Will Maliki return?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 February 2026

          On January 27 US President Donald Trump declared on his Truth Social media platform that Iraq would be making a “disastrous mistake” if Nouri al‑Maliki was re-installed as prime minister.  He argued that “last time Maliki was in power, the country descended into poverty and total chaos” and that this “should not be allowed to happen again.”

Trump, typically riding roughshod over accepted practice, was openly seeking to influence the election of Iraq’s future prime minister.  To whom was he offering his advice?

Iraq’s constitution specifies that following parliamentary elections, the parliament – known as the Council of Representatives – elects the president of the republic.  Within 15 days of his election, the president appoints as prime minister‑designate the candidate nominated by the parliamentary bloc with the largest number of seats.  The prime minister‑designate then has 30 days to propose a cabinet and present it to parliament.  He becomes prime minister only if parliament grants him and his government a vote of confidence.

Trump was therefore speaking directly to the 329 parliamentarians elected to the Council of Representatives in the poll held on November 11, and especially to the Shia parties which took nearly 200 seats in those elections and form the majority bloc that will nominate the prime minister-designate.

Since the elections were held in November and the prime minister is not yet in post, the constitutional timetable has clearly slipped.  But the blockage is further up the line.  Parliament has not yet been able to elect a president.  The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have repeatedly failed to agree on a consensus Kurdish candidate for the presidency (a post traditionally held by a Kurd), and they have formally asked for more time.

​Assuming the logjam is eventually cleared, Trump has warned Iraq’s parliamentarians that if Maliki were to be elected prime minister the US will no longer help the nation, “and without our support Iraq has zero chance of success, prosperity, or freedom.”  US officials believe Maliki is too closely aligned with the Iranian regime, and regard his possible return as an attempt to bolster Iran’s Shiite Crescent in the Middle East. 

Maliki and his allies have, of course, condemned Trump’s comments as unwarranted American interference in Iraq’s internal political process.  Nouri al-Maliki was indeed proposed in January as candidate for prime minister by the Shia Coordination Framework and allied lists.  His election is not a foregone conclusion, though.  Some Shia figures (for example, leading Iraqi cleric and politician Ammar al‑Hakim) have not endorsed the nomination,

while parts of the Sunni and Kurdish camps are openly opposed to Maliki.  These negative factors, allied to Trump’s warning, might be sufficient to swing majority opinion against him, so at the moment it is uncertain whether his nomination will survive the government‑formation bargaining.

A return to power by Maliki would not, on the evidence, augur well for Iraq.

From 2006 till 2014 he served two four-year terms as Iraq’s prime minister. His performance over that period is generally considered to have deeply damaged Iraq’s stability, institutions, and social cohesion.  His second tenure of office, from 2010-2014, was especially  marked by internal instability and increasing authoritarianism.  He began accumulating power in his own hands.  By personally holding a number of key security and economic portfolios, he was able to evade scrutiny.  He was also widely criticized for using the security forces and state institutions to support his political allies, marginalizing and antagonizing many Sunni and some Kurdish groups. 

His fall from power resulted from his inability to combat the forces of ISIS and its allied militias as they overran Iraqi army units and, as government forces withdrew in disarray, seize control first of Fallujah and then of Nineveh and surrounding areas.

On June 10, 2014 Mosul, Iraq’s second city, fell after large numbers of Iraqi troops abandoned their positions – around 1,500 ISIS fighters routed an estimated 60,000 government soldiers and police, leaving vast stocks of weapons and equipment in ISIS hands.

The same offensive saw ISIS and allied insurgents seize Tikrit and other towns along the Tigris corridor, while Iraq simultaneously lost control of border crossings with Syria and Jordan.

These catastrophic defeats at the hands of ISIS were unsustainable politically, and on August 14, 2014 Maliki was pressured to resign.

According to Iraqi and international reports, his years in power saw politically sanctioned corruption flourish.  Human rights groups and policy institutes link his period in office to dishonest practices such as ghost soldiers on payrolls and fictitious contracts.

In a speech to the Iraqi parliament reported on October 28, 2015 Iraq’s Commission of Integrity spokesman Adil Nouri claimed that roughly half of reconstruction funds and a similar share of oil revenues – some hundreds of billions of dollars – had, in effect, been stolen.  He said explicitly that the money went missing “during the 8‑year period of office of former prime minister Nouri Maliki,” noting that Iraq’s oil income “between 2006 and 2014 alone was only 822 billion dollars.”​  The presumption is that it should have been double that.

While Maliki initially pledged to reconcile Sunnis and Shias, his later approach relied heavily on Shia‑dominated security forces and militias, deepening Sunni grievances.  His crackdown on Sunni protest movements in 2012–2013, and his dictatorial style, helped foster the unstable internal situation that led to the collapse of Iraqi army units in 2014, enabling ISIS’s rapid expansion.

            Publicly Maliki emphasizes Iraqi sovereignty but, especially worrying in present circumstances, he maintains a very close relationship with the Iranian regime.

          ​"Since leaving office," the trustworthy policy forum Chatham House notes​, “Maliki has kept close relations with Iran”​. ​ Iran backed his return as a prime‑ministerial candidate in 2026​, it says, because it sees him as a “trusted figure” who can impose order on Iraq’s fragmented security landscape.  Moreover, Iraq “serves as a critical security buffer closely entwined with Iran’s own domestic stability.”

Given Maliki’s record in office, his close Shiite connections, and his strong association with the Iranian regime, Trump’s opposition to his return to power makes sense.  Will Maliki succeed in out-maneuvering him?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Trump warns Iraq of the dangers of Nouri al-Maliki returning, but will he be out-maneuvered?", 25 February 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-887737  

 

Help? What help?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 February 2026

            On January 12, when riots and violent protests had been wreaking havoc across Iran for more than two weeks, US President Donald Trump posted a message on his social media platform, Truth Social.  “Iranian patriots,” he wrote.  “Keep protesting.  Take over your institutions.  I have cancelled all meetings with Iranian officials until the senseless killing of protesters stops.  Help is on its way.”

            This was not his first message of encouragement to the hundreds of thousands who had taken to the streets of Iran’s cities and towns protesting against the regime and the hardships it was inflicting on the people.  In a Truth Social post in the early hours of Friday, January 2 he had already posted that if Iran “violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue,” adding: “We are locked and loaded and ready to go.”

            The nationwide insurrection can be dated back to December 28, when a sudden currency collapse, coming on top of already severe inflation and falling purchasing power, led to bazaar strikes and street demonstrations in Tehran. 

The Iranian rial had plunged to a historic low of around 1.42 million per dollar, destroying price stability for import‑dependent traders, and making normal bazaar commerce impossible.  Rapid exchange‑rate swings and rising costs meant that shopkeepers could not set or honor prices.  Facing possible bankruptcy, they closed their shops and struck in protest at what they saw as regime mismanagement of the economy.

The uprising moved quickly from economic dissatisfaction by the trading community to an open challenge to the entire Islamic Republic by large numbers of the public.  By the first week of January, protests had expanded to cities and towns in nearly all 31 provinces.  It is still in progress and according to diplomatic and media estimates, the numbers of people participating nationwide could possibly be in the millions. 

The use of live fire by the security forces escalated sharply around 8–10 January.  Reports speak of thousands killed over a 48‑hour period and describe this phase as the deadliest repression since 1979.  So by the time of Trump’s January 13 message, the unrest had moved from an economic‑triggered protest to a nationwide, highly lethal confrontation.

          The many slogans chanted by protesters include calls for the overthrow of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, demands for an Iranian republic, and nostalgia for the deposed monarchy (“Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed”, which honored the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty).  “This is the final battle, Pahlavi will return” is chanted in places, explicitly calling for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi to lead a reborn Iran. 

These monarchist slogans do, however, coexist with strong anti‑monarchical and republican currents, and the insurrection’s center of gravity is essentially anti‑Islamic Republic.

In the light of Trump’s own words, Iranians who are risking life and liberty by challenging their oppressive government might reasonably believe that the US president is preparing to intervene on their behalf and help them overthrow the regime.  But that is not likely to happen. 

