Lebanon’s make or break election

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 29 April 2022

Lebanon is preparing to go to the polls on May 15. Many observers believe that this parliamentary election promises to be one of the most significant in the country’s modern history (“crucial” and “decisive” are among the terms used).  Three vital issues hang on the result.

First, Lebanon’s failing economy depends on the radical reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) being enacted before their essential financial package is put in place. Nothing can be done until the new government is up and running.  Secondly, President Michel Aoun’s term of office has ended, and the new parliament will have the task of electing and confirming his successor in office.  Thirdly, and perhaps most critical of all, this election campaign has produced a significant weight of anti-Hezbollah political feeling among a number of disparate political groups.  Given a modicum of leadership, they could be brought together to reduce the baleful influence of the Iran-supported extremist group once and for all

The elections come as Lebanon’s currency has lost more than 90 percent of its value in the past two years, plunging more than half of the 6 million Lebanese population into poverty.  The economic crisis was aggravated by the massive explosion at Beirut Port on August 4, 2020, when a large part of the capital was destroyed, more than 200 people killed, thousands injured, 300,000 people left homeless and billions of dollars in material damage was caused. Responsibility is yet to be determined, as powerful figures linked to Hezbollah do their best to frustrate the public Inquiry.

The World Bank has described Lebanon’s financial and economic crisis as among the worst in the world in 150 years. The IMF requires, among other measures, that the Lebanese government approve a restructuring of the banking system that takes account of the large losses in the sector, while protecting small depositors and limiting their recourse to public resources.  

Lebanon's political and financial elite have been at odds over such a plan for two years, particularly on how to distribute some $70 billion of losses between banks, the state, and depositors.  Lebanon's banking sector maintains that the government and central bank should bear the lion's share of losses.  Goldman Sachs has said the most challenging reform would be the restructuring of the local banks, “The distribution of losses between the government, bank shareholders and depositors is…unlikely to be resolved easily."  All the same resolved it will have to be after the election, if Lebanon is to be assisted by the IMF to regain a degree of financial stability.

Since his return to Lebanon in 2005 from France, where he lived in exile for 14 years, President Michel Aoun, aided by his son-in-law Gebran Bassil, both allied with Hezbollah, has been a destabilizing force in Lebanese politics.  In 2016 Hezbollah’s support for Aoun’s presidential bid was the primary factor leading to his election.

Once in office Aoun allowed, if he did not positively encourage, Bassil to engage in lucrative patronage activities. In addition the president and his son-in-law have been trying to ensure that Bassil succeeds Aoun in office. These aspirations were dealt a severe blow in November 2020 when the US sanctioned Bassil, accusing him of being at the forefront of corruption. Nonetheless Bassil is trying to lead his party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to victory in the parliamentary elections, and no doubt hopes to capture the presidency if he does. At least he is a Maronite Christian, an essential prerequisite for holding that office.

Modern Lebanon, founded in 1944, was established on the basis of an agreed "National Pact".  Political power is allocated on a religious or "confessional" system, with seats in the parliament allocated 50-50 as between Muslims and Christians. The top three positions in the state are allocated so that the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim.

Theoretically no system could seem more designed to satisfy all parties in a multi-sectarian society. Theory, however, has had to bow to practical reality.  Lebanon has been highly unstable for much of its existence, and its unique constitution has tended to exacerbate, rather than eliminate, sectarian conflict.

Hezbollah’s many opponents from within both Christian and Muslim parties accuse the Iran-supported organization of running a mini-state within Lebanon, disregarding the nation’s sovereignty. They are treating these elections as an opportunity to end what they see as its domination of the country’s political decision-making and Iran’s occupation of Lebanon through its powerful proxy.

As a result, two opposing camps are jockeying to gain the majority in the next parliament:  the anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces party and its allies, who are determined to challenge Hezbollah’s influence and its dominance of the country’s administration; and Hezbollah and its supporters, who will fight to retain the majority they currently hold in parliament, and counter efforts to normalize ties with Israel.

Earlier this year, Fares Souaid, an outspoken critic of Hezbollah, established what he termed “a national council for ending Iranian occupation” of Lebanon. The council includes Muslim and Christian politicians, academics and key figures of civil society opposed to Hezbollah’s influence.

Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces party, which has the second largest Christian bloc in Parliament and is an arch enemy of Hezbollah, is campaigning with the outright aim of wresting the country’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s clutches. Geagea hopes to overturn the majority won in the last election by the pro-Hezbollah group, which includes the Free Patriotic Movement founded by Aoun, and the Amal Movement led by parliamentary Speaker, Nabih Berri.  Geagea argues that a solution to the economic crisis begins with defeating Hezbollah, which he blames – with some reason – for Lebanon ‘s economic collapse.

This parliamentary election offers the Lebanese people a real chance to cast off the dead weight of the past, regain its sovereignty under a new president, and implement the reforms that will enable the IMF to sign off on a financial package designed to revitalize the country’s economy.  It is all up to them.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 29 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-705384

Published in Eurasia Review
https://www.eurasiareview.com/30042022-lebanons-make-or-break-election-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanons-make-or-break-election/

Published in Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/29/lebanons-make-or-break-election/

When will the Saudi-Israeli connection go public?

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 24 April 2022 

           Israel and Saudi Arabia have no diplomatic relations with each other – a situation that normally means hostility between nations. Yet on March 3, 2022, Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) said: “We don’t look at Israel as an enemy.” It was scarcely a surprising remark, since for several years extensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been an open secret, including a covert visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2020 by then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

            MBS went on to describe Israel as “a potential ally, with many interests we can pursue together. But,” he added, “we have to solve some issues before we get to that.”

