The new US-Syria-Iraq connection

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 4 August 2026

On July 8, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump had a face-to-face meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

According to the official Syrian read-out and US reporting, they discussed strengthening US-Syrian relations, Syria’s economic recovery, and foreign investment. Following their meeting Trump announced he was removing Syria from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, a designation Syria had borne since 1979.

Reuters reported that Trump handed Sharaa a personal letter during the meeting. The key passages were: "I promised to remove all barriers stopping you from rebuilding your country, and very soon, you will finally be able to do so," and "We have US companies ready to invest in Syria and help make your country greater and more prosperous than ever before."

Speaking to the media after their meeting, Trump praised Sharaa in unusually strong terms.  He’s: “doing an unbelievable job in unifying Syria….Syria was a mess…now it's just come together….He's done a fantastic job."  All the indications are that Trump has decided to adopt post-Assad Syria as a working partner in developing a reinvigorated Middle East.

One week later, Trump was entertaining Iraq’s prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, at the White House. 

Once again the meeting was notable for its tone. Trump repeatedly praised Zaidi and spoke of their "tremendous chemistry."  He made it clear that he regarded Iraq’s new prime minister also as a partner with whom Washington could build a stronger long-term relationship.

The discussion covered expanding economic relations between the two countries, while both sides endorsed a series of memoranda of understanding (MoU) involving US participation in Iraq's oil and gas sector.  Zaidi reiterated his government's intention of bringing all armed groups, including Iran-backed militias, under state control, while confirming that the remaining US forces in Iraq are expected to complete their withdrawal by September 30, 2026.

What was not specifically referred to by either party – and not mentioned either following Trump’s discussion with Sharaa – was the US-Syria-Iraq plan to revive the historic 500-mile pipeline from the oilfields of Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the town of Baniyas, on Syria's Mediterranean coast – a determined effort to reduce Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Tom Barrack, Trump’s ambassador to Turkey and envoy to Syria and Iraq, had been working on the details of the agreement before Zaidi’s visit. 

The pipeline was completed in 1952 by Iraq’s Petroleum Company with a capacity of around 300,000 barrels per day.  Baghdad shut the pipeline in the 1980s after Syria sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.

The pipeline will almost certainly have to be wholly replaced – a project calculated to last up to three years.  ​

A glance at the map shows that reviving the pipeline would give Iraq a strategic alternative to exporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike Gulf exports, shipments through the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline would avoid the Persian Gulf altogether.  It would spare tankers the need to negotiate the strategic Hormuz chokepoint on both their outbound and return voyages. Oil reaching Syria's Mediterranean coast via the pipeline could be shipped directly to European markets.

Routing Iraqi oil this way could cut a tanker's voyage to European refineries by roughly 3,000 nautical miles and more than a week at sea, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars in normal shipping costs while avoiding the war-risk insurance and disruption associated with the Strait of Hormuz.

Although it has clearly been agreed between the parties to keep the resurrection of the historic pipeline low-key, Reuters and other media outlets indicate that the project has advanced well beyond the conceptual stage. It is claimed that the US is officially backing restoration of the 891 km (about 550 mile) long pipeline, and that the US expects American firms to take part in rebuilding the line. Chevron has been widely mentioned as a potential participant, although the company has declined to comment publicly. 

Other pipeline projects with outlets on Syria’s Mediterranean coast are also under consideration, and could link major energy producers in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, directly to Syria’s ports.  ​Indeed, with Syria shorn of its sanctions and established as a fully-fledged partner, it ​has the potential to become a​ major energy transit hub. ​ It has about 2.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, ​but some geological estimates suggest its undiscovered onshore and offshore petroleum resources could ultimately exceed 20 billion barrels.

In February 2026, Chevron signed a memorandum of understanding with Syria's state-owned petroleum company and Qatar's Power International Holding to develop the country's first offshore oil and gas field. Days later, Saudi and American energy companies formed a consortium to explore four or five oil and gas blocks and rebuild energy infrastructure in north-east Syria. 

Finding gas is, of course, only the beginning. Syria would ultimately need to sell it. Trump's decision to remove Syria from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism signals that Washington now regards Sharaa's government as a legitimate partner. That political endorsement encourages investors who might otherwise have stayed away, and it makes it much easier to construct pipelines, use Mediterranean export terminals, attract investment and conclude long-term gas sales contracts with foreign buyers.

Were Israel to follow Trump’s lead in considering Syria's potential as a commercial partner, several hazards would need to be overcome.  One is the strong influence that Turkey, no friend of Israel, exercises on Sharaa.  

Then there is the fact that Russia has retained a significant military and commercial presence in Syria.  President Vladimir Putin has preserved his strategic foothold on the eastern Mediterranean, having negotiated continued access to Russia’s naval facility at Tartus and its Khmeimim air base near Latakia.​  At the same time, according to reliable media reports, a Russian commercial logistics hub is expected to become operational at Tartus very soon, handling Russian cargo and providing a maritime link between the Syrian coast and Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.

Trump seems determined to enfold both Syria’s Sharaa and Iraq’s al-Zaidi into a close commercial and economic embrace.  In Israel, however, both are viewed rather more cautiously.  Trust cannot simply be bestowed; it will have to be earned.

Published in the Jerussalem Post and the Jerusalem post online tgitled Iran’s proxy army

 

By Neville Teller

           

On July 28 Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) launched ballistic missiles at US forces in Jordan. 

