Hezbollah – Iran’s pawn

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 January 2024  

                 Iran's Supreme Leader meets the head of Hezbollah         

          A war with Israel is the last thing that Lebanon needs. The Lebanese people are in the midst of a severe economic downturn, facing soaring prices and severe shortages of food and basic commodities. Hezbollah-allied political, financial and business leaders, the source of the graft and corruption at the heart of the nation, have allowed Lebanon’s economy to deteriorate to crisis level. The nation is in a catastrophic economic situation which has lasted for years. If Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, were to initiate a full-scale conflict with Israel, he would find little support from the hard-pressed Lebanese.

          Even the continuous armed skirmishes over the Lebanon-Israel border serve little purpose beyond administering an Israeli tit for a Hezbollah tat. They achieve nothing of any value for either side. Initiated by Hezbollah at the behest of its paymaster, Iran, their true function is to fulfil Iran’s desire to cause as much trouble in the Middle East as possible.         

          Hezbollah was established in 1982 specifically to counter Israel’s invasion of  Lebanon, undertaken in response to constant attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory by Palestinian militants.  But when the subsequent Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon ended in 2000, Hezbollah’s aim was achieved.  What purpose can the constant armed interchanges have now?

One truth, long unacknowledged in the western world but the cornerstone of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, is that the Iranian regime is in relentless pursuit of its own agenda, namely to dominate the Middle East as a first step toward spreading the Shi’ite tradition of Islam eventually to the whole world. This was clearly spelled out by the instigator of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, on more than one occasion: “We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no god but Allah' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.”

 As essential stages in this process, the revolutionary leaders envisaged the overthrow of Zionism (ie Israel) and of capitalism (ie the US) – a fact which one-time US President Obama, and now President Biden, have seemed peculiarly reluctant to acknowledge.  Time and again attempts at mollifying the Iranian regime have proved useless – its ultimate aim remains unaltered.  It still regards America as the Great Satan, and Israel as its smaller manifestation – both destined for obliteration.

In pursuit of their objective Iran’s leaders recognize no bounds.  They sponsor terrorist activities and deploy their puppet organizations – among others, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon – to undertake them. In Lebanon Iran has nurtured, financed and equipped Hezbollah ever since 1982 to harry Israel.  UK media reported on January 12 that Iran is paying Hezbollah fighters a wage of $1300 per month.

 Lebanon’s problem as a sovereign state has been its inability to prevent the accretion of political, social and above all military power by Hezbollah over the past 40 years – a process that has left the sovereign state of  Lebanon in thrall to Hezbollah. 

In 2024 Hezbollah is virtually a state within a state, sucking the lifeblood out of Lebanon at the instigation of Iran.  It has effectively brought Lebanon’s political process to a standstill ­– since October 31, 2022 the nation has been without a president. and has hobbled along with only caretaker government ministers.  Every attempt to resolve the political difficulties has been frustrated by Hezbollah and its political allies.

As for Hezbollah’s armed forces, it is generally believed that they are larger and more powerful than the Lebanese national army.  The Hezbollah military has, after all, been in receipt of sophisticated technology from Iran for years, and has built up a formidable state-of-the-art armory directed at Israel.  The two armed forces exist side by side within the same state, and although under the previous president, Michel Aoun, there was often a degree of collaboration between them, Hezbollah steers its own course, and is not answerable to Lebanon‘s political leaders for its activities.

 Hezbollah’s last full-scale clash with Israel was brought to an end in August 2006 by UN Security Council Resolution 1701.  One main purpose of the resolution was to keep Hezbollah troops far from the Israel-Lebanon border, thus forestalling any future conflict.  In accordance with the resolution 15,000 UN international troops, operating alongside the Lebanese army, were deployed to police the Lebanon-Israel border. There are currently just over 9,500.  Known as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), they have been in place for the past 18 years, their authority largely ignored by Hezbollah. 

Another provision of Resolution 1701 that neither Iran nor Hezbollah had any intention of meeting was the UN’s strong demand, laid down in previous resolutions, that all armed groups in Lebanon, other than those of the Lebanese state, should be disarmed. 

On the day that Resolution 1701 passed unanimously in the UN Security Council, Hezbollah secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, said that Hezbollah would honor the call for a ceasefire provided Israel agreed to end its military actions. Resolution 1701 was approved by the Lebanese government one week after it was passed by the UN. As it did so, Nasrallah reiterated his pledge that once the Israeli offensive ceased, Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel would also stop.

In practice, of course, 1701 has failed utterly to maintain stability along the Israel-Lebanon border.  Hezbollah, marching to the beat of Iran’s drum, has prevented UNIFIL from performing its mission.  It has used its militia to control the area, has deployed its forces there, has launched thousands of rockets into Israel, and has constructed tunnels under the border to enable its terror units to penetrate Israel.  Its bombardment of Israel with rockets, missiles and drones has been unceasing.  UNIFIL has proved ineffective, unwilling to confront Hezbollah head-on.  It has failed to prevent Hezbollah’s continuous activity along the border in blatant violation of 1701.

For its part, the UN has failed to insist that its UNIFIL forces actually enforce adherence with its Resolution 1701.  As a result Iran, through its Hezbollah pawn, has been empowered to disrupt regional stability, just as it has done by fortifying Hamas in Gaza and using the Houthis in Yemen to attack shipping in the Red Sea and deploy missiles directly into Saudi Arabia.  The perpetual Hezbollah-Israel skirmishes across the Lebanon border serve no-one’s purposes except those of the Iranian regime. In the end it will be necessary to tackle the organ-grinder rather than his monkey.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online as "Hezbollah - a pawn in Iran's aim to obliterate Israel", 16 January 2024:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-782309

Published in Eurasia Review, 19 January 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19012024-hezbollah-irans-pawn-oped/#:~:text=In%202024%20Hezbollah%20is%20virtually,with%20only%20caretaker%20government%20ministers.

