On April 4, 2018 three national
presidents met in the Turkish capital of Ankara. Turkey’s president Recep
Tayyip Erdogan greeted his Russian and Iranian counterparts − Vladimir Putin
and Hassan Rouhani − to discuss a way forward in Syria. In the statement that
followed, the three leaders claimed to be working closely to bring about a
lasting peace in Syria.
“How ludicrous!” commented Mishary al-Zaidi in the Saudi Arabian journal Okaz, “As Russian warplanes indiscriminately bomb
civilian targets in Syria, leading to hundreds of deaths and thousands of
wounded, Moscow claims it is working for peace.”
He went on to point out that Iranian-backed
militias, fighting against what he termed “legitimate Syrian opposition forces”,
have taken over large areas of Syria and displaced millions of citizens from
their homes. He might have added a comment on Turkey’s invasion of northern
Syria in its effort to dislodge the Kurdish Peshmerga forces which played a
vital role in defeating Islamic State.
“It is clear to any outside
observer,” continued al-Zaidi, “that these countries lack any legitimacy to
speak about peace and security in Syria. In fact, they are part of the problem…”
Of course he is right. Here are three non-Arab countries presuming
to determine the future of a major Arab regional entity. Each is in Syria because it seized the
opportunity provided by a power vacuum to establish a politico-military
presence, and despite their apparent unity, each has its own priorities. Russia’s purpose is to consolidate its
strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean; Rouhani’s aim is to maintain
the Assad regime in power; Erdogan is intent on dismantling Kurdish PYD rule in
the north.
Al-Zaidi asserts that Russia, Iran and Turkey speak
only for their own interests, not those of the Syrian people whom they have
killed in their thousands and forced from their homes in millions. But the unhappy reality is that in
international affairs might is right, and to the victor go the spoils. There is, in short, a good chance that
Syria’s future will indeed be determined by the unsavory Russo-Turco-Iranian
triumvirate through what is known as the Astana process, rather than by the
official UN Geneva-based peace process headed by UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura.
There is little comfort in noting
that during the Ankara discussions Rouhani subscribed to the idea of drawing up
a new constitution for Syria. Iranian
involvement in shaping the structure of a post-war Syria inevitably raises the prospect
of Iran embedding itself into the body politic and consolidating its grip on
its “Shia crescent”. This danger was recognized by the US on April 14, when its ambassador to the UN,
Nikki Haley, said that deterring Iran’s entrenchment in Syria was one of
Trump’s top priorities, and would help determine how long the US maintained a
military presence there.
In their post-Ankara joint
statement, the three leaders set out five principles that they agreed should
underlie any future settlement, namely the “sovereignty, independence, unity,
territorial integrity and nonsectarian character” of Syria. This formula, it has been suggested,
represents a compromise among the three over the nature of a future Syrian
government. Russia may have given up its
proposed federalist concept, while Iran and Turkey may have agreed not to seek an
Alawi- or Sunni-dominated solution.
The Astana process might,
therefore, result in proposals for a power-sharing government rather along the
Iraqi lines. Assad’s own future,
however, is by no means settled. Putin
has been equivocal about it, while Erdogan
is a long-time opponent of Assad. If the
intention is to hand over any final Astana plan to the Geneva process, Assad’s
eventual fate undoubtedly hangs in the balance.
In Geneva, the combined Syrian opposition has an assured presence, and
they are adamant that Assad must play no part in Syria’s long-term future – the
main reason why the peace process has so far failed.
The last session, the eighth, held
in December 2017, collapsed because of pre-conditions set by the Syrian government
for holding direct talks with the opposition. According to de Mistura the Syrian government delegation
refused to discuss two agenda items – a constitutional process and presidential
elections. The Syrian government lead
negotiator, Bashar Ja’afari, said that a statement issued ahead of the talks by
the opposition delegation team demanded a political transition in which Assad
did not participate. He said he would not negotiate under blackmail.
Astana has not yet tackled the issue of Assad’s future, but rather than handing the presidency back to Assad, Putin has hinted at the possibility of a presidential election in which Assad might stand as one candidate among several. There would be a sort of precedent to fall back on. In late April 2014, Assad himself announced that he would run in Syria's first multi-candidate direct presidential election. Although the poll was boycotted by opposition parties, the election was held, and Assad is formally in the middle of a 7-year term which ends in 2021.
Astana has not yet tackled the issue of Assad’s future, but rather than handing the presidency back to Assad, Putin has hinted at the possibility of a presidential election in which Assad might stand as one candidate among several. There would be a sort of precedent to fall back on. In late April 2014, Assad himself announced that he would run in Syria's first multi-candidate direct presidential election. Although the poll was boycotted by opposition parties, the election was held, and Assad is formally in the middle of a 7-year term which ends in 2021.
Most western nations have asserted
that Assad’s early departure is an essential element in any plan for the future
of Syria – a position likely to be held even more firmly following the Syrian
government's chemical attack on Douma, and the subsequent western riposte. Reports from the US back in December indicated that the Trump administration
was prepared to accept Assad’s continued rule until Syria’s next scheduled presidential
election. If this remains the position,
Putin may simply decide to strong-arm both Assad and the rebel representatives
into agreeing to a presidential election in 2021, as part of a new
constitutional order. If the Geneva
process were handed this on a plate, it might be possible to incorporate it
into a UN-backed agreement.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 29 April 2018:
https://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Syrias-future-552789
Published in the MPC Journal, 30 April 2018:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2018/04/30/syrias-future/
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