The US, in association with Saudi Arabia, directed its response not at the IRGC direct, but at a number of Iran-backed militias based in Iraq. They accused these heavily armed groups, acting under the direction of the IRGC, of past attacks on US forces, and of carrying out drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities.  

In short the US and its allies have recognized that the amalgamation of Iran-linked Shiite militias operating in Iraq are, taken together, an extremely powerful military force in effect acting as a functioning wing of Iran’s IRGC.

This network of Shiite militias, spread across Iraq, was put together by Qasem Soleimani, the one-time commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.  Responsible for Iran’s external operations and covert activities, it took him roughly 17 years – from the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq until his death in 2020 by a US drone on the orders of US President Donald Trump. 

His network has since become an invaluable adjunct to Iran’s military potential. The militias, with Iranian financial and military support, have accrued arsenals which include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons.  They are, in short, a formidable proxy army capable of engaging the US and Arab countries in long, costly conflict.

That was precisely Soleiman’s intention.  The militias were built to fight Iran’s enemies beyond its borders, dragging conflict away from the Islamic Republic itself.  With the US and Saudi Arabia striking Iraq instead of Iran, Soleimani’s plan appears to be working.

The UK’s Daily Telegraph reported a Tehran-based analyst’s unconventional opinion of the militias.

“They are nothing and have no power,” he declared, “but they have the potential to expand the war to Iraq and add more actors into it. Their main job is to move the war from Iran to Iraq…If America wants to destroy them, it is a matter of one week. But that would officially bring the war to Iraq, and this is what Iran wants. More actors and fronts will make it expensive and hard for Trump to carry on.”

Although most of these Iran-aligned factions are nominally part of the Iraqi state's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the main groups retain their own command structures, intelligence networks, missile and drone arsenals, and political organizations.

The PMF as a whole is an umbrella organization comprised of dozens of militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS.  In 2016, Iraq formally incorporated the PMF, which numbers well over 200,000 personnel, into the state's security structure. It remains separate from the army and reports through its own command framework under the Iraqi government.

The principal Iran-aligned militia organizations operating within Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They are estimated to field around 50,000 frontline fighters.

Despite recent US and allied strikes, which have damaged their facilities and killed commanders, they remain militarily formidable. They possess rockets, ballistic missiles, armed drones, anti-tank weapons and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Several have extensive combat experience from Iraq, Syria and, more recently, operations linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation.

Moreover, rather like the position that Hezbollah in its heyday achieved within Lebanon, the militia organizations have embedded themselves deeply in Iraq’s political, economic and social fabric.  Many militia leaders also head political parties represented in parliament, hold ministerial portfolios or influence appointments throughout the security bureaucracy.  Moreover they command substantial financial resources through various economic enterprises, border crossings and reconstruction contracts.

Not all the money acquired is illicit.  Many PMF units are officially part of Iraq's security apparatus and receive government funding.  Salaries, equipment, and operational budgets come from the Iraqi state budget and are legal.

But Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, and other neighbors handle billions of dollars in trade annually. Reports from Iraqi officials, researchers, and international organizations have described militia influence at certain border crossings, where groups allegedly extract unofficial "fees" from importers and truckers, facilitate smuggling operations, manipulate customs procedures and gain control over transportation and logistics services.

After the war against Isis, Iraq set aside large amounts of finance for rebuilding damaged cities and infrastructure.  Militia-linked businessmen and companies have been accused of winning government contracts through political influence, demanding kickbacks from contractors seeking permits or security access, and controlling local economic activity in areas where the militia is dominant.

Consequently, the Iran-linked militias function not merely as armed groups, but as an entrenched political-economic network embedded within the Iraqi state.

This is a situation that Iraq’s recently elected prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi – very much like Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun – finds intolerable.  Both have declared their intention to bring all non-state military groups within their respective nation‘s control.  Al-Zaidi has gone so far as to set September 2026 as a target for significant progress. His pledge enjoys support from Washington and from many Iraqis who wish to strengthen national sovereignty.

The obstacles are formidable.  The strongest militias reject complete disarmament. With powerful parliamentary allies and independent sources of finance, they are in a position to frustrate any attempt by al-Zaidi to bring them under government authority.  In any case, many of those within the groups do not see themselves as part of Iraq’s security forces, but as integral to Iran's wider "Axis of Resistance".

A complete dismantling of these organizations therefore appears unlikely in the short term.  Al-Zaidi may succeed in reducing their autonomy, but not in eliminating their independent military and political influence. 

An Iranian official is reported in the Telegraph as describing the militias as “indispensable”. 

“They are the backbone of the resistance forces in the region,” he said, “and their nature of multiple groups and closeness to Iran are their biggest strengths.”  He added that “some of them were in Iran during the war to help our armed forces control the streets” – that is, to subdue anti-government protesters – an indication of how deeply the militias are woven into Iran’s war machine.

For the foreseeable future Iran can continue to rely on this substantial external military power to bolster its own military capacity.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled "Trump’s Syria-Iraq pipeline plan aims to weaken Iran’s leverage", 4 August 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-904406

 

"Queers for Palestine" and the intersectionality trap

 Published in the Jerusalem Report, and the Jerusalem Post online, 28 July 2026

          A tidal wave of antisemitism has swept across the Western world in recent years. One of its more puzzling aspects is the bizarrely incompatible alliances it has fostered.

          A striking case is the common sight of LGBTQ+ activists and “Queers for Palestine” marching in solidarity with Palestinian movements such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad. They either do not know, or they choose to ignore, that according to the law and norms of their fellow campaigners homosexuality is a criminal offence, punishable with imprisonment or even death.

