Kerry and the Arab-Israeli peace process

The new US Secretary of State, John Kerry, has tentatively dipped his toe into the murky waters of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and has already had it nipped rather badly − not once, but several times.

Barack Obama returned to the White House at the start of his second presidential term clearly determined to make headway in the struggle for an accommodation between Israel and the Arab world. His personal visit to the Middle East shortly after his return to office was an obvious signal of his intention to engage his administration in a new peace-making effort. Back in 2009, on his first time around, Obama had appointed a special Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, to carry forward his attempt to bring Israel and the Palestinians to an agreement. This time he by-passed Mitchell’s successor, David Hale, and − emphasising the importance of the task − has charged his newly-appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry, directly to head it.

An early success, initiated by Kerry three weeks before President Obama arrived in the region, was brought to an apparent triumphant conclusion a few minutes before the president boarded Air Force One for his flight back home. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, had been persuaded to offer his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as much by way of an apology as he could, diplomatically and politically, for Israeli operational failures during the Mavi Marmara affair. Meanwhile, Secretary Kerry had been conducting intensive negotiations with Turkey for some three weeks, aimed at ensuring that the apology, when tendered, would be accepted.

The apology by Netanyahu was made on the understanding that Turkey would abandon its intention of putting four senior Israeli officials on trial, in absentia, charged with war crimes, while Erdogan’s acceptance was made on the understanding that Israel would pay compensation to the families of the nine Turkish citizens who were killed during the skirmish. It seemed like a acceptable deal for both parties.

The apology was duly made, and apparently accepted, although with a good deal of triumphalist bragging on Erdogan’s part about this “victory” over Israel − an aspect of the affair diplomatically glossed over by John Kerry on his return to Turkey, his third visit to the Middle East in as many weeks. What Kerry cannot ignore, however, is the fact that the lawsuit being heard in absentia in an Istanbul court against four of Israel's most senior retired commanders, including the ex-army chief, has not been dropped and apparently will not be, according to Turkish participants, even if the terms for compensation are agreed. A first sharp lesson to Kerry of the realpolitik that rules in the Middle East − and little assurance that his bid to normalise Turco-Israeli relations will be successful, at least in the short term (“We would like to see the relationship get back on track in its full measure,” said Kerry after meeting with Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu) .

A second rebuff to Kerry followed swiftly, administered as a double-whammy by the Palestinian Authority (PA).

There had been reports that the Obama administration is once again − as at the start of Obama’s first term − pinning its hopes on the Arab Peace Plan of 2002 to provide some sort of template to kick-start the Israel-Palestinian peace process back into life. Israel has never agreed to the Arab League plan, though it has never formally rejected it. Putting it back on the table, it was surmised, was meant to galvanize Arab support and draw in Turkey.

The Arab Initiative offers Israel a comprehensive peace and a renunciation of further Arab land claims in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from land it captured in 1967. In all subsequent discussions between Israel and the PA it has been taken for granted by both sides that in any final agreement the 1967 boundaries would be modified by “agreed land swaps” to account for major Israeli settlements. In addition, the United States was reported to want more security commitments between Arab states and Israel.

In a first brush-off by the PA – which was not enamoured of the Obama-Netanyahu love-in during the US President’s visit to Israel − chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat told the Voice of Palestine radio station last week − “Kerry asked us to change a few words in the Arab Peace Initiative, but we refused.”

Subsequently, Kerry has denied that the US does, in fact, intend to base future negotiations on the old Arab initiative.

And then, before Kerry arrived back in the Middle East, he had asked the PA to refrain from any action that could harm efforts to restart talks on an eventual two-state solution − such as pursuing claims against Israel in the International Criminal Court. All the PA would offer was to do so for a period of eight weeks. “We are not canceling those efforts,” said an official, “but we are freezing them.”

Not the most promising of starts to Obama’s well-intentioned efforts to reactivate the peace process, especially given the other pressing problems in the region − Iran’s nuclear ambitions and what to do about them, the worsening situation in Syria, the knock-on effect of the flood of refugees into Jordan and Lebanon, and the effort to prevent Syria’s stockpile of weapons, both conventional and chemical, from falling into the hands of Iran, its terrorist protegés like Hezbollah, or any of the jihadist groups that hope to come out on top when Syria finally collapses. All of which, compared to 2009-2010, provides a very different backdrop to this current peace effort by Obama.

One western diplomat is reported as saying: "It's too early to be optimistic."

That’s putting it mildly.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 10 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/10042013-kerry-and-the-arab-israeli-peace-process-oped/

NATO and the Israel connection

Israel is, of course, fairly remote from any part of the north Atlantic, so it would be reasonable to wonder why it should have any sort of connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). But then NATO has itself travelled a fair distance since 1949 when, after much discussion and debate, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by ten western European nations plus the United States and Canada, with the aim of deterring Soviet aggression at the very start of the Cold War.

The kaleidoscope of political change in the past 65 years has radically altered NATO’s nature and scope. Two landmarks define these changes: the end of the Cold War, which rendered NATO’s defensive strategy against the Soviet Union obsolete, and the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US in 2001, which redefined the enemy and the nature of the battle and which, incidentally, shifted the focus of NATO’s attention from Europe to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and beyond − which is where Israel enters the picture.

NATO, which has on seven occasions added new members and now comprises 28 nations, has also broadened its operations to encompass both a “Partnership for Peace” programme with states of the former USSR, and also a number of “dialogue programs”. Among these is the Mediterranean Dialogue, set up in 1994 and intended to link Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in security discussions.

Of course, this group of countries lacks any culture of cooperation in security matters, so the programme as such is pretty much a dead letter. Except that out of it, Israel alone has forged extremely close links with NATO. For example, recently Israel became the first country to conclude an individual cooperation programme. Through this it conducts an ongoing strategic dialogue with NATO covering, among other items, terrorism, intelligence sharing, nuclear proliferation, procurement and rescue operations. Israel is also a partner in NATO’s naval control system in the Mediterranean. By joining NATO forces in patrolling the Mediterranean. Israel contributes on a regular basis to Operation Active Endeavor, which was established after 9/11 and designed to prevent the movement of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction.

Given the close relationship that has developed between Israel and NATO, should Israel apply, or be invited, to join as a full member? The question has been raised on more than one occasion, and Avigdor Liberman, while he was Israel’s foreign minister, was convinced that joining NATO would act as a vital deterrent against Iran. But would membership be in Israel’s best interests? Israel’s defence doctrine has been always based on self-reliance and freedom of manoeuvre in security matters. Israel’s unwritten alliance with the United States is, perhaps, a more convenient alternative.

In any event, NATO’s “all for one, one for all” doctrine has acted against any attempt to pull Israel into full integration with the alliance. Other members − especially Turkey − have consistently blocked any such attempts, either on ideological grounds or because Article 5 of the NATO charter would oblige its members to fight for Israel if it were attacked by any of its many potential enemies.

All the same, despite the deterioration in Israel’s international standing in recent years, NATO and Israel have been strengthening their cooperation by leaps and bounds. For example, Israel has recently received approval to participate in NATO activities in 2013 that had been held up amid tensions with Turkey. The approval coincided with NATO agreeing Turkey’s request for Patriot missile batteries to be deployed along its border with Syria. It looks suspiciously as though NATO used this opportunity to induce Ankara to thaw its relations with Israel.

And now it seems as though the ties that bind NATO and Israel are to be strengthened even further. On 7 March 2013 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Israel’s president Shimon Peres met at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss enhanced military cooperation focused on counter-terrorism − enhanced, that is, well beyond the so-called “Mediterranean Dialogue”.

Peres offered to assist NATO in counter-terrorism operations directed not only against Hezbollah and Iran, but against terrorism generally in the Middle East, stressing Israel’s ability to provide technological assistance based on the vast experience Israel had gained in the field of counter-terrorism.

“Israel will be happy to share the knowledge it has gained and its technological abilities with NATO,” Peres told Rasmussen. “Israel has experience in contending with complex situations, and we must strengthen the cooperation so we can fight global terror together and assist NATO with the complex threats it faces including in Afghanistan.”

Their joint statement points to an Israel-NATO partnership “in the fight against terror and the search for peace in the Middle East and the world. Israel and NATO are partners in the fight against terror.”

What this undoubtedly suggests is the participation of Israel in active theatre warfare alongside NATO. In other words, in all but name Israel looks set to become a de facto member of the Atlantic Alliance − a win-win situation both for NATO and for Israel.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 7 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/07042013-nato-and-the-israel-connection-oped/

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line edition, 5 June 2013
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/NATO-and-the-Israel-connection-315515

How Turkey accepts an apology

The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has managed to convince himself – and is doing his best to convince the entire Turkish population − that he has won a great psychological victory over Israel.

