Wednesday, 3 July 2013
The Muslim world and Israel – is peace possible?
To adapt W S Gilbert’s well-known lyric:
“They themselves have said it,
And it’s greatly to their credit…”
“They” are the 22 members of the Arab League (21 since last November, when Syria was suspended), but speaking now – according to their own website – for all 57 Muslim majority states, including Iran, Pakistan and Malaysia.
What have they said? It is contained in what is known as the “Arab Peace Initiative”, issued initially by the Arab League in 2002, subsequently readopted several times, and only a few months ago, as a gesture to US Secretary of State John Kerry, somewhat softened in interpretation.
On March 20, 2002, a few days ahead of a summit of the Arab League to be held in Beirut, then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia electrified the assembled Arab foreign ministers by floating a peace plan for Palestine-Israel.
Basically, he called for peace with Israel in return for Israel withdrawing from all territories captured in the 1967 war and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee crisis based on UN Resolution 194 (a sort of "right of return" or, for those who do not want to go back, agreed compensation). The quid pro quo for Israel’s acceptance of the plan would be that all 22 Arab States would consider the Arab–Israeli conflict over, sign a peace agreement and establish normal relations with Israel. The plan was discussed for a week, amendments were incorporated (notably a clause which prevented the 350,000 or more Palestinians living in Lebanon claiming Lebanese citizenship), and it was adopted on March 28, 2002.
Shortly after President Obama took office for the first time, George Mitchell, the US special envoy to the Middle East, announced that the new administration intended to "incorporate" the Arab League’s initiative into its Middle East policy. During Obama’s first term the peace effort got as far as several face-to-face meetings between Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but petered out when Israel’s moratorium on construction in the West Bank came to an end.
Obama’s second term started with a clear intention by the new administration to give high priority to a renewed effort at brokering a deal between Israel and the Palestinians. This time the lead was to be taken not by a special envoy, but by the newly-appointed Secretary of State, John Kerry. He soon proved himself dedicated, tireless and unremitting in his effort to narrow the differences between the two sides to the point at which they would agree to meet. On April 29, 2013, he hosted an Arab League delegation in Washington, during which Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani for the first time signalled that a “comparable and mutual agreed minor swap of the land” would be an acceptable interpretation of the Arab peace initiative’s requirements.
When first issued, the initiative was perceived by the Israeli government as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and they made no official response to the proposals. Within Israel, however, reactions divided as might be expected between right- and left-wing political opinion. What is not generally known, however, or has been forgotten, is that during Ehud Olmert’s premiership a semi-official Arab League delegation actually came to Jerusalem and discussed the Arab peace initiative with the prime minister and then foreign minister, Tzipi Livni.
Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, and his Jordanian counterpart, Abdul Ilah Khatib, came to Israel on July 25, 2007. At a joint press conference in Jerusalem, Khatib said the offer he and his colleague had come to present was an “opportunity of historic magnitude — it will provide Israel with the security and recognition and acceptance in this region to which Israel has long aspired.” Gheit added that he planned to present a report to the Arab Ministerial Council within days and “then we shall probably suggest some ideas to strengthen and ensure the continuation of this process.”
They “were never heard of again,” said an Israeli Foreign Ministry official.
Opinion within Israel remains as divided as ever on the Arab peace plan. Only last week cabinet minister Yaakov Peri, his Yesh Atid party’s lead on peace talks and former head of Shin Bet, warmly endorsed it. "The initiative signals the path ahead," he said.
International Relations and Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz, is less enthusiastic. “No peace initiative can replace bilateral negotiations between us and the Palestinians,” he said in June. “We need to worry about genuine peace with genuine security — these items are not included in the Arab Peace Initiative…and it would not be right to discuss them with the entire Arab world.”
But this view is based on an “either-or” perception of peace negotiations – either the Arab peace initiative, or face-to-face negotiations between the PA and Israel. It would be more realistic to regard the prize offered by the Arab initiative – a peace agreement between Israel and the whole Muslim world, and the normalization of relations – as a bonus that would, in whole or in part, follow the conclusion of an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For the terms of an Israel-Palestine accord ending the interminable dispute would doubtless also fulfil the requirements of the initiative.
This interpretation of the situation may explain the persistent rumour that surfaced during an earlier Middle East visit by John Kerry. An authoritative speculation, which described itself as an “exclusive”, affirmed that Kerry had obtained the agreement of both Netanyahu and Abbas for a novel plan to run peace negotiations simultaneously on twin tracks. The first track would have Israel facing the Palestinian Authority (PA) across the table; the second would, for the first time ever, see Israel facing the Arab League in direct discussions.
Last month, speaking during a debate in the Knesset on the Arab peace initiative, Netanyahu said: "We are listening to every initiative - the Arab initiative has been mentioned - and we are prepared to discuss initiatives that are proposals and not edicts."
Opinion polls are notoriously unreliable – for public opinion is notoriously fickle – but one carried out in Israel in May indicated that 73.5 percent of Hebrew-speaking Israelis had never heard of the Arab initiative. When the plan was explained to them, though, 55 percent of respondents said they would support the initiative to some degree. When they were asked how they would respond if the prime minister backed the initiative, the number of supporters jumped to 69 percent.
In short, if the Arab peace initiative were in some way associated with, or incorporated into, meaningful bilateral peace negotiations, Israel’s prime minister would have more than two-thirds of the nation behind him – possible compensation for the loss of half his cabinet, and a prize no less tempting, perhaps, than that held out by the initiative itself.
But whether the Muslim world as a whole, which can rarely live at peace with itself and is at present in a state of turmoil, would be willing or able to live up to its declared intention – that is a quite different story.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 3 July 2013:
http://ow.ly/Zx5l30edbvm
Published in the Eurasia Review, 3 July 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/03072013-the-muslim-world-and-israel-is-peace-possible-oped/
Monday, 1 July 2013
The optimistic Mr Kerry
“I would not have returned here five times – I would not be here now – if I didn’t have a belief that this is possible.” The words of US Secretary of State John Kerry on 27 June 2013, prior to joining Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, for a long working dinner at Jerusalem’s David Citadel hotel.
By “this”, Kerry must surely mean a peace agreement ending the interminable Palestinian-Israeli dispute – though he would undoubtedly count it a feather in his cap simply to engineer the presence of the two men at the same negotiating table. That in itself would be a noteworthy first step in his current peace-making endeavours – a step his predecessor in office, Hillary Clinton, achieved, though with no positive outcome, back in September 2010.
Has John Kerry a trick or two up his sleeve to ensure that history does not repeat itself – that talks launched with high hopes, expressed by all parties, do not again peter out in a welter of recriminations?
During an earlier Middle East visit by John Kerry, an authoritative speculation, which described itself as an “exclusive”, affirmed that Kerry had obtained the agreement of both Netanyahu and Abbas for a novel plan to run peace negotiations simultaneously on twin tracks. The first track would have Israel facing the Palestinian Authority (PA) across the table; the second would, for the first time ever, see Israel facing the Arab League in direct discussions.
If true, this – or an arrangement along these lines – would mirror the device adopted by Hillary Clinton back in 2010 designed to give political cover to Mahmoud Abbas, since sitting down at the same table as Israel’s prime minister would be sticking his neck out as regards his own Palestinian constituency. To back his gamble, Clinton persuaded both Egypt’s then-president, Hosni Mubarak, and Jordan’s King Abdullah, to attend the launch of the negotiations. In the event Abbas, who also had the backing of the Arab League for his presence, was well supported.
By bringing the Arab League directly into the negotiating process, Kerry would similarly be providing the PA president with strong political backing to justify his involvement in direct face-to-face peace talks. Nor is Abbas alone in requiring political support. If Kerry succeeds in bringing the parties together, Netanyahu too needs to be assured that sufficient of his coalition government, and of the Israeli public, are behind him. For both men must surely have in mind the dangers of moving too far or too fast in this peace process minefield. Hovering over any peace discussions must, on the one hand, be the fate of Anwar Sadat (assassinated in 1981 by an Islamist extremist), and on the other of Yitzhak Rabin (assassinated in 1995 by a Jewish extremist).
Which is enough to explain the extreme caution being exercised by both parties to John Kerry’s unremitting efforts to bring them together. In his latest visit to the region he has been unsparing of time and effort in repeatedly meeting Abbas and Netanyahu, as he tries to hammer out a formula, acceptable to both sides, that can lead to the launch of meaningful face-to-face peace discussions.
Media speculation is rife as to what inducements Kerry may have up his sleeve – he has been extremely guarded in his public pronouncements. One persistent rumor, which first surfaced back in the spring, is that an Israel-Palestinian-US-Jordan summit might precede direct talks between Israel and the PA. A press report in Jordan on June 29 reiterated this, and was subsequently qualified, though scarcely denied, by a Jordanian official, who said that such a meeting was not “imminent”.