          A similar pattern appears among some women’s rights activists. They proclaim their solidarity with regimes or movements such as Iran or its proxy Hamas, whose gender policies are starkly anti‑feminist. Iran’s legal system fuses patriarchal culture with rigid Sharia‑based rules, producing discrimination and state‑sanctioned violence against women, including lethal force over dress‑code violations. In this strange alliance, some left‑wing feminist elements in the West are prepared to turn a blind eye to extreme misogyny, just as long as it is embedded in forces opposed to “Western imperialism” and Israel, condemned as a “white, colonial, patriarchal” oppressor.

          This unnatural conjunction of progressive, left-wing activists with narrow-minded, homophobic, misogynistic entities is glued together by a doctrine that mesmerized feminist and critical race theorists in the late 1980s, and rapidly captivated large parts of the social sciences world. It is called “intersectionality”.

          The term was coined in 1989 by the American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw. She invented it to explain how Black women’s lives were adversely affected by discrimination not only of race but also of gender, and that the two impacted on each another.

          This basic idea – that one form of oppression actually influences another – appealed to sociologists. It quickly became an obsession, mushrooming to encompass the concept that every form of discrimination within a society against oppressed or disenfranchised groups is interlinked.

          It did not require much effort to incorporate into these intersecting forms of oppression the old chestnut that – despite all the evidence to the contrary – Israel was an apartheid state dedicated to oppressing Palestinians. As a result, the groups that considered themselves oppressed were led to embrace the Palestinians as fellow victims, and to perceive Israel as part of the oppressive global power structure. In short, intersectionality soon offered anti-Israel organizations a fashionable and acceptable way of wielding the ultimate antisemitic weapon – linking every perceived evil in the world to the Jews or the Jewish state.

          From the 2010s, intersectionality became mainstream in progressive NGOs, campus politics, social justice and anti-fascist campaigns. Movements increasingly adopted an “intersectional” language of overlapping systems. In left-wing circles it became both fashionable and a matter of self-preservation to maintain, for example, that equal pay for women is related to Black Lives Matter, or that climate change activism is inseparable from the struggle against colonialism. And since left-wing opinion has decreed that Palestinians are quintessential victims and their villainous oppressors are Israel, dogma dictated that in opposing any form of discrimination you must oppose Israel.

          Your opposition must, of course, extend to all those who support Israel – which means the vast majority of diaspora Jewry. And then, by a further extension, to all Israelis. You must deny them a voice, ban them from public life, cut them off from academic interchange, boycott or disrupt their artistic performances. It is on the basis of intersectionality that the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement operates its anti-Israel and anti-Israeli campaigns.

          Pride Month events in the US and Europe supply clear examples of this frankly antisemitic thinking. LGBTQ+ organizations regularly accuse Israel – the only state in the Middle East with a liberal approach to sexual issues – of “pinkwashing”, that is of cynically using its advanced LGBTQ+ rights to distract the world’s attention from its alleged human rights violations. In other words, nothing that Israel can do – even demonstrate its open-hearted support for liberal sexual politics – can outweigh the underlying antipathy toward the Jewish state.

          As a result Jewish and pro‑Israel LGBTQ+ groups have been harassed or excluded from Pride marches, while organizations which support Palestinian factions with deeply homophobic ideologies are welcomed in the name of solidarity with the “oppressed.”

         Groups and movements intent on putting intersectional theory into practice simply fail, or refuse, to perceive antisemitism as a rampant form of oppression. None take into account that for centuries Jews across the world were subject to discrimination and persecution. Nor do they acknowledge that Zionism was the political reaction – a movement aimed at restoring to the Jewish people the right to determine their own future in their ancestral homeland.

          It is heartening, however, to note that the intersectionality tide is beginning to turn. Some scholars have started to argue that intersectionality sidelines antisemitism.

          Sociologist Karin Stogner writes that intersectionality as usually practiced shows a “tendency to exclude global antisemitism from its understanding of oppression.” She notes that movements guided by this exclusion—she names the Women’s March, Chicago Dyke March, and parts of Black Lives Matter—have “excluded Jewish organizations and individuals from participation and take a vehement anti‑Israel stance.”

          In one paper she describes “strange alliances that occur between queer and intersectional feminism on the one hand and global antisemitism on the other.”

          Professor Christina Hoff Sommers has written: “Of course, intersectionality theory is a confused muddle.  It fights racism and sexism by classifying everyone according to race and sex.  It views race and gender privilege as the root of all evil, while ignoring the role played by dogmatic ideologies held by all genders."

         Even Kimberlé Crenshaw herself, some twenty years after devising the idea of intersectionality, complained that her concept had been stretched beyond what she intended. She wrote that intersectionality was “originally meant to be a tool used to understand and frame the discrimination faced by black women in the United States,” but that it had been “contorted” to become something that she never intended it to be.

         No-one could speak with greater authority.  She has asserted that intersectionality as she conceived it has burst its banks and flooded out of control. Are its proponents at last beginning to perceive that the misguided application of its theories to Israel and the Jewish people is in part responsible for the uncontrolled expansion of antisemitism in the West?

Published by the Jerusalem Post online, 28 July 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-903414

Trump’s nuclear deal and Saudi Vision 2030

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 July 2026

            It was on July 22 that a new Saudi civil nuclear agreement was signed between the US and Saudi Arabia.  First reports indicated that the agreement assured Saudi Arabia of a 30-year cooperation with the US on civil nuclear development with no reference to the requirements laid down in the past by the US as essential to such a deal – such as joining the Abraham Accords or a ban on enriching uranium domestically.