From the US perspective there are, in addition to the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters, three pressing issues in the Iran file:  the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, and Iran’s regional proxies.  These seem to have taken precedence over any practical support for the popular uprising against the regime.

To justify Trump’s visible military buildup around Iran in late January, Washington did cite Iran’s ruthless crackdown and soaring protester death toll, but also mentioned broader concerns about Tehran’s regional and nuclear behavior.  The marked increase in US air, naval, and missile‑defense deployments across the Middle East, notably the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and accompanying forces to the region, were explicitly framed as deterrence and preparation for possible strikes on Iran.

​​Preliminary ​US–Iran talks ​in the first week of February ​were fruitful enough for a further round to be tabled, and Prime Minister Netanyahu flew to Washington to coordinate with Trump the line to be taken.  Talks not action emerged as Trump’s priority.  Meanwhile confused commentators are asking why Iran’s nuclear program is once again a central concern.  Didn’t Trump himself say Iran’s nuclear capabilities had been “completely and fully obliterated” during the 12-day war in June?

Herb Keinon, writing in the Jerusalem Post, put the issue in a nutshell:  “The return to negotiations – reviving the nuclear file while setting aside what has taken place on Iran’s streets – gives the impression that a moment of great regime vulnerability has been squandered. All of a sudden, the two sides are talking about centrifuges and enrichment levels, when many assumed the focus had shifted decisively to the awful nature of the regime and its violent suppression of its own people.”

As regards the nuclear issue, the current US position is a demand that Iran completely halts its nuclear program and ships its stock of enriched uranium, estimated at some 450 kg, out of the country – presumably to Russia.  If serious negotiations actually start, several months of talks would probably be needed to finalize agreement on the nuclear issue, which is the only one the Iranians have so far agreed to consider.

​But there is no evading the harsh truth.  Trump explicitly urged Iranians to “keep protesting” and “take over” institutions, telling them that “help is on its way​.” ​ He then held back from intervention while the ​regime's crackdown ​on the protesters escalated, and ​now US policy ​has shifted toward nuclear talks and military deterrence, leaving Iranians facing mass killings, detentions, and collective punishment without the external backing they thought had been promised.

According to Reza Pahlavi’s media office the regime has killed at least 43,000 Iranians since the current protests began.  On February 10 the family of 20-year-old Ali Heydari, arrested by regime forces on January 8, reported that he had been executed without facing trial.  

For protesters, Trump’s combination of rhetorical encouragement and minimal practical support must be a bitter disappointment.  Anger against the regime will doubtless persist, but what has happened may well be perceived by the people of Iran as a form of betrayal by Trump and the US.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Donald Trump promised to help the Iranians - when is that help coming?", 17 February 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-886674

Published in Eurasia Review, 20 February 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/20022026-iran-help-what-help-oped/

Syria’s enigmatic al-Sharaa

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 February 2026 

Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has become something of a puzzle. His words increasingly appear at odds with his actions.

For example​, he repeatedly emphasizes that his overriding aim is to unify the nation while recognizing the basic rights of its minorities. Yet here he is in deadly conflict with both the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the administrative body of Rojava, the Kurds’ semi-autonomous region in the north-east.

Sharaa probably regards the offensive as consistent with his unification agenda: he is seeking to bring Kurdish-controlled areas fully under state authority.  But since the campaign marginalizes Kurdish political representation, undermines local self-administration, and results in collective harm to Kurdish civilians, it breaches his commitment to protecting minority rights.

In December 2024, with a militant Sunni Islamist career behind him, Sharaa emerged at the head of a professional fighting force to overthrow the dictatorship of Shia-aligned Bashar al-Assad.  Since then he has consistently declared that his aim is to ​construct a ​Syria that unites its disparate elements into a unified​ democratic state.  He has been just as clear in insisting that the future Syria will be rooted in Sunni‑Islamic moral and legal principles. He clearly does not believe his twin aspirations are mutually incompatible​, though they may be. Where is an Islamic state that is truly democratic?  

He may be looking as a model toward Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, which retains a few democratic elements in its constitution.