As John Kerry leaves the Middle East again, after four days of shuttling between the sides, he would assert that his glass is half-full, not half-empty. He affirms that he has “considerably” narrowed the gaps between Israel and the Palestinians, and he believes the start of final-status negotiations could be “within reach”. He declares himself impressed with the “serious commitment” by both sides to resume talks.
Announcing that he would be leaving a team of experts in the region to continue efforts, and that he plans on returning soon, Mr Kerry – ever the optimist – maintains:
“I know progress when I see it, and we are making progress.”
Published in the Jeusalem Post on-line, 1 July 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-optimistic-Mr-Kerry-318308?prmusr=tv7%2frMMPr8oS3f1H%2f%2ba6kDeGLij1t2EVnavx3RK36hW%2bMwH8C8kwGkFQx1pDT9j%2f
By “this”, Kerry must surely mean a peace agreement ending the interminable Palestinian-Israeli dispute – though he would undoubtedly count it a feather in his cap simply to engineer the presence of the two men at the same negotiating table. That in itself would be a noteworthy first step in his current peace-making endeavours – a step his predecessor in office, Hillary Clinton, achieved, though with no positive outcome, back in September 2010.
Has John Kerry a trick or two up his sleeve to ensure that history does not repeat itself – that talks launched with high hopes, expressed by all parties, do not again peter out in a welter of recriminations?
During an earlier Middle East visit by John Kerry, an authoritative speculation, which described itself as an “exclusive”, affirmed that Kerry had obtained the agreement of both Netanyahu and Abbas for a novel plan to run peace negotiations simultaneously on twin tracks. The first track would have Israel facing the Palestinian Authority (PA) across the table; the second would, for the first time ever, see Israel facing the Arab League in direct discussions.
If true, this – or an arrangement along these lines – would mirror the device adopted by Hillary Clinton back in 2010 designed to give political cover to Mahmoud Abbas, since sitting down at the same table as Israel’s prime minister would be sticking his neck out as regards his own Palestinian constituency. To back his gamble, Clinton persuaded both Egypt’s then-president, Hosni Mubarak, and Jordan’s King Abdullah, to attend the launch of the negotiations. In the event Abbas, who also had the backing of the Arab League for his presence, was well supported.
By bringing the Arab League directly into the negotiating process, Kerry would similarly be providing the PA president with strong political backing to justify his involvement in direct face-to-face peace talks. Nor is Abbas alone in requiring political support. If Kerry succeeds in bringing the parties together, Netanyahu too needs to be assured that sufficient of his coalition government, and of the Israeli public, are behind him. For both men must surely have in mind the dangers of moving too far or too fast in this peace process minefield. Hovering over any peace discussions must, on the one hand, be the fate of Anwar Sadat (assassinated in 1981 by an Islamist extremist), and on the other of Yitzhak Rabin (assassinated in 1995 by a Jewish extremist).
Which is enough to explain the extreme caution being exercised by both parties to John Kerry’s unremitting efforts to bring them together. In his latest visit to the region he has been unsparing of time and effort in repeatedly meeting Abbas and Netanyahu, as he tries to hammer out a formula, acceptable to both sides, that can lead to the launch of meaningful face-to-face peace discussions.
Media speculation is rife as to what inducements Kerry may have up his sleeve – he has been extremely guarded in his public pronouncements. One persistent rumor, which first surfaced back in the spring, is that an Israel-Palestinian-US-Jordan summit might precede direct talks between Israel and the PA. A press report in Jordan on June 29 reiterated this, and was subsequently qualified, though scarcely denied, by a Jordanian official, who said that such a meeting was not “imminent”.
As John Kerry leaves the Middle East again, after four days of shuttling between the sides, he would assert that his glass is half-full, not half-empty. He affirms that he has “considerably” narrowed the gaps between Israel and the Palestinians, and he believes the start of final-status negotiations could be “within reach”. He declares himself impressed with the “serious commitment” by both sides to resume talks.
Announcing that he would be leaving a team of experts in the region to continue efforts, and that he plans on returning soon, Mr Kerry – ever the optimist – maintains:
“I know progress when I see it, and we are making progress.”
Published in the Jeusalem Post on-line, 1 July 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-optimistic-Mr-Kerry-318308?prmusr=tv7%2frMMPr8oS3f1H%2f%2ba6kDeGLij1t2EVnavx3RK36hW%2bMwH8C8kwGkFQx1pDT9j%2f
Sunday, 30 June 2013
Hamas's real enemy
No, not Israel. Hamas knows full well that, provided it continues to desist from unprovoked and indiscriminate rocket attacks on civilian targets, Israel poses no threat – which is why, ever since the Pillar of Defense cease-fire, it has largely refrained from mounting such attacks itself, and undertaken considerable efforts to prevent wilder activists within Gaza from launching them either.