            What are the issues that inhibit Saudi Arabia from joining its main Gulf allies —the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain — in normalizing relations with Israel, as those Gulf states did in September 2020 in the Abraham Accords?  

   One main consideration is that Saudi Arabia, guardian of Islam's two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, is viewed by vast numbers of Muslims the world over as the custodian of Islamic values.  Inevitably this makes the idea of normalization with Israel a more sensitive issue for Saudi than for other Gulf states.  However there would be nothing shocking or unprecedented in Saudi Arabia taking this step.  The precedent has been set with the Abraham Accords. 

            Another restraining factor is that Saudi’s King Salman is acutely aware that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was conceived and proposed by his half-brother (and predecessor on the throne), then-Crown Prince Abdullah.  

           The Plan, endorsed on three occasions by the Arab League, advocates a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute, requiring the establishment of a sovereign Palestine on territories overrun by Israel during the Six-Day War, namely the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.  Given that, and a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, the Plan promises full normalization of relations between the Muslim world and Israel.

            In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Salman – ignoring the fact that the Abraham Accords have breached the one-time Muslim consensus on the Initiative – again committed Saudi Arabia to it, asserting that it offers a "comprehensive and just solution" to the Palestine-Israel conflict

More recently MBS, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and other Saudi spokespeople, have not referred to the Initiative, but all have said repeatedly that normalization would not be possible until the Israel-Palestine dispute is resolved.

"The priority now,” Saudi foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud told Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv recently, “is to find an arrangement so that Israelis and Palestinians can sit together and have a peace process…This will make it easier for all countries that do not yet have relations with Israel.  For us, this will happen when a just solution is found." 

He went on to acknowledge: "The integration of Israel in the region will be a huge benefit not only for Israel itself but for the entire region."

   Yet MBS must be aware that the Palestinian Authority’s advocacy of the two-state solution is not its real objective.  The true aim of the Palestinian leadership, like that of Hamas and a substantial proportion of Palestinian opinion, is to remove Israel and acquire the whole of mandate Palestine “from the river to the sea”. It is an objective repeated again and again to  the domestic audience.

However the two-state tactic is itself a flimsy device. Supporting the concept fulfils a useful public relations function, but no Palestinian leader would be foolhardy enough to sign up to two states, which is why every attempt at a peace deal over the years – and there have been many – has foundered.  Acknowledging Israel’s legal rights in the region would bring a charge of treachery to the Palestinian cause down on his head.  Hamas would exclude Gaza from any such deal, and internal political upheaval might well follow. Yet along with the UN, the EU and much of the Western world, the official Saudi line is to persist in believing that an Israel-Palestinian deal which recognizes Israel’s legitimate status in the region is a practical possibility. 

All four Muslim states that have so far signed up to the Abraham Accords maintain their support for Palestinian aspirations, but they have decided that solving the intractable Israel-Palestinian dispute should no longer be a pre-requisite for normalizing relations with Israel.  They will support efforts to reach an accord, but they prioritize developing a flourishing Middle East for the benefit of all its citizens.

Each of the four had particular reasons for joining the Accords. The UAE is intent on countering the regional dominance sought by Iran and Turkey, but it is also developing commercial and hi-tech scientific links with Israel, increasing defense cooperation, and obtaining from Washington weapon systems like the F-35 fifth-generation fighter jet. Bahrain, too - its leaders Sunni, its population majority Shia - appreciates Israel’s strength in opposing not only Iran, but also the violent extremist groups supported by Iran in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.  On joining the Accords Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, while Morocco gained US recognition of its claims over Western Sahara.

When Saudi Arabia weighs the pros and cons of normalizing its relationship with Israel, or formally joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s determination to counter Iran’s ambitions to dominate the Middle East would be a major consideration.  MBS would also hope the move would help repair Saudi’s strained relations with Washington.  The murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. continues to reverberate in US political circles.  Normalizing relations with Israel could change perceptions about Saudi Arabia in both main parties, and help restore MBS’s status among the US elite.

So MBS has been careful to keep the normalization option open. Far from condemning its neighboring Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has signaled tacit support for the UAE and Bahrain. It has allowed unprecedented access to Saudi airspace for Israeli commercial planes, and reports of high-level meetings between Saudi and Israeli representatives continue to appear in the media. It was no doubt a source of regret that it could not participate along with the UAE and Bahrain in the so-called Negev Summit on 28 March.

The omens for Saudi Arabia and Israel soon formalizing what is already something close to a partnership seem good. 

Published in Jerusalem Post, 24 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-704889

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 April 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042022-when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 23 April 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public/

Published in Jewish Business News, 22 April 2022

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/22/when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public/

Hope at last for Yemen

 

The two-month truce between the combatants in the Yemen civil war, brokered by the UN on April 2, has been swiftly followed by dramatic action calculated to bring about a more permanent end to the hostilities, and even the start of a reconstruction program. 

On Thursday, April 7 Yemen’s ineffective, unpopular and largely absent president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, dismissed his vice president and went on TV to announce that he was abdicating in favour of a new presidential council that had been established for just that purpose. “I irreversibly delegate to the Presidential Leadership Council my full powers,” he said.

According to his statement, the new body will assume the duties of both the president and his deputy, and will carry out political, military and security duties for the Yemeni government during what he refers to as a "transitional period".

No sooner were details of the unprecedented political changes in the public domain than Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced a support package for the new Yemeni presidential council to the tune of $3 billion – a vast sum, but arguably only enough to start the immense task of repairing the ravages of seven years of conflict.