Published in the MPC Journal, 24 Januay 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/hezbollah-irans-pawn/

Erdogan - back to square one

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2023

          Ever since Recep Tayyip Erdogan gained power as Turkey’s prime minister in 2003, Turco-Israeli relations have been on a see-saw, now up, now down – though more often down than up.  This is scarcely surprising since Erdogan is a deeply committed devotee of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization whose DNA is imbued with antagonism towards Jews.  However, he is also a consummate politician, well aware of the need, from time to time, to temper his aversion to Israel with sweet words and conciliatory gestures.

            On December 27 Erdogan announced to the world that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was Adolf Hitler reborn, comparing Israel's campaign to destroy Hamas in Gaza to the systematic annihilation of the Jewish people by the Nazis.  In a speech at an event in Ankara, he demanded of an absent Netanyahu: “How are you any different from Hitler?” adding, to rapturous applause: “What Netanyahu is doing is no less than what Hitler did.”

A riposte was readily to hand.  Netanyahu resorted to the social media platform X (once Twitter), and accused Erdogan, with some justification, of carrying out "genocide against the Kurds."  Erdogan, he wrote, “is the last one to give us a lesson in morals…He holds the world record of imprisoning journalists who object to his regime."

Anyone familiar with the to and fro of interchanges between Ankara and Jerusalem would have experienced a feeling of déjà vu.  This particular exchange of insults was nothing new. In July 2028, roundly condemning Israel’s just-passed  “nation state law”, Erdogan asserted: "Hitler's spirit has re-emerged in some Israeli leaders."  Netanyahu’s response?  "Erdoğan is slaughtering Syrians and Kurds and imprisoning tens of thousands of his fellow citizens,” adding “Turkey is becoming a dark dictatorship under Erdogan.”

During his early years as prime minister, back in the early 2000s, Erdogan was careful not to promote too radical an agenda too soon. Despite his Islamist views, he made an official visit to Israel in 2005 to be feted by Israel’s then-prime minister, Ariel Sharon.  However it was not long before the previously close relations between Turkey and Israel began to sour. The turning point came in 2009 with the first conflict between Israel and Hamas, which had seized power in the Gaza strip and had been firing rockets indiscriminately into Israel.

In the annual international gathering at Davos that year, Erdogan could not restrain himself. Rounding on Israeli president Shimon Peres, Erdogan called the Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip a "crime against humanity" and "barbaric." 

Wagging his finger at Peres, he declared: "When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill. I know very well how you hit and killed children on beaches." Then, infuriated by the moderator's refusal to allow him more time in response to Peres's emotional rebuke, he stalked off the stage.

What followed was the great barren waste of the Mavi Marmara affair.  On May 31, 2010 an encounter on the high seas between Israeli soldiers and a Turkish flotilla nominally on a humanitarian mission to Gaza, ended with nine of those on board the leading vessel, the  Mavi Marmara, losing their lives.  Erdogan manipulated the event into a rupture of Turkish-Israeli relations lasting six years. The affair was finally put to rest only in June 2016.  

When on May 14, 2018 then-US President Donald Trump formally confirmed his intention to relocate the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Erdogan declared three days of national mourning.  The next day Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador and withdrew its ambassador in Tel Aviv.  In response, Israel expelled Turkey's consul in Jerusalem.

The next two years saw Turkey’s international standing slump to a new low.  By the autumn of 2020 Erdogan was in the process of purchasing the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, designed specifically to destroy aircraft like US’s state-of-the-art multi-purpose F-35 fighter.  Reasonably enough, Trump refused to allow Turkey, a member of NATO, to acquire it ejecting Erdogan from the F-35 program and imposing sanctions on Turkey.

The EU had also sanctioned Turkey.  In this case it was in reaction to Erdogan continuing to explore for gas in what is internationally recognized as Cypriot waters.   The UK, now no longer in the EU, imposed sanctions on Turkey on the same grounds.

Turkey’s relations with Egypt had been frozen solid ever since 2013, when Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi was ousted by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.  Erdogan expelled Egypt’s ambassador, and Sisi reciprocated.  Relations with Saudi Arabia had been overshadowed for years by the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi’s consulate in Istanbul.

As for Israel, it had long been obvious that Erdogan seized every opportunity to denounce Israel in the most extravagant terms and to act against it whenever he could.  Not the least of his hostile moves was to support Hamas and to provide a base in Istanbul for senior Hamas officials, granting at least twelve of them Turkish citizenship.

In short Turkey, in pursuit of its own political priorities, had fences to mend with, inter alia, the US, the EU, the UK, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

This was the background to Erdogan’s sudden and dramatic change of tone on the international stage.  Erdogan, or his advisers, must have realized that to achieve his strategic objective of extending and stabilizing Turkey’s power base across the Middle East, a fundamental reassessment of tactics was called for.  Out of what must have been a root and branch analysis, came a plan to address the problem – Turkey would embark on a charm offensive, involving “reconciliation” or “rebooting” of relationships with one-time enemies, opponents or unfriendly states. 