And no, not the Palestinian Authority, though Hamas leaders undoubtedly have their eye on the possible prize of eventually taking over the PA and its presidency and thus controlling the whole of the Palestinian body politic. They denounce PA President Mahmoud Abbas at every turn, declare that his term of office expired six years ago, reject outright his approach to the United Nations last autumn for recognition of Palestine within the context of a two-state solution, and seek to undermine his authority within the West Bank at every opportunity.
Hamas’s real enemy is the enemy within – within Gaza, that is – the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist groups, such as the Majlis, who call themselves “Salafi jihadists” to the fury of leading Salafi scholars. In fact Salafi is a religious movement within Sunni Islam which looks back to earliest Muslim practice, and leading Salafist clerics have gone so far as to issue fatwas condemning suicide bombing and the killing of innocent civilians, declaring it to be totally forbidden in Islam.
The extremist organisation the Majlis was launched as recently as June 2012 by way of a video, released from the Sinai Peninsula. It featured seven fighters, two of whom had carried out a suicide cross-border attack on Israel. The Majlis has subsequently embarked on a policy of vying with Hamas for public support. Criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood in general, and Hamas in particular, has been a recurring theme. It is utterly opposed to Egypt’s political accommodation with the US, which has been maintained – for good financial reasons – despite the access to power of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its objections to Hamas in Gaza are twofold: failure of Hamas to apply Islamic law rigorously enough, and outrage at the crackdown by the Hamas administration on Salafi activists, who continually attempt to seize the anti-Israel initiative from Hamas by firing “unauthorised” rockets from within Gaza.
Defiantly, a senior Salafist in Gaza recently stated: 'We will continue the jihad, regardless of the stance of Egypt or Hamas,' adding that the Majlis has 'precise knowledge on the complete cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in the war against the Salafists.' In a similar vein, the Majlis recently released a statement calling for the release of all Salafist detainees held prisoner by the Hamas government.
Salafist pressure within Gaza to enforce Islamic law more rigidly seems to have some effect on Hamas policy – one example is the recent move to institute gender segregation in Gaza schools. Yet in the eyes of the Salafist militants, these Islamization moves are merely cosmetic, do not compensate for imprisoning and torturing Salafist brethren, and so cannot alter the Majlis efforts to recruit public opinion within Gaza against Hamas and in favour of its own proactive stance towards Israel.
As David Barnett reports in the Longwarjournal, tensions between Hamas and the Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip are on the increase, especially since April 30, 2013, when Hithem Ziad Ibrahim Masshal, a well known jihadist, was targeted by Israel and killed. On May 1 a jihadist media unit suggested that Masshal had been set up by elements within Hamas, echoing a Facebook posting claiming that Masshal had been offered by Hamas to Israel "on a golden platter".
On the same day as Masshal's death, the Arab newspaper Asharq al Awsat reported that members of Hamas's al Qassam Brigades had been "deployed in the border areas of the Gaza Strip replacing policemen with the aim of preventing the firing of rockets from Gaza." A report in Al Ayyam stated that Hamas has warned Salafi jihadist groups in the Gaza Strip that those who fire rockets will be arrested and that the firing of rockets should not occur "without a general national consensus" on the issue.
The antagonism between Hamas and the jihadists within Gaza continued to rumble on. On May 2, Hamas's Interior Ministry announced the arrest of six Salafists, four of whom were accused of stealing rockets from other terror groups in the Gaza Strip. The jihadist media unit repudiated the charge, and said that those detained had been arrested only because of their beliefs.
More recently Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip have been complaining about the Hamas-run Field Control Force, which has increased deployment in the Gaza Strip to prevent the firing of rockets into Israel. According to Al Ayyam, the Field Control Force "has managed to foil many attempts to fire rockets over the past two weeks."
To bring the story of fraternal strife more or less up to date, the Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of the Islamic Jihad Movement, reported on June 24 that Abu Al-Qassem, one of its leaders, had been shot and killed in Gaza by security officers of the Hamas-led Ministry of Interior. The Brigades said that, by killing Abu Al-Qassem, the security forces of Hamas “granted Israel a free service whether they intended to or not”, since Al-Qassem headed Israel’s assassination list. It added that it would not remain idle while “certain groups” are attacking it, trying to confiscate its weapons, or trying to prevent it from defending Palestine and its people. Accordingly, its reaction to Al-Qassem’s assassination was to suspend contacts with the Hamas rulers of Gaza.
