UK's Chief Rabbi and the Abraham Accords

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post dated 14 November 2022

           The 9th annual assembly of the Abu Dhabi Peace Forum was held this year in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from November 8–10.  Founded in 2014 as a Forum for the Promotion of Peace in Muslim Societies, its original purpose was “to serve as a space for the discussion of humanitarian problems and intellectual and religious conflicts in Muslim societies.”  Last year its remit was broadened and its title amended to embrace issues of global concern.  With a variety of armed conflicts raging across the world, more than 100 million displaced refugees, and growing food and energy shortages, this year’s assembly met to discuss "Global Conflict and Universal Peace: Urgent Needs and Opportunities for Partnership". 

It brought together religious leaders, politicians, officials, representatives of national and international organizations, and peace activists – in all some 500 participants from 60 countries. Among them, making the occasion unique and historic, was Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, to give him his full official title. 

Britain’s first Chief Rabbi was appointed in 1704.  In all the subsequent 318 years, no holder of that office has ever paid an official visit to an Arab country – until November 8 this year. That was the day Mirvis arrived in the UAE and addressed the Abu Dhabi Peace forum.  In scenes that would have been unbelievable, indeed impossible, only a couple of years before, Rabbi Mirvis had been greeted by the Forum’s founder and president, Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah, one of the world’s most revered Islamic scholars, and was accorded a seat next to him in the sumptuously furnished ballroom of Abu Dhabi’s Ritz Carlton.

Mirvis greeted the attendees with the words “Salam aleikum, shalom aleichem.” and then, in a mixture of Hebrew, Arabic and English, he called on leaders of all faiths to build on the historic peace brought about by the Abraham Accords, signed two years before. 

“I am only standing here before you thanks to the courage of great and outstanding leaders who have reached for the stars,” he said.

The Abraham Accords are, of course, primarily an expression of political, economic and security pragmatism – a recognition of the benefits for the signatories and the region as a whole that flow from cooperation rather than indifference and a failure to engage.  Normalization of relations with Israel did not involve the Arab states in renouncing deeply held views on the Israel-Palestinian dispute, but they agreed that resolving that long-standing problem was not a necessary pre-requisite.

Mirvis has taken the Abraham Accords at their word, as it were.  He has used the rationale behind its title – namely the common Abrahamic basis for Judaism, Christianity and Islam – as the basis for a plea to strengthen tolerance and understanding between those faiths and their followers, and indeed between all faiths.

He told his audience that it was thanks to the Accords that he was able to visit the UAE and speak in an official capacity, but also that the Accords had opened a “window of opportunity” to strengthen Jewish-Muslim relations.”  He urged his audience to remember the common thread linking their faiths – namely Abraham. “All of us here are children of Abraham, our father.”

In an interview before setting out for the UAE, Mirvis revealed that many of his meetings with religious leaders around the world on interfaith cooperation and understanding happen only “on condition of secrecy”, and even then are cancelled at the last minute.  The result of secret meetings, he said, is that “it doesn’t make an impact because it stays among the faith leaders at the top of that pyramid and it just doesn’t filter down.”  But that is changing, he believes.  “We are now seeing, gradually, more and more faith leaders come out into the open.”

Mirvis also made this point at the Forum.  He said more needed to be done to bring people together at a grassroots level. “Where we are up to is not good enough. We have harmony between faith leaders but it has to filter down.  It is good and pleasant for brothers to sit together in peace in this hall, but we want this to happen between all Jews and all Muslims and all Christians.”

Ari Gordon, US director of Muslim-Jewish relations at the American Jewish Committee, described the Chief Rabbi’s appearance at the Peace Forum as a “watershed moment. It was moving to see the warm greeting Chief Rabbi Mirvis received from Sheikh Bin Bayyah, and even more so the enthusiastic applause from hundreds of Muslim scholars upon hearing his call from Jewish tradition for cooperation across lines of faith.  For the Jewish delegates, his voice on the main stage was ennobling, and for those who have little exposure to Jews or Judaism it opens a path to learn more and to correct misconceptions.”

By attending the Peace Forum, and by extending a hand of friendship, tolerance and understanding to the Muslim faith leaders and others at the gathering, Chief Rabbi Mirvis very specifically associated his presence and his message to the ground-breaking political achievement represented by the Accords.  He has demonstrated that the Abraham Accords have religious and social possibilities not initially apparent, and has taken a global lead in a bid to exploit them.  His initiative is surely to be commended.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 November 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-722283

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 November 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26112022-uks-chief-rabbi-and-the-abraham-accords-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 November 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/uks-chief-rabbi-and-the-abraham-accords/

Published in Jewish Business News, 25 November 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/25/uks-chief-rabbi-and-the-abraham-accords/

Was OPEC's decision to cut oil production "purely economic"?

          OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) is composed of 13 of the world’s leading oil-producing nations.  With the aim of coordinating action and controlling the market, OPEC regularly invites 10 smaller oil producers to an expanded summit, known as OPEC+.  The last such meeting took place on October 5.

With the global economy struggling, largely due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US had for weeks pressured Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s leading light, not to cut production, a move that would inevitably lead to a rise in oil prices.  In the event Washington’s lobbying was disregarded, and the OPEC+ summit decided to reduce production by 2 million barrels per day.  

President Joe Biden’s press secretary, Jen Psaki, reacted angrily.  She accused OPEC of siding with the Russians, because higher oil prices could only to generate more revenue for Russia to fund its war in Ukraine.  The recriminations seemed a trifle disingenuous, since Russia is itself an influential member of OPEC+, but the charge has substance.

Crude oil prices, which were peaking at around $120 back in June, have reacted to fears of a global economic recession, rising US interest rates and a stronger dollar by falling to about $90.  Cheaper oil and gas for the consumer acts as a restraint on inflation. When the OPEC+ cuts in production start to bite, prices will certainly begin to rise.  The main beneficiaries will be Russia and Saudi Arabia. 

