Gaza protection force stymied

              

           Since coming to power Erdogan has demonstrated deep hostility toward Israel...

          On December 16, US Central Command convened a multi-nation conference in Doha, the capital of Qatar.  Its purpose was to set up the International Stabilization Force (ISF) that is an essential element in Phase Two of President Donald Trump’s Gaza ceasefire/peace plan.  The ​enterprise was a failure.  As painfully emerged after the conference, not a single unequivocal commitment was forthcoming from the multitude of nations attending.  Media reports indicate that offers of troop​s, police ​or finance remained at the level of “interest” or conditional willingness, pending ​domestic legal reviews​ and a clearer mandate, ​or a UN or treaty framework​.

For some reason no complete list of the nations participating in the conference has yet been provided in official media releases.  Published reports of the number of states present vary wildly from “approximately 25” as reported by The Media Line, to 45 according to Ynet Global.   Among the states that did attend though, there were two notable absentees:  Israel and Turkey.  Neither ​had been invited.

As for Israel, most political analysts agree that since Washington was trying to convince Arab, Muslim and other states to send forces or support to Gaza, Israel​'s presence would ​have made their participation more ​difficult.  ​​In the absence of Israel​, moreover, it would be easier to keep the focus on the prospective multinational force rather than on Israel’s security demands.  

Turkey, it is generally agreed, was not invited because Israel specifically requested its exclusion. Israel has consistently objected to any Turkish security role in post‑war Gaza.  One commentator likens the idea of allowing Turkish troops into Gaza to welcoming in a Trojan horse. The people of Troy, an ancient city in modern-day Turkey, were tricked into bringing a giant wooden horse inside their walls.  Once inside, Greek soldiers emerged to sack the city. 

The purpose of the ISF is to help disarm Hamas, thus preventing Gaza from again becoming a launchpad for attacks on Israel.  But Turkey under its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has for years ​supported Hamas.  Senior Hamas leaders have been allowed to ​take up residence in Istanbul and Ankara​, and maintain offices and networks, including political​ and operational hubs​​.  Some, like Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri​, have been granted Turkish citizenship.

Since he came to power Erdogan, with his Muslim Brotherhood origins, has time and again demonstrated a deep hostility toward Israel.  Two weeks after Hamas’s barbaric assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, he described Hamas as a “liberation” movement, adding: “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahideen defending their lands and citizens.”

In March 2024 he said: “No one can make us qualify Hamas as a terrorist organization…Turkey is a country that speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them.”

Erdogan has said he is willing to contribute forces immediately to the projected ISF, but it is pretty obvious that to allow Turkish forces to participate would be to undermine the whole purpose of the enterprise from the start.  

Just prior to the Doha conference, on December 15, President Trump – ​anticipating a successful outcome – said in the White House that the ISF was “already running…More and more countries are coming into it. They’re already in but they’ll send any number of troops that I ask them to send.”  

Clearly Doha failed to deliver the result that Washington had ​envisaged.

As regards the major Arab states – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Jordan –​ reports prior to the Doha conference indicated all as potential troop contributors.  Moreover Saudi Arabia and the UAE were reported to be “working with the US to secure funding for the deployment of troops to Gaza.”  

In the event none of these states committed soldiers or resources.  ​They and the other Arab governments remained cautious​, fear​ful of risking clashes with Hamas, to say nothing of  domestic ​opposition at policing or disarming Palestinians. Even Qatar as host, while backing the ​ISF concept, did not pledge troops or funding.

As for ​the non-Arab ​Muslim states and ​the European nations that have expressed support for the ISF – among others Indonesia, Italy, France and the UK –​ although some accounts say Indonesia has “signaled readiness” to send troops​, and that Italy “may be the only European country to contribute forces,” expressions of intent have not been converted into formal commitments.   

UN and diplomatic reports reveal that, though the UK and France ​expressed strong support​ for the rapid deployment of an ISF in principle, neither government used the Doha conference to earmark budgets or announce specific troop numbers. Other invited states (including Pakistan, Azerbaijan and various Western and Asian allies) appear in lists of those expressing​ willingness to assist in some way, but none converted willingness to actual commitment.

