Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 December 2025
Back in September Lebanon’s army chief Rodolphe Haykal presented the government with a plan to ensure that, by the end of 2025, Hezbollah would be fully disarmed and military hardware would be held exclusively by Lebanon’s state forces. The cabinet authorized the army to begin implementing it immediately.
Various leaks to the
media gradually revealed that the army’s plan is called “Homeland Shield”, and
that its strategy is to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons in five phases, starting
south of the Litani River.
It also emerged that President
Joseph Aoun has rejected the idea of replicating Iraq’s Popular Mobilization
Forces, where Iran-backed paramilitary groups have been integrated into Iraq’s
security forces. He is opposed to creating a distinct Hezbollah entity
within the army. He wants Hezbollah fighters to be recruited into Lebanon’s
armed forces only if they meet the same criteria as all other applicants –
academic qualifications, entrance exams, and training.
On October 22, 2025, prime
minister Nawaf Salam said that ultimately Hezbollah “will need to return to
being a regular political party without a military arm.” Hezbollah leaders,
however, have made it clear that they oppose being wholly disarmed. Assuming
that Lebanon will be permanently in conflict with Israel, they regard
themselves as essential to the national effort.
The Meir Amit intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) was founded in 2001 to specialize in
matters related to terrorism and intelligence. In a report published on
October 30, ITIC said it believed the Lebanese Army will aim to complete its
operations south of the Litani by the end of 2025, but that in Hezbollah’s
strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, it will be hindered
from acting because the government is shying away from a
confrontation with Hezbollah that could escalate into civil war.
In short, ITIC believes that the
original army plan was far too ambitious in assessing that Hezbollah’s
disarmament could be accomplished by the year’s end, and that instead of
all five phases, only phase one is likely to have been achieved.
ITIC believes Hezbollah may agree
in principle to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani,
but in exchange for guarantees. These would include protection against
Israeli targeted assassinations, and the integration of the
organization’s operatives into the security functions of the state. The
ITIC says it believes the Lebanese government, in an effort to show
flexibility, will indeed try to persuade the international community,
especially the US, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and
withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon.
Rumours abound in the Arab media about the uneasy standoff between
Lebanon’s leaders and Hezbollah. “Sources” assert that
although the Army knows about many Hezbollah military stockpiles, it desists
from raiding them because the offices of the President, the Prime
Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament have agreed that any direct
confrontation with Hezbollah could plunge the country into civil war.
The US has shown growing
impatience with the Lebanese government’s velvet glove approach to carrying
through Hezbollah’s disarmament. General Haykal was scheduled to travel
to Washington on November 18 for high-level meetings with US officials
regarding military assistance, border security, and efforts to bring all armed
groups in Lebanon under state authority. Just before Haykal’s planned
departure, the trip was abruptly canceled.
The immediate trigger was a public
statement by the Lebanese army on November 16 condemning Israeli attacks near
the southern border. Notably avoiding any reference to Hezbollah’s
significant armed presence independent of the state, the statement referred to
Israel as "the enemy."
Understandably, US officials
interpreted the army statement as aligning with Hezbollah's narrative. US
policymakers and members of Congress criticized the Lebanese army. Senator
Lindsey Graham publicly condemning Haykal’s leadership, calling the rhetoric a
setback for efforts at regional stabilization.
This episode seems to have
galvanized President Aoun and prime minister Salam into action.
On
November 20 Salam said at a governmental press briefing at the presidential
palace in Baabda, Lebanon: “Lebanon is currently open to engaging with Israel in
a partnership for disempowering Hezbollah.” He added that Lebanon would
seek US help in advancing negotiations in the context of escalating Israeli
strikes on Hezbollah positions.
The next day in a televised speech, President Aoun is reported by international media as saying that Lebanon is “ready for negotiations” with Israel, focused on “ending Israeli strikes” and “Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in Lebanese territory”.
So what is the current position?
Open-source maps show that parts
of southern Lebanon previously strongly associated with Hezbollah are now
increasingly coming under the Lebanese Army’s control. According to one
source, out of some 265 identified Hezbollah positions in that zone, around 190
have been ceded to the Lebanese Army.
Meanwhile Hezbollah’s
infrastructure has been significantly degraded. In particular,
Hezbollah’s elite unit, the Radwan Force, has taken a serious hit: reports
indicate that up to 80% of its weapons systems and tunnel infrastructure have
been damaged or lost. Moreover it is estimated that some 4,500 of its operatives
have been killed and about 9,000 wounded. representing a very large chunk of its
active force.
And yet, despite losses, Hezbollah
is not defunct. Analysts argue that though it is undoubtedly weaker, it remains
resilient. Its survival depends on achieving a balance between the
pressure to disarm, financial constraints, and its role in Lebanese politics.
To do so, it is attempting a
“reset”. By acceding to a partial disarmament, it may be able to retain a
reduced but still meaningful arsenal — enough to deter, survive, and remain
politically relevant.
The English poet Alexander Pope
catches the position of the Lebanese government in a nutshell:
"Willing to wound, yet afraid to strike." Its
equivocation means that Hezbollah could yet survive in perhaps a
more limited, but still highly dangerous, form.
Published in the Jerusalem Report, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Lebanon 'reset': Hezbollah may survive in more limited, but dangerous, form", 1 December 2025:
