Lebanon – fantasy and reality

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2026

      The three-way US-Israel-Lebanon deal, agreed and signed on June 26, brings clarity to what has been ​the ​somewhat obscure situation ​produced by ​the US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), agreed on June 17.

            It ​has certainly seemed that, when it comes to Lebanon, US President Donald Trump and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu were pulling in somewhat different directions.

            The published text of the MoU states that the US, Iran “and their respective allies involved in the current conflict” declare an “immediate and lasting cessation of military actions across all fronts, including Lebanon.”  Opening a 60‑day window for negotiating a fuller agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the MoU declares a ceasefire, implicitly including Israel and Hezbollah in the truce.

But neither Israel nor Hezbollah had been involved in negotiating the agreement, which embodies the fantasy that the US and Iran ​completely control their “respective allies”.  They ​do not, and for the US to​ have assume​d ​it could take Israel for granted was presumptuous.  Although ​Israel could scarcely be considered bound by its terms, ​it has chosen to abide by the MoU, though not abdicating the right to defend itself against any breach of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.

For its part, Iran has been unable to restrain Hezbollah, which has ignored the MoU and mounted a whole series of armed assaults on the IDF.  There have been at least two major, lethal Hezbollah attacks since the MoU was signed, with five Israeli soldiers killed (four in a tank strike on June 18, and one in a drone strike on June 20), plus several additional non‑fatal attacks.  For example, a Hezbollah explosive‑drone attack in southern Lebanon on Saturday June 20 wounded 13 Israeli soldiers.

Despite earlier calls from the White House for Israel to observe the ceasefire, basic justice for the soldiers who lost their lives demanded a response. Israel characterizes these retaliatory actions as self‑defense against clear Hezbollah violations, essential to deterring further attacks.  On June 18, performing something of a volte-face compared with the recent past, Trump publicly warned Tehran that it is responsible for reining in Hezbollah, and must ensure the group fully respects the truce. 

Iran retaliated on June 20, declaring that Israel was breaching the agreement by attacking Hezbollah, and itself promptly proceeded to violate the MoU by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The Lebanon situation is full of anomalies.  In demanding that Israel cease its military activity in Lebanon, the US, the UN and Western nations, providing no background, declare they are protecting the country and its people from the effects of air strikes. But Hezbollah’s very raison d’être is to attack Israel in pursuit of its declared aim, and that of its Iranian sponsor, to annihilate the state and its people. This basic truth is too often ignored or ​discounted by Western politicians. 

​            The reality is more nuanced, for what is often ignored is that the Lebanese government has taken matters into its own hands and for many months ​has been in a deal of its own with Israel​, predicated on containing and eventually disarming Hezbollah.  The latest round of talks was held in Washington on June 23-26.  And the historic three-way agreement of June 27 is the result.

Joseph Aoun was elected Lebanon’s president on January 8, 2025.  His top priority was to restore national sovereignty – and that meant reining in the overmighty Hezbollah organization that had become “a state within a state”, and in particular disarming it.

        In August 2025 Aoun and his cabinet instructed the army to develop a plan to bring all weapons in the country under the control of state security forces, thereby ending Hezbollah’s autonomy.

One month later Lebanon’s army chief, Rodolphe Haykal, presented the cabinet with a multi‑phase plan to achieve just that.  The first phase aimed at disarming all Hezbollah personnel south of the Litani river.

The cabinet authorized the army to put the plan into operation. But it soon became clear that government forces lacked the military capacity to achieve the desired result.  Despite some success in dislodging Hezbollah from a few areas of southern Lebanon, it became clear that the plan was not viable. The state on its own could not bring Hezbollah to heel.  It needed help if it was to regain national sovereignty.

So from March 2026 Aoun began pushing the idea of face‑to‑face ceasefire talks with Israel, as part of a broader strategy that would ultimately bring Hezbollah’s weapons, and therefore Hezbollah itself, under state control.

The first 2026 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire deal was agreed on April​ 16.  It was extended by 45 days on May​ 15, following US-mediated talks in Washington, and then renewed and expanded again on June​ 3.  Under this arrangement, a conditional ceasefire was agreed, contingent on a complete halt to Hezbollah’s military strikes against Israel, the evacuation of Hezbollah forces from the South Litani sector, and the creation of “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese Armed Forces ​(LAF) would exercise exclusive control to the exclusion of non‑state actors.

By moving into key areas in southern Lebanon and clearing them of Hezbollah, Israel has laid the groundwork for implementing this agreement.  Under the new and historic deal, Israel has agreed to withdraw from two areas that will be taken over by the Lebanese army as pilot zones.  Now Israel and Lebanon are in effect acting hand-in-hand to degrade Hezbollah, and restore national sovereignty to the Lebanese state itself.  The US has agreed to improve the capabilities of the LAF and support its anti-Hezbollah operations.

           Aoun has to tread very carefully in implementing this policy.  Hezbollah commands considerable support among Lebanon’s Shi’ite community – roughly a third of the population – even if recent reports indicate a degree of disillusionment setting in.  Memories of the 1975-1990 civil war are still fresh, and Aoun is determined to avoid reigniting it. 

           He is also well aware that tens of thousands of the residents of northern Israel’s border are still displaced, and that Israel’s policy is to remove Hezbollah’s offensive capability – by military action if necessary – before a full return is possible.

            The Lebanese government is as anxious as Israel to see that day.