Accordingly Erdogan set about making conciliatory overtures to Germany, the EU, Saudi Arabia and even Greece.  Israel, too, received indications that a rapprochement was sought and, doubtless despite misgivings, on March 9, 2022 President Herzog became the first Israeli president to visit Turkey in 15 years.

In an interview on Turkish TV at the time, Erdogan said: “This visit could open a new chapter in relations between Turkey and Israel,” adding that he was “ready to take steps in Israel’s direction in all areas.” 

The new chapter lasted about 18 months.  By October 25 he was praising Hamas as “liberators” and condemning what he described as “the Israeli regime’s unlawful and unrestrained attacks against civilians.”  In short, Erdogan had reverted to his default mode. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Erdogan reverts to old, inflammatory self-opinion" on 10 January 2024:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-781488

Published in Eurasia Review, 13 January 2024:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/13012024-erdogan-back-to-square-one-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 15 January 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/erdogan-back-to-square-one/

The Abraham Accords prevail

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2023

            On December 4, Time magazine published an article under the title “It’s time to scrap the Abraham Accords”.  The author, a director of a body called Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), argued that the Hamas attack of October 7 proved that the assumption on which the Abraham Accords were conceived – that the Palestinian issue was no longer important in Israel’s relationships in the region – was wrong.  She maintained that conditions for the Palestinian people had worsened since the Accords were signed, and that the Gaza war has projected the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of global concerns.  When signing the Accords, she claimed, the Arab leaders involved “hailed the agreement as a means to encourage and cajole Israel to take positive steps toward ending its occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory.”  And now, she wrote, “because continued Arab adherence to the Accords signals continued support for Israel,”  DAWN is calling on the Abraham Accords countries to withdraw from the agreement.

Both her assumptions and her conclusions are quite incorrect.  The Israel-Palestine dispute had no bearing on the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords and is unrelated to them.  The purpose of the Accords is to advance regional security and stability; pursue regional economic opportunities; promote joint aid and development programs; and foster mutual understanding, respect, co-existence and a culture of peace. 

All the Arab leaders concerned have indicated that normalizing relations with Israel has not affected their support for Palestinian aspirations. There is a brief reference to this in the Bahrain agreement, while the Morocco document mentions “the unchanged position of the Kingdom of Morocco on the Palestinian question.”  Sheer logic dictates that none of the signatories perceives their support as involving the elimination of Israel.  Since October 7 none of the four Abraham Accord signatory states has indicated any desire to withdraw from the Accords. 

Sudan is in the throes of a devastating civil war.  Government forces are on the back foot, as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues its advance.  On December 19 it captured Sudan’s second largest city, Wad Madani.  The future of Sudan, and with it the future of its normalization with Israel, hangs in the balance.

In the other Accord countries – the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Morocco – public opinion undoubtedly favors Hamas, deplores the high civilian death toll in Gaza and calls for a ceasefire.  As a result all three states have been walking a tightrope as regards their official attitude toward the Israel-Hamas conflict.  All the same, the Accords are holding firm.

   At one time it seemed as though Bahrain might be wavering.  On November 2, Bahrain’s parliament issued an unusual statement saying that the ambassadors of Israel and Bahrain had each left their posts and economic ties had been cut.

"The Zionist entity’s ambassador has left Bahrain," parliamentarian Mamdooh Al Saleh said in parliament, “hopefully not to return.”

But the parliament has no responsibility for foreign affairs, and it soon became clear that Bahrain-Israeli diplomatic and economic relations were intact.  Israel issued a statement confirming that relations were stable, and one from Bahrain's government mentioned simply that the envoys had left, without giving any reason.

            Iran has long been engaged in stirring up Bahrain’s Shi'ite population against the Sunni monarchy.  But Bahrain is home to the US Navy Fifth Fleet, and close US relations through the Accords are a vital bulwark against Iran and too valuable to abandon.  They also bring Bahrain closer to the wealthy UAE.  So Bahrain is content to perform its balancing act – on the one hand seeking to keep the deal intact; on the other needing to reflect its disagreement with Israel's military campaign in Gaza.

The other two Abraham Accord states face the same problem.

Despite internal and international pressure over the mounting toll of the war in Gaza, the UAE does not plan to break diplomatic ties with Israel.  It has sponsored two resolutions within the UN Security Council of which it is currently a member.  The first, calling unequivocally for a ceasefire, was vetoed by the US.  The second, after days of intense diplomatic effort, concentrated on enhancing the flow of humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza, and was approved on December 22.

As well as maintaining its links with Israel, media reports indicate that the UAE has been working to moderate public positions taken by Arab states, so that once the war ends there is the possibility of a return to a broad dialogue.  In addition the UAE has been in talks with Qatar about the possibility of a further Qatari-brokered deal involving the release by Hamas of some hostages in return for a break in the fighting.

The Accords were partly based on a shared concern over the threat posed by Iran.  Despite an effort at rapprochement early in 2023, the UAE continues to sees Iran as a threat to regional security. So there seems no prospect of an end to UAE-Israel diplomatic ties.  They represent a strategic priority for the Emirates. 

As for Abraham Accords signatory Morocco, Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal recently scored a resounding own goal. 

           On November 19, speaking from his luxury villa in Qatar, he addressed the Moroccan people by way of a video.  Urging them to cut ties with Israel and expel its ambassador, he declared: “Morocco can correct its mistake,” and called on Moroccans to take to the streets.