Despite the heavy burden of sanctions, Russia still enjoys a vast, if diminished, income from its oil exports which enables it to maintain its military adventure in Ukraine.  The inevitable increase in the oil price following the decision by OPEC+ will no doubt be greatly welcomed by President Vladimir Putin – something he vigorously denies. 

On October 11 he defended the planned cuts, saying “our decisions … aren’t directed against anyone.”  He described the OPEC+ agreement as being aimed at ensuring stability in global energy markets.  The purpose, he maintained, was the economic necessity of balancing supply and demand, thus giving confidence to both the consumers and the producers of energy.

As for Saudi Arabia, one commentator pointed out that the Saudis need the money. “They need to keep the price as high as possible. They have so many schemes and projects in the kingdom … so they need all sorts of cash in order to keep that going.”  He was referring to the ambitious and immensely costly Saudi 2030 project being master-minded by Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).

The US regards the OPEC decision as a snub by the Saudis.  With the US midterm elections just around the corner, Biden is aware of the negative effect higher gas prices will have on voters.  He has threatened the Saudis with “consequences”, without so far specifying what these might amount to.  Prominent Democratic senator Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested the US should immediately freeze all cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including arms sales.

The flood of disapproval and criticism spurred Saudi Arabia to issue a statement on October 12 justifying the decision by OPEC+.  It began by totally rejecting any suggestion that Saudi Arabia was taking sides in international conflicts or was politically motivated against the US, pointing to how it has voted in support of UN resolutions on the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

As for the decision to reduce oil production, the statement pointed out that it had been taken unanimously by all members of the OPEC+ group, and was based on purely economic considerations such as limiting volatility in the oil market, and maintaining the balance of supply and demand.

Needless to say, the Saudi statement did nothing to curb the continuing crossfire of accusation and counter-accusation. The West accuses Russia of weaponizing energy, creating a crisis in Europe that could trigger gas and power rationing this winter.  Moscow accuses the West of weaponizing the dollar and financial systems, and distorting global economics through its sanction regimes.

In fact, the OPEC+ decision is not quite as clear-cut as first appears.  While it will certainly result in a decrease in oil production overall, some countries managed to negotiate an exemption.  Libya and Nigeria, for example, will be allowed to increase their current outputs in recognition of local difficulties affecting oil production.  More worryingly, so will Iran, which has declared the agreement a diplomatic triumph.

The concession to Iran was provided on the assumption that the current talks on reviving the nuclear deal could succeed.  If so, a large tranche of sanctions on Iran would be lifted, allowing its oil industry to revive. Since Iranian crude could then supply countries seeking to free themselves from Russian energy dependence, this is an outcome welcomed by some voices in the West.  One oil industry analyst believes that Iran has built up a sizeable flotilla of cargoes, amounting to some 93 million barrels of Iranian crude, that could reach the market fairly quickly, should a nuclear deal be concluded. 

The OPEC+ decisions perform a complex balancing act.  On the one hand, overall oil production is to be reduced, guaranteeing a rise in consumer oil and energy prices to the political benefit of both Saudi Arabia and Russia.  On the other, Iran is being positioned to weigh in with substantial new oil supplies that could bring relief to European and world markets urgently seeking alternative energy sources.

In short, neither Saudi Arabia nor Russia can claim that the decisions taken at the OPEC+ meeting on October 5 were “purely economic”.  

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 November 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-721132

Published in Eurasia Review, 11 November 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/11112022-was-opecs-decision-to-cut-oil-production-purely-economic-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 13 November 2022:

https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/6109609079602445946/2627141077894353957

Published in Jewish Business News, 11 November 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/11/was-opecs-decision-to-cut-oil-production-purely-economic/

King Charles III - what can the UK and the world expect?

This article appears in the issue of the Jerusalem Report dated 21 November 2022

"I'm not that stupid,” said the then-Prince Charles in a BBC interview in 2018. “I do realize it's a separate exercise being sovereign. The idea that somehow I'm going to carry on exactly in the same way is complete nonsense."

His comment reflects the fact that during his 70-year apprenticeship as heir to the British throne, he acquired the reputation for espousing a variety of causes close to his heart, and lobbying for them in ways which sometimes aroused surprise, or even controversy.  A question often asked in those years was whether he ever would, or indeed could, change direction.

Like his father, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, Charles as heir to the throne had no constitutional role.  Elizabeth II, the British monarch, was head of state.  Philip her consort, and Charles her heir, had either to live purposeless lives or else forge meaningful careers for themselves.  It is a tribute to them that they both managed to do this.

As Prince of Wales, Charles was the patron or president of more than 400 organizations, and in 1976 he founded his own flagship charity, the Prince's Trust, to connect with what he called the "hardest to reach in society".  It has helped close to a million disadvantaged young people from some of the poorest parts of the country transform their lives by providing them with education, skills and employment.  He set it up against government opposition.

"The Home Office didn't think it was at all a good idea,” he once said. “It was quite difficult to get it off the ground."

As Prince he was able to act independently.  As monarch – and about this he is fully aware – he must act only on government advice.  That lesson was made clear at the moment of his accession, when a projected trip to the Middle East was cancelled.  Charles, a lifelong environmental campaigner, had planned on giving a speech at the 27th UN Climate Change Conference (COP27), taking place in Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh between November 6-18.  He cancelled the trip, the media reported, on the advice of then-prime minister, Liz Truss, probably taking into consideration the political implications of the new monarch’s first overseas visit.

It was in 1984 that Charles first burst into the headlines as an independent and controversial voice with what became known as his carbuncle speech.  Of all the things he has ever said in public on matters of policy, this is what will probably never be forgotten, both for his colorful language and for the impact it had on UK society.  It proved to be the opening of his decades-long campaign of opposition to modern architecture.