As a parting shot in his recent tour of the Middle East, President Obama persuaded his host, Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to issue an apology for failures that occurred in the course of the Israeli military operation during the Mavi Marmara affair in May 2010, when nine Turkish citizens were killed in an attempt to run the blockade of Gaza. The careful wording was as far, politically and diplomatically, as Netanyahu was prepared to go. He made his phone call to Erdogan from the airstrip, while Obama waited to board Air Force One for his return flight to the US.

It is obvious that the President must also have exerted no little pressure on the Turkish prime minister to accept whatever it was Netanyahu was able to say by way of apology, and in addition to withdraw his threat of putting four Israeli military officials on trial in Ankara in absentia, provided Israel financially compensated the families of those who were killed.

They say that the darkest hour is just before the dawn. Perhaps the darkest hour in Turkish-Israeli relations was Erdogan’s outburst in late-February declaring Zionism to be a “crime against humanity”, on a par with fascism. Admittedly, on seeing the general outrage that his remarks had caused, he hastened to soften their impact, but as Alon Liel observed in the Jerusalem Report, speaking for many observers at the time: “Erdogan crossed a red line no Israeli government can ignore. With this slander he has destroyed any hope of an Israeli apology.”

Lo and behold, in the very week that Liel’s prediction appeared in print, the apology was made and – it is presumed – accepted. The acceptance has to be presumed, because instead of any gracious acknowledgement of Netanyahu’s gesture, instead of extending a “thank you” or indicating pleasure in the fact that Netanyahu had made a considerable personal and diplomatic effort to heal relations between Israel and Turkey, Erdogan reacted by trumpeting the apology as a humiliation for Israel and a triumph for himself. Billboards in Ankara read: “Dear prime minister, we are grateful that you let our country experience this pride.”

No-one begrudges the Turkish people feeling pride, but one must ask: ‘pride in what?’ There is no cause for pride in having one’s arm twisted. It was Obama − working through his Secretary of State, John Kelly − who had masterminded three weeks of covert negotiation with the Turkish prime minister and his colleagues, to ensure that the apology, when issued by Netanyahu, was accepted, and that, as a quid pro quo for Israel paying compensation to the families of the Turkish citizens killed in the Mavi Marmara incident, Erdogan agreed to drop charges he had intended bringing against four Israeli officials involved in planning and executing the operation. In short, it is difficult to perceive any Turkish victory over Israel since it was not Erdogan who persuaded Netanyahu to act, but Obama.

The triumphalist posturing adopted by Erdogan since the apology does not augur well for future Turco-Israeli relations. It would have been easy for Erdogan to accept the apology graciously, to grasp the hand of friendship extended to him, to have declared that the episode marked a new beginning in relations between the two countries. The way Erdogan did react makes it seem highly unlikely that his rabid anti-Israel rhetoric will be much modified in the future. He is engaged in a power play – a bid to trump both Iran and Egypt, still racked by its Arab Spring revolution − to achieve regional hegemony, if not leadership of the Muslim world. Erdogan dare not be seen to draw too close to the perennial enemy, even if he wished to – doubtful in itself.

However, a more covert Turco-Israeli rapprochement might develop – growth, perhaps, in sales to Turkey of Israeli defense equipment; possibly exports of gas to or via Turkey from the vast reserves off Israel’s coast just starting to be exploited; maybe restoration of old trade and tourism links. However, even optimistic observers agree that nothing will happen quickly. The re-establishment of confidence and of contacts will take time and patience. Recent reports indicate that negotiating teams charged with restoring ties between Turkey and Israel are to due to begin meeting this week. The Turkish team will be led by Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Feridun Sinirlioglu, former Ambassador to Israel; the Israeli team by Joseph Ciechanover.

Meanwhile on 12 April an Israeli delegation will travel to Ankara to begin discussions on the extent of the financial compensation to be paid by Israel to the families of the Turkish citizens killed on board the Mavi Marmara. There is certainly a gap to be bridged here, if reports are to be believed. Turkey is said to be demanding that Israel pay $1 million per family of each activist killed, while Israel is currently offering each family $100,000 by way of compensation. Negotiations seem likely to be extensive.

Whether Netanyahu should have offered his apology in the first place, whether Erdogan should have responded to it as he did − these matters are now water under the bridge. The fact is that, even if extracted from both sides by American pressure, this unexpected political development is a fait accompli. What is needed now is for both Turkey and Israel to exploit it, taking account of their own interests. Do either have the will, desire or inclination to do so? Time will tell.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 2 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02042013-how-turkey-accepts-an-apology-oped/

Where is Iran going?

What are the long-term ambitions of the Iranian regime?

The answer to that conundrum, if indeed it has been fully formulated, is a secret restricted to Ayatollah Khamenei (the “Supreme Leader”), and the tight group of oligarchs of which he is head. As long as they are able to retain complete dominance over the instruments of the state, their grip on the reins of power is well-nigh absolute. That dominance is not, however, without threat.

One predominant aim within the Iranian oligarchy must be to preserve in their own hands the vast access to wealth and power that they have managed to accumulate through a network of foundations, charities and other bodies − essentially business organisations with extensive national and international connections. These are estimated to control some 70 per cent of the national economy outside agriculture and the state-owned industries.

Amir Taheri, a veteran Iranian writer, estimates that in the past 10 years some 200 state-owned enterprises have been “privatized”, in other words transferred to a small group of politicians and mullahs close to the Supreme Leader. Senior Khomeinists, including Khamenei himself, are among major shareholders of over 100 companies. In addition, the oligarchy has divided Iran's foreign trade among its members − for example, trade with much of Asia, China and Japan, is reserved for the Rafsanjani-Bahremani clan.

Perhaps the greatest internal threat to dictatorial regimes in the modern world − as the Arab Spring has vividly demonstrated − is the internet. It is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has denounced the internet as sinful and a means for the West to wage "soft war". Accustomed to censors blocking Facebook, email and foreign news sites, Iranians recently learned that the régime has ambitious plans to block access to foreign-based social media sites and email altogether, and to substitute Iranian versions. The first phase of this “Halal Internet”, as it has been termed, has already being introduced into government departments and the universities. The aim appears to be to isolate Iran altogether from the world wide web, partly perhaps to avoid another Stuxnet-type cyber attack like the one carried out on its nuclear facilities in 2010. Something similar is being attempted in Saudi Arabia. There is, though, some doubt whether either country has the necessary infrastructure to cut off users' access to the internet entirely.

The religious ambitions of Iran’s oligarchy seem to centre on precipitating the introduction of extreme Islamism across both the Muslim, and as much of the non-Muslim, world as possible − for example in Latin America, where considerable inroads have been made via Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador. According to Amir Taheri, under the 1979 Khomeinist Constitution the Supreme Leader represents Allah's sovereignty on earth, is the leader of all Muslims throughout the world, whether they like it or not. and has unlimited powers to decide what Islam is and is not at any given time. Considering that the Iranian religious oligarchy are firm followers of the Shi’ite tradition, this is not a proposition that the vast Sunni Muslim world has ever accepted, or is likely to. Nevertheless, the Iranian oligarchy sees itself as the embodiment of a messianic revolution, opposed root and branch to state structures that require to be cleansed of "corrupt" rulers and Western democratic constitutions.

As the mass of Wikileaks documents released into the public domain in 2010 revealed, many Arab leaders – especially, perhaps, in the Gulf states − view Iran’s bid for leadership of the Muslim world, to say nothing of its covert operations to achieve that aim, with alarm. Their deep-seated fear of a nuclear-armed Iran stems from these activities.

Iran’s bid for regional hegemony has been sustained by the military and financial support it has lavished on Shi’ite organisations like Hezbollah and the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, but also by nurturing the extreme Islamist – albeit Sunni-based − Hamas organisation in the Gaza strip.

Do Iran’s ambitions – which doubtless extend to developing a military nuclear capability as soon as possible − also encompass the physical destruction of Israel? Both the Supreme Leader and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have on numerous occasions declared their desire to see Israel removed from the map of the Middle East. It would not take more than three or four atomic bombs to wipe out Israel’s infrastructure and most of its citizens. Tempted though Iran’s leaders might be − once they possessed the requisite nuclear capability − could the régime contemplate with equanimity the possible response by Israel or the USA to a nuclear strike on Israel?

The balance of probability is that Iran, from mere self-interest, would probably desist from a direct nuclear-based assault on Israel, unless it was part of a concerted action. Iran’s lack of allies in the region render this an unlikely proposition. The old “Shia Crescent” concept – the crescent-shaped area in the Middle East where the majority of the population is Shi’ite − is a busted flush, as far as an active military campaign against Israel is concerned. Two of the major members, in addition to Iran, were Iraq and Syria. Neither are now capable of joining such an alliance; Azerbaijan and Bahrain would not wish to; Hezbollah, although a major player in Lebanon, does not control the government.