The reaction was an outburst of fury on social media from Moroccans condemning the intervention as a breach of the kingdom’s sovereignty.  There have indeed been a wave of public demonstrations in Morocco supportive of the Palestinians and condemning the suffering of the Gazan population, but it is a curious fact of Moroccan life that they are all organized with the state’s blessing.  The government provides logistical and security arrangements for demonstrators every weekend, and itself calls for de-escalation, access to humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians in line with international law. 

On the other hand, Morocco has not the slightest intention of withdrawing from the Abraham Accords.  This became clear on November 11 when, at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Morocco together with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Jordan, and Egypt, blocked a proposal to cut ties with Israel.

          So in complex and shifting circumstances the Abraham Accords seem in good health.  They may yet come into their own in helping rebuild Gaza once the war has ended. That is when, in the recent words of Jared Kushner, one of their architects. they may become “more important than ever”.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in Jerusalem Post online as "Abraham Accords will outlast Gaza war", on 3 January 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-780487

Published in the Eurasia Review, 6 January 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06012024-the-abraham-accords-prevail-oped/#:~:text=So%20in%20complex%20and%20shifting,%E2%80%9Cmore%20important%20than%20ever%E2%80%9D.

Published in the MPC Journal, 11 January 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-abraham-accords-prevail/

Is an Israel-Hezbollah war inevitable?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 December 2023

In his much-trumpeted speech on November 3, Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, predictably praised Hamas’s October 7 invasion of Israel, the subsequent massacre of 1200 civilians and the abduction of some 240 hostages.  However he was at pains to emphasize that it had been a purely Palestinian enterprise. He asserted, whatever the truth of the matter, that neither Iran nor Hezbollah had had any part in planning or carrying out the operation, and that in present circumstances neither found it expedient to support Hamas by opening full-scale hostilities against Israel.  He wanted the subsequent conflict to remain Palestinian. 

Even so, changing circumstances could trigger an escalation of the fighting to encompass Israel’s northern border.  The initiative could come from Iran.  An unequivocal defeat of Hamas, known to be funded and equipped by Iran, could be the trigger.  Israel could not be seen to glory in victory over Iran's proxy, so the baton could be passed to Hezbollah to continue the conflict. 

It might come from Nasrallah.  If Hamas was about to be destroyed, he might feel that Hezbollah could be the next target, and move to launch a full-scale pre-emptive attack on Israel.  Britain’s prestigious Royal Institute of International Affairs, otherwise known as Chatham House, in a recent wide-ranging survey of the prospects of an Israel-Hezbollah war, believes so.  It maintains that the closer Israel gets to defeating Hamas, the more likely it is that Nasrallah will widen the war.  It points out that he heads an army of more than 100,000 battle-hardened fighters equipped with thousands of missiles, rockets, and armed drones that can hit targets deep inside Israel with pinpoint accuracy. 

.           Incidentally, provided the Iranian ayatollahs are able to continue fighting Israel by way of their Hezbollah proxy, they are unlikely to grieve overmuch at the destruction of Hamas.  Although happy to use Hamas, to fund, equip and support it, Iran must always have regarded it as expendable.  Hamas is a Sunni organization.  The ultimate ambition of Iran’s Islamic Revolution is to impose the Shi’ite tradition of Islam across the whole world.  Unlike Shi’ite Hezbollah, Hamas could never form part of Iran’s Shia Crescent.  It would eventually have been cast aside.

Meanwhile, with Iran’s connivance, the Shi’ite Houthis have ramped up their attacks against shipping in the Red Sea, while the cross-border armed exchanges between Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been increasing in number and ferocity.  There are incidents on a daily basis.

Throughout December 24, for example, air raid sirens were sounding south of the Lebanon border in Avivim, Margaliot, Yiron, Shlomi, and the border Bedouin village of Arab al-Aramshe.  The IDF attacked the source of rockets launched towards Avivim, and bombed Hezbollah infrastructure with a tank near Kibbutz Yiron.

There were also alerts in Sasa, Matat, and Dovev following a suspected enemy drone infiltration and rocket attack.  Several rockets were also fired from Lebanon at the Keren Naftali peak in the Galilee Panhandle.  The IDF said it shelled the source of the fire with artillery, and attacked the source of Hezbollah fire and a cell of Hezbollah operatives close to the border near Shtula in the Western Galilee.

And so it goes on, day after day, while the toll in fatalities and casualties mounts.  Seven Israeli soldiers and four civilians have been killed since October 7, as have 121 Hezbollah fighters and 10 Lebanese civilians.   

Chatham House has pointed out that the initiative for a full-scale escalation of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is not restricted to Hezbollah or Iran.  It could also come from the Israeli side.  It asserted that there are those in the Israeli government, including certain ministers, who see an opportunity in the present situation to neutralize the threat to Israel’s northern front once and for all.  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not yet reached that conclusion, said Chatham House, implying that it is not beyond possibility.  If ministers threatened to resign over this issue, for example, he might change his mind in order to maintain the integrity of his government.

Chatham House is not alone.  In early November the media were reporting concern in Washington about Israel’s intentions on its northern border. The worries may have been accelerated by the mass evacuations of Israeli towns and villages within easy striking distance of the Lebanon border.  Almost certainly undertaken by Israel to pre-empt any possible Hezbollah invasion on the lines of Hamas’s murderous incursion of October 7, suspicious minds in Washington may have seen in it preparations by Israel for a second front.

Under the headline: “Scoop”, the on-line news media Axios reported on November 12 that US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had phoned his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Gallant, the previous day to urge restraint in the escalating tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border. According to Axios there was growing anxiety in the White House that Israeli military action in Lebanon could lead to a regional war.