The Hamas interior ministry said Al-Qassem had opened fire on police, prompting them to respond, while Hamas government spokesman Ihab al-Ghussein said: "I hope everyone will await the results of the commission of inquiry which has begun its work."
Meanwhile Gaza jihadists continue to defy the Hamas administration. On June 24 six rockets were fired from Gaza at southern Israel, two of which were launched towards Ashkelon and were successfully intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system. Israel, which holds Hamas responsible for what happens inside Gaza, responded with airstrikes against four military targets in central and south Gaza.
Since Hamas gets all the pain, and none of the gain, from these jihadist initiatives, it is no wonder that Hamas is exerting every effort to prevent “unauthorised” rocket attacks against Israel, and is cracking down hard on ultra-extremist groups which are opposed tooth and nail to its policies. Hamas, bidding for widespread Palestinian popular approval, has a snarling dog yapping at its heels.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 30 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Hamass-real-enemy-318182?prmusr=3h4tr%2fLatbHBG6RjqNCmOc9iFflg3nZM9L3tx277Gqek%2fhhzxqPIZNyAlGXZecXk
Published in the Eurasia Review, 27 June 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/27062013-hamass-real-enemy-oped/
And no, not the Palestinian Authority, though Hamas leaders undoubtedly have their eye on the possible prize of eventually taking over the PA and its presidency and thus controlling the whole of the Palestinian body politic. They denounce PA President Mahmoud Abbas at every turn, declare that his term of office expired six years ago, reject outright his approach to the United Nations last autumn for recognition of Palestine within the context of a two-state solution, and seek to undermine his authority within the West Bank at every opportunity.
Hamas’s real enemy is the enemy within – within Gaza, that is – the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist groups, such as the Majlis, who call themselves “Salafi jihadists” to the fury of leading Salafi scholars. In fact Salafi is a religious movement within Sunni Islam which looks back to earliest Muslim practice, and leading Salafist clerics have gone so far as to issue fatwas condemning suicide bombing and the killing of innocent civilians, declaring it to be totally forbidden in Islam.
The extremist organisation the Majlis was launched as recently as June 2012 by way of a video, released from the Sinai Peninsula. It featured seven fighters, two of whom had carried out a suicide cross-border attack on Israel. The Majlis has subsequently embarked on a policy of vying with Hamas for public support. Criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood in general, and Hamas in particular, has been a recurring theme. It is utterly opposed to Egypt’s political accommodation with the US, which has been maintained – for good financial reasons – despite the access to power of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its objections to Hamas in Gaza are twofold: failure of Hamas to apply Islamic law rigorously enough, and outrage at the crackdown by the Hamas administration on Salafi activists, who continually attempt to seize the anti-Israel initiative from Hamas by firing “unauthorised” rockets from within Gaza.
Defiantly, a senior Salafist in Gaza recently stated: 'We will continue the jihad, regardless of the stance of Egypt or Hamas,' adding that the Majlis has 'precise knowledge on the complete cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in the war against the Salafists.' In a similar vein, the Majlis recently released a statement calling for the release of all Salafist detainees held prisoner by the Hamas government.
Salafist pressure within Gaza to enforce Islamic law more rigidly seems to have some effect on Hamas policy – one example is the recent move to institute gender segregation in Gaza schools. Yet in the eyes of the Salafist militants, these Islamization moves are merely cosmetic, do not compensate for imprisoning and torturing Salafist brethren, and so cannot alter the Majlis efforts to recruit public opinion within Gaza against Hamas and in favour of its own proactive stance towards Israel.
As David Barnett reports in the Longwarjournal, tensions between Hamas and the Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip are on the increase, especially since April 30, 2013, when Hithem Ziad Ibrahim Masshal, a well known jihadist, was targeted by Israel and killed. On May 1 a jihadist media unit suggested that Masshal had been set up by elements within Hamas, echoing a Facebook posting claiming that Masshal had been offered by Hamas to Israel "on a golden platter".
On the same day as Masshal's death, the Arab newspaper Asharq al Awsat reported that members of Hamas's al Qassam Brigades had been "deployed in the border areas of the Gaza Strip replacing policemen with the aim of preventing the firing of rockets from Gaza." A report in Al Ayyam stated that Hamas has warned Salafi jihadist groups in the Gaza Strip that those who fire rockets will be arrested and that the firing of rockets should not occur "without a general national consensus" on the issue.