Seven years of civil war left Yemen divided between an internationally-recognised government led by Hadi and backed by Saudi Arabia based in the southern city of Aden, and the Houthis based in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, which they captured back in 2014, controlling a fair chunk of territory in the west of the country.

The new 8-member Leadership Council is chaired by Rashad Al-Alimi, a minister during the presidency of Hadis’s predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi has the support of Saudi Arabia, but he also has a close relationship with Yemen’s major political group, the Islamist Islah party.

Yemen’s misery started during the sadly misnamed “Arab spring” of 2011. Its political activists responded to the wave of protest sweeping the Arab world with its own mass protests and a near-assassination of the then president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Saleh was eventually forced to step down in favour of his vice-president, Hadi, who attempted to meet some of the activists’ demands.  In 2015 he tried sponsoring a draft constitution which proposed a federal system split between northerners and southerners, but the Iran-backed Houthi rebels rejected it.

The Houthis are a fundamentalist Shia group supported by Iran.  Saleh, although a Sunni Muslim, gave up the presidency with great reluctance, and then sought to manoeuvre a return to power in collaboration with his erstwhile enemies. It was through Saleh that the Houthis were able to gain control of most of the Yemeni military, including its air force. As a result, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, they overran large tracts of the country.

Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from consolidating a strong presence in the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to beat back the Houthis. The fighting has continued ever since, with neither party able to gain a clear advantage.

When Hadi took over the presidency in 2012, he was supposed to be in power for two years and serve as a transition to a full, inclusive Yemeni democracy.  He proved a sad disappointment, and the end of his period in power is not being mourned by many Yemenis.  Hadi never rose to the challenge of being a wartime leader.  He was a silent president who spoke to his people on camera only a handful of times. As Saudi Arabia launched its attack on the Houthis in March 2015, he fled to Saudi Arabia, and holed up in its capital, Riyadh.

As for the new Presidential Leadership Council, seeds of disunity are unfortunately already sown within in.  One of the eight members is Aidarous al-Zubaydi, who supports an independent South Yemen and labels himself its president. 

South Yemen has a checkered history. Back in 1967, just after Britain left its South Arabia protectorate, South Yemen became an independent communist state backed by the USSR. It was only in 1990, with the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, that South Yemen agreed to unite with the north to form the Unified Republic of Yemen.  The glue binding the two quickly became unstuck. It took only four years for the south to try to break away again. A short civil war ended with the south being overrun by northern troops and the national government back firmly in control. In 2020 South Yemen again declared independence. It is now governed by a Southern Transitional Council (STC), but there is cooperation and dialogue with the Yemeni government.   

To be successful the new Council will need to set aside their differences and cooperate in the interests of the nation as a whole.  It has clearly won the confidence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the task of disbursing its windfall $3bn to best effect is likely to occupy a good deal of its time and attention. 

As for the Houthis, they refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the establishment of the presidential council, and have subsequently denounced it as a foreign and illegitimate imposition.  This reaction is perhaps not unexpected, but the current two-month ceasefire is a reality, brought about by extensive Saudi-Houthi negotiation.  If negotiations continue, the ceasefire could be extended into something approaching a truce. 

What Yemen needs are elections, an inclusive government, and a new structure for the state. UN Resolution 2216 aims to establish democracy in a federally united Yemen. The Houthis must be given the opportunity to choose. Do they wish to remain an outlawed militia permanently, or would they prefer to become a legitimate political party, able to contest parliamentary and presidential elections and participate in government? The price would be serious engagement in negotiations aimed at a peaceful transition to a political solution for a united Yemen.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and Jerusalem Post on-line, 13 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-703979

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 April 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/15042022-hope-at-last-for-yemen-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 April 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/hope-at-last-for-yemen/

Lebanon's dilemma

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post of 7 April 2022

The good news is that a two-month truce between the warring parties in Yemen, brokered by the UN, went into effect on April 2.  At last there is some hope of relieving the humanitarian disaster that has overwhelmed the Yemeni people. The issues that led to the conflict, however, remain unresolved.

The bad news, from Lebanon’s point of view, is that the truce will do nothing to solve the political dilemma facing Lebanon, caught as it is between a rock and a hard place.  Its weak and vacillating government finds itself trapped between two warring and irreconcilable forces, Iran and Saudi Arabia – the one supporting the Houthis in Yemen, the other battling to defeat them.

Lebanon’s situation is exacerbated by the dire state of its economy. The Lebanese lira has lost more than 90 per cent of its pre-crisis value, and this has led to soaring inflation and widespread hardship. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of Lebanon’s population now live in poverty. Gasoline stations have run dry, medicine and many basic foods are in short supply, and critical social infrastructure is shutting down.   

In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) boosted the Lebanese economy with a massive loan. In 2020, in the face of a financial system spiralling out of control, the government again appealed to the IMF for help.  A rescue plan was approved by the majority parties in parliament.  Then a parliamentary committee, supported by the Banque du Liban and the other Lebanese banks, advocated a diametrically opposite approach, on the grounds that it was defending the interests of depositors. It was clear to the IMF that administrative reforms were needed before necessary economic measures could be implemented.

It is against this background that Lebanon’s political dilemma is being played out. Iran-backed Hezbollah is so entrenched in the country’s institutions that it would require close to a revolution to dislodge it. Moreover, the nation’s ruling cliques have been infiltrated by Hezbollah and its allies.  Lebanon’s current difficulties stem from comments made by Information Minister George Kordahi in October 2021, criticizing Saudi Arabia’s role in the conflict in Yemen.

In 2011 Yemen’s president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, a victim of the so-called Arab Spring, gave up the keys of office with a very bad grace.  He allied himself with his erstwhile enemies, the Houthis, in an attempt to maneuver his way back to power. Supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Houthis overran large tracts of the country, including the capital city, Sanaa. 

Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from extending its footprint into the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to help beat them back.  Saudi’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, assembled a coalition of Arab states, obtained the diplomatic backing of the US, UK, Turkey and Pakistan, and launched a series of air strikes against the rebels. Civilian casualties were high, and Yemen degenerated into a humanitarian disaster area.  Seven years later both parties remain entrenched in various parts of Yemen.

Appearing on an Al Jazeera TV show on October 25, 2021, Kordahi was asked his views of the war in Yemen.  Mirroring the Iranian point of view, he said the Houthi rebels fighting the Saudi-led coalition were acting in self-defence. “They are defending themselves against external attacks launched for years against Yemen."

In subsequent media conferences Kordahi refused to apologize.  Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were outraged. Saudi expelled Lebanon’s ambassador and said it was ending all imports from the country. The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain followed suit and recalled their ambassadors.  George Kordahi resigned.

Saudi Arabia and its fellow wealthy neighbors once spent billions of dollars in aid in Lebanon, and still host a huge Lebanese diaspora. But the friendship has been strained for years by the growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The powerful Iranian-backed Shia movement, which has come to dominate Lebanon‘s political  and economic establishment, represents a vital building block in Iran’s bid to dominate the region. Hezbollah and its allies are integrated into the ruling elites, which are mired in venality, corruption and self-interest.  Arab News warned recently that their unwillingness to put Lebanon's interests ahead of their own could destroy the nation.

A major issue uniting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is their determination to thwart Iran’s effort to undermine and overturn Sunni Muslim states, acquire a nuclear arsenal and dominate the Middle East.  In this they are at one with Israel, which is also the object of Iran’s visceral hatred.  The Abraham Accords, which may yet be expanded, is a sign of their common purpose.

Despite Iran’s strong influence within Lebanon through its proxy, Hezbollah, ministers have tried hard to mend fences with Saudi and the Gulf.  Very recently a green shoot has surfaced.  On March 19 Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati visited Doha Forum in Qatar, met the Emir, Sheikh Tamim al-Thani, and discussed ties between Lebanon and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

In a press conference later Mikati said: “Lebanon is meant to always have excellent relations with the Arab countries and the Gulf states. Lebanon is one of the founders of the Arab League and we strongly believe in such ties.”

Speaking about Lebanon’s diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Mikati stressed: “It was a summer cloud that passed. God willing, it will entirely fade out with the visits that I will make to the Arab countries, and with the restoration of diplomatic ties between Lebanon and the Gulf states. We need these ties, especially with Saudi Arabia.”

On March 22 the Saudi ministry welcomed Mikati’s statement, and said it hoped it would “contribute to the restoration of Lebanon’s role and status on the Arab and international levels.”

It was a first step, but the way out of the forest for Lebanon is likely to be long and difficult.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-703436

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 April 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/09042022-lebanons-dilemma-oped/

Published in Jewish Business News, 8 April 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/08/lebanons-dilemma/

Published in the MPC Journal, 9 April 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanons-dilemma/

The IRGC in Iranian politics

IRGC stands for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian armed forces.  It was founded shortly after the Iranian revolution in 1979 specifically to consolidate the ayatollahs’ grip over post-revolutionary Iran. Starting small, it has mushroomed into an enormously powerful organization, deeply entrenched in Iran’s body politic and highly influential both at home and across the Middle East.  Forty-two years on from the revolution, the IRGC is now operating as a state within a state with its own military, economic, cultural, political and intelligence arms.

          In April 2019 then-US President Trump designated the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).  Officials explained that the IRGC was an “active and enthusiastic participant in acts of terror,” including the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in which 241 American serving people lost their lives, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, in which 19 US Air Force personnel were killed and 498 of many nationalities wounded.

Recently rumors emanating from Vienna, where a revitalized nuclear deal with Iran is being negotiated, suggested that President Joe Biden is considering removing the IRGC from the US’s terror blacklist.   Accounts of what the quid pro quo might be for this major concession are vague – which might explain remarks made recently by ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov, head of Russia’s delegation to the Vienna talks: “Iran got much more than it could expect, much more…This is a matter of fact.” 

The rumors were backed by former US Vice President Mike Pence, when he visited Israel recently and told prime minister Naftali Bennett and foreign minister Yair Lapid that a delisting of the IRGC as a terrorist organization was on the table.  Pence claimed that the delisting would be in return for a commitment that the IRGC would not target Americans.

          Accordingly, on March 18 Bennett and Lapid issued a joint statement deploring the idea of delisting the IRGC. They described the IRGC as: "Hezbollah in Lebanon, they are Islamic Jihad in Gaza, they are the Houthis in Yemen, they are the militias in Iraq, The IRGC is responsible for attacks on American civilians and American forces throughout the Middle East, including in the past year…They are an integral part of the brutal machine of oppression in Iran. Their hands have on them the blood of thousands of Iranians…The attempt to delist the IRGC as a terrorist organization is an insult to the victims.”

The IRGC has become a major military, political and economic force in Iran, with close ties to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many other senior figures including, significantly, the recently elected president, Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi. 

The IRGC controls the Basij Resistance Force, an Islamic volunteer militia of about 100,000 men and women. The Basij are loyalists to the revolution who are often called onto the streets to use force to dispel dissent. The IRGC and Basij are active in suppressing the mass opposition protests that erupt from time to time, for example in 2009 after the disputed re-election of then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Dozens of opposition supporters were killed and thousands detained.

With some 190,000 active personnel, the IRGC is considerably smaller than the regular military, but it is considered the dominant military force in Iran.  It operates its own armed, naval and air forces, and is behind many of the country's key military operations.