The failure to generate firm troop or funding pledges suggests that setting up the ISF will be a more protracted undertaking than initially envisaged.  US officials have ​now acknowledged that, even under optimistic assumptions, building the force could take most of 2026.  They have spoken about a target of around 10,000 troops.

Phase Two of the Trump peace plan rests on four interlocking elements: disarming Hamas; further withdrawal of the IDF;  transfer of security to the ISF operating alongside vetted Palestinian police; and the establishment of an interim technocratic Palestinian governing committee under a Board of Peace, with an eventual handover to a reformed Palestinian Authority and a pathway to Palestinian self‑determination.

All four depend on the ISF actually deploying in meaningful strength, with a clear mandate, rules of engagement and reliable financing.  ​Following Doha, however, it seems likely that the ISF will emerge later, smaller and in a more cautious manner than envisaged in the Trump peace plan and UN Resolution 2803​,which gave the plan international legitimacy.

Some commentators are now warning that in the absence of clear national commitments, Phase Two itself risks remaining “largely a blueprint on paper rather than an actionable plan,” with a danger of drifting into a “permanent Phase One” in which the IDF would, of necessity, have to remain in Gaza to maintain security.

 

 

Your Pro-Israel Bookshelf

 

           My new book "Your Pro-Israel Bookshelf: 100 titles reviewed" is due to be published on 10 February 2026. It will be available both as paperback and ebook. But it can be purchased NOW through the publisher.

          Why the title?  Not to be provocative, but to make quite sure that potential readers were not misled. Calling it "A Middle East Bookshelf" could have done just that. This book is likely to appeal most to readers not unsympathetic to Israel.

          This collection of exactly 100 book reviews is intended to be both a useful and a pleasurable guide for dedicated readers who have a special interest in the Middle East in general and Israel in particular. Originally published by the Jerusalem Post, they are selected to cover a wide range of genres. Among the 100 are biographies, political and personal memoirs, novels, thrillers, works on morals, religion and psychology, poetry, humour, children's books, even a graphic novel (that is, a book conceived as drawings accompanied by words).

          Presented alphabetically by title, anyone reading through this volume will never be aware of what type of book the next review will be dealing with, and will be pleasantly surprised by the variety of subject matter.

          I do hope readers might be moved to acquire a volume or two as a result.

          "Your Pro-Israel Bookshelf" can be purchased in either form NOW through the publisher at:

https://store.bookbaby.com/book/your-pro-israel-bookshelf?srsltid=AfmBOop9HcSn42BgrrbXw6TKqPSBtTE4yn5FXzCHT7tp6wOz-TG47JSH

Gaza: why the delay?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 December 2025

           On September 30, the day after President Trump’s ceasefire plan for Gaza was ​launched, ​ a report in the National – the English language journal published in the United Arab Emirates​ – ​described the plan as “booby-trapped” because “every provision in the plan is kind of tied to other provisions.”​  That observation is true enough, but the 20-point plan embodies a further weakness – the omission of a timetable for completing ​each of the three stages envisaged.  

    The interdependence between the various provisions of the plan, together with the lack of a clear deadline for the achievement of each stage, have together resulted in its progress being slowed to a snail’s pace.

   Under the plan, the first phase required a cessation of hostilities and then, over the next 72 hours, the release by Hamas of all living hostages together with the remains of the deceased.  Meanwhile Israel would free Palestinian prisoners, aid and relief would flow into Gaza under international supervision, and most IDF troops would withdraw to an agreed “yellow line”.  

This yellow line refers to a non-physical demarcation boundary, drawn on a map of the region, marking the initial phase of Israel's partial withdrawal from parts of the enclave. This line divides Gaza into two roughly equal zones – Hamas to the west; the IDF to the east.  In some areas Israeli forces have marked the line with yellow concrete blocks, but because the blocks do not precisely align with the agreed demarcation, a certain amount of confusion reigns​ on the ground.

Unfortunately, without a built-in requirement to complete the various stages of phase one within a given period, or sanctions against failure to comply, the plan as a whole has simply lost impetus.  Nor is there any incentive for either Hamas or the Israeli government to remedy the situation. Both are using ambiguity over these conditions to preserve leverage ahead of talks on stage two, where the core disputes over ​Hamas disarmament, ​the interim governance of Gaza, ​​deployment of an international armed force, and further IDF withdrawal are featured.