The occasion was the 150th anniversary of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the setting Hampton Court Palace. Charles had been invited to present the Royal Gold Medal for Architecture to the Indian architect Charles Correa.  Rather than handing over the award with a few gracious words, as was expected, Charles seized the opportunity to denounce a proposed extension to the National Gallery. The National Gallery flanks one side of Trafalgar Square, in the very center of London’s West End.  Designs for an extension to house Britain’s collection of early Renaissance paintings had been put up for competition, and out of seven entries the design  submitted by the architectural firm ABK had been adjudged the winner.  Plans were proceeding for its erection. 

          Choosing his words carefully, what Charles objected to was attaching a modernist structure to buildings constructed in the architectural style of a century-and-a-half earlier. “I would understand better this type of high-tech approach,” he said, “if you demolished the whole of Trafalgar Square and started again with a single architect responsible for the entire layout. But what is proposed is like a monstrous carbuncle on the face of a much-loved and elegant friend.”

          A veritable hurricane of comment, both denunciation and approval, followed, but in the end the ABK scheme was abandoned in favor of a more modest design.  Charles’s interest in architecture, though, continued unabated. In 2009 eminent British architect Richard Rogers blamed the prince for having him removed from a project to redesign Chelsea Barracks in West London. “We had hoped that Prince Charles had retreated from his position on modern architecture,” he told the media, “but he single-handedly destroyed this project.”  

A few years after his carbuncle speech, Charles’s concerns about modern architecture led him to take the lead in an experiment in urban development – constructing a completely new town from scratch.  Poundbury, in the county of Dorset, is designed entirely on traditional architectural lines, and is generally judged to be a great success.  The work was sponsored by the royal Duchy of Cornwall, which is historically the preserve of the Prince of Wales. Charles handed the Duchy and its interests to his son, Prince William, shortly after acceding to the throne.

          Over the years Charles has far from confined his passions to architecture. He has proved a tireless activist in support of a range of issues that concern him, from organic farming to homeopathy, from youth to the environment. He soon learned that his unique position in the Establishment meant that his opinions were always heard and often made a difference. He lobbied in a variety of ways, one of which itself caused major controversy a few years ago – the so-called “black spider memos” affair.

As a key weapon is his lobbying arsenal, Charles took to addressing government ministers, from the prime minister downwards, in a continual stream of memos and letters, handwritten by him in black ink. These documents, which came to be known as his “black spider memos”, were sent by Charles in a private capacity, but when news about them reached the media in 2005, it was thought they might represent the exercise of undue influence over British government ministers, and demands were made for them to be made public.  Battles between the media and the government ensued, finally reaching the courts.

After several legal cases the Supreme Court in March 2015 allowed for the publication of the letters.  However on their release, the memos were variously described in the media as "underwhelming" and "harmless", and one paper claimed that their release had "backfired on those who seek to belittle him".

Charles has always been aware of the importance of religious belief in people’s lives, and has actively supported the organizations representative of the many faiths active in modern Britain.  He has shown a particular interest in the Jewish community, and the late Chief Rabbi, Lord Jonathan Sacks, was a personal friend – a friendship now extended to the UK’s new Chief Rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis.  Charles’s coronation is scheduled for Saturday May 6, 2023.  To assist Mirvis observe the Sabbath, the King and Queen Consort have invited him and his wife Valerie, after they have attended Shabbat service with local communities, to stay with them at Clarence House on the Friday night.  Westminster Abbey, where the coronation will take place, is less than a mile away.

In addition to being head of state, the British monarch is head of the Church of England, and the sovereign’s title – emphasized in the coronation ceremony – is Defender of the Faith.  Several years ago Charles indicated that he would rather be known as defender of faith than simply defender of British Protestantism.  Although he has not pressed this idea further, it does demonstrate that as king he is likely to embrace what is now a multicultural, multi-faith Britain.  

Charles is not likely to lose his innate sympathy with the many causes close to his heart, but he has certainly taken on board the fundamental difference in how he may do so, compared with his previous incarnation.  William Shakespeare, as ever, has precisely the right words, which he puts into the mouth of the young Henry V as he is about to be crowned:

                    Presume not that I am the thing I was,
                    For God doth know, so shall the world perceive
                    That I have turned away my former self.

          During the coronation ceremony Charles will be asked if he is willing to assume the awesome responsibilities of being the sovereign head of state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of his other realms and territories, and head of the Commonwealth. In doing so he will certainly be bringing a difference in tone to the monarchy – a greater awareness of, and in many cases a greater sympathy with, the issues that most concern today’s Britain. Over the years of his apprenticeship, the public has come to respect him for his causes, and in many cases come to see that he was ahead of his time in advocating them – issues like organic farming, climate change, wildlife preservation, and alternative therapies. Beneath the robes of state he will of course be the same man, but no one is more acutely aware than he that in future his actions must be subject to his new status.

Why Israel should give Zelensky what he wants

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 October 2022

Ever since it invaded Ukraine, Russia has succeeded in preventing Israel from providing meaningful support to the Ukrainians, using its presence in Syria and Israel’s security interests there as its justification.

Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Israel set up a "deconfliction mechanism" with Russia to prevent inadvertent clashes when Israel struck Iranian deployments and arms transfers in Syria. Officially Russia never condoned the Israeli strikes, consistently calling them “violations of Syrian sovereignty” (ironic terminology in view of its subsequent incursion into Ukraine).  Unofficially, Russia agreed to turn a blind eye, provided it was given sufficient advance warning of forthcoming Israeli actions.

The Russian embassy in Israel once explained: "Our military officials discuss the practical issues of this substantively on a daily basis. This mechanism has proven to be useful and will continue to work."

Israel rarely comments on individual strikes, but has acknowledged carrying out hundreds to counter Iranian efforts to turn Syria into an advanced military hub in its own right, and as a route to supply hardware to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel is obliged to make every effort to prevent possible future attacks on the nation.