A nuclear capability in Iran’s hands, does, however, open up the prospect of much heightened terrorist activity, fostered and supplied by Iran, both within Israel and in the wider world. Which explains the near-universal approval for the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on the Iranian regime for failing to comply with its nuclear obligations.

From the point of view of the West, Iran exemplifies the “rogue state” – a regime intent on advancing its own malign interests and undermining or destroying states which stand in its way, regardless of almost all considerations. The will to control its overweening ambitions, backed by a convincing display of force, is long overdue.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 March 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30032013-where-is-iran-going-oped/

The Commonwealth, Israel and Palestine

On 11 March 2013 Queen Elizabeth formally signed the “Commonwealth Charter” - a document setting out for the first time 16 core values shared by the peoples of the Commonwealth and their governments.

The Commonwealth is an aspect of contemporary life that most people know little about. Perhaps the Commonwealth games, interspersed every four years between the Olympics, might occasionally raise a flicker of interest, but as for the background or purposes of the organization itself, there is little general knowledge or interest. And yet the Commonwealth has the potential to exert an enormous power for good on global politics. Judging by the charter just signed by Queen Elizabeth as its head, and endorsed by the 54 governments who are members, the organization also has the collective will to do so. What it has so far failed to demonstrate, and may still lack, is the drive to provide positive leadership on the world stage in favour of the core values it professes.

The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 nations most of whom, but not all, were once part of the British Empire. All of them, however, regardless of their individual constitutions, agree to recognize the current British monarch as head of the association. The members have a combined population of 2.1 billion people, almost a third of the world’s population. What unites this diverse group of nations, beyond the ties of history, language and institutions, are the association’s values of democracy, freedom, peace and the rule of law.

Essentially, these are the basis of the 16 core values now enshrined in the charter. They include a commitment by Commonwealth leaders to uphold democracy and human rights (“we are implacably opposed to all forms of discrimination”); to advance international peace and security (”we reiterate our absolute condemnation of all acts of terrorism in whatever form or wherever they occur or by whomsoever perpetrated”); to promote tolerance and respect, freedom of expression, the rule of law, good governance, to protect the environment, provide access to health, education and food for all, promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, and recognise the positive role of young people in promoting these and other values.

The Commonwealth is not a political union, but an intergovernmental organization in which countries with diverse social, political and economic backgrounds are regarded as equal in status. Alongside shared values, Commonwealth nations share strong trade links; trade with another Commonwealth member has been shown to be up to 50 per cent more than with a non-member.

Five countries are currently seeking membership of the Commonwealth. Neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority (PA) are among them – though, as part of former British mandated Palestine, both would have a stronger claim than, say, Mozambique or Rwanda, which are members, or Algeria which has applied to join.

Could a stated intention to apply for membership of the Commonwealth by both Israel and a sovereign Palestine be a positive factor in the process of negotiating a solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute?

One organization that would probably support the idea – way off the map though it might appear at the moment − would be the Israel Britain and the Commonwealth Association (IBCA), a body formed as far back as 1953 with the aim of encouraging, developing and extending social, cultural and economic relations between Israel and the Commonwealth. Over the years the IBCA has developed close links with the British and Commonwealth embassies. Regular meetings, addressed by prominent politicians, diplomats and academics and attended by many members of the diplomatic corps, have fostered a continuing dialogue between representatives of Israel and the nations of the Commonwealth.

And indeed Israel may quite recently have come close to applying to join the Commonwealth. It was only in 2007 that the Jewish Journal reported:

“As a former British colony, Israel is being considered for Commonwealth membership. Commonwealth officials said this week they had set up a special committee to consider membership applications by several Middle Eastern and African nations. Speaking on condition of anonymity, diplomats said those interested in applying include Israel and the Palestinian Authority, both of which exist on land ruled by a British Mandate from 1918 to 1948. An Israeli official did not deny the report, but said, ‘This issue is not on our agenda right now.’”

Perhaps right now it should be. With renewal of the peace process looming – fostered, perhaps, by President Obama’s forthcoming visit to the region and a new Israeli government about to take office with peace on the agenda − some new idea is needed to burnish the old, old arguments. Whatever Israel’s traditional enemies might assert, there is no doubt that Israel’s core values precisely match those of the Commonwealth. The Palestinian Authority could make a reasonable case for aspiring to most of them – though the same could not be said of Hamas, the de facto government of Gaza, an essential element in any future sovereign Palestine. However, it is the PA, as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” that is the acknowledged negotiating partner – and what within the Palestinian body politic might follow any peace agreement is anybody’s guess.

The offer of future membership of the Commonwealth to both Israel and a new sovereign Palestine would provide a new element in any peace negotiations – a previously unconsidered framework within which the two states might flourish, for it would incorporate acceptance of the peace agreement by a swathe of nations from every continent, the assurance of new markets and flourishing trade relations for both parties, and membership of an association dedicated to democracy, freedom and peaceful co-existence.

It’s a thought.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 17 March 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/The-Commonwealth-Israel-and-Palestine

What's wrong with the Human Rights Council?

See revised article "What's wrong with the Human Rights Council" posted on 11 August 2013.

Lebanon in crisis

Damascus is half-an-hour’s drive from the Lebanese border, and refugees from the civil war currently raging in Syria are flooding over that border in ever-increasing numbers. An authoritative estimate is that asylum-seekers from Syria have reached 400,000 – which, if true, would represent a 10 per cent increase in Lebanon’s population of 4 million. If this influx of homeless people into a small, and not particularly prosperous, country continues on this scale, it will speedily turn a humanitarian crisis into a disaster.

The number of refugees involved is, moreover, only one aspect of the problem for Lebanon. Just as important is the sectarian allegiance of the majority of those pouring into the country. For they are mainly Sunni Muslims fleeing from President Bashar Assad and his ruthless Shi’ite-affiliated régime, supported as it is by Iran and its protégé, the Islamist terrorist organization Hezbollah. But Hezbollah has managed to infiltrate itself into Lebanon’s body politic, and is an integral element in the government. So the Sunni refugees are perforce flying into the arms of a country where a government minister is a member of Hezbollah, and the terrorist organization controls eleven of the thirty seats in the cabinet. In the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the Lebanese government has done little for their hapless visitors, who have largely been left to fend for themselves.

The civil war in Syria − which to a large extent involves a Sunni-backed attempt to oust the Shi’ite-affiliated Assad régime − is a deeply divisive issue in Lebanon, and its sectarian issues are inhibiting the government from taking decisive action to relieve the humanitarian crisis on its doorstep. Lebanon’s political constitution is a complex mechanism, aimed at achieving a delicate balance of power between Christians, Sunnis and Sh’ites. By design the composition of the government, together with that of many public institutions, is shared between these three elements.

Which explains Lebanon’s reluctance to unbalance the country’s fragile stability, and also why reporter Anne Barnard, writing in the New York Times, notes that Lebanon’s refugee crisis does not match the familiar image of vast, centralized tent camps and armies of foreign aid organizations. The crisis, she says, “is nowhere, and everywhere. Displaced Syrians seem to fill every nook and cranny: half-finished cinder block houses, stables, crowded apartments… Drying laundry peeks from construction sites. Bedsheets hang in shop windows, concealing stark living spaces. Daffodil sellers, shoeshine men, women and children begging in Beirut − all incant, “Min Suria.” From Syria.”

One other factor may be deterring the Lebanese authorities from acting more positively. The nation has been overwhelmed by at least two previous refugee crises − in 1948 and again in 1967, when Palestinians poured over the border during two of Israel’s conflicts with Arab forces that had combined against it. The consequences are ever-present. Because the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) has bestowed the status of “refugee” on all the descendants of those who originally fled their homes, generation after generation, regardless of how much time has elapsed, the number of so-called Palestinian “refugees” has mushroomed. As regards Lebanon, over 400,000 Palestine refugees, as defined by UNWRA, live in the country, half of them in 12 official refugees camps. But the Lebanese, only too aware of the delicate system of checks and balances that keeps their state afloat, have consistently denied them the right to settle and adopt Lebanese citizenship. A sudden influx of Muslims into the body politic would totally unbalance the constitutional basis of the state.

Locked into the collective national memory, also, is what can happen when refugee issues remain unresolved and passions become inflamed. The Lebanese remember the shameful episode in 1976, when Christian Phalangist militias overran and destroyed three Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut (Tel-El-Zaater, Jisr-El-Basha and Dbayeh). Tel-El-Zaater was besieged for 51 days and, when it surrendered, an estimated 3,000 of its inhabitants were massacred.