Moreover, according to Chatham House, the White House believes some senior officers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) believe that a war in the north is inevitable.  It is the possibility of a pre-emptive Israeli strike, leading to a forceful Hezbollah response, that concerns Washington, since the US would inevitably be drawn into such a conflict. The last thing US President Joe Biden wants during re-election season is a war between Israel and Hezbollah that could lead the US into a direct confrontation with Iran.

So the US is intent on avoiding all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah. In an attempt to deter Hezbollah from launching deadlier attacks against northern Israel, Biden has ordered the deployment of a substantial amount of additional military assets to the Middle East, including an aircraft carrier, warships, a nuclear-powered vessel, attack helicopters, fighter jets, and 5,000 sailors.

On December 15 US National Security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters that the US believes the threat to Israel from Hezbollah “can be dealt with through diplomacy and does not require the launching of a new war.”  The best way to ensure that the tens of thousands of Israelis who have evacuated their homes in the north can return, he said, “is to come up with a negotiated outcome.” 

Is an Israel-Hezbollah war possible?  Certainly.  Is it inevitable?  Surely not.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 December 2023, and in the Jerusalem Post online as "Israel-Hezbollah war is possible but not inevitable":
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-779648

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 December 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29122023-is-an-israel-hezbollah-war-inevitable-oped/#:~:text=Britain's%20prestigious%20Royal%20Institute%20of,Nasrallah%20will%20widen%20the%20war.

Published in the MPC Journal, 2 January 2024:

https://mpc-journal.org/is-an-israel-hezbollah-war-inevitable/

What’s in store for Hamas and its leaders?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 December 2023

The leaders of Hamas responsible for the pogrom of October 7 will be hunted down and eliminated, even if it takes years

          On November 30 the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), in what appears to have been a world exclusive, published a detailed report of discussions said to have taken place between US and Israeli officials about possible plans for shortening the war in Gaza.

 The report indicates that these official level discussions are following up options suggested by Israel’s political and military leadership of ways to disempower Hamas.  One favoured approach turns to a precedent set in 1982.   At that time the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat had entrenched inside within Lebanon, and then–prime minister Ariel Sharon had authorised Israeli forces to invade and advance into the country.  In an attempt to dislodge the PLO, Israel was besieging the capital Beirut.  The US brokered a deal with Israel under which US, French and Italian troops entered Beirut and oversaw the departure of Arafat and his organization for a new base in Tunisia.. 

There is, of course, no question of offering the Hamas leadership the chance to escape with their thousands of followers to some country prepared to accept them. Planners are aware that though neither Hamas nor the PLO has any qualms about the use of terrorist tactics, the PLO is essentially a secular, political organisation while Hamas is a jihadist group inspired by extremist Islamist philosophy.  Hamas, unlike the PLO, would not respond favourably to a deal involving expulsion from what they consider their land. 

The idea under consideration is to capture  and expel thousands of lower-level Hamas fighters from the Gaza Strip, thus cutting away Hamas's power base – namely the tens of thousands of Hamas fighters it controls.  If achieved, this would undoubtedly contribute to the collapse of Hamas and shorten the war.  It would also prevent the group from ever retaking power, thus enabling Gaza to become governable in the future.

The process may have started.  In a statement released on December 11, the IDF announced: "More than 500 Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists have been apprehended by the IDF and Shin Bet over the past month and transferred for further questioning.”  

As for the Hamas leadership, the WSJ had yet another revelation up its sleeve.  On December 1 it asserted that, according to  Israeli officials, the intelligence services were preparing a covert operation akin to that following the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972. The report was later confirmed by Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar in a domestic broadcast on December 3.  Those leaders of the Hamas organization responsible for planning, organizing and perpetrating the invasion and pogrom of October 7, he said, would be hunted down and eliminated, even if it took years and no matter where they were living, or wherever they might choose to settle after their defeat.

The WSJ, citing unnamed senior Israeli and US officials, says another option, floated by the Israel Defense Forces, is to form a “Gaza Restoration Authority” backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, tasked with rebuilding a Hamas-free Gaza.

A major obstacle to this plan, the report says, is a fundamental disagreement between Israel and the US about whether the Palestinian Authority (PA) would, or should, be part of such a solution.  US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and a number of Washington spokespersons, have said repeatedly that the settled US vision of the post-war future is the unification of the governance of Gaza and the West Bank under the PA, leading to peace negotiations with a two-state solution as their goal. 

This unchanged US view was repeated by vice-president Kamala Harris, speaking at the Cop28 summit in Dubai on December 2. 

Post-war reconstruction efforts in Gaza, she said, must be undertaken “in the context of a clear political horizon for the Palestinian people towards a state of their own, led by a revitalized Palestinian Authority…”

Netanyahu, however, has made it clear that Israel would not agree to allow the PA, as presently constituted, to have any part in the future governance of Gaza.  On December 12, after a conversation with US President Joe Biden, he virtually rejected  the US aspiration of an eventual two-state solution.  He would not allow Gaza, he said, to be ruled by those who “teach, support or fund terrorism”, thereby ruling out both Hamas and the Fatah-run PA.

Biden sees the right-wing elements in Netanyahu’s government behind this.  In a speech on December 12, he is reported as saying that Netanyahu “has to change this government,” adding that Israel ultimately “can’t say no” to a Palestinian state.

A problem given little emphasis so far in the media is that, in addition to Hamas, other groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), control thousands of gunmen who not only took part in the October 7 atrocities, but are also holding hostages.  On November 27 CNN, based on a highly-placed diplomatic source, reported that more than 40 hostages taken from Israel into Gaza on October 7 are not currently in the custody of Hamas, but were being held by PIJ or other unidentified groups or individuals.  If accurate, this report complicates not only any future truce agreement, but also the wider issue of what an Israeli victory in the Gaza Strip might mean.