So, in the national interest, Israel has continued to strike at Iranian military hardware being transported across, or stored within, Syria.  For example, Syria claims that Israel carried out a strike against Damascus International Airport on October 21.  According to the respected Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Israel also targeted sites on September 15, near the airport where Iranian-backed groups were stationed. During August Israeli airstrikes were twice reported to have targeted Aleppo airport.  In June, the Syrian Observatory reported that Israeli strikes put Damascus airport out of service for nearly two weeks when weapons depots belonging to Iran-backed militias were targeted.

 Just before Russia invaded Ukraine, Israel condemned any potential incursion as "a serious violation of international order".  In response, Moscow summoned the Israeli ambassador for talks, and in the UN Security Council the Russian spokesman condemned Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.  The message was clear enough.  Subsequently, though foreign minister Yair Lapid did denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel has remained largely silent on Russia’s actions, while Moscow has indicated that it would continue coordinating with Israel in Syria.

Events, however, have not stood still. It is now clear that Russia has purchased thousands of Iranian drones which it is using against Ukrainian civilians in the course of its military actions.  There are reports that Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) technicians are actually on the ground in Ukraine, helping the Russians deploy the drones.  On October 16 the Washington Post reported that Iran is expected to enhance its support.  In addition to the Shahed-136 "kamikaze" drones and the Mohajer-6 attack drones it has already provided, Iran is expected to start supplying Russia with precision-guided, short- and medium-range missiles.

With Russia and Iran growing ever closer, how long can the delicately balanced Russo-Israeli arrangement in Syria continue?  Will the Iranians start demanding a price beyond dollars for supplying their military equipment to Russia?  In short, can the agreement hold, or will Israel finally have to run the risk of clashing with the Russian military?  If so, how much of a risk would that be?  Would Russia actually initiate such clashes?

The same questions would arise if Israel took the initiative and provided Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, with the defensive hardware he is asking for. 

On October 15 the Ukrainian government sent Israel an official request for air defence systems that will allow it to counter Iranian ballistic missiles and attack drones used by Russia in Ukraine.  The letter confirms that Russia has started using Iranian-made drones against cities and civilian infrastructure.

"According to available information,” the letter runs, “…there is a high probability of prompt deliveries to the Russian Federation of Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles from Iran."  In order to protect its civilians, Ukraine wants to initiate cooperation with Israel on air and missile defence.

"Ukraine is highly interested in obtaining from Israel…defence systems, in particular: Iron Beam, Barak-8, Patriot, Iron Dome, David's Sling, Arrow Interceptor, and Israeli support in training for Ukrainian operators."

The letter made the point that experience gained by Iran of using these weapons in Ukraine would "significantly contribute in strengthening Iran’s potential of producing offensive weapons and, as a result, will increase the security threats for the State of Israel and the Middle East region."

The day before the letter was sent, Israel's defence minister Benny Gantz said in a meeting with EU ambassadors that Israel supports Ukraine via humanitarian aid and the delivery of life-saving defensive equipment, but emphasized that Israel will not deliver weapon systems to Ukraine due to a variety of operational considerations. 

"We will continue to support Ukraine within our limitations," said Gantz.

The question is: have Israel’s limitations been drawn too narrowly?  To what extent can Israeli anti-missile defence systems be considered offensive military equipment?  They can only be deployed after rockets, missiles or drones have actually been launched.  They are, as the saying goes, “exactly what’s written on the tin” - namely defensive.  In which case, there can be no  reasonable objection to providing the Ukrainians with this means of defending themselves.  Given the unjustifiable misery Putin has inflicted on Ukraine and its people, Israel would surely be justified in complying with its urgent request for assistance – and dealing with any consequences.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online, 25 October 2022:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-720475

Published in Eurasia Review, 5 November 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/04112022-why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 5 November 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants/

Published in Jewish Business News, 4 November 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/11/04/why-israel-should-give-zelensky-what-he-wants/ 

Taking the wait out of Kuwait

       

            Kuwait is an oil-rich emirate, tucked up in the north-western corner of the Gulf.  Its immediate neighbours are Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.  One factor that distinguishes it from other Gulf states is that Yasser Arafat founded Fatah there in 1959, and it became home to a large Palestinian diaspora.  Before the US-led invasion of Iraq in 1991, some 400,000 Palestinians lived in Kuwait, amounting to 20 percent of its total population.  Subsequent deportation and emigration has reduced that figure to 70,000 at the most. 

Even so, a 2021 study by the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies concluded, largely because of its remaining Palestinian population, that “Kuwait does not seem ripe for decision on the highly sensitive issue of normalization.”

The Palestinian question has been a key issue in Kuwait for the past 60 years.  But as 2022 dawned, different voices began to emerge within the country. On January 17 Kuwaiti writer and poet Nejoud Al-Yagout published a long article calling for Kuwait to join other Gulf states in fostering coexistence with Israel and the Jewish people.   “There is no justified reason for the prejudice against Jews,” she wrote.  “And there is no other time but now to wake up from this stupor of separation… Let’s take the wait out of Kuwait.”

She proceeded: “One can continue to support Palestine without hating Jews. Many Palestinians themselves coexist with Jews. And many Jews support Palestine. One can embrace Jews without having a political agenda… It is our responsibility, each one of us, to become ambassadors of humanity, beyond our belief systems, beyond our political inclinations.”

A few days later the Kuwait-based newspaper, the Arab Times, called openly for normalization and breaking away from the Palestinian leadership.  “Normalize,” ran the headline.  “Let insulters fend for themselves.”

In the accompanying editorial, Ahmed Al-Jarallah, editor-in-chief of the Arab Times, explained that Kuwait, along with the other Gulf States, had continued to support the Palestinian cause despite a long series of provocations by the Palestinian leadership. Among other matters he lists their support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, of Colonel Gaddafi in his attacks on the Gulf states, and of the Iranian-bolstered Houthis. He objects to their condemnation of the leaders and governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries because they did not mourn the assassination of “the head of the terrorist snake Qassem Soleimani.”