​In fact it is Erdogan who is eyeing Syria as a future sphere of influence – and ​Turkey already has a foot firmly planted there.  Large areas of Syrian territory ​adjacent to the Turkish border have been under de facto Turkish military occupation and administration since 2016.

The Kurds have long been a domestic political nightmare for Erdogan with their constant demands for autonomy, and he has been engaged for years in ensuring that his Turkish Kurds get no military support from their Syrian co-ethnics lodged in their autonomous administration just across the border.

Current analysis suggests Erdogan is seeking to consolidate and, where possible, expand the partial security zones he has seized inside Syria along  the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkish officials consistently proclaim their goal to be a 30‑km wide buffer zone. 

In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement.  The text presents Turkish involvement as supporting, not dismembering, Syria.  By early 2026, official statements emanating from Ankara were increasingly framing Turkey’s entrenched military presence in northern Syria as part of a cooperative security and state‑building process during Syria’s transition from the Assad regime.

There has as yet been no ultimatum, demand or even request from Sharaa that Turkey evacuate the northern zones it occupies.  It is however implicit, in Sharaa’s long‑term aim of recovering full sovereignty, that once security threats are removed, foreign forces, including Turkey’s, should ultimately leave.  Erdogan may have different ideas.

Given Sharaa’s jihadist past, many of his statements as he took control of Syria surprised world opinion.  From the start he repeatedly emphasized unity, reconstruction, transitional governance and “a new era” for Syria, including democratic elections and a truly representative parliament.

In his first televised address as interim president on January 30, 2025 he said: “We will work on an inclusive transitional government that reflects Syria’s diversity.”  This government, he added, would “build institutions and run the country until it can hold free and fair elections.”

He went on to announce that he would shortly form a committee to prepare for a national dialogue conference, described as “a platform for Syrians to discuss the future political program of the nation.”  The committee was indeed set up by presidential decree early in February 2025, and has been at work ever since.  Some commentators criticize it for being dominated by Islamists close to Sharaa, and as excluding key Kurdish, Alawite and Druze figures.

Druze exclusion from the constitutional committee reflects Sharaa’s ambiguous relationship with this minority community.  As with the Kurds, while his words emphasize his intention to include them within the fabric of a unified Syria, what he does appears to negate what he says. 

For example, government forces were certainly involved in the armed attacks on the Druze community over the four months April-to-July 2025.  The immediate triggers were a combination of long‑standing grievances between Druze communities and the new Syrian authorities over perceived discrimination and security control, and local provocations by Bedouins.

In July, Sweida – a city where Druze form about 90% of the population – became the site of intense conflict. 

          Syrian government forces were deployed to suppress the violence, but multiple independent reports document government troops and allied fighters looting and burning homes and shops, humiliating Druze clerics and residents, and in some cases executing civilians hiding in their houses.  Human rights groups put the death toll at over a thousand, mostly Druze civilians.

Before the mid-July ceasefire between Syrian government representatives and Druze leaders, Sharaa declared in a televised address: “Protecting our Druze community is a top priority… We will do everything in our power to protect the lives and dignity of every Druze citizen.”

After the ceasefire, in the course of a speech on TV he said: “Sweida remains an integral part of the Syrian state, and the Druze constitute a fundamental pillar of the Syrian national fabric”, adding a vow “to protect all minorities in Syria.”

Israel, of course, intervened militarily and politically in July 2025, first striking Syrian army positions around Sweida, and then key military sites in Damascus.  Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other ministers told both the Syrian Druze community and Israel’s own Druze citizens that the IDF was “acting to protect our Druze brothers.”

The Syrian leadership rejects any Israeli claim to a protective role over Syrian Druze, portraying it as cover for reinforcing a demilitarized belt along the Golan to Israel’s advantage.  Sharaa insists that reasserting central control is integral to his policy of unifying the nation.