Within 24 hours US President Donald Trump had posted clarifications on both issues on his Truth Social platform.  He endorsed the nuclear agreement – which, incidentally, still requires a 90-day congressional review, and could face opposition – but, he wrote, it “is totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and successful Abraham Accords.”

Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Saudi Arabia joining the Accords “would be an historic leap forward for peace in the Middle East.”

Since no international inspection process had been built into the deal, there were immediate fears that Saudi Arabia would be able to enrich uranium, leading eventually to a nuclear weapons program. 

            Trump was intent on quashing that assumption as well.

“The Civil Nuclear Deal,” he wrote, adding in brackets “(there will be no enrichment of material)…pertains only to non-military use such as the ones that Iran and UAE (and others) already have.”

Little attention has been paid to how the new arrangement will impact on the ambitious plan, launched by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in April 2016, aimed at  revitalizing the kingdom – Saudi Vision 2030.     

            The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is less than a hundred years old. It was only in 1932 that Abdul Aziz ibn Saud emerged from many years of political and military struggle against the Ottoman empire and other local chieftains, and was able to name the area he had conquered “Saudi Arabia”, and proclaim himself its monarch. 

  No doubt MBS had an eye on the eventual centenary celebrations in 2032 of the monarchy and the kingdom when he launched the Vision 2030 program. If it succeeds, by the centenary year Saudi Arabia will have been transformed from virtual total dependence on oil revenues into a modern, liberalized, thriving society, its prosperity underpinned by flourishing industrial, financial, economic and commercial sectors.

 When first announced, Saudi Vision 2030 envisaged, among hundreds of initiatives, privatizing entire sectors of the economy, cutting subsidies, courting investors at home and abroad, streamlining government services, and going public with the national oil company, Saudi Aramco, the world's largest oil producer and most profitable company.  

  This last step was achieved in 2019, when Aramco’s initial public offering (IPO) raised $29.4 billion, the largest in history,   Yet it was only 1.5% of the company that was sold to the public; the Saudi state and its sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, still own 98.5% of Aramco. 

A key objective of the program is to achieve economic diversification not by diminishing oil production, but by reducing the kingdom’s dependency on oil.  Ten years after the launch of Vision 2030, in April 2026, the government published a new progress report.  It reveals a rapid expansion and diversification of non-oil economic activity, employment, investment and government revenue sources.

The report states that by the end of 2025,  non-oil GDP was contributing 55% to the economy – the first time that non-oil sectors have made up a clear majority of the kingdom’s real  economic output.

To reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil, Saudi Arabia is also investing heavily in renewable energy projects. The kingdom has become the fastest-growing renewables market outside China.  

Vision 2030 includes nearly 50 large-scale construction and development projects aimed at transforming the nation's infrastructure.  A cornerstone of the program is Neom, a $500 billion futuristic city sited in the northwest of Saudi Arabia.

Envisioned as a hub for innovation and sustainability, it aims to incorporate smart city technologies and renewable energy sources. Recent reports indicate that Neom is facing significant financial challenges, with rising costs and delays leading to concerns about the project's feasibility.  This is one obvious area where Israeli hi-tech know-how, under an Abraham Accords umbrella, could help the development. 

The Red Sea Project is an initiative focused on developing a luxury tourist destination along Saudi Arabia's west coast. With environmental conservation built into the concept, it features resorts across an archipelago of pristine islands and inland sites.  When all phases are completed it will comprise 50 resorts offering 10,000 hotel rooms in addition to more than 1,000 residential properties.  Saudi Arabia hosts millions of Muslims each year on their Hajj pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, but inside an Abraham Accords partnership Israeli expertise in global, as opposed to Islamic, tourism could be of invaluable assistance in realizing the project.

The Red Sea Project is a 28,000-square-kilometer tourism masterplan on the northern Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia, developed in collaboration with the Red Sea Development Company under Saudi Vision 2030. Covering more than 90 islands, two coastal village hubs, and inland development across a planned 10,000 hotel keys and residential units, the masterplan is designed to generate 100% of its required power on-site through photovoltaic panels and solar roads.

Positioned near Riyadh, Qiddiya is envisioned as a vast entertainment city, encompassing theme parks, sports facilities, and cultural venues. It aims to become a major tourist destination, contributing to the diversification of the economy. Construction of a variety of parks, performing arts centers. sports stadiums and other projects is forging ahead, with several attractions planned to open well before 2030.  

Recently announced, the Mukaab is set to be the largest building in the world, featuring a unique cube-shaped design. It is part of the New Murabba development in Riyadh and aims to offer a mix of residential, commercial, and entertainment spaces. Construction has commenced, with the first phase expected to be completed by 2030.

Ever since the idea was mooted of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, their prequisite has been a clear path to Palestinian sovereignty.  They may decide that Phase 3 of Trump’s 20-point peace plan for Gaza provides that assurance.

Now a multi-billion dollar US-partnered investment program in civil nuclear development is to be added to the immensely challenging program already under way. It presages a partnership way into the future, allowing US companies to help Saudi Arabia not only develop a civilian nuclear power program, but also realize MBS’s ambitious Vision 2030 project.