“Enough is enough!” Al-Jarallah ended. “The camel’s back has been broken from the burden of grief we endure due to the ingratitude of the Palestinians. They have been encouraging terrorism against us, issuing calls to kill us…All the Gulf states should normalize relations with Israel due to the fact that peace with this most advanced country is the right thing to do. Let the foolish fend for themselves.”

Kuwait went to the polls on 29 September to elect a new parliament. The previous parliament, dissolved in June just six months after its 4-year term began, had become embroiled in months of political feuding with the government.  Under the Kuwaiti system it is the Emir who both appoints the government and can dissolve the parliament. 

            However things are changing in Kuwait.  Last year the Emir, Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, issued an amnesty for political opponents who were on trial under various charges.  Then, just before the poll, the country’s prime minister, Crown Prince Sheikh Meshal, the Emir’s son, speaking apparently on behalf of the Emir and the royal leadership, pledged not to meddle: “We will not interfere in the people’s choices for their representatives, nor will we interfere with the choices of the next National Assembly in choosing its speaker or its committees.”  He added: “Parliament will be the master of its decisions and we will not be supporting one faction at the expense of another. We will stand at the same distance from everyone.”

         

This election was perhaps the most inclusive in Kuwait’s history. Although Kuwait was the first country in the Gulf region to establish an elected parliament in 1963, and women won the right to vote in 2005, there had been only one woman MP, Safa al-Hashem. In December 2020 she lost her seat. In this election 22 women were among the 305 candidates competing for the 50 elected seats in the National Assembly, and two women were elected.

These steps by Kuwait toward a more liberal system of government and more open society could also be seen as a move toward the pragmatic policies adopted by its fellow Gulf states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, on normalizing relations with Israel.  Kuwait’s electorate, though, may be a few steps behind its leadership.  The election resulted in considerable gains by Islamist parties, and the new parliament might seek to obstruct the government if it decided to pursue its liberalization policies.

What of the future?  The Kuwaiti Emir has taken more than a leaf from the book of his Saudi neighbor, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), whose ambitious Vision 2030 plan to transform the Saudi economy is well under way. Giving himself an extra five years to achieve his objectives, the Emir published his “Kuwait Vision 2035 – New Kuwait” in 2017, a year after MBS.   

Kuwait's 2035 vision aims to transform Kuwait into a regional and international financial and trade hub.  With its economy led by the private sector, it will promote competition and production efficiency.  A supporting institutional body will concentrate on cultivating a business friendly environment, especially attractive to investors.  Without spelling it out, it seems obvious that the Emir’s vision would slot perfectly into a policy of normalization with Israel in line with that of the UAE and Bahrain.  Kuwait will surely connect up the dots well before 2035.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 19 October 2022, and in Jerusalem Post online under the title "What is the future of Kuwait?":

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-719963 

Published in Eurasia Review, 30 October 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/28102022-taking-the-wait-out-of-kuwait-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 October 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/taking-the-wait-out-of-kuwait/

Published in Jewish Business News, 28 October 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/10/28/taking-the-wait-out-of-kuwait/

The Ayatollahs cannot control their Gen-Z

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 11 October 2022

           The Washington-based Pew Research Center, founded in 1996, has made its name by investigating the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world.  Part of its early work involved studying the last generational cohort before the millennium.  It named them the Millennials, which it defined as anyone born between 1981 and 1996.  The subsequent generation – that is, people born between 1997 and 2012 – have become known as Generation Z, or more simply Gen-Z.

   On September 13 Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman from a Kurdish family, was with her brother in Tehran when she was arrested by Iran’s infamous “morality police” for what was claimed to be “improper” hijab.  Mahsa, who also went by the Kurdish name Jhina, was taken to the Vozara Detention Centre, where she collapsed.  Three days later she died. According to media reports, she had been beaten on the head with a baton, and her head had been banged against a vehicle. The authorities stated that she died of natural causes.

Mahsa’s death sparked nationwide protests.  Thousands took to the streets in cities across the country, including in Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, Mashhad, Rasht, Saqqes and Sanandaj.  Security forces responded with live ammunition, pellet guns and tear gas. By October 6 the civilian death toll was reported to have risen to at least 133, and the authorities – shaken by global media reports of brutality perpetrated by the police – had taken to arresting journalists.  The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) published on its website a list of 35 arrested up to October 6.

Widespread anti-regime protests have erupted more than once in the 43 years since Iran’s Islamic Revolution, but there is a fundamental difference between previous waves of demonstrations and what is happening today.  In the current nationwide riots a prominent role is being played by the Iran’s Generation Z, also known as Zoomers. According to the ultra-conservative Javan Daily, a paper affiliated to Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), “93% of the protesters” are no older than 25 which, it observes, marks the rise of a “new generation of rioters in the country.”

Iran’s Zoomers are seen within the country as extremely skeptical about the world. They are believed to have no interest in politics, religion, customs, and traditions.  What they do have is much greater access to information and the outside world than their parents and grandparents.  Online social media has given them a platform to voice their concerns, and the courage to speak out. 

The old-established Washington-based Middle East Institute recently undertook an analysis of Iran’s Gen-Z population.  It concluded that this generation tends to question authority, does not believe in the red lines drawn by society or the regime, and is unwilling to take anything for granted, including religion and the country’s laws and regulations.  Gen-Z’s mass reaction to what they perceived as the state-sponsored killing of one of their own, 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, was not their first clash with authority. In 2014 tens of thousands showed up to attend the funeral ceremony for Morteza Pashaei, a famous young pop star. Never before had there been a massive ceremony for a music icon who would be considered a threat to Islamic values. Over the years there have been other mass gatherings of the young that were dispersed by the police and involved arrests and criminal charges.

That today’s nationwide protest is being led by Gen-Z young people should have come as no surprise to the authorities.  Over the last few years there has been a succession of warnings issued by academic bodies and researchers.

In December 2017 the sociologist Saeed Razavi Faqih published a paper about Iran’s Gen-Z.  “This new generation has completely different demands, trends, and views,” he wrote, “and basically shares no common language with the managers and officials of the country’s administration.”  Just wait until they realize their political clout, he warned.  They will “transform everything.”