The IRGC navy is tasked with patrolling the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which 20% of the world's oil supply passes. The force's small boats have intercepted US warships that it says have approached Iran's territorial waters, and detained or diverted international shipping. Its air force is responsible for Iran's missiles. Iran is believed to have more than 10 ballistic missile systems either in its inventory or in development, and a stockpile of hundreds of missiles.

The IRGC also has a powerful presence in Iran's civilian institutions. It controls around a third of Iran's economy through a series of charitable foundations and trusts known as the bonyads, which run a considerable part of the economy.  Apart from military industries, the IRGC is active in housing development, dam and road construction, oil and gas projects, food, transportation, engineering and even educational and cultural activities.

The most prominent IRGC entity in recent years has been the Quds Force, used to implement its foreign policy goals. Considered Iran's primary instrument for cultivating terrorist groups across the Middle East, Quds actively supports Lebanon's Hezbollah movement and Palestinian Islamic Jihad with funding, training, weapons and equipment. Iran has acknowledged its role in the conflicts in Syria, where it has advised forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and armed thousands of Shia Muslim militiamen fighting alongside them, and Iraq, where it has backed a Shia-dominated paramilitary force that helped defeat IS.

Iranian president Raisi is intent on further empowering the IRGC. The ageing Supreme Leader, in dubious physical health, is seeking to ensure a hardline Islamist regime after his death. His chosen successor, it is widely believed, is Raisi.  Raisi is fully aware that if he is to become the next supreme leader, he will need the IRGC’s backing, since anti-regime sentiment is rising among the Iranian population   In expanding the power of the IRGC, Raisi will be seeking to boost his support when the time comes to select Khamenei’s successor.

The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change believes that the IRGC will be a critical element in any possible scenario for Iran’s future. Understanding the dynamics of the IRGC’s higher echelons, it asserts, is therefore of the utmost importance. Western and international policymakers must be able to read the Guard’s inner workings, it says, and the Institute has accordingly published a new model to aid understanding of the internal structures, relationships and intra-elite alliances and rivalries within the IRGC. 

“Know your enemy,” said the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu, “and know yourself; and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-702557

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 April 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01042022-the-irgc-in-iranian-politics-oped

Published in the MPC Journal, 3 April 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/the-irgc-in-iranian-politics/

Published in Jewish Business News, 1 April 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/01/the-irgc-in-iranian-politics/

The US’s new non-NATO ally

“Major non-NATO Ally” (MNNA) is a US legal designation conferred on nearly 20 countries including Australia, Israel, Japan and Brazil.  On March 10, President Joe Biden formally confirmed his grant of the status to Qatar.

The MNNA designation, a powerful symbol of friendship and close collaboration, provides foreign partners of the US with a range of benefits and privileges, especially in the areas of defense, trade and security cooperation. By conferring the designation on Qatar, the Biden administration is signaling it wants an even closer relationship with the Gulf state than it already enjoys.

The actual decision was made at the end of January, during the visit to Washington of Qatar’s Sheikh, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. With Biden’s announcement, Qatar becomes the third country in the Gulf region, after Kuwait and Bahrain, to become a US major non-NATO ally.

What led to the decision?  One factor was the important role played by Qatar in the events leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.  Collaborating closely with the US, Qatar acted as mediator between the Taliban and what was left of the previous Afghan administration in assisting the evacuation of refugees.

Another consideration must be the current global concern over energy supplies and surging fuel prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Qatar is among the world’s largest producers of liquified natural gas (LNG), and could play a vital role if the flow of fossil fuels from Russia were reduced, either through the EU cutting its demand or by Russia reducing its supply.

Yet this elevation of Qatar’s status needed Washington to turn a blind eye to a range of rather dubious activities by the Gulf state.  While offering itself as a key US ally, Qatar has long pursued a strategy of backing Islamists − from Hamas in Gaza, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to hard-line Syrian opposition fighters.  Although the US Air Force had a base at al-Udeid, about 20 miles from Qatar’s capital, Qatar also allowed the Taliban to establish a political office in Doha.

Even before the Afghanistan debacle, Qatar had become recognized as a regional power broker because of its major role in the delicate Israel-Hamas-Palestinian situation in Gaza.  Financial aid to the tune of millions of dollars has flowed into Gaza from Qatar over the years.  Some of it was earmarked for Gazan families, reconstruction or fuel supplies and was closely audited, but much was provided with too little accountability attached.  Media reports suggest that large sums of Qatari money were simply pocketed by Hamas.

Qatar’s wayward policies, especially with regard to Islamist groups, had long infuriated its neighboring Arab states, and on 5 June 2017 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar for a second time, and virtually imposed a trade blockade.

For three-and-a-half years, largely through trade agreements with Turkey and Iran’s ayatollahs, Qatar withstood the worst that the Egypt-led alliance could inflict – and in January 2021 diplomatic relations were restored without any concessions by Qatar, which continued its contacts with Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist interests.

The embrace of Qatar, warts and all, by the US reflects Biden’s desire to deepen economic and security ties with the Gulf state, a desire given instant substance by the announcement by Akbar Al Baker, chief executive of Qatar Airways, of a $34 billion deal to purchase planes from Boeing.  

The deal involves Qatar Airways buying the new super cargo plane from Boeing, the 777-8 freighter. Baker called it “the most significant new freighter aircraft for a generation.”  White House officials described the deal between the two companies one of the largest in Boeing’s history, supporting tens of thousands of jobs at Boeing and its affiliated companies.