The antagonism between Hamas and the jihadists within Gaza continued to rumble on. On May 2, Hamas's Interior Ministry announced the arrest of six Salafists, four of whom were accused of stealing rockets from other terror groups in the Gaza Strip. The jihadist media unit repudiated the charge, and said that those detained had been arrested only because of their beliefs.
More recently Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip have been complaining about the Hamas-run Field Control Force, which has increased deployment in the Gaza Strip to prevent the firing of rockets into Israel. According to Al Ayyam, the Field Control Force "has managed to foil many attempts to fire rockets over the past two weeks."
To bring the story of fraternal strife more or less up to date, the Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of the Islamic Jihad Movement, reported on June 24 that Abu Al-Qassem, one of its leaders, had been shot and killed in Gaza by security officers of the Hamas-led Ministry of Interior. The Brigades said that, by killing Abu Al-Qassem, the security forces of Hamas “granted Israel a free service whether they intended to or not”, since Al-Qassem headed Israel’s assassination list. It added that it would not remain idle while “certain groups” are attacking it, trying to confiscate its weapons, or trying to prevent it from defending Palestine and its people. Accordingly, its reaction to Al-Qassem’s assassination was to suspend contacts with the Hamas rulers of Gaza.
The Hamas interior ministry said Al-Qassem had opened fire on police, prompting them to respond, while Hamas government spokesman Ihab al-Ghussein said: "I hope everyone will await the results of the commission of inquiry which has begun its work."
Meanwhile Gaza jihadists continue to defy the Hamas administration. On June 24 six rockets were fired from Gaza at southern Israel, two of which were launched towards Ashkelon and were successfully intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system. Israel, which holds Hamas responsible for what happens inside Gaza, responded with airstrikes against four military targets in central and south Gaza.
Since Hamas gets all the pain, and none of the gain, from these jihadist initiatives, it is no wonder that Hamas is exerting every effort to prevent “unauthorised” rocket attacks against Israel, and is cracking down hard on ultra-extremist groups which are opposed tooth and nail to its policies. Hamas, bidding for widespread Palestinian popular approval, has a snarling dog yapping at its heels.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 30 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Hamass-real-enemy-318182?prmusr=3h4tr%2fLatbHBG6RjqNCmOc9iFflg3nZM9L3tx277Gqek%2fhhzxqPIZNyAlGXZecXk
Published in the Eurasia Review, 27 June 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/27062013-hamass-real-enemy-oped/
Tuesday, 25 June 2013
The world's refugees - and Palestinians
June 20 is the date decreed by the UN in 2000 as World Refugee Day. It was established to draw international attention to the increasingly desperate world-wide problem of displaced people, and to honour the courage, strength and determination of those forced to flee their homes under threat of persecution, conflict and violence.
Last week the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, or United Nations High Commission for Refugees) issued its report for 2012. It shows that last year the number of displaced people hit a 14-year high, to reach 45 million. These new figures include 28.8 million people forced to flee their homes within their own countries, nearly a million asylum seekers, and 15.4 million internationally displaced refugees – a figure boosted during 2012 by some 7.6 million people becoming newly displaced.
As many as 55% of these refugees come from only 5 countries: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan and now Syria. The report does not, of course, include those forced from their homes in Syria during the current year which, it is estimated, will reach 3 million by the end of 2013, topping the 2.5 million Afghans who have fled conflict over 22 years.
“These truly are alarming numbers,” said António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees and head of UNHCR. “They reflect individual suffering on a huge scale.”
A notable omission in the UNHCR report is any mention of Palestine or Palestinian refugees. There is a simple explanation. For historic, and now largely obsolete, reasons UNHCR has no responsibility for Palestinian refugees. A special UN body deals wholly and exclusively with them on a basis, and according to rules, quite different from those applying to all other displaced persons. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – UNRWA – began its work in May 1950, seven months ahead of the establishment of UNHCR. As a result, Palestine refugees have been designated and treated quite differently from − and much worse than − all other refugees, the world over, ever since.
Whereas a main function of UNHCR is to resettle those millions of unfortunate people who have left their homes, willingly or unwillingly, over the years (voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are UNHCR’s three key solutions). a major effect of UNRWA’s humanitarian activities has been not only to maintain millions of people in their refugee status decade after decade, but to expand the numbers as generation has succeeded generation. Since UNRWA bestowed refugee status upon "descendants of Palestine refugees," regardless of how much time had elapsed, the number of Palestinians registered by UNRWA has mushroomed from the original 750,000 to 5 million today. The numbers continue to multiply existentially, year by year. Whereas UNHCR’s approach is to foster independence and a better life for refugees, UNRWA’s efforts have simply subjected Palestinians to lives of permanent dependence for themselves and their children unto the third and fourth generation.