In the early months of 2018 Iran faced its most widespread and sustained wave of public protests in a decade, fostered by long-standing grievances. A study conducted by the state-backed Office of Cultural Studies investigated, and concluded that in addition to the usual “political, economic and social dissatisfaction,” the Islamic Republic now faced a new problem: the “deep generational gap.”

A more recent warning of this sort came in 2019, when Sobhe Sadegh, the weekly publication of the IRGC, described Gen-Z as a possible threat to the Republic’s values that will be difficult to control.  As the writers put it, “their governance will not be as easy as with previous generations.”

Casting around for a scapegoat, Iran first stepped up its military operations against Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Three sets of drone and missile attacks targeted their party bases in northern Iraq, killing at least nine.  Then Iran turned to the support that Kurdish exiles have given to the protesters, and alleged that the demonstrations were entirely organized by foreign elements.  Iranian Kurdish exiles say their role has been small.

Older generations of Iranians who failed to achieve long-fought-for political and social freedoms during the past four decades are now expressing public admiration for their children and young people. It is echoed around the Iranian diaspora. Iran's exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the late Shah, has hailed the protests as the right way to victory.  He is heading a government-in-exile dedicated to bringing genuine democracy to the nation, once the regime is overthrown.

The latest protests have allowed the millions of Iranians living in exile to dream of a different future.  On September 24 and 25 thousands of Iranians in Los Angeles — home to the largest diaspora community of Iranians in the world — as well as in 159 cities across the globe gathered in support of the anti-regime movement. 

The Iranian leadership has sought to blame outside agitators for the protests inside the country, but it is young Iranians – the nation’s Gen-Z – who are leading the demonstrations and putting their lives on the line.  They are demonstrating to the world that the nation’s youth is coming into its own, that they care nothing for the crazed dreams of world domination cherished by the old men who lead them, and that they seek a way of life in line with what is enjoyed by young people all over the 21st century world.  How long can their dreams be quashed? The Iranian regime cannot throttle the hopes of its own people forever.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online as "Gen Z are standing up to Iran's regime", 11 October 2022

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-719328

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 October 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/23102022-iran-the-ayatollahs-cannot-control-their-gen-z-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal. 24 October 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-ayatollahs-cannot-control-their-gen-z/

Published in Jewish Business News, 21 October 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/10/21/the-ayatollahs-cannot-control-their-gen-z/

Under consideration: moving the British embassy to Jerusalem

  This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2022

Liz Truss, the new British prime minister, has come into office vowing to sweep away the entrenched, outworn attitudes that persist in parts of what is otherwise an admirable Civil Service.  One area she is focused on is the Treasury, which she regards as wholly out of sympathy with her radical approach to tackling the severe economic problems that face the UK.  Another sclerotic area she has in her sights is the Foreign Office.

   On September 22 the media outlet Politico reported a Downing Street spokesman saying that, at the recent UN General Assembly meeting in New York, Truss told her Israeli counterpart, Yair Lapid, that she had ordered a review of the current location of the British embassy.

This has not come out of the blue.  During the course of the leadership contest in the summer, Truss told the Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI) that, while recognizing the “importance and sensitivity” of the issue, she would have the UK’s decision to stay put in Tel Aviv looked at again.

Shock, horror in the hidebound Foreign Office and diplomatic circles generally.  No less than ten former UK diplomats came together to oppose the idea in classic British style – a letter to The Times.  Preceded by a catalogue of stock sitting-on-the-fence observations, the letter ended: “Two states is British government policy; until that policy is realized, the embassy should stay put.”

In fact two states is also US government policy, but that did not deter the Trump administration from acknowledging reality and re-siting the US embassy in Israel’s capital city.  President Joe Biden has not reversed that decision. nor does he seem minded to do so.

          The UK’s foot-dragging on this issue stems from its long-standing, and continuing, refusal actually to acknowledge that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital, which it was from the moment of the State’s foundation. 

Global opinion is in a terrible muddle about the status of Jerusalem.  In the original 1947 two-state Partition Plan for Palestine, Jerusalem was designated to be a “corpus separatum under a special international regime” administered by the UN. The idea that Jerusalem could be separately governed under UN supervision has long been abandoned.  Yet the UN as a whole, like the EU, still clings to the idea that Jerusalem is somehow not part of the State of Israel.   The UK goes along with this.  As recently as 2016, British Foreign Office briefing documents were still referring to Jerusalem as a corpus separatum.

These days the UN and the EU hold that “Jerusalem is a final status issue for which a comprehensive, just and lasting solution must be achieved through negotiations between the two parties.”  In short, they hold that the exact status of Jerusalem in international law is yet to be determined.  

Yet the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 2334 passed in 2016, seems to override this.  It declares that the status of Jerusalem and the West Bank is as it had been on 4 June 1967 – that is, on the day before the Six Day War – referring three times to “Palestinian territories including East Jerusalem.”  Ignored is the fact that in 1967 they were not Palestinian territories; they were territories that had been captured by the Jordanian army in 1948 and illegally annexed by Jordan.  The EU, echoing the UN position, officially refuses to “recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including in Jerusalem, other than those agreed by both sides.” 

So the UN and the EU assert that Jerusalem is a final status issue to be determined through negotiation, and in the same breath maintain that East Jerusalem is part of Palestinian territories.  They recognize no changes to the pre-Six Day War boundaries (the EU calls them “borders”, which they never were), except that they do not acknowledge that West Jerusalem was part of Israel at the time.

Their position defies logic.  Either the status of Jerusalem is still to be determined, or the part that used to be occupied by Jordan is declared to be Palestinian and the issue is closed.  Moreover if East Jerusalem is Palestinian, then at least West Jerusalem is Israeli – a position acknowledged by both the US and Russia, together with a clutch of other states, including the Czech Republic and Ukraine.  In December 2021, that is before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s ambassador to Israel, Yevgen Korniychuk, said his country recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s “one and only capital.” His promise to open a branch of its embassy in the city in 2022 during a projected visit by President Volodymyr Zelensky is, obviously, on hold.