On November 28 the armed wing of PIJ, the Al Quds Brigades, said that it had handed over “some civilian detainees” as part of an exchange with Israel.  And indeed, together with Hamas gunmen, fighters from PIJ were seen handing over 17-year-old Mia Leimberg.  This was the first time that PIJ, or any other party, had publicly acknowledged being involved in negotiations.

As regards future truce agreements, the terms have so far required Hamas to hand over hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. They depend on Hamas actually possessing the hostages to fulfill their part of the agreement.  If Hamas does not, and cannot persuade other groups to participate in any future deal, the only recourse left to Israel would be to locate the hostages itself by achieving a complete victory over opposing forces in the Strip.  Subsequently, Israel would have to treat all militant groups and their leaders exactly as how they plan to deal with Hamas and its leadership.

 Whichever way they look, the future for Hamas, its allies and their leaders seems bleak.  Perhaps on October 7 they bit off rather more than they could chew.

Published in Jerusalem Post, 18 December 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-778420

Published in Eurasia Review, 23 December 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/23122023-whats-in-store-for-hamas-and-its-leaders-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 25 December 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/whats-in-store-for-hamas-and-its-leaders/

The governance of post-war Gaza

 Published in the Jerusalem Report, issue dated 25 December 2023

            Stated briefly, Israel’s war aims as articulated by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, government ministers and Israel Defense Force (IDF) leaders are to destroy Hamas and ensure the safe return of the 240-odd civilians it is holding hostage.

The realization is growing that by the time the IDF have succeeded, a plan for Gaza's future governance must have been developed, agreed by those involved, and be ready for Implementation.  On November 2 the Reuters news agency, citing authoritative sources, reported that the US and Israel were exploring options for the future of the Gaza Strip, including a possible multinational force to keep the peace until a more stable leadership is established.  Such a scenario builds on US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s concept, laid out during his recent visit to Israel.  He said that he understood that Israel did not want to control Gaza, and he believed a revitalized Palestinian Authority (PA) should eventually be in charge of the territory.

On November 6 both the rumoured US-Israel negotiations and Blinken’s suggestion were apparently nullified.  In a TV interview Netanyahu said for the first time: “Israel will, for an indefinite period, have the overall security responsibility, because we have seen what happens when we do not have it.” 

His statement was as surprising for what he said as for what he omitted.  Maintaining that IDF forces would be stationed in Gaza for an indefinite period after the fighting had ceased seems to imply an intention for Israel to repossess the Strip.  What Netanyahu omits is any indication of how he sees Gaza being administered post-Hamas, and by whom.  Who would be responsible for redeveloping the ruined city, for housing the displaced people returning to their home areas, for administering the essential services?  Surely Netanyahu does not envisage a military occupation of Gaza on the lines of Area C in the West Bank.

Speaking in Japan on November 8, Blinken, while acknowledging that "some transition period" might be needed at the end of the conflict, virtually rejected Netanyahu’s vision of continued and indefinite IDF presence in Gaza post-war.  He strongly advocated a united and Palestinian-led government for a united Gaza–West Bank after the war ends, as a step toward Palestinian statehood.  “We’re very clear on no reoccupation,” he said, “just as we’re very clear on no displacement of the Palestinian population.”

            A few weeks into the war, the Washington Institute published a thoughtful analysis of what might follow an Israeli victory over Hamas.

As a starting point they acknowledged that it would be a mistake for Israel to destroy Hamas and then leave Gaza as an ungoverned space without a clear sense of what comes next. They insisted that the US and others must ensure that a plan is ready to be implemented once the IDF withdraws.  What the Institute did not consider was Netanyahu’s latest proposal – that the IDF might actually remain in place to guarantee that the Strip no longer posed any sort of security threat to Israel.

            The idea of a Gaza administered under some as yet undefined group or consortium, with the IDF as its security force, bristles with difficulties, and is almost certainly a non-starter.  Moreover Blinken’s idea that the PA would eventually take over the administration of Gaza simply could not work with the PA in its present condition. 

The PA is currently riddled with corruption and inefficiency.  President Mahmoud Abbas, who is scarcely capable of controlling the situation in Areas A and B of the West Bank, areas nominally under its control, is profoundly unpopular with the Palestinian public. In the most recent poll of Palestinian opinion, nearly 80% said he should step down.  So an essential prerequisite before Blinken’s ideas could be put into effect would be meaningful, substantive PA reform.  Without obvious and significant changes to its administrative structure and methods of operation, neither local Palestinians nor international donors would have confidence in the its ability to extend its authority to Gaza.

The Washington Institute hypothesized that a proposed Gaza Interim Administration (GIA) should have three main components:  a civilian administration; a law enforcement system; and an international coalition for reconstruction and development.

They believe that the civilian administration of post-Hamas Gaza should be led and run by Palestinians. The departments of a fully functioning local government – health, education, transportation, judiciary, social welfare – should, they maintain, be operated by a mix of technocrats and administrators from Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora.

They envisage public safety and law enforcement being directed by a consortium of those Arab states which have reached peace or normalization agreements with Israel. Only those states, it opines, would have Israel’s confidence, which is essential for the effort to succeed.

They suggest that a new Arab-run agency responsible for repair, reconstruction, and development should be established.  Billions of dollars would be needed to reconstruct Gaza city and to fund projects such as creating a new Gaza port and building new industrial zones to provide employment options.