Hamas decided to maintain its bargaining power by spreading the release of the deceased hostages over several weeks.  It still holds the remains of Ran Givili, the Israeli police officer who reportedly eliminated 14 terrorists before he was killed and his body taken to Gaza​.  ​While it does so, stage one of the ceasefire is not completed. 

At the same time, Hamas continues to tell the world about civilian deaths – “civilians” or “women and children”  is how they classify those killed in Gaza, never ​enumerating the deaths of fighters as such. ​ Fighters aged 17 or under are classed as children.  Israel, for its part, continues to report daily clashes with Hamas.

​The targeted killing of senior Hamas leader Ra'ad Sa'ad on December 13 aroused Trump's ire, but in the event it did not deter him from declaring on December 17 that, after 3000 years, he had brought peace to the Middle East.

Meanwhile difficulties are emerging which threaten the success of later stages of the plan.

Phase two envisages the creation of a council of independent Palestinian technocrats to run the day-to-day affairs of Gaza under international supervision.  It also provides for the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) made up of US, Arab and European personnel to oversee demilitarization and maintain security.  

To take the last matter first, as of now many countries asked to contribute troops or personnel have failed to respond or are hesitating, citing concerns about an unclear mandate, or the risk of confrontations with Hamas fighters.

On November 29, the Washington Post reported that Azerbaijan, which had been among the countries expected to contribute troops, is now tying any participation to a complete halt in fighting and a clear mandate.  Indonesia, which had earlier indicated it could provide up to 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, has clarified that this figure represented overall capacity rather than a firm commitment and is now considering a very much reduced initial contribution.

Meanwhile, despite the force being described diplomatically as “Arab-led,” ​to date no​t a single Arab government has formally committed troops.​  Several Arab countries previously mentioned as potential contributors, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have either declined or expressed increased reluctance to deploy forces, citing political sensitivities.  Even for states keen to win favor with the US administration, the Post reports, many uncertainties remain, including the thorny question of how the force would go about de-weaponizing Hamas, which has sent mixed signals about its willingness to disarm.

​The US “want the international stabilizing force to come into Gaza,” said a senior official in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “and restore​, quote unquote​, “law and order”, and disarm any resistance. So that’s the problem. Nobody wants to do that.”

So while Trump’s ceasefire plan has broad regional and international backing, especially from the mediators Qatar, Egypt and Turkey, its long-term prospects remain uncertain.  The situation was not improved by the disappointing and inconclusive results of the large US‑led planning conference​, held on December 16 under US Central Command auspices​, on ​the International Stabilization Force for post‑war Gaza.  More than 25 nations were represented, but it ended without firm decisions on the force’s mandate or concrete troop pledges.  In addition to that issue, many of the most controversial or sensitive components of phase two, including the disarmament of Hamas, transitional governance, the future status of Gaza and wider Palestinian political questions, also remain unresolved and contentious.

If the international force never deploys, or deploys in a limited, ineffective way, there is a real danger the ceasefire becomes a “frozen conflict” — and Gaza is subjected to a prolonged stalemate, a hark back to the “managed instability” that marked the pre-October 7 period.  History has already demonstrated what that situation finally leads to.

If Hamas refuses or delays disarmament, or Israel is unwilling to withdraw fully, the underlying structural problems – the vacuum in governance and security, and the humanitarian crisis– will remain, and the truce could collapse.  In those circumstances, the ceasefire may only delay, not end, the conflict.

Published in the Jerusalem Post 23 December 2025, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Why Trump's Gaza plan is losing momentum," 22 December 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-880885

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 December 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26122025-gaza-why-the-delay-oped/

Disarming Hamas – does the IRA point the way?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 December 2025

On December 8 the London Daily Telegraph reported that, as part of the emerging Gaza peace framework, the US is considering a two‑year, IRA‑style “decommissioning” scheme for the disarmament of Hamas. 