The result is expenditure by UNRWA on an ever-increasing scale to maintain more and more Palestinians in refugee status. If these spiralling costs were being met by Arab countries – fabulously wealthy as some of them are – there might be some logic and justification in the situation. But virtually none of the Arab countries contributes significantly to UNRWA’s soaring budget. The list of UNWRA’s top contributors is exclusively North American and West European countries. Funds which could have gone to relieving the world’s vast refugee problem are being diverted to maintaining millions of Palestinians in dependency.
Nor have the Arab countries in which Palestinian refugees largely reside allowed them to gain full citizenship. The reason? From the moment that the State of Israel came into being, Arab leaders determined to use the Palestine refugees as a pawn in the deadly game of trying to eradicate the Jewish state from the map of the Middle East. To resettle and absorb these people into their new places of residence would remove a formidable bargaining chip from the table, and have the effect of legitimising Israel. For its part, and to its shame, UNRWA has consistently gone along with this policy, washing its hands of any involvement in “final status” considerations.
The result? In Jordan today some three million Palestinians and their descendants are living as “registered refugees” (registered, that is, by UNRWA), about half of them still occupying some 58 refugee camps. Lebanon’s 400,000 Palestine refugees have been barred from 73 job categories including the professions, are not allowed to own property, are denied access to the healthcare system and even need a special permit to leave their refugee camps. Although some partial relaxation of these harsh conditions was granted in 2005, the Lebanese government has said repeatedly that it would not allow Palestine refugees to settle,.
As regards Syria, there are nearly half a million Palestinian refugees in that benighted country, and they have become totally embroiled in the civil war. Many have been on the run for nearly two years. If Syrian refugees are going through a truly horrific experience, the fate of Palestinian refugees is markedly worse. Palestinians are without the basic rights of passport-holding Syrian citizens – they are stateless and in legal and political limbo. "Stuck", "stranded" and "imprisoned" are some of the terms used to describe their condition.
All in all, the Palestine refugee story is one of heartless exploitation of Arabs by Arabs – the callous manipulation of powerless victims for political ends, without any regard to their welfare or human rights. This inhumanity must be brought out into the open, the UNRWA farce of “refugee status” accorded without any sort of limit must be ended, and steps must be taken to allow people and their families who may have lived in a country for up to fifty years, to settle and become full citizens.
The practical effect of UNWRA’s modus operandi is for vast and increasing amounts of money to be siphoned off to support young Palestinian families who should have been absorbed into their countries of residence long since. This diversion of funds on a massive scale to support the anti-Israel political aims of Arab nations is becoming increasingly untenable. Steps to stop it are long overdue. UNWRA should be disbanded, Palestinian refugees should be taken under the wing of UNHCR and treated on an equal basis with the rest of the world’s refugees, and the vast funds released should be used to help alleviate the vast and growing global refugee problem.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 25 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-worlds-refugees-and-Palestinians-317696
Published in the Eurasia Review, 24 July 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/23062013-the-worlds-refugees-and-palestinians-oped/
Last week the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, or United Nations High Commission for Refugees) issued its report for 2012. It shows that last year the number of displaced people hit a 14-year high, to reach 45 million. These new figures include 28.8 million people forced to flee their homes within their own countries, nearly a million asylum seekers, and 15.4 million internationally displaced refugees – a figure boosted during 2012 by some 7.6 million people becoming newly displaced.
As many as 55% of these refugees come from only 5 countries: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan and now Syria. The report does not, of course, include those forced from their homes in Syria during the current year which, it is estimated, will reach 3 million by the end of 2013, topping the 2.5 million Afghans who have fled conflict over 22 years.
“These truly are alarming numbers,” said António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees and head of UNHCR. “They reflect individual suffering on a huge scale.”
A notable omission in the UNHCR report is any mention of Palestine or Palestinian refugees. There is a simple explanation. For historic, and now largely obsolete, reasons UNHCR has no responsibility for Palestinian refugees. A special UN body deals wholly and exclusively with them on a basis, and according to rules, quite different from those applying to all other displaced persons. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – UNRWA – began its work in May 1950, seven months ahead of the establishment of UNHCR. As a result, Palestine refugees have been designated and treated quite differently from − and much worse than − all other refugees, the world over, ever since.