Finally, the Institute believes that while Arab administrators, officers, and officials, obviously including Palestinians, should take the lead in all these efforts, the US and other supporters of a peaceful, constructive future for Palestinians would have a vital role to play in conceiving the plans, and in supporting those entrusted to carry them forward.

Whether the ideas put forward by the Washington Institute come to fruition, or others, perhaps more radical, emerge, how Gaza is to be governed after the IDF have achieved their victory over Hamas clearly requires urgent and detailed consideration. Diplomatic efforts, led by the US, must be initiated as soon as possible aimed at establishing an effective mechanism for planning Gaza’s post-war future.

Published in the Jerusalem Report issue dated 25 December 2023, and on the Jerusalem Post website under the title: "Israel-Hamas War: Finding rulers for Gaza when the fighting ends" on 23 December 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-779070

UN chief Guterres: right problem, wrong solution

Published in Jerusalem Post, 11 December 2023

          On December 5 UN secretary-general, Antonio Guterres, wrote to the 15 members of the Security Council invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter. This article states that the secretary-general may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, “may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”

          In his letter, Guterres called on the Security Council to vote in favor of a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas conflict in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.  He said that the weeks of fighting had “created appalling human suffering, physical destruction and collective trauma across Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (the UN persists in regarding the Gaza Strip as territory occupied by Israel, despite the fact that Israel  totally evacuated the enclave in 2005).  He warned that “an even worse situation could unfold, including epidemic diseases,” and concluded: “The international community has a responsibility to use all its influence to prevent further escalation and end this crisis.”

UN spokesman Stéphane Dujarric said this was the first time Guterres had felt compelled to invoke Article 99 since taking office in 2017, and he hoped the Security Council “will be moved to push and put in place a humanitarian ceasefire.” 

Soon after Guterres’s letter was published, a resolution drafted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was submitted to the Security Council.  It demanded an immediate ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 

To pass, a Security Council resolution needs at least nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the five permanent members – US, Russia, China, France or Britain.  When put to the vote on December 8 the UAE resolution received 13 votes in favor, the UK abstained, and the US exercised its veto. 

While in the drafting phase the US had proposed substantial amendments to the text, including a condemnation of "the terrorist attacks by Hamas in Israel, including those on 7 October 2023."  The UAE did not add this to the text.

   Britain's UN Ambassador Barbara Woodward said her country abstained because there was no condemnation of Hamas.  "Israel needs to be able to address the threat posed by Hamas,” she told the council, “and it needs to do so in a manner that abides by international humanitarian law so that such an attack can never be carried out again."

Deputy US Ambassador to the UN, Robert Wood, told the council that the draft resolution was a rushed, unbalanced text "that was divorced from reality…We do not support this resolution's call for an unsustainable ceasefire that will only plant the seeds for the next war."

Guterres was right to draw attention to the dire and deteriorating living conditions within the Gaza Strip, but his proposed solution – the Security Council voting in favor of a ceasefire – is misconceived on practical grounds, if on no other. “Ceasefire” is universally defined as an agreement between two armed forces to stop fighting.  The Security Council cannot impose one.  The UN could certainly request Israel, a sovereign member, to lay down its arms unilaterally, but how can the Security Council, in Dujarric’s words, “put in place a humanitarian ceasefire”?  What influence does the Security Council have on Hamas that could induce it to stop firing rockets indiscriminately into Israel?  

 In reality what Guterres is seeking is for Israel to cease its efforts to eliminate Hamas, thus allowing the terrorist organization to retain its control of the Gaza Strip, continuing into an indefinite future its unremitting intention of destroying Israel.

Instead of throwing a lifeline to Hamas by way of a ceasefire, Guterres should be urging the Security Council to encourage an increased flow of humanitarian aid into the Strip.  At present the provision of aid is haphazard.  Agencies send what they can when they can,  A special UN agency could be established, charged with coordinating the efforts of the UN, governments, non-governmental agencies and charities to bring much enhanced relief to the civilian population, adequate to provide for its needs. 

Among the partners providing the humanitarian cargoes are the US, the EU, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  The work of these agencies needs to be coordinated and enhanced by recruiting other partners willing to contribute to a major humanitarian effort, so that the flow of aid can be brought up to the level required.  Here is where Guterres should be devoting his efforts.

As for Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are taking the greatest care to avoid violating internationally accepted laws of war.  Information released to the public daily demonstrates the steps they are taking, over and above what is strictly required of them, to minimize the effect on the civilian population of their anti-Hamas campaign.  They are even distributing maps indicating exactly where they next intend to attack Hamas - while on December 7 Israeli military spokesman Elad Goren told reporters that the Kerem Shalom border crossing will open “in the next few days “as another inspection station to expedite the entry of more humanitarian assistance into Gaza.

There is another button Guterres could be pressing – urging the Security Council to demand that Hamas and its allied terrorist groups release all hostages immediately, on pain of being charged in the International Criminal Court as war criminals.  Taking hostages is accepted universally as a war crime under international law, and if found guilty its perpetrators can be arrested and tried in over 170 countries world-wide. Perhaps a word from the UN’s secretary-general underlining the legal consequences of holding hostages would help bring about their release.

Deputy US Ambassador Wood said recently, “we remain focused on the difficult and sensitive diplomacy geared to getting more hostages released, more aid flowing into Gaza, and better protection of civilians.”  These are the issues that should also be Guterres’s top priorities in the on-going Israel-Gaza conflict .