So, in an attempt to preserve the national status quo and avoid providing citizenship to some 400,000 foreigners, the Lebanese government has consistently deprived Palestinian refugees of basic rights – for example, the government bars most of them from 73 job categories including professions such as medicine, law and engineering. They are not allowed to own property, and those in refugee camps need a special permit to travel. Unlike other foreigners in Lebanon, Palestinian refugees are denied access to the Lebanese health care system. A 2007 study by Amnesty International denounced the "appalling social and economic condition" of Palestinian Arabs in Lebanon.

With all this as the background, it is scarcely surprising that a further 400,000 Syrian Sunni Muslims flooding into the country are not being welcomed with open arms by the Lebanese authorities in general, and Hezbollah-affiliated officials in particular. Until quite recently no camps had been provided for Syrians, and international agencies had been given only limited access.

Lebanon has, however, recently made a move to ease its hard line on the issue. With no end to the problem in sight, and the Assad government hanging on to power, the Lebanese government recently approved plans to co-operate with the United Nations in managing the crisis. The UN now awaits funds and permission to build two transit camps, each housing 5,000 refugees − a drop in the ocean, perhaps but, to change metaphors, also a move in the right direction.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 10 March 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=305894&prmusr=N5GESLlNDaJz0zr2BbXKlUwApVwEOkO69Md5K00yiWOpkbFTQUAlNxEYIUVQNh5D

Hezbollah and the EU

On 18 July 2012 forty-two Israeli tourists, having landed at Burgas airport in Bulgaria on a flight from Tel-Aviv, boarded a bus to their hotel. A suicide bomber among the passengers detonated an explosive device that also killed the bus driver and five Israelis, and injured a further thirty-two. On 5 February 2013, after an exhaustive investigation, the Bulgarian interior minister said that it was a reasonable assumption that two suspects, who lived in Lebanon, were members of the militant wing of Hezbollah. Forensic evidence and intelligence sources also pointed to Hezbollah's involvement in the blast.

On 18 February 2013 Bulgarian foreign minister, Nikolai Mladenov, was in Brussels briefing his EU counterparts on the seven-month investigation and its conclusions. In a news conference Mladenov said: “We believe the attack that happened in Burgas last year was organised by people connected to the military wing of Hezbollah…We in Europe need to take collective measures to make sure that such attacks will never happen again on EU soil... We must send a strong message to the rest of the world, that activities like this are unacceptable, no matter where they are planned or executed.”

The EU seems reluctant to respond. Far from sending a strong message to the world, the EU’s foreign policy chief − British peeress Baroness Ashton − has resorted to dithering and equivocation. Meanwhile Hezbollah – indicted by a UN tribunal for the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, the repository of vast stocks of weaponry supplied by Iran, the active supporter of Bashar Assad’s régime in Syria, designated a “terrorist organisation” by Canada, the UK, the US and even Turkey − as far as the EU is concerned remains persona grata.

The fact is that Hezbollah has a 30-year history of terrorist activity in Lebanon, the Middle East and around the globe, directed against the United States and the West, against pro-Western Arab states, Hezbollah's enemies in Lebanon − and, of course, Israel and the Jewish people generally, usually at the behest of Iran, which uses Hezbollah as its main proxy.

For example. there was the attempted attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2008, carried out by two Hezbollah operatives who underwent training in Iran. The plan was exposed when Azeri security forces stopped a car carrying the two Hezbollah operatives and found guns, explosives and pictures of the Israeli embassy. The two were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Then there was the unsuccessful attempt in 2011 to assassinate the Israeli consul in Istanbul which injured eight Turkish citizens. According to Sky News Iran’s Quds Force Unit 400 was behind the attack.

And now a man is on trial in Cyprus suspected of helping plan a terrorist attack against Israeli tourists on the island. On Wednesday 20 February he admitted in court to being an active member of Hezbollah since 2007, trained to use weapons and having acted as a courier for the organisation in Turkey, France and the Netherlands. In court Hossam Taleb Yaacoub gave details of meetings with his Hezbollah handler, and said that he had staked out locations in Cyprus known to be popular with Israeli tourists. He had also noted the number plates of tour buses carrying Israelis.

Whether this new turn of the screw will be sufficient to induce the EU finally to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organisation is open to speculation. The suspicion is that what is holding the EU back is the fact that Hezbollah has managed to insinuate itself into the heart of the Lebanese body politic.

Lebanon's history is, perhaps, more convoluted than many another state's – and this is not the place to rehearse it in detail. Sufficient to note that, liberated by Free French and British troops in 1941, Lebanon was declared an independent sovereign nation, and France handed over power to the first Lebanese government as from 1 January 1944.

The "National Pact" established the basis of modern Lebanon. Political power in Lebanon is allocated on what is known as a "confessional" system, with seats in the parliament allocated 50-50 as between Muslims and Christians. The top three positions in the state are allocated so that the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament, a Shi'a Muslim.

This partly explains the presence of Hezbollah in the Lebanese government. Hezbollah, an extremist Islamist group, originated within the majority Shiite block of Lebanon society. It emerged with a separate identity in the early part of the 1980s as an Iranian-sponsored movement resisting the presence of Western and Israeli forces. Perhaps its most notorious terrorist actions were those of 23 October 1983 when the United States Marine barracks in Beirut was blown up in a suicide bombing. Just six months previously, on 18 April, the US embassy in Beirut had been subject to a suicide car bombing which killed 63 people.

Born in blood, fire and explosion, Hezbollah can scarcely be said to have become respectable, but the group achieved a certain acceptability in Lebanese society following Israel's withdrawal in May 2000. In the election that followed Hezbollah formed an electoral alliance with the Amal party and took all 23 seats in South Lebanon, out of a total 128 parliamentary seats.

Since then Hezbollah has participated in Lebanon's parliamentary process. Following the elections in April 2009 Hariri constructed a 30-minister cabinet made up of five ministers nominated by President Suleiman, 15 from Hariri's coalition, and 10 from the opposition including two members of Hezbollah. It is this semi-respectable position achieved by Hezbollah − doubtless augmented by the emphasis placed by the organisation on social and welfare activities among the population − which is deterring the EU from acknowledging that at its heart Hezbollah is a ruthless, merciless, terrorist organisation dedicated to achieving its Islamist aims without regard to moral considerations of any sort.

Perhaps eventually the penny will drop.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 26 February 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=304615&prmusr=CFWiaSoT%2bBetju%2f7Zhb29xw48i9QBbxAPbWglsBs4HZMXjyL6g0O6PQaOaQ3LKtb

Barack and Bibi, older and wiser

Benjamin Netanyahu has been remarkably unfortunate. On the three occasions that events have propelled him to the premiership in Israel, he has had a Democratic president in the White House to deal with - and let's be honest about it, Bibi is a born Republican.

Back in the 1990s Netanyahu's relationship with Bill Clinton was a disaster. The two men never got on. After meeting him for the first time, Clinton is reported as remarking: "He thinks he is the superpower, and we are here to do whatever he requires." One of Clinton's aides categorised Netanyahu's performance in the White House as "nearly insufferable". And later, in 2000, Netanyahu was vehemently opposed to Clinton's Camp David peace initiative during which the then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, and Yasser Arafat, appeared to come close to an agreement that would have given a sovereign Palestinian state by far the greater part of the West Bank, and also east Jerusalem as a capital.

Following Barack Obama’s spectacular appearance in the White House as America’s first black president, Netanyahu again found himself prime minister of Israel. But he was heading a fragile coalition, held together through the support of right wing religious parties unyielding in their support for the settler movement and the indivisibility of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, under pressure from Obama, Bibi succeeded in persuading his Cabinet to agree to his formally supporting the two-state solution and, in November 2009, to vote in favour of a ten-month freeze on construction in the West Bank.

If anyone had hoped that Netanyahu had learned a little more by way of diplomatic niceties in the intervening decade-and-a-half, however, there was little sign of it. When he and Barack Obama met in person in March 2010, there was certainly no meeting of minds. Hours of discussion between the two failed to result in an agreed media statement, and Netanyahu postponed his return to Israel by an extra day in the hope of achieving some form of common position. He and the President spoke long and earnestly; Israeli officials had discussions with their opposite numbers, but a common position on building in east Jerusalem could not be hammered out.

Now history seems to have offered the two men a second chance. President Obama is back in the White House just starting his second term, while Netanyahu is in the process of hammering out a new coalition government following the recent general election. Nothing is certain in politics, but it seems a pretty fair bet that he will indeed soon be heading a new Israeli government. Obama’s visit has been mooted as taking place on March 20; Bibi has until March 16 to construct his coalition and present it to the Knesset for a vote of confidence.