Whoever leads the US in 2032 will certainly merit a seat of honor at Saudi Arabia’s  centenary celebrations.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Saudi Arabia-US nuke deal helps MBS realize Saudi Vision 2030", 28 July 2026
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-903756

Trump, Erdogan and the F-35 enigma

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 July 2026

Designed as a multirole combat aircraft, the F-35 combines low-observable (stealth) shaping with advanced sensors, data fusion, and networked communications, enabling it to conduct air-to-air combat, precision strike missions, intelligence gathering, and electronic warfare in contested environments.       

       On July 7, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump met the media together with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

       Trump used the occasion to announce that the US would ​be lift​ing the sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey in December 2020 under the CAATS (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions)​ Act.

       Turkey had been sanctioned because Erdogan​​, in defiance of Washington’s express warnings, ​had gone ahead and purchased the Russian S‑400​, a long-range surface‑to‑air missile system​ specifically designed as a defense against aircraft such as the F-35​, the advanced multirole stealth fighter that has become the cornerstone of America’s tactical air power.

       Trump was then asked whether Turkey would be allowed to buy the F-35.
       "Turkey has been in many ways much more loyal than other countries that we thought would be loyal,” he replied “…so it is something we definitely would consider."

       That was an astonishing response, given that Turkey is still deploying the S-400 system, specifically designed as a defense system against aircraft such as the F-35.

       It was Erdogan’s decision to acquire the S-400 that got him ejected from the F-35 program back in 2017. As soon as he announced his intention to do so, Washington made it clear that any attempt to fly US F-35s and simultaneously operate the Russian S-400 defense system was an absolute non-starter. It would effectively turn the S‑400 into a live intelligence‑collection platform on the F‑35’s stealth and mission‑system profile.

The S-400 mobile air defense system is designed to detect, track, and engage aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and certain other aerial targets using a combination of phased-array radars, command vehicles, and multiple types of interceptor missiles operating at different ranges and altitudes.

       What was obvious then remains obvious today. If F-35s routinely flew within range of an operational S-400, the Russian-designed radars could collect enormous quantities of data about the aircraft's radar signature, flight profiles, electronic emissions and tactics. Highly classified information about the F-35's stealth characteristics could be exposed.

       That concern explains why Congress enacted legislation barring the transfer of F-35s to Turkey while it retains the Russian S-400 air defense system.

       It has not prevented continued low-level negotiations between Turkey and the US about the possibility of Turkey rejoining the F-35 program. On December 10, 2025, US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack wrote on social media that the US was in ongoing discussions with Turkey “regarding their desire to rejoin the F-35 program and their possession of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. As laid out in US law, Türkiye must no longer operate nor possess the S-400 system to return to the F-35 program."

       By April 2026 Barrack’s stance had hardened. Speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum he expressed confidence that the long-running dispute over Turkey's Russian-made S-400 air-defense system was nearing resolution. "I think you're going to see the S-400 [problem] solved soon," he said, adding: "From my boss's point of view, acceptance into an F-35 program is fine."

       There may be political and practical reasons for Trump’s change of heart.

       Deteriorating relations with Iran has made Turkey's strategic value to Washington considerably greater. Turkey controls NATO's southeastern flank and borders Iran, Iraq and Syria. Trump may judge that rebuilding the alliance with Ankara is now a priority.

       Moreover a confidential understanding may have been reached over the S-400. Although nothing has been announced publicly, media reports suggest that there have been discussions about deactivating the system. Reuters notes that transferring the system to a third country is another proposal under discussion.

      Congress has not changed the statutory restrictions of the sale of the F-35, meaning that any proposal to do so could face a significant legal and political battle. Trump may be prepared to challenge Congress. But all he may be signaling is intent rather than a settled policy. All he said was that he will lift sanctions and "consider" F-35 sales.

       If Erdogan is ultimately to win the F-35 struggle, then either Turkey has to remove, export or permanently deactivate the S-400; or Congress has to agree to relax or amend the legal restrictions despite the continued presence of the S-400.

       Currently there is no evidence that the first has occurred, while there is substantial evidence of bipartisan resistance in Congress to the second. That is why, despite Trump's dramatic shift in tone, the path to restoring Turkey's F-35 status remains uncertain.

       Speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 17, Barrack threw in a casual remark that raised a few eyebrows at the time, but has not been followed up.

       "Greece has S-300s and F-35s," he said.

       Greece, like Turkey, is a member of NATO. Could it possibly be deploying the advanced US fighter and the Russian anti-missile defense system at the same time – the very situation that Washington totally vetoed in the case of Turkey?

       An examination of the facts reveals a complicated but innocuous situation that has little in common with Turkey’s.

       Barrack was entirely accurate when he spoke of ​the S-300​, ​an older​ version with significantly more limited capabilities than the ​S-400. ​Moreover the S-300 system​ operated by Greece was not a Greek purchase.

       In 1997 Glafcos Clerides's government in Cyprus ordered two S-300 PMU-1 batteries from Russia. Turkey threatened military action if the missiles were deployed in Cyprus. After a major diplomatic crisis involving the US, Britain and NATO, Cyprus agreed not to install them. In 1998-99 the missiles were transferred to Greece.

       So Greece inherited the S-300, designed during the late Soviet period and delivered more than 25 years ago.

       US officials have consistently argued that Turkey's case is fundamentally different. Despite repeated US warnings, Turkey deliberately negotiated a major strategic defense contract with Russia in 2017, and it bought the far newer S-400 Triumf, one of Russia's most advanced strategic air-defense systems..

       As for the F-35s, in January 2024 the US State Department approved the sale of 40 Lightning II aircraft to Greece.

       On July 8, following the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, Greece’s prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, told Greek journalists: "Greek pilots will begin training on the Greek F-35s in 2027.”