The UK position on Jerusalem is provided in a standard response by the British embassy to public queries.  Its first sentence almost boasts that Britain has not shifted its views since April 1950.  At that time, it says, the UK unreservedly recognized the State of Israel de jure, “but it withheld recognition of sovereignty over Jerusalem pending a final determination of its status. The UK recognizes Israel’s de facto authority over West Jerusalem, but, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and subsequent UNSC resolutions, regards East Jerusalem as under Israeli occupation.

“A final determination of the status of Jerusalem should be sought as part of a negotiated settlement…It must ensure Jerusalem is a shared capital of the Israeli and Palestinian states… The UK disagrees with the United States' decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem and recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital before a final status agreement.”

Up till now the UK response has concluded: “The British Embassy to Israel is based in Tel Aviv and there are no plans to move it before, or in the absence of, such a settlement.” 

          During the leadership contest, Truss declared war on outworn thinking in the Civil Service, declaring she was “prepared to break eggs” in taking on establishment orthodoxy.  That final sentence in the British embassy’s standard response may one day need to be amended.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 6 October 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-718983

Published in Eurasia Review, 18 October 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14102022-under-consideration-moving-the-british-embassy-to-jerusalem-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 18 October 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/under-consideration-moving-the-british-embassy-to-jerusalem/

Published in Jewish Business News, 14 October 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/10/14/under-consideration-moving-the-british-embassy-to-jerusalem/

Starving the terrorists of cash

 

             It was as far back as October 2021 that Israel accused six Palestinian civil society groups of funneling donor aid to militants, in particular the PLFP (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) , and consequently designated them terrorist organizations.  On August 18 Israel's defence minister, Benny Gantz, repeated Israel's claim that the designated NGOs operated undercover to serve the PFLP. maintaining that "they also assist in raising funds for the terrorist organization via a variety of methods that include forgery and fraud."

            The next day Israel’s security forces closed down seven Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the West Bank. The reason given was that those particular NGOs had been diverting to the PLFP charitable funding provided to them for their own use.  The PLFP is designated a terrorist organization by Israel, but also by the US, the EU, Japan, Canada and Australia.  The UN immediately condemned the closures as “totally arbitrary”.

Justification for this can be traced back to a document published by the Israeli government in February 2019 titled: “Terrorists in Suits”.  It presented dozens of examples of ties between NGO activists who delegitimize Israel, and the PFLP and Hamas. The ideological connection between them is that all reject the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state, and oppose any normalization between Israel and its neighbours. The report, which lists in detail the ties between the various bodies, also found that many of these NGOs were led or staffed by members and operatives of known terrorist organizations.

In designating the six NGOs as terrorist-linked, the Israeli defence ministry said that they had “received large sums of money from European countries and international organizations, using a variety of forgery and deceit," and that the money had been passed to the PFLP to support its activities.  "Those organizations present themselves as acting for humanitarian purposes,” it said. ”However, they serve as a cover for the 'Popular Front' promotion and financing." 

“Terrorists in Suits” is not the only exposé of this connection between non-governmental and terrorist organizations.  In November 2021 the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a research body associated with Tel Aviv University, published an 11,000-word academic research paper. It analyzed the extent to which the EU, as well as individual European nations, consistently pour millions into the coffers of certain Palestinian NGOs nominally concerned with economic development, peace and human rights.  The recipients, however, are “substantial political and economic actors, and are among the leaders of intense soft power conflict, voicing repeated allegations of fundamental Israeli wrong-doing and encouraging anti-Israel campaigns through boycotts and lawfare.” 

            The document summarizes its conclusions as: “The EU and West European governments provide funding and access (particularly to media and international institutions such as the UN and ICC), in return for political services from the carefully selected Palestinian NGOs. This is evidenced by a detailed examination of repeated and overlapping grants and contracts from numerous European funding frameworks to the same group of recipients, including some linked to the PFLP terror organization.”

Israel's defense ministry said: "Those organizations present themselves as acting for humanitarian purposes; however, they serve as a cover for the 'Popular Front' promotion and financing."  Reuters reported that an official with the PFLP did not actually deny its ties to the six NGOs designated by Israel, but said they maintain relations with civil society organizations across the West Bank and Gaza.

          Predictably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International said the "decision is an alarming escalation that threatens to shut down the work of Palestine's most prominent civil society organizations."  The UN Human Rights Office in the Palestinian territories said “Israeli authorities have not presented to the United Nations any credible evidence to justify these declarations"

A clue to the comparative dearth of hard and fast evidence in support of Israel’s action lies in a document issued on January 6, 2022 by Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.  It reproduces a letter received from the Legal Advisor’s Office of the Israel Defense Forces, which includes the following:

“The core of the declarations is based on classified, crosschecked and reliable intelligence that indicates that your clients operate on behalf of the terrorist organization, the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" and are essentially arms of the terrorist organization, which cannot be revealed for fear of threatening national security.”

In short the security forces maintain that the evidence they hold about the connections between the designated Palestinian NGOs and the PFLP is classified, and to reveal it would  endanger national security.

The resultant situation is stalemate.  Without chapter and verse to support the Israeli contention, the NGOs concerned, the UN and the nations and organizations that fund them will continue to assert that closing them down is arbitrary and unjustified. Indeed no less than nine EU countries have said they will continue working with the groups, citing a lack of evidence for the Israeli accusations.  All Israel can do is keep reiterating that it has incontrovertible evidence that links the designated NGOs with covert financial and other support for the PLFP and related terrorist entities, while steadfastly refusing to reveal classified information.  Meanwhile it has cut off the flow of finance to the PLFP from this source, defying the  objectors in order to avoid compromising national security. 