Brian Deese, director of Biden’s National Economic Council, said in a tweet: “this deal boosts America’s civil aviation industry, promoting greater domestic production capacity, a healthy hybrid commercial-defense industrial base and strong supply chains, while uplifting the hundreds of small businesses that feed into Boeing’s supply chains.”

On the positive side Qatar has transformed itself into a major diplomatic player and a commercial hub, and is well on its way to becoming a cultural, sports and tourist center for the Gulf as a whole – a position likely to be consolidated when Qatar hosts the FIFA World Cup in the winter of 2022. 

Even though Qatar now joins Israel as a major non-NATO ally of the US, there seems no immediate prospect of it following its Gulf neighbors, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Bahrain, in concluding an Abraham Accord with Israel.  Qatar seems unable, as four other Muslim states have done, to normalize relations with Israel while at the same time maintaining its support for Palestinian aspirations.

          Sheikh al-Thani is reported as saying that Qatar would continue its “working relationship” with Israel in order to help the Palestinians, but that it seemed to him unrealistic to enter into an agreement with Israel like the UAE or Bahrain “in the absence of a real commitment to a two-state solution.”  Yet he must be aware that supporting a two-state solution is only a tactic, not a real commitment, of his Islamist friends.  Al-Thani must know that they would never agree to endorsing Israel’s legal rights in the region, since their true objective is to acquire the whole of mandate Palestine “from the river to the sea”.  

          The US will need to keep a wary eye on its newest non-NATO ally.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 22 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-701948

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 March 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/26032022-the-us-new-non-nato-ally-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 24 March 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-uss-new-non-nato-ally/

Can Israel help Europe with its energy needs?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in unprecedent unity of action by the Western world.  Acting in concert, the West has imposed the heaviest sanctions yet on Russia and its leaders.  The country has been isolated across a wide variety of fields from banking to sport, from the use of air space to the transmission of television shows. There seems complete unanimity in the West – every possible obstacle will be put in the way of Putin’s ill-advised adventurism.  He must not be allowed to succeed. 

One anomaly in this consensus sticks out like a sore thumb.  At the moment Europe is continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas in vast quantities, and Russia is continuing to receive hundreds of millions of dollars every day from European nations.  This reflects the fact that around 40 percent of Europe's energy needs are imported from Russia.  The EU is determined to reduce its dependency, and on March 8 the European Commission published plans to cut EU demand for Russian gas by two-thirds and make Europe "independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030".

On the same day, the US and the UK both announced that they would ban Russian oil imports in an attempt to increase the financial pressure on the Kremlin. US President Joe Biden signed an executive order blocking US imports of Russian oil, natural gas and coal, while UK Business minister Kwasi Kwarteng said Britain would “phase out” imports of Russian oil by the end of 2022 and was “exploring options” to end Russian gas imports.

In the short term the soaring price of fossil fuels makes trade even more profitable for Russia than before the crisis. At the same time, the situation gives Russian president Vladimir Putin a vital political bargaining chip.  He can hold the threat of slowing or cutting off supplies of oil and gas altogether over the EU’s head, and in certain eventualities he might consider doing so.

Germany, the European country most heavily dependent on Russian fuel supplies, is taking urgent action.  On February 27 Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced plans to build two liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, in order to diversify supply. Natural gas is being recognized as a “transitional fuel”, an interim lower carbon source of energy for use while the world struggles to reach the optimistic targets it has set itself for reducing carbon emissions from fossil fuels.

 Europe's LNG imports hit a record high in January.  Nearly half came from the United States, second only to Russia in its reserves, but there are other potential sources of LNG, including the Middle East in general, and perhaps Israel in particular.

All the same some hard facts need to be taken into account.  The reserves of natural gas recently discovered off the coast of Israel and beyond, huge as they are, dwindle in significance when compared with those held by Russia. For example, Israel’s two primary natural gas fields off the western shore of the country are Tamar and Leviathan.  Tamar contains approximately 10.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and Leviathan, 22 trillion cubic feet.  Russia holds a total proved resource of 1,341 trillion cubic feet.  Israel and its partners Greece, Cyprus and Italy, and even its potential partner Turkey, could only ever supplement, never satisfy, Europe’s enormous appetite for energy – and that assumes establishing effective distribution methods. 

The EastMed pipeline, meant to transfer natural gas from Israeli waters to Europe via Greece and Cyprus, was announced in 2016, and several agreements have been signed between the three countries on the subject. The three states aimed to complete the €6 billion project by 2025, but no financing had been secured for it.  Progress came to a shuddering halt in January, when the Biden administration withdrew US support for the project.

No formal explanation for the change of policy was provided, but in a TV documentary Amos Hochstein, then a senior State Department energy adviser, said: “Why would we build a fossil fuel pipeline between the EastMed and Europe when our entire policy is to support new technology?…This project probably will not happen because it’s too complicated, too expensive and too late in the arch of history.”

Biden’s decision may have been influenced by a parallel, and extremely ambitious scheme, which has indeed received EU financing to the tune of $732 million – the EuroAsia interconnector, a project designed to connect the electricity networks of Cyprus and Greece as the first step in linking the power grids of Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Europe.  A 1,208 km undersea cable will create an "energy highway" ensuring a secure supply of electricity from Cypriot and Israeli gas reserves as well as from renewable energy sources. Construction is planned to begin this year, to be completed by the end of 2025 and to be commissioned in the first half of 2026.

          When British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was asked what was most likely to blow governments off course, he replied: “Events, dear boy, events”. The event that has rendered the thinking of only a couple of months back obsolescent is Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now all options aimed at radically reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy are back on the table. Turkey, which has never supported the EastMed project because of Greece’s involvement, is nevertheless keen on an LNG pipeline running through Turkey to Europe.