       Greece’s situation may indeed be different from Turkey’s, but a convincing case could be made for a precedent having been set. 

       Could this be the chink that leads to opening the door for Turkey’s acquisition of the F-35?

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 22 July 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-902969

Iran’s internal power struggle

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 July 2026

 Ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has been an autocratic theocracy, ruled with an iron fist by the supreme leader – first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini until his death in 1989, and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, until he was killed on February 28, 2026 in an airstrike.

 Today’s Iran is no longer what it has been.  What it has become is the subject of controversial interpretations.

 Some believe that Iran is no longer a republic of any kind but has morphed into a dictatorial, mafia-style oligarchy in military uniform.  The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), they maintain, exercises total control over political, economic and strategic decisions, whilst maintaining a theocratic veneer for the purposes of internal and international legitimacy.

They believe the new supreme leader, Motjaba Khamenei, is a puppet of the IRGC, selected under direct military pressure which bypassed the constitutional process. The new Khamenei certainly lacks religious credentials and public legitimacy, and has yet to demonstrate any independent authority.

         Real power, they say, resides in three IRGC hardliners: IRGC Commander‑in‑Chief Ahmad Vahidi; Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr; and senior military adviser to Khamenei Mohsen Rezaei.  All three rejected the renewed negotiations with the US and want to continue the war.

       They are only too aware that Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president since July 2024, wants a ceasefire, and they act systematically to thwart him.  The IRGC has blocked his ministerial appointments and countered his signals of de-escalation.

On July 6 some source of power within the regime authorized Iranian forces to attack three commercial vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, well aware that this would prompt a US reaction.  In response US Central Command struck more than 80 Iranian military targets.  

This supports those who maintain that Iran is governed today by an IRGC which functions simultaneously as an armed force, an economic empire, an intelligence service, a political party and the effective government.

Yet, while many expert commentators do believe that the IRGC has reached a level of power never previously achieved, others are convinced that the internal struggle for dominance is not over and that the IRGC still has to consolidate the level of control it has acquired. They hold that power in Iran today is heavily contested between the IRGC and a more pragmatic political‑diplomatic camp, while the newly elected supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, sits above them as an ambivalent, vulnerable arbiter whose authority is real in law, but fragile in practice.  

On the evening of June 30, Iran’s state news TV channel was broadcasting a pre-recorded interview with Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator in the ongoing talks with the US over sanctions relief, nuclear constraints and regional de‑escalation. 

Having confirmed that there are “behind‑the‑scenes negotiations” with Washington leading to a possible deal on limiting Iran’s nuclear activity, Ghalibaf was in the middle of a sentence when the screen went blank.  After a second or two, an old speech by Ali Khamenei, the former supreme leader, was on the air.

 Iranian hardliners had succeeded in cutting off a television interview with the country’s chief peace negotiator, as he was defending the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

In reporting the incident, the UK’s Daily Telegraph said that the censored sections included Ghalibaf’s response to reports that international inspectors would be allowed to visit Iran’s nuclear sites, his account of how frozen Iranian assets would be released, and details of the agreement’s proposed $300bn fund for post-war reconstruction.

Most importantly, Ghalibaf was about to discuss the new supreme leader’s equivocal message about the deal with the US, in which he had remarked that “in principle I had a different opinion” but had nonetheless authorized the agreement.  Hardliners had seized upon the remark as proof that the supreme leader was basically opposed to the negotiations that his own government was pursuing, even though he had given his approval to do so.

The television blackout prompted Parliament’s media center to issue a rare public protest, accusing state TV of violating normal protocol.  This led to a public debate about who controls the airwaves.  

Vahid Jalili, deputy chief at Iran’s state broadcaster, is the brother of Saeed Jalili, a former negotiator aligned with the Paydari Front, Iran’s most uncompromising conservative bloc, which opposes talks with the country that killed the former supreme leader.  For the Paydari Front and its allies, resistance to the US is the ideological core of the revolution.  

The Ghalibaf TV incident was not the first of its kind.  Just ten days previously, on the evening of June 20, Mahmoud Nabavian, a cleric and former member of Iran’s negotiating team, had gone on the air to allege that in agreeing to the US-Iran MoU,  the Iranian negotiating team had gone way beyond their brief,  and that the terms they had agreed to did not reflect the conditions that the supreme leader had previously set.

In a television interview, he began reading out what he claimed was classified correspondence from the supreme leader.  He claimed Khamenei had written to the negotiating team saying: “What was agreed upon in the Pakistan talks is completely different from what was supposed to happen, and was a condition for the legitimacy of the talks, and the talks must be stopped.”

The TV broadcast was cut off abruptly, and soon afterwards the public relations office of the news network announced that it "accepts the resignation of the relevant director general of the network" and would charge him with "negligence in professional management."

Commentators said Nabavian could not have gained access to the supreme leader’s letters without the complicity of a hardline source.

So what is the true situation within Iran? Evidence from reports in Iranian and international media points to a multi‑layered contest for supremacy being waged within the upper echelons of Iran’s governance.  

Many believe that Iran is currently operating with four overlapping centers of authority: the supreme leader, the IRGC, the president, and senior IRGC-aligned political figures – and that each is vying for supreme power.​  All, however, are probably united behind Khamenei's pledge to avenge his father's death;  the ideology that has driven the revolution since 1979 lives on. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Hardliners in Tehran are running the show while the Iran's supreme leader watches", 15 July 2026: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-902329

Is the Gaza peace plan dead?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2026

US President Donald Trump’s 20‑point plan for Gaza, announced on September 29, 2025, linked a one‑off hostage/prisoner exchange to a transition period in which Gaza would be demilitarized and placed under tightly managed international oversight.