Assuming the meeting takes place, both men will indeed be older. Will they be wiser?

Take Netanyahu. The recent general election will have shown him that Israel’s heart is not in extreme right-wing policies, either domestically or in the foreign arena. The surprise element in the result – the emergence of the moderate Yesh Atid party with the second largest number of seats in the new Knesset − is a clear signal that the Israeli public would not dissent from re-opening peace negotiations with the PA. The “painful concessions” that might have to be made in any overall agreement – not possible in Netanyahu’s previous coalition with its heavy dependence on right wing and religious parties − now again emerge as possible shots in Israel’s armoury. Curiously, Netanyahu will come to his discussion with Obama, at least about the Israeli-Palestinian issue, strengthened, not weakened, by the loss of Likud-Beytanu seats.

And President Obama, what has he learned over the past four years? Well, his initial “let’s try it” approach at wooing the Muslim world – worth a try, perhaps, coming from the first US President with a Black Power background − proved a disastrous failure. Iran could not be deflected from its determination to develop nuclear weaponry, Syria dissolved into civil war well before a US ambassador could present himself at the court of President Assad, and poor Mahmoud Abbas was hedged into a corner by the Obama administration’s early and repeated demands on Israel to stop all settlement construction in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Once that demand had been made by the US President, there was no wriggle-room left for the PA President. He could scarcely ask for less. As a result, the “peace process” has been frozen solid for more than two years.

One other lesson perhaps learned since the glory days following Obama’s first election, is that the great central issue worrying the leaders of the Arab world – those, that is, not more directly concerned with the spill-over of the Arab Spring into their territories − is not the Israel-Palestine dispute. It is, as the mass of Wikileaks documents released into the public domain in 2010 revealed, their deep-seated fear of a nuclear-armed Iran. Many Arab leaders – especially, perhaps, in the Gulf states − view Iran’s bid for leadership of the Muslim world, to say nothing of its covert operations to achieve that aim, with alarm.

Older and wiser as they both now are, is there a chance that more mature and considered counsels will prevail when, and if, Barack and Bibi do meet next month? We need a meeting of hearts and of minds. Co-ordination both of intention and execution could achieve positive results in the two main areas they have to discuss: when and how to call a genuine halt to Iran’s aggressive nuclear capabilities, and when and how to start a genuine process leading to a final settlement of the festering Israel-Palestine dispute.

Have the Oslo Accords had their day?

If anyone believed that support for Palestinian national aspirations was ipso facto incompatible with maintaining close and friendly relations with Israel, they need only look to Cyprus.

On Friday 8 February Cyprus upgraded the status of its Palestinian Authority (PA) diplomatic representation to that of Embassy, and the head of the Palestinian diplomatic mission to Cyprus, Walid Al-Hassan, became a fully-fledged Ambassador. “All official correspondence will now be done in the name of the State of Palestine," he informed the world’s media. “Cyprus is the first European state to upgrade Palestinian status since the UN vote."

Until PA President Mahmoud Abbas succeeded in upgrading the Palestinians’ UN status to “non-member observer state” in November 2012, the broader Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” was, by general agreement, governed by the Oslo Accords. In accordance with those undertakings, signed in 1993 and 1995, both Israel and the Palestinians had agreed that a final status settlement would be negotiated between them. It is, therefore, a fair assumption that Abbas’s UN initiative amounted to turning his back on the Accords − and equally that the UN General Assembly, in its wisdom, had done likewise.

Yet both the General Assembly’s vote, and Cyprus’s subsequent upgrading of the PA’s diplomatic status are, in legal terms, merely cosmetic − they do nothing to change the status of the PA in international law. Nor does Cyprus’s initiative represent any sudden shift in policy, for it has always supported Palestinian sovereign aspirations. It was as far back as 1988 that Cyprus formally recognised Palestine as a state within the 1967 boundaries, while in May 2011 it upgraded what was then simply “the general delegation of Palestine” in Cyprus to the status of “diplomatic mission.”

However this decision is not perceived by the Cypriot government as altering its excellent relations with Israel which, like Greece’s, have been flourishing in recent years in parallel with the increasing deterioration of Israel’s relations with Turkey. In announcing the PA’s diplomatic upgrade, Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis expressed "full support" not only for Palestinian aspirations for statehood and sovereignty but also for those of Israel for security through a comprehensive negotiated peace based on a two-state solution.

Israeli-Cyprus relations, excellent for a number of years and founded on a thriving tourist industry, have been boosted by the recent discovery of huge oil and natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as what is now the world's longest subsea electric power cable. The alliance has been further strengthened by collaboration on military, cultural and political matters.

All of which goes to show that support for Palestinian national aspirations is not necessarily incompatible with maintaining close and friendly relations with Israel. What it does betray is the basic anomaly at the heart of the current state of the Oslo Accords. In all logic they are a dead letter, yet they also provide the basis on which the current fragile status quo on the West Bank is maintained.

Under the Accords Israel agreed to withdraw in part from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in favor of autonomous Palestinian rule, which was to last for a five-year interim period. Permanent status negotiations, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, would commence no later than May 1996.

Israel indeed withdrew, but the final status negotiations never took place. A basic requirement of the agreement was breached; accordingly the Oslo Accords no longer governed the relationship between Israel and the PA. What had been established, however, was the first phase of providing the Palestinians with self-government pending a permanent agreement. Under the Accords the West Bank and the Gaza strip were regarded as one territory, and in 1994 Israel began a phased withdrawal from Gaza and a handover of its administration to the PA. The West Bank was divided into three zones:

• Area A –under the Palestinian Authority's full control and including all Palestinian cities and surrounding areas with no civilian Israeli presence.
• Area B –under the Palestinian Authority's civil control and Israel's security control and including areas of dense Palestinian population with no civilian Israeli presence.
• Area C –under full Israeli control, except over Palestinian civilians. This area includes all West Bank settlements and their immediate vicinity as well as strategic areas dubbed "security zones."

The Gaza strip was wrenched from the PA’s grasp in 2008 by Hamas, the Islamist terrorist group opposed to all attempts at reaching a peace agreement with Israel, while also aiming to oust their rivals, Fatah, from the West Bank and perhaps, eventually, from the PA altogether.

As for the West Bank, the Oslo Accords arrangement remains, by mutual agreement, the basis on which the region is currently administered. It is. moreover. the generally accepted road map along which the parties will have to travel to reach a final agreement. The Accords were, after all, signed not only by Israel and the PA as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”, but were also witnessed by representatives of the USA, Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Norway and the EU. Despite the inconsistencies at the heart of the current situation, despite the PA’s new status at the UN, they remain the only generally acknowledged road map.

So half-dead the Oslo Accords might well be, but they must surely provide the starting point for any new attempt to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. As the catch-phrase has it: “there’s life in the old dog yet”.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 14 February 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=303147&prmusr=scK4u5QXSHEwzHAi6aqeDOI8dmmPhePOFTyhs1CZu%2boyhzFZHWbRWkFQx1pDT9j%2f

After Assad

The 13-year rule of Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, is drawing to a close, although the exact nature of its demise remains, at present, uncertain. It has been a long-drawn-out process. When he took power in 2000, Bashar inherited a formidable grip on power, initiated by his father Hafez. With members of the Alawite sect placed in key positions in the ruthless secret police and the military, both organisations were tightly integrated into the ruling élite. The process of dislodging it is taking mammoth efforts which, in turn, have resulted in truly terrible humanitarian consequences.

What is now a fully-fledged civil war in Syria began in March 2011 as one manifestation of the Arab Spring, then flaring across the Arab world. In April the Syrian Army, deployed to quell the uprising, began firing on demonstrators. Opposition forces, composed originally of defected soldiers and civilian volunteers, became increasingly armed and organized, but soon opportunistic jihadist bodies, supported from outside sources, were exploiting the chaotic situation on both sides.

Assad was supported by pro-Shi’ite jihadists. When he falls, pro-Sunni extremists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), will probably gain the upper hand as the Islamists continue their own power struggles for a while. As a result, Israel may find itself facing MB régimes in two of its major Arab neighbors – Egypt and Syria.

On a more positive note, the departure of Assad will certainly represent a major blow to Iran’s strategic position in the Middle East. Syria is an integral element in Iran’s anti-Israel alliance, and the conduit through which it supplies Hezbollah with military and financial support. Which perhaps explains the current effort of Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to repair fences with Egypt. After 34 years of non-contact, initiated because of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, Iran courted Egypt’s MB President Mohamed Morsi with a three-day visit early in February.

