future, untainted by Hamas or other jihadist philosophies or by a rejectionist past?

One name forces itself to the front of the list – Mohammed Dahlan.  Now based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), he is widely regarded by Western and Israeli commentators as a potential post-war leader.

His credibility is boosted by the fact that he is a native Gazan, born in 1961 in the Khan Yunis refugee camp.  As a teenager Dahlan helped set up the Fatah Youth Movement, known as the Fatah Hawks. In his twenties he was arrested more than once by the Israeli authorities for political activism, but never for terrorist activities. He put his time in Israeli prisons to good use by learning Hebrew, which he speaks fluently.

In the early 1990s Dahlan was reliably reported to have helped in the negotiations leading to the Oslo Accords.  The first Accord, signed  in 1993, was violently opposed by Hamas, which severed relations with Yasser Arafat as a result.  Arafat chose Dahlan to head the Preventive Security Force in Gaza.  Israel and the US​ supported and closely cooperated with ​him in his new role​, particularly in countering Hamas.  Building up a force of 20,000 men, he became so powerful that the Strip was nicknamed "Dahlanistan". 

In 2001 Dahlan began condemning corruption in the PA and calling for reform.  The 2006 Palestinian elections saw Hamas gain a majority in Gaza.  Dahlan called their election victory a disaster, and denounced Hamas as “a bunch of murderers and thieves”. Six months later Hamas staged a bloody coup in Gaza, seized power and expelled those Fatah officials it had not murdered. Years later it was revealed that Dahlan played a key role in an abortive US plot to remove Hamas from power.

In October 2007 the Bush administration reportedly pressured Abbas to appoint Dahlan as his deputy.  Ever since then  Abbas regarded him as a dangerous rival.  In June 2011 he charged Dahlan with financial corruption and murder, going so far as to accuse him of killing the late leader, Yasser Arafat.  In 2011 Dahlan was expelled from Fatah.  French investigators in 2015 concluded that Arafat died of natural causes.

 Settling in the UAE, Dahlan became a close advisor to Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), then Crown Prince, now UAE president.

  Though never officially acknowledged, Dahlan is believed to have played a behind-the-scenes role in facilitating the normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel, resulting in the Abraham Accords in September 2020. 

The most plausible figure after Dahlan is 73-year-old Salam Fayyad, the former Palestinian prime minister.  Widely viewed as a technocratic, Western-friendly administrator, Fayyad, first as finance minister and then as prime minister of the PA, built up a reputation as a financial and administrative reformer. 

Significantly, during Tony Blair’s time as special representative of the Quartet for Middle East Peace, he worked closely with Blair on economic development and institution building in Palestinian territories.  In particular they collaborated on what was known as the Fayyad Plan, a roadmap to statehood.  Blair, a member of Trump’s Board of Peace, would no doubt support Fayyad as a candidate for the technocratic committee which it is to oversee.

Another potential candidate is Mohammad Mustafa, the prominent Palestinian politician and economist appointed PA prime minister in March 2024.  Widely viewed as a technocratic reformer, his career has been marked by high-profile international experience and economic leadership including 15 years at the World Bank Group in Washington, and senior advisory roles for the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 

A further possible figure is 79-year-old Hanan Ashrawi, the veteran PA diplomat.  In December 2020, she resigned from the Executive Committee of the PLO, citing the marginalization of women and young people in Palestinian leadership.

Less involved in formal political office than she used to be, she remains very active as a public activist and advocate, pushing for reform and accountability.

Two other possibilities are Hussein al-Sheikh, currently serving as the PLO’s Secretary-General, and Majed Faraj, the chief of PA intelligence.  Western circles typically regard al-Sheikh as a pragmatic speaker, deeply involved in diplomatic engagement and security coordination. Faraj is viewed as a leader in Palestinian efforts to counter terrorism and maintain West Bank stability. He regularly collaborates with Israeli and US intelligence, and his agency has thwarted numerous planned attacks.  Although both men have historical connections to Fatah armed activity, they are generally regarded in Western official circles as valuable security and political interlocutors.

With the sole exception of Dahlan, none of these names appears on the list of leaders most favored by the Palestinian public.  According to the latest poll, Palestinians overwhelmingly support 66-year-old Marwan Barghouti as their leader of choice.

Arrested by Israel in April 2002 during the second Intifada, he was convicted in 2004 on five counts of murder and attempted murder, and sentenced to five life sentences plus an additional 40 years. He will not be included in the return of some 2000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees under the Trump ceasefire arrangements.

Others ranking high are Khaled Mashaal – Hamas through and through – and, more feasible as a future leader, Mustafa Barghouti, a physician, activist, and prominent Palestinian politician known for his secular, reformist orientation.

The Trump plan need not fail for lack of Palestinian leaders​. ​ ​After all, there is also the whole of the Palestinian diaspora to scour for possible figures​ able and, hopefully, willing to play their part in rebuilding Gaza and constructing a promising future for the whole region.  The political will to get started is all that is needed.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 13 October 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-870182

Sharaa pauses his pact with Israel

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2025

On September 17 Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president, who was briefing reporters in Damascus ahead of his trip to the UN General Assembly, said that the ongoing negotiations with Israel to reach a security pact could lead to results “in the coming days.” According to Saudi-owned newspaper Independent Arabia, citing “senior Syrian sources”, Israel and Syria were expected to sign a security agreement under US auspices on September 25.

It never happened.  Multiple news outlets, citing senior US officials and both Israeli and Syrian sources, indicated that the two sides were very close to concluding a security arrangement intended to reduce hostilities along the border and protect the Druze minority. However, issues such as Israel's access to Sweida, precise demilitarization mechanisms, territorial buffer zones, and domestic political considerations in Syria delayed finalization.