Will he eventually bring his disparate minority interests, such as the Kurds and the Druze, within the overall control of a unified national government that represents a democratic, albeit Islamic, state?  That is the conundrum he currently represents.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Syria's future: "Can Ahmed al-Sharaa reconcile democracy, Islam and minority rights?", 10 February 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-886054

Published in Eurasia Review, 14 February 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13022026-syrias-enigmatic-al-sharaa-oped/

A pro-Israel bookshelf

 Published in the Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, 6 February 2026

I talk about the book on YouTube at: https://youtu.be/GYd0nyAnoNU

          I have been reviewing books for The Jerusalem Post and its sibling, the bi-monthly Jerusalem Report, for a good many years. One day, looking through the ever expanding “Reviews” folder on my computer, I was struck by just how many good books and eminent authors the Post and Report have allowed me to bring to the attention of their readers. A quick tot-up showed that I had well over 100 reviews stored online.

          Dedicated readers, I thought, might welcome the chance to learn about books and authors they could have overlooked, while occasional book buyers or people seeking a suitable present could surely find something to their taste in such a wide selection of titles. So, the idea was born of bringing 100 of my book reviews together in one volume.

         What would I call such a volume? My first thought was “Your Middle East Bookshelf,” but I realized almost immediately that potential readers might be misled into believing that the contents would cover the whole regional spectrum, whereas the books I have been reviewing all these years were selected to appeal specifically to a Jewish readership. Honesty is always the best policy, so I decided on Your Pro-Israel Bookshelf: 100 titles reviewed.

          With that issue settled, the next problem was how to present the material. The reviews covered a very wide range of genres. Among the hundred were biographies, political and personal memoirs, novels, thrillers; works on morals, religion and psychology; and poetry, humor, children’s books, even a cookbook and a graphic novel (that is, a book conceived as drawings accompanied by words). Should all the biographies be listed together, all the short stories, and so forth?

          That possibility was rejected for good reasons, as were several others. Finally, the best solution, from the point of view of the potential reader, seemed to be to present the hundred volumes alphabetically by title. Anyone reading through the book would never be aware of what type of volume the next review would be dealing with and would, it was hoped, be pleasantly surprised by the variety of subject matter and the range of authors – some of them very eminent – whose works are represented.

          Among them are Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, Douglas Murray, leading historian Lord Andrew Roberts, political journalist Melanie Phillips and Alan Dershowitz.  The memoirs represented include those of Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, and Zalman Shoval who was Israel’s ambassador to the US.

          Thrillers with an Israeli theme include A Death in Jerusalem, Jonathan Dunsky’s seventh novel featuring his Israeli hero-detective Adam Lapid, and Khaled Talib’s fast-paced thriller Smokescreen.

          I also reviewed a fair selection of short stories. Notable are those of Michael Oren and Jennifer Anne Moses.

          My hope in putting together this collection of reviews was to whet readers’ appetite, and lead them perhaps to purchase a volume or two that particularly catches their interest. To help potential book buyers, each review is preceded by the book’s publisher.

Published in the Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine and the Jerusalem Post online, 8 February 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-885615#google_vignette

The ISIS prisoner dilemma

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 February 2026

The first week of 2026 witnessed a significant turnaround in US policy in the Middle East. 

A key factor was the visit of Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to US President Donald Trump in the White House on 10 November, 2025. Speaking in the Oval Office, Trump said of Sharaa: “We aspire to see Syria evolve into a prosperous nation, and I believe this leader has the potential to achieve it…”

By December 2025, the US was publicly expressing satisfaction with “steps being taken by the Syrian interim government.”

For more than a decade, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had maintained effective governance in Rojava, the extensive region in north and north-east Syria where Kurds form the largest community alongside other minority populations.

But on January 6, Sharaa launched an intensive campaign across the SDF‑held areas in the north-east aimed at absorbing the SDF into the Syrian army. Washington pressed the SDF to accept integration and focused on mediating ceasefires and withdrawals.

On January 18, a US‑mediated ceasefire was announced, setting out terms for SDF integration into the Syrian army. In reports of a late‑January phone call between Trump and Sharaa, Trump is quoted as supporting “the aspirations of the Syrian people to build a unified and strong state” and welcoming “the understandings related to the integration of military forces, including the SDF, into official state institutions.”

So what began as Trump’s full military and political backing for the SDF as the central anti‑ISIS instrument has evolved into a policy where the SDF is treated as a problem to be solved through subordination to Sharaa’s forces. His support has moved from arming and shielding the SDF to endorsing a unified Syrian state under al‑Sharaa and accepting, even facilitating, a Syrian military campaign that directly targets SDF forces.