The occasion was not without incident. The New York Times reported that during a visit to Al-Azhar mosque and university, Egypt’s seat of Sunni scholarship, Ahmadinejad was publicly upbraided by his hosts, who accused Shi’ites of interfering in Arab countries, including Egypt and Bahrain, and of discriminating against Sunnis in Iran. Later, a protester, identified as a Syrian angered at Iran’s alliance with Syria’s president Assad, tried to hit Ahmadinejad with a shoe. Finally four people were arrested for attacking the Iranian leader’s motorcade. Deep-seated divisions are not so easily healed.

In fact, nothing could really replace the loss to Iran of so vital a strategic ally as Syria. If the Iranian nuclear story does finally, after Assad’s departure, culminate in a strike by Israel or the US, Syria would be unable to contribute to Iran’s response, while Hezbollah would be denied a critical corridor of support and resupply during and after the confrontation.

Throughout the civil war, Iran, Hezbollah and Russia have actively supported the Assad régime, but the West as a whole has resisted the temptation to become directly involved. It has relied instead mainly on strong words.

For example, at the end of January, amid reports of the wholesale killing of civilians by the Syrian army, US President Obama released a video statement to the Syrian people: "In the face of this barbarism, the United States has joined with nations around the world in calling for an end to the Assad regime, and a transition that leads to a peaceful, inclusive and democratic Syria.”

Only Israel among the Western democracies, perceiving some of the possible dangers flowing from the fall of Assad, has taken effective action. The eventual fate of Assad’s huge arsenal of missiles, sophisticated ground-to-air and ground-to-sea rockets, and chemical weapons, is of as great a concern to the democratic world as to Israel. Not only might Assad seek to ensure that they are removed to some jihadist safe haven before the apocalypse, but In the chaos of a post-Assad Syria they could as easily fall into the hands of jihadists in Syria itself, or of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In either eventuality the West would be at risk, though Israel would probably be the terrorists’ prime target.

Israel’s presumed airstrike within Syria on the night of 29-30 January was aimed at countering such threats. Some media reported that Israeli fighter jets struck a Syrian convoy suspected of carrying SA-17 missile parts, a Russian-made, medium-range delivery system, and other equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon; others that an Israeli strike targeted a research facility near Damascus – probably Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS), a state organization suspected of developing biological and chemical weapons and transferring them to Hezbollah and Hamas.

The fall of Assad is likely to plunge the region into a new era of instability. A fragmented, decentralized, and dysfunctional Syria is the likely outcome, with Tehran remaining active in parts of the country. If so, the existing jihadist challenge to Israel along the Sinai border may well be matched by a new jihadist challenge from within Syria, perhaps both coordinated. This possibility may explain why Israel recently began erecting a sophisticated security fence in the Golan, similar to the one just completed in Sinai.

A huge destabilized area in the centre of the Middle East is in no one’s interests – it is likely to become a tempting hunting ground for vested jihadist entities whose main interests are their own bitter power struggles. Coordinated planning involving the US, the EU and Israel, with the aim of averting the worst possible scenarios in post-Assad Syria, is becoming an urgent necessity.

Published in the on-line Jerusalem Post magazine, 7 February 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=302483&prmusr=SooRcOtlke/2h04xdVPFe03f8aOBZbbf3GP90aE317ZarZUWhOZ0ItyAlGXZecXk

Israel's network of friends

As Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, stood before the UN General Assembly last November and asked them to upgrade Palestine to a “non-member observer state”, 41 nations withstood the intense pressure of world opinion in favour of the bid, and abstained. The world’s media concentrated on the fact that 138 members voted for the upgrade, but the 41 abstentions represent something of diplomatic triumph for Israel.

No one disputes that Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, had an acute mind and the capacity to think strategically, attributes abundantly apparent in the foreign policy strategy most closely connected to his name: the Alliance of the Periphery, or the Periphery Doctrine. This concept, born out of the circumstances of the 1950s, called for Israel to develop close strategic alliances with non-Arab Muslim states in order to counteract the united opposition of Arab states to Israel’s very existence.

As conceived by Ben Gurion, the policy was directed primarily towards Turkey and pre-revolutionary Iran. In 1950 Turkey and Iran became the first and, for a long time, the only Muslim states to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and for many years Israel enjoyed long, close and fruitful relationships, involving extensive military and industrial cooperation, with both. These mutually beneficial arrangements served as a counter-weight to the pressure of enmity generated by the largely hostile Arab nations surrounding the fledgling Israel.

Israel's basic strategic need in this respect has not changed in the past sixty years. Geographically, Israel is still a tiny island of Western democratic values set in a sea of enemies, many bent on obliterating it by whatever means. Driven by these circumstances, successive Israeli governments have developed an expanded version of the Periphery Doctrine, which has worked reasonably well.

With an eye on non-Arab countries with significant Muslim populations, Israel has gone a long way towards achieving normal relations with nations like Ethiopia, Nigeria and India. Then, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Israel managed to gain the friendship of newly-independent Muslim republics of Central Asia such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, went so far in 2006 as to say: “It is not a crime to have relations with Israel.”

But times change. The accession of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Turkish prime minister in 2003 brought with it a sharp deterioration in relations with Israel. Rooted as he is in hard-line Islamism, Erdogan immediately began courting favour with the Muslim world, and support for the extremist terrorist organisations Hamas and Hezbollah began to dominate Turkey’s approach to foreign affairs. Naturally enough, Israel’s reaction was to extend the periphery doctrine concept, namely to seek − and, indeed, achieve − a closer relationship with Turkey’s long-standing opponent, Greece.

In pursuit of this wider interpretation of the doctrine Israel, building on the growth of its high-tech economy, has succeeded in the past decade in improving relations with a variety of countries including Korea, Singapore, and most notably, China and India.

How does the periphery doctrine look at present?

Israel was quick off the mark when the new, mainly Arab Muslim, republic of South Sudan proclaimed its independence in July 2011. Israel immediately recognised the new state and offered economic help. Before the end of the month Israel and South Sudan had sealed full diplomatic relations.

Perhaps the delicate refurbishing of relations with Indonesia best exemplifies how the alliance of the periphery has been nurtured and developed. During the past year, after five years of sensitive deliberations, Indonesia agreed a sort of informal upgrade in its relations with Israel. It agreed to open a consulate in Ramallah, headed by a diplomat with the rank of ambassador, who will also unofficially serve as his country’s ambassador for contacts with Israel. The move represents a de facto upgrading of relations between Israel and the world’s most populous Muslim country. Formally Indonesia presents the move as a demonstration of its support for Palestinian independence. In fact, while the ambassador-ranked diplomat will be accredited to the Palestinian Authority, a significant portion of his work will be in dealings with Israel, and the office will fulfill substantial diplomatic duties as well as consular responsibilities. Meanwhile Israel and Indonesia quietly maintain trade, security and other relations, including tourism.

As for continental Africa, Israel has run extensive foreign aid and educational programs, sending in experts in agriculture, water management and health care. As a result it has built up some excellent working relationships – Angola, Cameroon and Eritrea, for example − though Ethiopia is perhaps its best partner. Fractured relations with Ghana were restored in 2009 following a state visit by the then Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Liberman, and diplomatic relations were resumed in September 2011.

But South Africa – an obvious target for the Periphery Doctrine − represents one of its major failures. A tide of delegitimisation seems about to overwhelm Israel in South Africa, and so far Israel has been unable to stem it. The ruling African National Congress party (ANC) has just adopted a policy of supporting anti-Israel boycotts, divestments and sanctions. This situation demands immediate attention from the new Israeli government before the leading state on the African continent sets itself up as Israel’s leading non-Arab opponent.

Nor will South Africa’s opposition to Israel necessarily be confined to its own government. South Africa is a leading member of the African Union (AU), whose summit conference has just ended, and its ANC representatives are in a position to cast a baleful influence on AU policies. It is of some comfort to Israel, perhaps, that at the summit the three-year chairmanship of the AU passed not to South Africa, as was at one time expected, but to Ethiopia, with whom − thanks to the Periphery Doctrine − Israel enjoys good relations.

Ben Gurion was far from infallible, but in his Periphery Doctrine – as in his advice to young Israelis of his day (“Go south, young man”) − time has surely proved that his instincts were sound.

Published in the Eurasia Review, 24 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/24042013-israels-network-of-friends-oped/

Post-election Israel and the peace process

Discount the immediate response of Palestinian Authority (PA) spokesmen to the outcome of Israel’s election: “nothing has changed”. Much has changed. It is pretty clear that Israel’s next government, whoever may lead it and whatever its final composition, will contain as a vital component the 19 elected members of Yesh Atid (There is a Future) − a party dedicated to negotiating a two-state solution with the PA. Its leader, Yair Lapid, has said specifically: “Yesh Atid will not join a government that will not conduct diplomatic negotiations.” Given Israel’s political realities, a coalition without Yesh Atid does not seem feasible.

