Published in the Jerusalem Post, 31 March 2026
Putting to one side, just for the moment, President
Donald Trump’s talk of highly promising ceasefire negotiations involving an
unnamed senior Iranian leader, media outlets report that some 50,000 US troops
are already in the Middle East, with the Pentagon bringing in a
further 5,000 Marines, and some 2,000 paratroopers from the
82nd Airborne Division, some of whom have already sailed or are being
flown in. A
further surge of 10,000 ground troops is under consideration.
On March 19 the UK’s Daily Telegraph
quoted the leader of one of the main Kurdish armed groups, Babasheikh
Hosseini, saying that the
Iranian regime will not fall without a ground offensive which must involve
Kurdish forces.
“If we are not on this
battlefield,” he said, “the end of the regime will either not occur, or be
delayed by a lot.”
Hosseini is
the general secretary of the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, a long‑standing
Iranian Kurdish opposition party, based in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan. On
February 22 Khabat became one of five founding members of a new “Coalition of
Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan” (CPFIK).
A number of think tanks and commentators now adjudge the CPFIK a
significant new factor in the Iranian opposition. The coalition’s objectives include
overthrowing the Islamic Republic and creating a democratic Kurdish entity in
Iranian Kurdistan, on the lines of the Kurdistan Regional Government in
Iraq.
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In practice these twin aims are only
partly viable. The coalition can
certainly coordinate opposition and support protest, but its most ambitious
goals – toppling the Islamic Republic and securing Kurdish self-determination –
could be achieved only as part of some larger initiative, and with substantial
military support.
There is, of course, a long and
distinguished history of close military collaboration between the US and
Kurdish fighters. Together they defeated
ISIS both in Iraq and in Syria.
In Iraq, Peshmerga forces were key
in the 2017 defeat of ISIS. In Syria the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with its major Kurdish element, became the main
US-backed ground partner in 2015. The
territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria was announced in March 2019.
The CPFIK has unified five major
Kurdish parties after years of internal fragmentation. A firm and clearly defined Kurdish stance is
a strength in a situation where the various Iranian opposition entities are fragmented. Kurdish unity is an example of disciplined
coordination that other opposition elements could emulate.
As the price for their
cooperation, the Kurds require support for Kurdish autonomy within a
restructured Iran. Cooperation will be
fragile if opposition figures regard Kurdish demands as a separatist threat. It would be politic to accept them as part of
a post-regime settlement.
A major player on the scene is Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah, who has been living in exile since leaving Iran in 1979 in the wake of the Islamic Revolution.
Presenting himself as a figure
recognized and respected by the vast majority of the Iranian people, Pahlavi is
offering to lead the nation into a new, post-revolutionary future. He specifically does not seek a restoration
of the monarchy above any other form of constitutional democracy, but advocates
a referendum of the Iranian people through which they would select the form of constitution
they prefer.
As an instrument for regime
change, however, Pahlavi’s network is not by itself a realistic mechanism
for toppling the Islamic Republic. His strongest asset is symbolic: he is in
his very person a link to Iran’s past – and nostalgia for the pre-revolutionary
past has been a feature in the vast popular demonstrations in recent
years. Pahlavi could serve as a rallying point and a unifying force
holding disparate opposition forces together.
There is a snag. At the moment Pahlavi’s published roadmap and
public messaging do not accord with Kurdish aspirations. He promises equal individual rights and non‑discrimination
for Kurds and other minorities, but stops short of endorsing a federal “Iranian
Kurdistan” on the Iraqi model. In fact
he stresses territorial integrity over any ethnically defined region with self‑rule.
Moreover he has urged Kurds and other minorities not to use the present
conflict “to press for separation”. But Kurdish
alliance statements in 2026 explicitly reaffirm Kurdish rights and federal‑style
autonomy “within a unified Iran.” A
failure to reach some form of compromise could rule out a collaboration between
the Pahlavi organization and the CPFIK – and that means the formidable Kurdish
fighting force.
How much might that matter? Pahlavi has never received a positive
endorsement from US President Donald Trump.
The furthest Trump would go is to say that he would be fine with
Pahlavi if Iranians themselves accepted him, but on March 3 Trump is
reported as saying: “It seems to me that somebody from within maybe would be
more appropriate.” On March 22 he said the US had held talks with a “top
person” in Iran and had identified “major points of agreement”. On March 23 he told reporters that Washington
was in contact with the “right people” in Iran and that the US and Iran were
“in negotiations right now.”
Tehran has consistently denied that
talks were in progress.
America’s natural allies on the
Iranian scene are clearly the Kurds, and in particular the formidable Kurdish
Peshmerga fighting force. It had been
thought that Trump had more or less ruled out US boots on Iranian soil, but the
facts seem to point to a build-up of American forces in the region.
Meanwhile accounts have appeared
in the media of limited desertions and refusals to obey orders by both the Iranian
police and the regular army. These
reports, if accurate, could be taken as an indication that, given large-scale
anti-government demonstrations, a neutralized IRGC, or some form of
direct attack, defections to the popular cause from within both forces is
not out of the question.
A military defeat of the Iranian
regime backed by popular support is not, perhaps, entirely beyond the bounds of
possibility.
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