The new governance features a technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza​ (NCAG) – a Palestinian body running services and reconstruction.  It would operate under the strategic control of a Trump‑chaired “Board of Peace” and an international security presence.

Hamas is to be removed from governing authority and stripped of its military capacity​.  In its place vetted local forces and international troops ​would enforc​e a terror‑free, demilitarized Gaza.   Meanwhile massive, externally directed reconstruction and investment programs ​would get under way.

In due course the Palestinian Authority would inherit Gaza from this interim committee, but only if the PA completes a prescribed reform program on security, corruption, and governance.  At that point a unified Palestinian administration over Gaza and the West Bank, backed by elections, is envisaged.

Beyond that, the plan holds out the prospect of US‑backed negotiations toward a Palestinian state, but only once the demilitarization process is in progress, and the reformed PA proves it can govern Gaza within this heavily circumscribed framework.

The plan was formally adopted by the UN Security Council on November 17, 2025 in Resolution 2803.  Eight Arab and Islamic states had already issued a joint statement welcoming Trump’s effort and confirming that they were ready to work with the US on implementing it: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE.  Even Hamas had agreed to some parts of the proposal, including hostage release and transferring authority, while maintaining that other elements – such as its own disarmament – required further negotiation.

The first phase of the plan – ceasefire plus hostage and prisoner exchange – was achieved and ended large‑scale Israeli–Hamas hostilities.  For phase two the UN resolution authorized a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to help demilitarize Gaza and train Palestinian police, with US coordination and contributions from Arab and other states.

As of mid‑2026, Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania had pledged troops, while Egypt and Jordan have agreed to train Palestinian police.  However no ISF units have actually deployed inside Gaza, while the $100 million earmarked by the UAE for police training remains frozen.

Meanwhile the military geography on the ground has been changing.  Since the ceasefire the IDF has steadily reduced the area controlled by Hamas from 47% of the Strip to 40% or even less. In May 2026 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he intended to expand Israel’s control to 70% of Gazan territory. However territory and population are not in balance.  No more than 15% of Gaza’s population remains in Israeli-controlled areas; at least 85%, and perhaps more, are living in wretched conditions in the coastal zones and urban enclaves held by Hamas.  Reports speak of overcrowding, problems with sanitation and access to services, and a severe lack of water.

Gaza’s traditional water sources have been badly degraded by the war, leaving much of the population reliant on minimal supplies, some trucked in daily. Trump’s 20‑point plan and its Board of Peace envisage substantial investment in repairing Gaza’s water infrastructure, but in reality these water‑sector reconstruction measures remain largely at the planning and pledge stage.

More generally, despite Trump's announcement that billions has been pledged through the Board of Peace, the Financial Times reported on May 27 that no donor money has actually reached the World Bank, and that informed sources said “not one US dollar” had yet been spent on Gaza reconstruction through the Board's funding mechanisms.

Turkish and Egyptian construction giants, US and European firms, and Gulf‑based companies are preparing bids to benefit from the envisaged multi‑billion‑dollar rebuild.  Most projects are at planning or competition stage, except for one large‑scale build actually under way.

A Gaza‑based contractor, Masoud & Ali Contracting Co (MAC), is constructing an Emirati‑funded housing compound for tens of thousands of displaced Palestinians in an Israeli‑controlled part of southern Gaza.  In addition a few businesses and contractors have started some limited reconstruction.

In mid-2026 Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan can best be described as wilting. While still formally in play, phase two seems to have stalled.  The ceasefire is repeatedly violated, Hamas demilitarization and therefore Israeli withdrawal have not occurred, and reconstruction in accordance with the plan remains minimal.

This is not precisely the picture presented on March 24 by Nickolay Mladenov, the UN High Representative for Gaza and director‑general of the US‑backed Board of Peace, in his first appearance before the UN Security Council.  He was present to brief members on progress in implementing the Gaza peace plan endorsed the previous year in Security Council Resolution 2803.

Mladenov informed the council that a plan, developed with and guaranteed by the US, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, “is now in place for the decommissioning and reintegration of armed groups in Gaza.”  He described the principle at the heart of the framework as: “one authority, one law, one weapon.”

This formula, he stressed, applied without exception to all armed active militias in the Strip, explicitly including Hamas. The objective was the complete decommissioning of weapons in Gaza and their transfer to the control of the technocratic Palestinian authority.

Mladenov said that the first priority, after consolidating a total ceasefire and emergency humanitarian measures, would be to identify and remove heavy weapons systems and military‑grade infrastructure, including tunnels. Subsequent stages would expand disarmament in parallel with staged Israeli withdrawals. The process would be supervised by Palestinian security forces answerable to the National Committee.

Crucially, Mladenov linked compliance with disarmament to the start of large‑scale reconstruction, arguing that collecting the most dangerous weapons was a precondition for economic recovery.

Meanwhile, starting on June 30 the Board of Peace held a two‑day “reset” meeting at a Cyprus resort,
bringing together Board officials, the NCAG, and allied advisers to review stalled plans for post‑war governance, reconstruction, and a transition away from Hamas rule.  Participants later called the talks “highly productive”.