Other media sources had already reported that the idea of disarming Hamas gradually was being proposed by Turkey and Qatar (neither of them noted friends of Israel)​, and that Bassem Naim, a Hamas political bureau member, had said that the group would be open to discussing “freezing or storing” its arsenal. 

Israeli officials were reported to believe that this slow disarmament idea is simply a ploy to keep Hamas weaponized as long as possible, and maybe to by-pass the decommissioning of its arsenal altogether.  Moreover, weapons “stored” (which does not feature in IRA decommissioning) are weapons re-access​ible.

   On the face of it the history of the IRA’s disarmament seems to offer a blueprint for how a violent, insurgent movement can be disempowered and made the instrument of a durable peace.  But in fact the differences in context with Hamas are so deep that the IRA experience can offer only indicators not a template.

The struggle for Irish independence from Britain has a long history.  The historic conflict was intensified by the presence of a large Protestant minority, mainly resident in the north-east of the island, loyal to the British monarchy and opposed to rule from Dublin.  Intensive political activity finally resulted in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which created Northern Ireland as a separate six-county devolved entity within the United Kingdom.  The rest of the island passed through several phases of increasing sovereignty before becoming the Republic of Ireland in 1948–49.

The partition compromise did not suit those whose dream was a united Ireland. Starting in 1968, the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and then the Provisional IRA used armed violence to try to force an end to British rule in Northern Ireland. The strategy escalated from attacks on security forces in the six northern counties to indiscriminate bombings and shootings in mainland Britain. Their campaign ended when a mix of military containment, diplomatic engagement, political inclusion and changing public attitudes convinced the republican movement that it could pursue its goals more effectively through negotiation than armed struggle.

The IRA’s disarmament was a protracted and politically choreographed process that ran from discussions in the mid‑1990s to the verified destruction of its arsenal in September 2005, under international supervision.  To manage this, the British and Irish governments set up the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) in 1997, while the Good Friday Agreement, signed in 1998, ended the armed struggle and envisaged the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons within two years.

The first key step was symbolic rather than destructive.  In June 2000 the IICD was allowed to inspect IRA arms dumps, confirming that weapons were being secured under agreed arrangements but not yet destroyed. The IRA then announced in October 2001 that it had begun actual decommissioning, and the IICD reported that an initial quantity of IRA arms had been put beyond use – though, to protect republican sensitivities, without publishing an inventory.​

It was a slow process.  Crises over alleged IRA activity, and other political problems, repeatedly interrupted momentum and limited the confidence‑building impact of these partial moves.  Finally, on July 28, 2005, the IRA leadership publicly ordered an end to the armed campaign, instructed all units to dump arms, and authorized its representative to work with the IICD to finish putting weapons beyond use, with two witnesses invited to increase public confidence.

Between late July and September 2005 the IRA carried out what the IICD described as several decommissioning acts, culminating on September 24–26, 2005 in the final verified destruction of all arms under its control.​

To identify the IRA and its history with Hamas in any but the most superficial terms is totally unrealistic. 

The fundamental and decisive difference is that all parties in what became known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland were nominally Christian.  The IRA’s purpose was to dislodge Britain from the six counties, not to eliminate its Protestant minority.  When the armed struggle became more trouble than it was worth, the IRA was prepared to hammer out a deal with people with whom, in the final analysis, they shared deep cultural ties. Only a few years later Queen Elizabeth was able to shake hands with ex-IRA leaders.

         Hamas, on the other hand, is a Sunni Muslim organization so viscerally antisemitic that it actually includes in its charter an obligation to kill Jews. Its oft-stated objective is to eliminate the state of Israel and its Jewish inhabitants. Reasoned dialogue in such circumstances is well-nigh impossible.

         By the late 1990s the IRA’s political vehicle, Sinn Féin, was fully inside an internationally underwritten peace process, with a seat at multi‑party talks, prisoner releases, institutional reforms, and a clear route into power‑sharing government in Belfast and influence in Dublin. The Good Friday Agreement created a consensual framework in which republican disarmament was explicitly linked to new institutions, cross‑border bodies, and gradual demilitarization of the British presence, giving the IRA leadership something concrete to trade weapons for.​

Hamas, by contrast, currently clings on to a portion of a devastated Gaza, is still designated a terrorist organization by key external actors, and has no place in final status negotiations.  On the contrary, it is specifically excluded by all the main players from any participation in the final governance of Gaza.