For the past two years PA President Abbas has been demanding a freeze on construction in the West Bank as one precondition for resuming peace negotiations – one, it might be noted, among several which have varied from time to time. This building issue has been a useful red herring for Abbas, fearful of moving too far and too fast, doubtless mindful of the fate of a previous Arab leader who did just that – Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat. After all, who would willingly put their head on a chopping block?

The current political configuration bears a certain resemblance to that of four years ago. As now, in early 2009 both President Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu had just come into office. Then, in response to Obama’s urgent request, Netanyahu succeeded in persuading his newly formed right-wing coalition to agree a freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank. In the event a 10-month building moratorium began at the end of November 2009. Most of the subsequent ten months was spent in shilly-shallying by Abbas, who sought cover from the Arab League for every tiny step he took. Much of the time was wasted in so-called “proximity talks”, with President Obamas’s Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, scurrying from side to side, trying to build confidence between the parties.

When finally Abbas was persuaded to come to the negotiating table for direct face-to-face talks with Israel, all but three weeks of the 10-month building moratorium had been used up. To reach this point Abbas had required not only the good offices of the United States and the support of the Arab League, but also the physical presence at the table of Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah. Once there, optimism ran riot among all the participants. Extravagant claims were voiced on all sides of a final settlement of the Israel-Palestine dispute within twelve months.

It proved too much for Abbas. As the leader of Fatah, he was in principle dedicated to wresting back mandate Palestine in toto from Israel, but the party was also in bitter conflict with the extremist terrorist organisation, Hamas, that had seized power in Gaza and was battling with Fatah for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people. Seizing the imminent end of Israel’s 10-month construction freeze as a handy excuse, Abbas demanded a resumption of the moratorium as a pre-condition for continuing the peace discussions. This was a price that Netanyahu’s coalition could not deliver. The result: a two-year stalemate in the peace process that only a radical change in the political landscape could alter.

Such a change has indeed taken place, and not only in Israel following the general election. Abbas himself is very differently placed from where he was in 2010. Under his belt he now has the endorsement of the UN General Assembly to his request that Palestine be considered a state with “non-member status.” He has, moreover, once again come to some sort of patched-up agreement with Hamas, brokered by Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi, that will nominally lead to new PA elections covering Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Whether this arrangement will indeed hold on this occasion is problematic, given the many previous attempts at healing the Fatah-Hamas rift that have failed. On this occasion, however, Hamas may feel that they would emerge from elections much strengthened, in view of their self-designated “victory” following Israel’s latest incursion into Gaza, Operation Pillar of Defense.

Some people know Mahmoud Abbas very well, following meetings, discussions and negotiations sometimes extending over years. Among such are Israel’s President, Shimon Peres, former foreign minister Tzipi Livni, and former prime minister, Ehud Olmert. When Abbas in a recent TV interview, said quite unequivocally, “I believe that the West Bank and Gaza is Palestine, and the other parts are Israel.” each of those who are very well acquainted with him welcomed the statement as a courageous act by a man they believed was a genuine partner for peace.

A new Israeli government with members dedicated to renewing negotiations with the PA (even, one supposes, if some sort of construction freeze were called for), a Mahmoud Abbas strengthened by both a UN triumph and a possible healing of the bitter internal Palestinian feud − from such disparate elements as these it may be possible to resurrect a peace process that, while guaranteeing Israel the security it must have, would lay the foundation for a peaceful future for all the inhabitants of this unsettled corner of the world.

Published in the on-line editions of the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Report, 30 January 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/JerusalemReport/Israel/Article.aspx?id=301524&prmusr=GI9lUPj5SElGlL0JyJfczVwb8cx%2b9Cf64Cp0HpmLu1fLatPL3DNe9oZdzQ6R4XBa

Mali points the way

2013 has opened with a quite astonishing and heartening development. Against all the odds, and quite at variance with precedent, the civilised world has pretty well unanimously agreed to take a determined stand against one display of Islamist extremism.

Nothing in the recent past could have suggested that a European power − in this case, France − would have deployed its formidable military capability against a group of Islamist jihadists intent on seizing power in the West African republic of Mali. Nor that this action by its former colonial masters would have received the unanimous support of the government of the country, the UN Security Council and the European Union. Nor, indeed, that the British government would go so far in support of France as to put C-17 transport planes of the Royal Air Force at France’s disposal and speak of providing training and support for the Malian army.

Yes, self-interest is at stake. Last March, Tuareg tribesmen and members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb seized control of the northern part of the country. Last week they moved south, taking Konna and threatening Mopti, home to the only army garrison between them and the capital, Bamako. With a civilian administration controlled by a small, weak army, Mali must have seemed to Islamist extremists as vulnerable and ripe for a takeover. Once in their control, the country could be used as a springboard for attacks not only on other African states, especially Nigeria, but also on Europe. It is clearly a strategic priority for the civilised world that the insurgents are defeated, and that more moderate Tuareg elements regain power and resume a democratic form of government.

It has taken this particular example of Islamist ruthlessness to precipitate a decisive response. But extreme Islamism has been active for decades in its global jihad against Western values, and the West has turned a blind eye. For example no country stirred a finger when the Islamist terrorist organisation, Hamas − an offspring of Egypt’s extremist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) − seized power in 2008 in the Gaza strip, in a bloody fratricidal coup against fellow Palestinians.

The MB and its Islamist and al-Qaeda-backed adherents have flourished in the wake of the Arab Spring, and governments affected adversely by their current upsurge in confidence include Algeria of course - as the hostage bloodbath in that benighted country has just proved - but also Kuwait, Sudan, Somalia, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Jordan – to name only some. Wherever it manifests itself, the MB and its associates are dedicated to the tenets set out originally by its founder, Hassan al-Banna, in 1928. He declared, quite simply: “It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.”

That is the agenda of these Islamist militants. That is why this often stealthy, but steady and sure, expansion of influence and activity should concern the Western world far more than it has done up till now. For the MB not only spans the Middle East but, as political author Lorenzo Vidino has demonstrated, since the early 1960s its members and sympathisers have “moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organised network of mosques, charities and Islamic organisations”. Islamism has active branches in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and a variety of other European countries. Seeking to bring about their Islamic aspirations through political means, the MB’s motto is: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Koran is our law. Jihad is our way. And death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our ambitions.” Its goal, stated quite openly by its leaders, is to create situations in which Sharia law can be imposed on states, with the aim eventually of uniting them and thus continuing the expansion of Islamism.

This is precisely what the insurgents in Mali − known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) − have done in the ministate they have established in the north of the country. An extreme form of Sharia has been imposed. Refugees in the 92,000-person camp at Mbera, Mauritania, describe the Islamists as "intent on imposing an Islam of lash and gun on Malian Muslims."

So the West has reason enough to seek to defeat this al-Qaeda–backed insurgence in Mali, and to re-establish a legitimate civil government. On this occasion France’s President François Hollande has led the way, and the rest of the civilised world has not demurred. The question is: does President Hollande’s determined action mark the beginning of a more resolute response by the West to other examples of Islamist extremism, as they manifest themselves in the Middle East and elsewhere? Will others be similarly stalwart in defence of Western values? Or is this decisive action, welcome as it is, a flash in the pan?

Time will tell.

Published in the on-line Jerusalem Post magazine, 17 January 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=299881&prmusr=5wfdFn35AmwtiXkDhcVrZTzf9OR7ql7wbuVqEac6JejPxqBC3YAC%2bW81Z8%2bf8acD

Israel, Palestine and the International Criminal Court

There’s a fairly widespread feeling that one of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) main motives in seeking an upgrade of its status at the UN recently, was to enable it to haul Israeli officials before the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes committed during Israel’s first – and possibly also its second − Gaza incursion.

Throughout the three weeks of Operation Cast Lead the broadcast media was out in force, capturing the horrors of war for the world’s television sets. Soon charges were being levelled against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the usual sources of “disproportionate” military activity. It was not long before they turned into accusations of war crimes. On the day after hostilities ceased − 22 January 2009 − the PA submitted a declaration to the International Criminal Court accepting its jurisdiction for “acts committed on the territory of Palestine”.

This initiative was seen by world opinion as the first stage in a bid to indict Israeli officials for actions committed during Operation Cast Lead. It failed on purely technical grounds.

The powers of the ICC, which came into being under the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002, are constrained in a number of ways: It has no jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed before the ICC itself came into existence; its jurisdiction can be activated only by sovereign states; it can investigate crimes only in states that have signed the Rome Statute. Any state that is not party to the Statute can accept the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to crimes committed on its territory. This is the crack through which the PA sought to squeeze itself. But the PA was not a sovereign state, and having considered its request for three years, in April 2012 the ICC prosecutor rejected it and referred the issue back to the UN Secretary General.