          On February 25 former energy minister Dr Yuval Steinitz, a prime mover of the EastMed project in 2017, tweeted that the government should now give top priority to the rapid promotion of its construction. Nor are pipelines the sole method of distributing LNG. Seaborne cargoes are creating a global market, similar to oil. In 2019, alongside pipeline flows from Norway, the UK and the EU imported almost 20 per cent of its gas through LNG shipments. Israeli LNG could also find its way to European and UK markets via giant tankers.

          One way or another, there is pressure for the LNG bonanza that unexpectedly came Israel’s way a decade or so ago to come to the aid of Europe in its hour of need.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 14 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-701174

Published in Eurasia Review, 19 March 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19032022-can-israel-help-europe-with-its-energy-needs-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 17 March 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/can-israel-help-europe-with-its-energy-needs/

Published in Jewish Business News, 18 March 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/03/18/israel-help-europe-with-its-eastmed-pipeline/

A royal record: Queen Elizabeth's Platinum Jubilee

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Report dated 21 March 2022

Silver is universally considered the appropriate precious metal to commemorate a 25th wedding anniversary, gold a 50th, diamonds a 60th. Comparatively few are the couples who survive to celebrate 70 years of married bliss – though, as we are all living longer, perhaps they are becoming more common.  The appropriate precious metal to honour such occasions is platinum.

It was in 1897 that Queen Victoria marked her 60 years on the British throne with her Diamond Jubilee, a splendid national event. “No-one ever, I believe,” she wrote, “has met with such an ovation as was given to me, passing through those six miles of streets. The crowds were quite indescribable and their enthusiasm truly marvellous and deeply touching.”

At the time no British monarch had ever reigned longer.  Victoria lived for another four years, but on 9 September 2015 Queen Elizabeth II beat Victoria’s record, and then went on to create one of her own. The 6th of February 2022 marked the 70th anniversary of the day the Queen acceded to the throne on the death of her father, King George VI.  As a result, the year 2022 has been designated Platinum Jubilee Year – and not only in the UK, but in the Commonwealth of which Elizabeth is Head.

What is the Commonwealth?  When Elizabeth came to the throne in 1952, the Commonwealth consisted of just eight nations, all of which had once been part of the British Empire.  Today it is a voluntary association of 54 independent sovereign states with a combined population of some 2.4 billion people, almost a third of the world’s inhabitants.  Queen Elizabeth is Head of the organization, and Commonwealth leaders have decided that, in due course, her son and heir, Prince Charles, will succeed her in that role.  What unites this diverse group of nations, beyond the ties of history, language and institutions, are strong trade links and the association’s 16 core values set out in the Commonwealth Charter. 

These “Commonwealth values” commit the organization to promoting world peace, democracy, individual liberty, environmental sustainability, equality in terms of race and gender, free trade, and the fight against poverty, ignorance, and disease.

It was in 1884 that Lord Roseberry, later a British prime minister, first dubbed the British Empire “a Commonwealth of nations”, and the term “British Commonwealth” remained uncontroversial until 1947, when India achieved independence.  Although the new state became a republic, the Indian government was very keen to remain in the Commonwealth – and the Commonwealth, unwilling to lose the jewel in its crown, found no difficulty in changing the rules of the club. Henceforth “British” was to be dropped from the title of the organization, and membership did not have to be based on allegiance to the British crown. Members were to be “free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.”

Since then, fully independent countries from all parts of the globe have flocked to join the Commonwealth.  At first all were required to have some historic connection to the old British Empire – until two nations, with absolutely no such ties, applied to join.  Once again the Commonwealth demonstrated flexibility and further amended the rules to allow first Mozambique, and a few years later Rwanda, to become members.  Applications and expressions of interest in joining the Commonwealth continue to arrive from a wide diversity of states.

          Over the 74 years of Israel’s existence no effort has been made, nor has a viable opportunity arisen, to develop any sort of collaboration with the Commonwealth. All the same, Israel’s bitter-sweet historic connection with Britain has always seemed to point towards a special relationship. In 1953, the year of Elizabeth’s coronation, some visionary British ex-pats in Israel established an organization that flourishes to this very day – the Israel, Britain and the Commonwealth Association (IBCA). The body’s second chairman was President Isaac Herzog’s father, Chaim.  IBCA has never lobbied for Israel to join the Commonwealth – the concept has seemed politically unrealistic – but the idea has certainly been mooted in the past.

In December 2006, for example, the Jewish Journal reported: “As a former British colony, Israel is being considered for Commonwealth membership. Commonwealth officials said this week they had set up a special committee to consider membership applications by several Middle Eastern and African nations…and that those interested in applying include Israel and the Palestinian Authority, both of which exist on land ruled by a British Mandate from 1918 to 1948. An Israeli official did not deny the report, but said, ‘This issue is not on our agenda right now.’”

Perhaps full Israeli membership never will be, but the idea of forging some sort of link between Israel and the Commonwealth family of nations is not an impossible one.  It could bring benefits all round. For example, businesses in Commonwealth countries enjoy trading advantages. It is approximately 19% cheaper to export from one member to another within the Commonwealth than it would be outside. 

The advantages for Israel of some sort of formal link to the Commonwealth, perhaps a type of associate membership, would lie in the political and trade benefits that it would enjoy, but the gains would be far from one-sided.  Israel is in a position to offer a very great deal to the Commonwealth as a whole, including its developing members, by way of its advanced technologies in a whole variety of areas from cyber security and hi-tech innovations to agriculture and water conservation.