The IRA entered the ceasefire and decommissioning period as an undefeated insurgent force.  It presented its disarmament as a voluntary, phased choice rather than capitulation. ​

Hamas, after two years of intense war, has suffered severe military attrition.  Although it remains operational and still dominates security and administrative structures in part of the Strip, its damaged and weakened situation mean its negotiating position is fragile.

Phase two of the ceasefire deal requires the disarmament of Hamas as a pre-requisite for establishing appropriate security and governance mechanisms in Gaza.  Allowing Hamas to spread the decommissioning process over two years allows it the chance to retain some sort of involvement in Gaza’s future.  The idea should be vigorously resisted.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Could Hamas be disarmed by an IRA decommissioning scheme?", 16 December 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-880373  

Atrocity at Bondi Beach

 This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today,15 December:

Sir

The horrific incident on Bondi beach at the start of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah, and the attack at the Manchester Synagogue on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, came amid biased media portrayals of Israel's fight against the terrorist organisation Hamas.  Ignorant philosophies, which persist in viewing Israel as a colonialist incursion into the Middle East and capable of any monstrosity including genocide, have unleashed a wave of global anti-Semitism and, in some deranged minds, justified the taking of innocent Jewish lives. 

Neville Teller

 

The Axis of Resistance is crumbling

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2025

          On November 25 Afshin Madadi, a journalist attached to the UK’s Daily Telegraph, reported on conversations he had held ​recently with senior Iranian officials in Tehran. ​His account was both unexpected and truly surprising.

          They told him that Iran has lost control of the Houthis – that the fighters in Yemen who regularly attack global shipping lanes have stopped taking orders from Tehran.

“The Houthis have gone rogue,” ​one senior Iranian official told Madadi, “…and are now really rebels.” Then he added: “It’s not just the Houthis. Some groups in Iraq are also acting as if we never had any contact with them.” 

The revelations went even further.  Between them the officials maintained that the ​Iranian leadership is struggling to hold together what is left of its “axis of resistance” forces all around the Middle East – in other words that the regime is also losing control in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. 

The Institute for the Study of War analyzed Madadi’s report.  In its evaluation it described his contacts as "unspecified Iranian officials", the suggestion being that limited credence should therefore be placed on what they said.  The Telegraph article, however, strongly suggests​ that these were senior confidential sources speaking on the very condition they remained anonymous and unidentifiable. 

Given the situation within Iran, no whistle-blower or informant could allow their identity to be revealed.  The regime treats unauthorized communication with foreign media, particularly Western outlets, as treasonable offenses liable to the death penalty. ​

Madadi provides no information about how contact was made with these officials or why they agreed to talk to him, but despite the known dangers, Iranian officials do reach out to Western journalists and also to anti-regime organizations sited abroad.  

GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) is an independent Netherlands-based research foundation. In June 2024, it conducted a survey to measure support within Iran for regime change.  It found that more than 80% of those polled were in favor.

It is not, therefore, surprising that internal politics can result in moderates leaking information damaging to hardliners, especially those aligned with the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).​  Moreover some officials cultivate Western media contacts as insurance in case they need to flee Iran or seek asylum in the future.  ​Given Iran's systematic persecution of anyone suspected of providing information to Western media, the personal courage required for these officials to talk to the outside world, even if under the cloak of anonymity, should be recognized.

            As for the revelations passed on to Madadi, available evidence suggests there is indeed some substance to them.

The Houthis’ rift with Iran goes back to April, when the ayatollahs, fearful of being drawn into direct conflict with America, failed to come to their aid during heavy US strikes.  Ever since the Houthis, by broadening alliances and augmenting supply lines, have been trying to wean themselves off full blown Iranian support.

In response, Iran dispatched a senior IRGC commander, Abdolreza Shahlaei of the Quds Force, to Sana'a in mid-November in a bid to restore Iranian influence.