So the Gaza peace plan is not dead; it is languishing.  It could surely be nursed back to health.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem post online, 7 July 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-901467

 

 

Lebanon – fantasy and reality

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2026

      The three-way US-Israel-Lebanon deal, agreed and signed on June 26, brings clarity to what has been ​the ​somewhat obscure situation ​produced by ​the US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), agreed on June 17.

            It ​has certainly seemed that, when it comes to Lebanon, US President Donald Trump and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu were pulling in somewhat different directions.

            The published text of the MoU states that the US, Iran “and their respective allies involved in the current conflict” declare an “immediate and lasting cessation of military actions across all fronts, including Lebanon.”  Opening a 60‑day window for negotiating a fuller agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the MoU declares a ceasefire, implicitly including Israel and Hezbollah in the truce.

But neither Israel nor Hezbollah had been involved in negotiating the agreement, which embodies the fantasy that the US and Iran ​completely control their “respective allies”.  They ​do not, and for the US to​ have assume​d ​it could take Israel for granted was presumptuous.  Although ​Israel could scarcely be considered bound by its terms, ​it has chosen to abide by the MoU, though not abdicating the right to defend itself against any breach of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.

For its part, Iran has been unable to restrain Hezbollah, which has ignored the MoU and mounted a whole series of armed assaults on the IDF.  There have been at least two major, lethal Hezbollah attacks since the MoU was signed, with five Israeli soldiers killed (four in a tank strike on June 18, and one in a drone strike on June 20), plus several additional non‑fatal attacks.  For example, a Hezbollah explosive‑drone attack in southern Lebanon on Saturday June 20 wounded 13 Israeli soldiers.

Despite earlier calls from the White House for Israel to observe the ceasefire, basic justice for the soldiers who lost their lives demanded a response. Israel characterizes these retaliatory actions as self‑defense against clear Hezbollah violations, essential to deterring further attacks.  On June 18, performing something of a volte-face compared with the recent past, Trump publicly warned Tehran that it is responsible for reining in Hezbollah, and must ensure the group fully respects the truce. 

Iran retaliated on June 20, declaring that Israel was breaching the agreement by attacking Hezbollah, and itself promptly proceeded to violate the MoU by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The Lebanon situation is full of anomalies.  In demanding that Israel cease its military activity in Lebanon, the US, the UN and Western nations, providing no background, declare they are protecting the country and its people from the effects of air strikes. But Hezbollah’s very raison d’être is to attack Israel in pursuit of its declared aim, and that of its Iranian sponsor, to annihilate the state and its people. This basic truth is too often ignored or ​discounted by Western politicians. 

​            The reality is more nuanced, for what is often ignored is that the Lebanese government has taken matters into its own hands and for many months ​has been in a deal of its own with Israel​, predicated on containing and eventually disarming Hezbollah.  The latest round of talks was held in Washington on June 23-26.  And the historic three-way agreement of June 27 is the result.

Joseph Aoun was elected Lebanon’s president on January 8, 2025.  His top priority was to restore national sovereignty – and that meant reining in the overmighty Hezbollah organization that had become “a state within a state”, and in particular disarming it.

        In August 2025 Aoun and his cabinet instructed the army to develop a plan to bring all weapons in the country under the control of state security forces, thereby ending Hezbollah’s autonomy.

One month later Lebanon’s army chief, Rodolphe Haykal, presented the cabinet with a multi‑phase plan to achieve just that.  The first phase aimed at disarming all Hezbollah personnel south of the Litani river.

The cabinet authorized the army to put the plan into operation. But it soon became clear that government forces lacked the military capacity to achieve the desired result.  Despite some success in dislodging Hezbollah from a few areas of southern Lebanon, it became clear that the plan was not viable. The state on its own could not bring Hezbollah to heel.  It needed help if it was to regain national sovereignty.

So from March 2026 Aoun began pushing the idea of face‑to‑face ceasefire talks with Israel, as part of a broader strategy that would ultimately bring Hezbollah’s weapons, and therefore Hezbollah itself, under state control.

The first 2026 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire deal was agreed on April​ 16.  It was extended by 45 days on May​ 15, following US-mediated talks in Washington, and then renewed and expanded again on June​ 3.  Under this arrangement, a conditional ceasefire was agreed, contingent on a complete halt to Hezbollah’s military strikes against Israel, the evacuation of Hezbollah forces from the South Litani sector, and the creation of “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese Armed Forces ​(LAF) would exercise exclusive control to the exclusion of non‑state actors.

By moving into key areas in southern Lebanon and clearing them of Hezbollah, Israel has laid the groundwork for implementing this agreement.  Under the new and historic deal, Israel has agreed to withdraw from two areas that will be taken over by the Lebanese army as pilot zones.  Now Israel and Lebanon are in effect acting hand-in-hand to degrade Hezbollah, and restore national sovereignty to the Lebanese state itself.  The US has agreed to improve the capabilities of the LAF and support its anti-Hezbollah operations.

           Aoun has to tread very carefully in implementing this policy.  Hezbollah commands considerable support among Lebanon’s Shi’ite community – roughly a third of the population – even if recent reports indicate a degree of disillusionment setting in.  Memories of the 1975-1990 civil war are still fresh, and Aoun is determined to avoid reigniting it. 

           He is also well aware that tens of thousands of the residents of northern Israel’s border are still displaced, and that Israel’s policy is to remove Hezbollah’s offensive capability – by military action if necessary – before a full return is possible.

            The Lebanese government is as anxious as Israel to see that day.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2026, and in the Jerusalem Post online tiled: "The new US-Israel-Lebanon deal reshapes the fight against Hezbollah," 1 July 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-900802