However, on 29 November 2012 the UN General Assembly voted in favour of recognizing Palestine as a state with observer status, even though a non-member of the UN. It is generally agreed − although not, perhaps, by the PA − that this resolution had no power to create a Palestinian state. Even so, it may cause the newly appointed ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda of Gambia, to reconsider her predecessor’s opinion.

Why? Because in rejecting the PA’s application, her predecessor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, cited the UN General Assembly as the final authority for deciding who a “state” is for the purposes of filing a case with the ICC. Moreover, he indicated that his decision was influenced by the fact that the PA had only “observer” status within the UN – implying that if it had been a “non-member observer state” his decision might have gone the other way.

So it remains a possibility that the ICC will agree to accept the PA’s request to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court. If so, could the PA in fact initiate a criminal action against Israel?

As far as Operation Cast Lead is concerned, the two external inquiries each originally castigated Israel severely, and each subsequently had its main charges substantially modified.

The board of inquiry set up by UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, ignored the eight years of attacks against Israel and Hamas’s methods of armed operation which put Palestinian civilians at risk, and found the IDF was responsible for death, injuries and damage in seven of the nine incidents it investigated. In his response, sent to the UN Security Council, Ban Ki-moon made it clear that he took a different view. He criticized the firing of rockets at Israeli towns, and praised the coordination between the IDF and the UN during Operation Cast Lead and during the inquiry itself.

The UN-appointed Fact Finding Mission led by South African jurist Richard Goldstone, was set up to investigate alleged violations of human rights during the Gaza War. Its report accused both the IDF and the Palestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. Lo and behold, on 1 April 2011 Goldstone published a personal retraction in The Washington Post, noting that subsequent investigations "indicate that civilians were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy". He concluded: "If I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document."

All of which would seem to cut the ground from beneath the PA’s feet, should it seriously consider hauling Israel before the ICC in respect of Operation Cast Lead. As regards Israel’s latest sharp lesson to Hamas, Pillar of Defense, the operation and the outcome resulted generally in a more even-handed account in the world’s media of the initial provocation and the subsequent Israeli reaction. There seems little of substance to place before the ICC.

Assuming, however, that the PA persists, and that the ICC prosecutor accepts it as a competent party, two questions remain. What are its chances of success, and is there anything Israel could do in response?

As regards the former, the ground rules of the Rome Statute are explicit: “If a state becomes a party to this statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State….” The PA’s declaration was made on the day after Operation Cast Lead ended. It seems clear that the ICC could not consider alleged crimes committed before that day.

Is there any counter action Israel could take? If Palestine is eventually considered by the ICC to be a state, Palestinians could be indicted for crimes committed on their own soil which, let us recall, the UN General Assembly assumed to include Gaza. The rockets fired indiscriminately from Gaza at Israel’s civilian population centres almost certainly constitute crimes against humanity. Israel and the United States have withdrawn from the Rome Statute, but nothing in the Statute says that a state referring charges to a prosecutor must be a party to the treaty.

The PA needs to beware. If it persists in pursuing its action, it may be opening a Pandora’s box.

Published in the on-line Jerusalem Post magazine, 14 January 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=299516&prmusr=66YhTv%2ffH6d51TvX%2b5pYdH5bqVZH8tD7A4qW0fI%2feJcaV6V6nvH2g3lsY5fU%2fvJj

Hamas flexes its muscles

There’s a great deal of talk these days about a “reconciliation” between Hamas and Fatah. In December the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) allowed Hamas to celebrate its 25th anniversary in the West Bank; last Friday Hamas permitted a rally in Gaza city to commemorate Fatah’s “launch of the revolution” 48 years ago. Buoyed up by recent self-proclaimed “successes” on both sides (Hamas has deluded itself into believing it won a great victory in the recent Operation Pillar of Defense; the PA regards its recent vote in the UN General Assembly as tantamount to achieving a sovereign Palestinian state), there is now much loose talk of “moving forward towards unity”, in the words of Hamas spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri.

However the underlying truth is that Hamas and Fatah are irreconcilable, for Hamas is concerned above all with outflanking Fatah in the battle for Palestinian hearts and minds. It refuses to accept Mahmoud Abbas as the legitimate president of the PA, to endorse the PA’s policy of seeking to establish a sovereign Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, or even to acknowledge Israel’s existence. So it is unlikely that current efforts at reconciliation will achieve anything more than the many previous abortive attempts.

On the contrary, strange rumours have been circulating about Hamas in the past few months.

They were sparked off shortly after the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won its convincing victory in Egypt’s parliamentary elections, and the MB candidate, Mohamed Morsi, topped the poll for president. Hamas, founded in 1987 during the first intifada, was an offshoot of the Egyptian MB, set up with the specific aim of establishing an Islamic state in the whole of the area that is now Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The overwhelming success of the Brotherhood in what is arguably the leading nation in the Arab world − and Gaza’s next door neighbour to boot − must have seemed to the Hamas leadership like a golden opportunity too good to miss.

Accordingly, in July 2012, very shortly after Morsi took over as Egypt’s president, Arab newspapers like Al-Arabiya and Al-Hayat reported a meeting between Gaza prime minister Ismail Haniyeh and President Morsi. The subject of their discussion, according to the reports, was the possibility of Hamas issuing a unilateral declaration of independence − in short, breaking away from the PA and establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in the Gaza strip, possibly under the benign overlordship of an MB Egyptian government. Khaled Mesmar, head of the Political Committee at the Palestinian National Council, was reported at the time as saying: “Hamas is trying to garner as much support as possible for the idea of secession, especially among several Arab regimes.”

Clearly the proposal – if indeed it was made in the terms reported − was not to President Morsi’s liking, for no such move followed. However subsequent events further strengthened Hamas to a degree that the leadership could not have foreseen back in July, and may have led to renewed efforts in that direction.

Emboldened by the MB’s success in Egypt, and also by the growing confidence of jihadists elsewhere as a result of the Arab Spring, Hamas began stepping up its rocket attacks on Israeli civilian targets. Israel’s reaction, in the form of Operation Pillar of Defense, gave Hamas the opportunity to stand for eight days at the centre of the world stage, representing the so-called “Palestinian armed struggle”. As a result Hamas greatly enhanced its standing in Arab popular opinion.

Riding the crest of this popular acclaim, the latest story to surface concerning Hamas is a statement made in the last days of 2012 by senior Hamas official, Musa Abu Marzouk, a likely candidate to replace Khaled Mashaal as head of the organisation. A frustrated President Abbas had been reported as saying that if there was no progress in the peace process: “I will take the phone and call Netanyahu and tell him : ‘Sit in the chair instead of me, take the keys, and you will be responsible for the Palestinian Authority’.” Abu Marzouk riposted: “Why does Abbas want to hand the keys over to Netanyahu? Why not hand it over to Hamas?” Hamas’s record, he asserted, “qualified it to run the West Bank successfully.”

Fatah officials are reported to have reacted angrily. Jamal Muheisen, a member of the Fatah Central Council, claimed that Hamas was renewing its pursuit of a unilateral declaration of independence for Gaza − though now, he asserted, Hamas had turned from seeking to do so under Egyptian auspices, and was conducting secret negotiations with Israel, with US approval, aimed at establishing an Islamic emirate in the Gaza strip. The West Bank, claimed Muheisen, was to be left as cantonised pockets of Palestinians separated by the Israeli settlements.

So the rumoured claim − which has about it the hallmarks of paranoid fears by an embattled Fatah − seems to be that Israel is prepared to allow the Gaza strip to become an extreme Islamist Palestinian state in its own right, and for Hamas to take over from the PA as the ruling authority in Palestinian-occupied West Bank areas, provided they leave all Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria under Israeli control.

The whole story seems wildly improbable, starting with the idea of secret Israel-Hamas negotiations. Even more unlikely is the concept of an Israel-approved takeover by Hamas of areas of the West Bank, however tempting the kickback. Hamas’s objective, its very raison d’être, is undisguised – the elimination of Israel, and the establishment of an Islamist Palestine “from the river to the sea”. To permit Hamas to assume control of parts of Judea and Samaria would indeed amount to Israel clutching a viper to its bosom.

This, surely, is one rumour too far.

Published in the on-line Jerusalem Post magazine, 6 January 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=298576&prmusr=%2bYE0NSFs3v9vHObbbYiRaIKLPF%2by7DFM1BRbpcXTc%2b7qjfGeQpl74BEYIUVQNh5D