Meanwhile the faster the IDF can finish the job of disempowering Hamas and its allies, the faster Gazans can take the first steps towards recovery, and a future free from the baleful influence of the Islamist terror group which has deprived them of freedom and prosperity for seventeen years.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "UN Secretary-General has the wrong solution", on 11 December 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-777458

Taking hostages is a war crime

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 5 December 2023

The events of October 7 have proved too flagrant to be ignored by the body that is supposed to be the world’s watchdog on protecting and advancing human rights. 

The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was established in 2006 with one over-riding purpose – to rectify the egregious faults of its predecessor body, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Over the 60 years of its existence the Commission had accrued a raft of objectionable practices, high among them an obvious anti-Israel bias.

UNHRC is UNHCR with just one letter transposed, and it soon became obvious that all the UN had done was to substitute Tweedledee for Tweedledum.  It did not take long before the same anti-Israel stance began to emerge from the new Council.  Since its founding it has passed more than 90 resolutions condemning Israel – more than against Iran, Syria, North Korea, China, Russia, Cuba and Venezuela combined. The Council would have the world believe that Israel is more guilty of human rights abuses than all the blatant abusers of human rights put together.

Its determined anti-Israel position was actually codified in a decision in 2006 to include as a permanent feature of its sessions a review of alleged human rights abuses by Israel.   Even Human Rights Watch, no friend of Israel, urged the Council to look as well at international human rights and humanitarian law violations committed by Palestinian armed groups. This proposal was not followed through.

Now the Council’s commission of inquiry has undertaken an investigation on “possible international crimes and violations of international human rights law in Israel and the Palestinian territories since October 7, 2023.”  The Commission’s findings will be delivered to the Human Rights Council in June 2024.

Given the long-standing anti-Israel bias of the chairperson, Navi Pillay, as well as several commission members, what sort of picture it will eventually present is a matter for speculation.  But it is perhaps a hopeful sign that on October 10 the commission included the following in a media release: “The taking of hostages is a violation of international law and constitutes an international crime.”

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a unique role in the system of international humanitarian law.  It works on battlefields, reports on the problems encountered, and makes practical proposals for improving international humanitarian law.  Its proposals have led to the revision and extension of international humanitarian law, notably in 1906, 1929, 1949 and 1977.  This special role of the ICRC is now formally recognized by the states party to the Geneva Conventions – that is, practically the whole world.

According to the ICRC, the prohibition on hostage-taking is now “firmly entrenched in customary international law and is considered a war crime.”

Among the elements of the offence in international armed conflict are:

1. The perpetrator seized, detained or otherwise held hostage one or more persons.

2. The perpetrator threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain such person or persons.

3. The perpetrator intended to compel a State…to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or the release of such person or persons.

On October 11 the Lieber Institute published a lengthy, detailed and explicit survey of the provisions in international law regarding the taking of hostages. The Lieber Institute is situated at West Point and is part of the US Military Academy.  Its purpose is to contribute to the global dialogue on the complex issues surround the law of war, and to maintain the primacy of law in today’s armed conflicts.  It seeks to bridge the divide between legal scholarship and battlefield experience.

   The Lieber document explains that the provisions of the law of armed conflict depend on how a conflict is classified. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas is best characterized as non-international in character. Therefore the applicable treaty law is Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and this unequivocally forbids hostage-taking. The International Court of Justice has determined that “The taking of hostages is prohibited.”

The Lieber document goes on to explain that as a war crime, the offence of hostage-taking is subject to universal jurisdiction.  That means that any State, even those with no connection to the hostage-taking, is free to  prosecute offenders. Many States have accordingly criminalised the offence in their penal codes.

On the matter of hostage-taking alone – the unspeakably brutal onslaught on innocent civilians is an issue in its own right – the Lieber paper adjudges that Hamas has “without the slightest doubt” violated the law of armed conflict.  It concludes: “Hostage-taking was a central feature of Hamas’s opening salvo in its conflict in Israel…those involved are subject to worldwide prosecution as war criminals under international criminal law.” 

The basis for this conclusion is the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, a UN treaty under which states agree to prohibit and punish hostage taking. The creation of an anti-hostage-taking treaty was a project initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976.  The convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1979 and came into force in 1983.  As of October 2016, 176 states are party to the convention.

Too little public consideration has been given to the likelihood of the Hamas organisation eventually being found guilty by the UN and other international bodies of the war crime of hostage-taking, and consequently that its leaders would then be liable to be arrested, charged and imprisoned in virtually any part of the world.  

Ismail Haniyeh may believe himself safe in Qatar, but in Qatar he would have to stay.  If Yahya Sinwar, who masterminded the October 7 onslaught, is not captured by the IDF within the Gaza Strip, he would be on the run for the rest of his life. Mohammed Deif, architect of the Hamas tunnel complex, Marwan Issa, Khaled Meshaal, Mahmoud Zahar – they and a host more leaders of Hamas would have nowhere to hide but in the few states not prepared to fulfil their obligations under the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, and prosecute them.  Even so, they would all, no doubt, have in mind the fate of the perpetrators of the Munich Olympics massacres, given the remarks by Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar in a domestic broadcast on December 3.  Israel will hunt down the Hamas leaders, he said, even if it takes years

All provided that Israel achieves its primary war aim, and destroys Hamas.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 5 December 2023: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-776542

Published in Eurasia Review, 8 December 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/08122023-taking-hostages-is-a-war-crime-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 11 December 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/taking-hostages-is-a-war-crime/