According to the Telegraph report, an Iranian official told journalist Madadi that Shahlaei was tasked with encouraging the Houthis to "cooperate more than before, as they are the only operational group left" in Iran's weakened proxy network.​ The fact that Tehran felt compelled to send such a high-ranking commander to Yemen highlights both the strained relationship and Iran's desperate attempt to maintain influence over its last major functioning proxy.​

   The Iranian officials who told Madadi about Houthi defiance also revealed that Iraqi militia groups are increasingly ignoring Tehran's directives.  These militias, according to recent reports, are being subjected to ever greater control by Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, backed by an Iraqi electorate increasingly favoring sovereignty over Iranian patronage.  To prevent Iraq from being drawn into the Israel-Iran conflict in June, Sudani reportedly blocked dozens of attempted attacks on Israel by his Iran-backed militias.​

Hezbollah, once the steel spine of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, is still reeling from Israel's September 2024 escalation which decimated its command structure and weapons stockpiles. The group lost its leader Hassan Nasrallah (killed September 2024), his presumed successor Hashem Safieddine, military commanders Ibrahim Akil and Ali Karaki, and most recently chief military commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai (killed November 23, 2025).  Hezbollah, which retains a fair amount of political power in Lebanon, is attempting to counter the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm the organization altogether.

Syria under its once-president Bashir Al Assad was often described as the lynch pin of the Axis of Resistance.  As well as serving as a base for IRGC operations, it provided Iran's essential land corridor for supplying weapons and materiel to Hezbollah in Lebanon.  After investing massive military support and billions of dollars to prop up Assad since 2011, Iran's abrupt withdrawal from Syria exposed Tehran's strategic and military weakness.  

In Gaza, the long-term viability of Hamas remains an open question.  There is evidence of attempts by the remaining leadership to re-establish control in the areas vacated by the IDF, but the organization as a whole has nominally signed up to the Trump 20-point peace plan which requires them to abandon any attempt to have a say in the governance of Gaza, and to disarm.   

          The Gaza ceasefire has effectively cut off what remains of Hamas from operational coordination with Iran.​

Finally, and perhaps most telling of all, the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June 2025 fully exposed the disintegration of the Axis. Israel conducted approximately 360 airstrikes across 27 Iranian provinces, targeting military installations, air defense systems and nuclear facilities, and killing at least 30 senior IRGC commanders and 11 nuclear scientists.​

Throughout this direct assault on Iranian territory, Iran's proxy network was nowhere to be seen. Despite decades of rhetoric about the Axis providing "forward defense" and deterrence, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis took virtually no offensive action against Israel or the US throughout the period Iran's nuclear facilities were under attack.

What was once a relatively coherent strategic network under Iranian guidance seems to have devolved, for the moment at least, into a collection of entities pursuing parochial interests, while maintaining loose ideological and material ties to Tehran.​

 
Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's axis of resistance is crumbling", 8 December 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-879462 

 

Hezbollah disarmament falters

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 December 2025

 Back in September Lebanon’s army chief Rodolphe Haykal presented the government with a plan to ensure that, by the end of 2025, Hezbollah would be fully disarmed and military hardware would be held exclusively by Lebanon’s state forces.  The cabinet authorized the army to begin implementing it immediately.

   Various leaks to the media gradually revealed that the army’s plan is called “Homeland Shield”, and that its strategy is to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons in five phases, starting south of the Litani River.

It also emerged that President Joseph Aoun has rejected the idea of replicating Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, where Iran-backed paramilitary groups have been integrated into Iraq’s security forces.  He is opposed to creating a distinct Hezbollah entity within the army. He wants Hezbollah fighters to be recruited into Lebanon’s armed forces only if they meet the same criteria as all other applicants – academic qualifications, entrance exams, and training.

According to the US military, the Lebanese Army has cleared away nearly 10,000 Hezbollah rockets and 400 missiles since the ceasefire in late November 2024.   Aoun has claimed that up to 85% of the area south of the Litani River is now free of Hezbollah weapons. 

On October 22, 2025, prime minister Nawaf Salam said that ultimately Hezbollah “will need to return to being a regular political party without a military arm.” Hezbollah leaders, however, have made it clear that they oppose being wholly disarmed.  Assuming that Lebanon will be permanently in conflict with Israel, they regard themselves as essential to the national effort.