        There is a glimmer of hope in the impasse.  Although the EU announced in June that it would resume funding for two of the designated Palestinian NGOs, it has agreed in July to resume meetings of the EU-Israel Association Council.  This confirms the new Middle East diplomatic reality, namely that political and economic relations are no longer dependent on the Israel-Palestinian dispute. The EU-Israel Association Agreement, which came into force in 2000, is intended to develop “mutual understanding and solidarity” and “convergence of positions on international issues”. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 September 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-717553

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 October 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/08102022-starving-the-terrorists-of-cash-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 9 October 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/starving-the-terrorists-of-cash/

Published in Jewish Business News, 7 October 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/10/07/starving-the-terrorists-of-cash/

Lebanon-Israel maritime talks still all at sea

Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, in power for 30 years, faces an acute dilemma.  On the one hand, Hezbollah cannot possibly endorse the formal negotiations now in progress between Israel and the Lebanese government, of which it is a part. On the other hand, it cannot be the one to torpedo an agreement that could rescue Lebanon from the economic problems that are almost overwhelming it.

The crisis is so severe that people have taken to staging armed bank hold-ups to recover their savings.  At least five such bank “heists” were reported on September 16, two days after a young woman stormed a central Beirut bank with fuel and a plastic gun to demand the deposits of her sister, who needed to pay for cancer treatment.  The woman made off with around $13,000 and became an instant hero on social media.  The severity of Lebanon's crisis has been widely blamed on a self-serving political elite dominated by Hezbollah, and decades of corruption.

Lebanon and Israel have been locked in US-mediated negotiations for some two years in an effort to agree on a maritime border that would determine which oil and gas resources belong to which country. The struggle is over a gas-rich area of the Mediterranean with an estimated value reaching billions of dollars.

US envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in the region in the first week of September to help overcome the issues still standing in the way of a settlement, and to try to push the parties closer to an agreement.  The three principals – the US, Israel and the Lebanese government (even though Hezbollah has a place in it) – have indicated a willingness to get a deal concluded as soon as possible, while Hezbollah itself has been ratcheting up its threats to launch a military attack on Israel’s Karish gas reserve field, to protect what it regards as Lebanon’s rights.  

            The dispute goes back to 2007, when Lebanon and Cyprus reached an agreement over the limits of their maritime borders. The southern boundary in that agreement represented Lebanon’s maritime border with Israel. Cyprus has ratified the agreement; Lebanon has not.

In 2010, Israel signed an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Cyprus, using the coordinates within the Cyprus-Lebanon agreement as its northern boundary.  Israel lodged these coordinates with the UN in July 2011.  Lebanon refused to accept them, claiming at the time that its maritime border with Israel lies well to the south, along a boundary known as Line 23.  An official document issued by the UN in 2011 confirmed that this was Lebanon’s view, and Lebanon has made no move to amend it.  And yet Lebanon has subsequently shifted its claimed maritime boundary even further south to a position known as Line 29, and this cuts across Israel’s Karish gas reserve field.

The dispute first turned toxic in late 2017, when Lebanon signed a gas exploration and production agreement with a French-Italian-Russian consortium.  Seismic surveys showed promising results for what is known as Block 9, which extends beyond Israel’s claimed northern border into disputed waters. The French company, Total, announced that it would not start operations in Block 9 until the Israeli-Lebanese maritime dispute was resolved.

Back in June Hezbollah warned Israel against extracting gas from the Karish field, saying it was prepared to act, “including force”.  Threats and counter-threats between Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces continued throughout the summer and showed no signs of slackening, even when the US-brokered talks appeared to be on the verge of a positive outcome.

On September 13 the head of Lebanon's general security agency, Abbas Ibrahim, told local TV channel Al-Jadeed that the maritime border talks are close to concluding.  "We're talking about weeks - actually, days - to finish the delineation issue,” he announced. “I'm hopeful that the situation is positive."

The next day Lebanese President Michel Aoun said there had been “major progress” in the US’s mediation efforts. “Lebanon has achieved what enables it to exploit its resources in its waters.”  He added: “There are technical details that are currently being studied in order to realize Lebanon’s interest, rights and sovereignty.”

What might the “major progress” amount to?  According to Israeli and Lebanese officials, an Israeli proposal would allow Lebanon to develop gas reserves in the disputed area provided it agreed to retain Line 23, or something close to it, as the maritime Lebanon-Israel border. This would open Block 9, and its promising Gana prospect, for exploration and exploitation by Lebanon.  At the same time it would guarantee the Karish gas reserve field remaining in Israeli waters. According to one media report, Lebanese officials demanded a written version of the proposal before providing a final answer.  At the time of writing no final answer was forthcoming.

Meanwhile Israel insists that natural gas extraction from the Karish field will go ahead despite the drones launched by Hezbollah at it in July, and their blood-curdling threats.  “The hand that reaches for any of this wealth will be severed,” warned Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

An Israeli official reiterated: “We are planning on starting extraction the moment the work there finishes.” On September 8 the London-listed Energean company, licensed by Israel to extract gas from the Karish field, announced that it would begin yielding output within weeks.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz said late last month that any attack by Hezbollah on Israel’s gas assets could reignite war between the two sides.

Despite the tub-thumping, political imperatives are favoring an agreement.  Lebanon’s foreign minister, Abdallah Bouhabib, in a press interview, pointed out that Lebanon’s president, Michel Aoun, is due to step down in October, and that Israeli elections in November could see the return to power of Benjamin Netanyahu. If that happened, opined Bouhabib, “he may blow up the agreement.  Here [in Lebanon], a president with a different approach and vision may come. Therefore, the time is right for an agreement.”

Let us hope this particular ship, after a stormy passage, sails into a safe haven.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 September 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-718249

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 October 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/02102022-lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-still-all-at-sea-oped/

Published in Jewish Business News, 30 September 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/09/30/lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-still-all-at-sea/

Published in the MPC Journal, 6 October 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/lebanon-israel-maritime-talks-still-all-at-sea/