With the Middle East as a whole now reaping the benefits of normalised relations between Israel and a number of Arab states – a situation deemed utopian, even impossible, only a few short years ago – some sort of Israel-Commonwealth relationship does not seem beyond the bounds of possibility.  It would certainly give the worldwide Jubilee celebrations an unexpected dimension.

Globally, the Platinum Jubilee is to be marked by the lighting of beacons.  The ceremony will start with the igniting of a beacon in Buckingham Palace in London.  This will be followed by the lighting of over 1,500 beacons across the UK and the world.  For the first time, beacons will be lit in each of the 54 capital cities of the Commonwealth.

As far as the UK is concerned, street parties are being planned across the nation, as well as public ceremonies such as Trooping the Colour, which marks the Queen's official birthday.  To allow for a true “knees-up” (English slang for a right royal celebration), a four-day public holiday is planned for the whole of Britain.  The major Platinum Jubilee celebrations will begin on Thursday, June 2, and will continue until June 5 – a truly long weekend. How people will feel when the normal working week resumes on Monday, June 6 is anybody’s guess.

Queen Elizabeth II is perhaps the most travelled person on the planet.  She has been everywhere, and she is known, recognized and respected around the world.  It seems right and proper that the world has decided to acknowledge, and to celebrate with her, this special year in the life of the 95-year-old monarch.

France opens the way for Islamic State

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2022

In what looks like a loss of will and abdication of responsibility, France’s President Macron announced on February 17 that French troops are being withdrawn from Mali, the former French colony.  Leading French newspaper Le Monde commented: “It is an inglorious outcome of an armed intervention that began in euphoria and which ends, nine years later, against a backdrop of crisis between Mali and France.”

   Macron’s justification is that relations with the military junta that took over Mali in 2020 have broken down: "We cannot remain militarily engaged alongside de facto authorities whose strategy and hidden aims we do not share."  The junta had gone back on an agreement to organize an election in February, and proposed holding power until 2025. 

Macron’s decision has profound implications not only for Mali but for the whole Sahel, the vast band of territory running coast to coast across Africa, just south of the Sahara, home to nearly 100 million people.  The zone encompasses areas in a range of countries – just how many is open to dispute – from Senegal and Mauritania in the west, to Sudan and Eritrea in the east.  Ever since the defeat of Islamic State (IS) and its caliphate in Syria, the Sahel has become a jihadist hotbed, where the fighters of extremist Islam have been assembling in ever-growing numbers, many under the black flag of IS.

For years three international forces have been trying to stem the advancing tide of Islamist extremism – one under French control, one under the UN, and the third drawn from the governments of the region.  Independently and collectively they have failed.  A total of 25,000 foreign troops are currently deployed in the Sahel region. They include about 4,300 French soldiers, the UN peacekeeping mission established in 2013, and an EU military training mission that aims to improve the Malian military’s capacity in fighting armed rebels.

The security crisis started in 2012, when an alliance of armed Islamist groups took over northern Mali.  France, the former colonial power, stepped in to stop their advance toward the capital, Bamako, which could have resulted in a total collapse of the Malian state.  For some time French troops were able to control the situation, but gradually armed jihadist groups began expanding their reach across the region. According to the UN, attacks in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have increased fivefold since 2016.

Many Islamist groups are involved, but the two main ones are the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM (Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin), and the IS-affiliated ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara).  Despite repeated French airstrikes, both have expanded their reach beyond their strongholds in northern Mali to unleash bloodshed across the region. Accounts of a succession of mass atrocities and ruthless massacres of civilians in Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania make for horrifying reading. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in its account of the violence in the Sahel in 2021, reports that the two main jihadist groups – JNIM and ISGS – also turn on each other, from time to time. 

          As France’s intervention in Mali began proving ineffective, the deteriorating situation prompted action in a variety of quarters.

          In July 2017, France, Germany and the EU announced the launch of the Sahel Alliance. They were joined by a swath of European nations, a number of international banks and the UN Development Program.

          In September 2019 leaders of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), in recognition of the terrorist attacks sustained by a number of West African countries, announced a billion-dollar plan to help in the fight against armed groups. The financial aid was expected to run between 2020 and 2024.

A France-Sahel summit in January 2021 ended with leaders agreeing to the creation of a new structure aimed at bringing the two parties' forces together under a single command.  The idea was to facilitate joint operations and improve intelligence-sharing.  In support, France announced in early February that it was expanding its 4,500-strong military presence in the region by an additional 600 troops.  There have been other initiatives designed to bring the Islamist-inspired terror in the Sahel under control.

All this has been imperiled by Macron’s withdrawal, especially since eight members of his Alliance have decided to follow his lead. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin has not refrained from using the chaotic situation in the Sahel to his advantage, especially since European nations are so heavily involved.  According to media reports, the rogue Mali government has been using the services of the hugely controversial Russian mercenary group Wagner to shore up its position.  As a result Putin has established a foothold in central Africa, and is a prime party in chasing Macron out of what was once clearly a French sphere of influence.  None of which augurs well for Franco-Russian relations, the future of Mali or the Sahel region as a whole.

Even though the remaining allies, weakened by France’s withdrawal, have undertaken to continue fighting terrorism in the Sahel region, including in the Gulf of Guinea, there is no doubt that Macron’s withdrawal is seen by the IS as a major victory.  The French president has opened the Sahel region to further infiltration by jihadist groups and possible conquest, as in Syria and Iraq, by Islamic State.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post on-line as "French troops are being withdrawn from Mali", 5 March 2022

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-700400

Published in Eurasia Review:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/25022022-france-opens-the-way-for-islamic-state-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:

https://mpc-journal.org/france-opens-the-way-for-islamic-state/

Published in Jewish Business News:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/02/25/france-opens-the-way-for-islamic-state/