The SDF ran 29 prisons and detention facilities containing some 10,000 men and about 40,000 women and children captured during the anti-ISIS campaigns. The largest prison was Hasakah; other prisons included al‑Shaddadi and al‑Aqtan. In addition, the al‑Hol family camp held around 24,000 women and children; the smaller al‑Roj camp held around 16,000.

“Two tumultuous weeks,” as ABC News put it in a report on January 21: “saw the fall from power in Syria of the Kurdish-led force that was once the main US partner there, as Washington shifts its backing to the country’s nascent government.”

Having toppled the Assad regime in December 2024, Sharaa was appointed interim president, committed to unifying the nation while recognizing the basic rights of its minorities. In pursuit of his policy to reestablish a sovereign Syria, he and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi agreed in March 2025 that the tens of thousands of SDF fighters would be integrated into Syria’s national army. The government would take over key institutions in north-east Syria, such as border crossings and oil fields, but also include the prison facilities and camps.

The deal failed to stick. US-brokered negotiations aimed at finalizing the agreement petered out. If the SDF believed that after so long an alliance, the US would support them in holding out for the autonomy they had won in Rojava, they miscalculated.

When attacked by Sharaa’s Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) on January 6, the Kurdish-led force lost most of its territory in north-east Syria, and Washington did not intervene. It focused on mediating a ceasefire.

By January 21, the ceasefire was holding, and the SDF had signed a deal that would effectively dissolve it as a separate fighting force, merging it instead into Syria’s national army. The agreement also triggered a rapid reshuffling of control over prisons and camps. Custody shifted from the SDF to a mix of Syrian state control and Iraqi-run facilities backed by US logistical and financial support.

The ceasefire allowed US forces to begin transferring up to some 7,000 ISIS detainees from SDF‑run prisons in Syria to facilities in Iraq, a process that US Central Command (CENTCOM) and Iraqi officials say will continue in phases.

A few ISIS and ISIS‑linked detainees, formerly held by the SDF, escaped during the conflict.

According to Syria’s Interior Ministry, about 120 ISIS detainees got out of al‑Shaddadi prison, of whom 81 were recaptured in subsequent sweep operations. Some 39 are still believed to be at large.

Under the 14‑point ceasefire deal with the SDF, the Syrian government formally assumed full responsibility for the “ISIS file,” including running ISIS prisons and camps. On 23 January, Syrian authorities took control of al‑Aqtan prison in Raqqa, and Syrian forces have also moved into the so-called “family camp” at al‑Hol, replacing the former SDF guards. Syria now formally runs al-Hol with its thousands of women and children, and faces major humanitarian and security challenges.

The prisoner issue, with which the SDF grappled and which now falls into the lap of Syria and the US, is a hot potato. Between 2012 and 2020, a fair number of foreigners traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS and live under the so-called caliphate.

Following the defeat of ISIS in 2019, very large numbers of ISIS militants and supporters were captured and imprisoned. The SDF soon came to realize that it held a large, diverse foreign population without the legal authority, resources, or diplomatic recognition to resolve their status.

Roughly 8,500 of the 40,000 women and children held in al‑Hol and Roj were third‑country nationals from about 60 states. Some 38 countries took back a few nationals, but many refused to do so, thus effectively exporting the legal, humanitarian, and security burdens to north-east Syria for the indefinite future.

The UK repatriated a small number of children without their mothers, and a handful of orphans, while in the classic case of Shamima Begum, she was stripped of her British citizenship.

It is estimated that only a couple of thousand of these foreign women and children been repatriated so far. Thousands more remained confined.

The SDF/Rojava administration lacked recognized statehood and formal diplomatic relations, so it could not negotiate repatriations through normal consular channels. With the change of responsibility to Sharaa’s Syria, formal diplomacy might succeed in alleviating the problem.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Why Washington shifts from Syria's Kurds to Sharaa", 3 February 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-885205

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 February 2026
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06022026-the-isis-prisoner-dilemma-oped/