Officials from both Israel and Syria, as well as US mediators, remain optimistic that ​this is merely a postponement.  Senior US figures have suggested ​that an agreement will be​ reached and signed soon.  

 ​What might come as news to some​ is that negotiations have been “ongoing” between Israel and Syria​ - in fact​, for months. The key Syrian participant, in addition to Sharaa himself, has been Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani. 

          Media reports mention strategic affairs minister Ron Dermer as Israel’s interlocutor, while US special envoy Thomas Barack has been acting as mediator. Meetings have taken place in a variety of locations including London, Paris and Baku. These promising contacts​, not exactly secret but given little publicity, are scheduled to continue.

Describing a security pact with Israel as a “necessity” for Syria, Sharaa ​has said ​that an agreement would need to respect Syria’s airspace and territorial unity​, and he ​seems to believe it should be monitored by the UN.  This potential deal is explicitly not being framed as normalization.  Syria’s position is that with the Golan Heights issue unresolved, and certain Israeli-held positions such as Mount Hermon still outstanding, normalization with Israel is not on the table at this point.

 However on September 17, during a media briefing to reporters in Damascus, Sharaa said that Syria is seeking “something like” the 1974 Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement concluded after the Yom Kippur War.  It established a formal ceasefire, and separated opposing forces by creating a demilitarized zone and a UN-patrolled buffer zone on the Golan Heights.

Sharaa also mentioned that in July a Syria-Israel deal had been “four to five days” away, but the outbreak of violence in Sweida derailed it.

On July 12, following mutual kidnappings and attacks between Druze and Bedouin armed groups, the Druze-majority region of Sweida in southern Syria was engulfed in severe armed sectarian clashes. The violence involved shoot-outs, extrajudicial executions, massacres, burning of villages, and looting.  Over 1,500 people were killed, hundreds of whom were Druze civilians, with at least 192,000 people displaced from the region.

Israel intervened to protect the Druze by mounting airstrikes targeting Syrian government and Bedouin positions.  Ceasefires were declared on July 15 and 19, but tension and periodic violence continued.  Sweida remains a potent factor in efforts to end conflict in southern Syria.

   The US, which is playing a mediating role in the Syria-Israel security discussions, is also deeply involved in the agreement known as the Sweida roadmap, publicly announced on September 16 in Damascus.  ​The negotiations leading to it were one reason for delaying the broader Israel-Syria security pact. The official signatories are Syria’s Shaibani, US envoy Barrack, and Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Safadi.

Two earlier rounds of talks held in Amman in July and August 2025 had set the stage for this final agreement.  At a joint press conference attended by all three, the seven-point roadmap to address the crisis in Sweida province was unveiled.

Describing it as “a collective vision,” Barack said the plan ensures displaced people can return to Sweida.  Jordan’s Safadi said: “Security in southern Syria is an extension of Jordan’s security and essential for our stability.  We want Syria to stabilize, recover and rebuild after years of destruction and suffering, and to start practical steps toward a brighter future for all Syrians”.

And indeed the roadmap emphasizes regional security considerations, linking the security of southern Syria to that of Jordan, which also hosts Druze and Bedouin communities.

The agreement aims to restore normal life in Sweida, including opening key roads, restoring services, allowing aid, launching an internal reconciliation process, and prosecuting inciters of the violence. Heavy weapons have reportedly been withdrawn from southern Syria under the plan, addressing Israeli security concerns as well.  A joint Syrian-Jordanian-American mechanism is expected to oversee implementation, including ceasefires and security sector reform.

The Syrian government will allow local Druze security forces to operate in Sweida to protect roads and ensure movement of people and commerce. The violence had led to large displacements, with over 160,000 people affected, including Druze and Bedouin internally displaced. The roadmap intends to plan for their return.

Whereas the Sweida roadmap stresses equal citizenship and an incremental trust-building approach, in north-eastern Syria the situation is nearly the opposite.  Despite Sharaa’s best efforts – including a formally signed agreement in March – the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are resisting full reintegration in the new Syria.  They reject assimilation and are demanding genuine decentralization in any new constitution.

Efforts at incorporating Kurdish civil and military bodies into the Syrian national forces have stalled and, as transitional authorities in Damascus have been prioritizing unitary control, thousands have been demonstrating for greater autonomy.

This runs counter to Turkey’s interests.  Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is broadly pro-Sharaa as long as he continues to prioritize Syria’s territorial unity and does not allow the SDF or other Kurdish groups to gain autonomy outside Damascus’s authority. Turkey retains a readiness to use force should Kurdish federalization or stalling on integration become apparent.

Sweida and the Kurdish region are not the only problems facing Sharaa as he tries to steer Syria toward unity and inclusivity.  There are entrenched regional administrations, each with independent military, civil, and judicial structures such as Rankous in the Qalamoun Region and Al-Tal, on the outskirts of Damascus.

Many observers believe that failure to reach an inclusive and mutually respectful arrangement with all Syrian constituencies could threaten both the transitional process and national unity, risking a return to internal conflict.

So while the Sweida stabilization includes reconciliation and reintegration, Sharaa’s broader strategy is constrained by Kurdish demands for a degree of autonomy at odds with his concept of a unified nation, Turkey’s rooted opposition to any such development, and the challenge of coordinating the fragmented power centers that abound in Syria.  If Sharaa and his government can achieve genuine pluralism and decentralization in a post-Assad Syria, not only a security pact, but a normalization deal with Israel could well follow.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2025 and the Jerusalem Post online titled
"Sweida’s crisis and the quiet path to a Syria-Israel security deal":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-869483

Published in Eurasia Review, 10 October 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/10102025-syrias-sharaa-pauses-his-pact-with-israel-oped