The Meir Amit intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) was founded in 2001 to specialize in matters related to terrorism and intelligence.  In a report published on October 30, ITIC said it believed the Lebanese Army will aim to complete its operations south of the Litani by the end of 2025, but that in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, it will be hindered from acting because the government ​is shying away from a confrontation with Hezbollah that could escalate into civil war. 

In short, ITIC believes that the original army plan was far too ambitious in assessing that Hezbollah’s disarmament could be a​ccomplished by the year’s end, and that instead of all five phases, only phase one is likely to have been a​chieved.

ITIC believes Hezbollah may agree in principle to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, but in exchange for guarantees.  These would include protection against Israeli targeted ​assassinations, and the integration of the organization’s operatives into the security functions of the state.  The ITIC says it believes the Lebanese government, in an effort to show flexibility, will indeed try to persuade the international community, especially the US, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon.

Rumours abound in the Arab media about the uneasy standoff between Lebanon’s leaders and Hezbollah.  “Sources” assert that although the Army knows about many Hezbollah military stockpiles, it desists from raiding them because ​the offices of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament ​have agreed that any direct confrontation with Hezbollah could plunge the country into civil war.

The US has shown growing impatience with the Lebanese government’s velvet glove approach to carrying through Hezbollah’s disarmament.  General Haykal was scheduled to travel to Washington on November 18 for high-level meetings with US officials regarding military assistance, border security, and efforts to bring all armed groups in Lebanon under state authority. ​ Just before Haykal’s planned departure​, the trip was ​abruptly​ canceled.

The immediate trigger was a public statement by the Lebanese army on November 16 condemning Israeli attacks near the southern border.  Notably avoiding any reference to Hezbollah’s significant armed presence independent of the state, the statement referred to Israel as "the enemy."  

Understandably, US officials interpreted the army statement as aligning with Hezbollah's narrative. US policymakers and members of Congress criticized the Lebanese army. Senator Lindsey Graham publicly condemning Haykal’s leadership, calling the rhetoric a setback for efforts at regional stabilization.

This episode seems to have galvanized President Aoun and prime minister Salam into action. 

On November 20 Salam said at a governmental press briefing at the presidential palace in Baabda, Lebanon: “Lebanon is currently open to engaging with Israel in a partnership for disempowering Hezbollah.”  He added that Lebanon would seek US help in advancing negotiations in the context of escalating Israeli strikes on Hezbollah positions.

The next day in a televised speech, President Aoun is reported by international media as saying that Lebanon is “ready for negotiations” with Israel, focused on “ending Israeli strikes” and “Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in Lebanese territory”.

So what is the current position?

Open-source maps show that parts of southern Lebanon previously strongly associated with Hezbollah are now increasingly coming under the Lebanese Army’s control.  According to one source, out of some 265 identified Hezbollah positions in that zone, around 190 have been ceded to the Lebanese Army.

Meanwhile Hezbollah’s infrastructure has been significantly degraded.  In particular, Hezbollah’s elite unit, the Radwan Force, has taken a serious hit: reports indicate that up to 80% of its weapons systems and tunnel infrastructure have been damaged or lost.  Moreover it is estimated that some 4,500 of its operatives have been killed and about 9,000 wounded. representing a very large chunk of its active force.

And yet, despite losses, Hezbollah is not defunct. Analysts argue that though it is undoubtedly weaker, it remains resilient.  Its survival depends on achieving a balance between the pressure to disarm, financial constraints, and its role in Lebanese politics.

To do so, it is attempting a “reset”.  By acceding to a partial disarmament, it may be able to retain a reduced but still meaningful arsenal — enough to deter, survive, and remain politically relevant.

        On the other hand Israel is not letting up.  Israel continues targeting Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild, and on November 23 eliminated its senior commander, Haytham Tabatabai. 

The English poet Alexander Pope catches the position of the Lebanese government in a nutshell:  "Willing to wound, yet afraid to strike."   Its equivocation means that Hezbollah could yet survive in perhaps a more limited, but still highly dangerous, form.

Published in the Jerusalem Report, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Lebanon 'reset': Hezbollah may survive in more limited, but dangerous, form", 1 December 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-876711