Whereas a main function of UNHCR is to resettle those millions of unfortunate people who have left their homes, willingly or unwillingly, over the years (voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are UNHCR’s three key solutions). a major effect of UNRWA’s humanitarian activities has been not only to maintain millions of people in their refugee status decade after decade, but to expand the numbers as generation has succeeded generation. Since UNRWA bestowed refugee status upon "descendants of Palestine refugees," regardless of how much time had elapsed, the number of Palestinians registered by UNRWA has mushroomed from the original 750,000 to 5 million today. The numbers continue to multiply existentially, year by year. Whereas UNHCR’s approach is to foster independence and a better life for refugees, UNRWA’s efforts have simply subjected Palestinians to lives of permanent dependence for themselves and their children unto the third and fourth generation.
The result is expenditure by UNRWA on an ever-increasing scale to maintain more and more Palestinians in refugee status. If these spiralling costs were being met by Arab countries – fabulously wealthy as some of them are – there might be some logic and justification in the situation. But virtually none of the Arab countries contributes significantly to UNRWA’s soaring budget. The list of UNWRA’s top contributors is exclusively North American and West European countries. Funds which could have gone to relieving the world’s vast refugee problem are being diverted to maintaining millions of Palestinians in dependency.
Nor have the Arab countries in which Palestinian refugees largely reside allowed them to gain full citizenship. The reason? From the moment that the State of Israel came into being, Arab leaders determined to use the Palestine refugees as a pawn in the deadly game of trying to eradicate the Jewish state from the map of the Middle East. To resettle and absorb these people into their new places of residence would remove a formidable bargaining chip from the table, and have the effect of legitimising Israel. For its part, and to its shame, UNRWA has consistently gone along with this policy, washing its hands of any involvement in “final status” considerations.
The result? In Jordan today some three million Palestinians and their descendants are living as “registered refugees” (registered, that is, by UNRWA), about half of them still occupying some 58 refugee camps. Lebanon’s 400,000 Palestine refugees have been barred from 73 job categories including the professions, are not allowed to own property, are denied access to the healthcare system and even need a special permit to leave their refugee camps. Although some partial relaxation of these harsh conditions was granted in 2005, the Lebanese government has said repeatedly that it would not allow Palestine refugees to settle,.
As regards Syria, there are nearly half a million Palestinian refugees in that benighted country, and they have become totally embroiled in the civil war. Many have been on the run for nearly two years. If Syrian refugees are going through a truly horrific experience, the fate of Palestinian refugees is markedly worse. Palestinians are without the basic rights of passport-holding Syrian citizens – they are stateless and in legal and political limbo. "Stuck", "stranded" and "imprisoned" are some of the terms used to describe their condition.
All in all, the Palestine refugee story is one of heartless exploitation of Arabs by Arabs – the callous manipulation of powerless victims for political ends, without any regard to their welfare or human rights. This inhumanity must be brought out into the open, the UNRWA farce of “refugee status” accorded without any sort of limit must be ended, and steps must be taken to allow people and their families who may have lived in a country for up to fifty years, to settle and become full citizens.
The practical effect of UNWRA’s modus operandi is for vast and increasing amounts of money to be siphoned off to support young Palestinian families who should have been absorbed into their countries of residence long since. This diversion of funds on a massive scale to support the anti-Israel political aims of Arab nations is becoming increasingly untenable. Steps to stop it are long overdue. UNWRA should be disbanded, Palestinian refugees should be taken under the wing of UNHCR and treated on an equal basis with the rest of the world’s refugees, and the vast funds released should be used to help alleviate the vast and growing global refugee problem.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 25 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-worlds-refugees-and-Palestinians-317696
Published in the Eurasia Review, 24 July 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/23062013-the-worlds-refugees-and-palestinians-oped/
Wednesday, 19 June 2013
Rohani may propose; Khamenei will dispose
A bizarre fact of modern life is that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a regular tweeter. Just before the presidential election on 14 June 2013, this message appeared on his Twitter page: “a vote for any of these candidates is a vote for the Islamic Republic [and] a vote of confidence in the system.”
Believe it. He made the statement with assurance, knowing better than anyone that the forthcoming election was pretty much of a charade. No less than 39 men registered originally as candidates (the very idea of a woman putting herself forward as a potential president being outside the realms of the conceivable). Each was then subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the Guardian Council – the unelected but supremely powerful body positioned at the very heart of Iran’s body politic. The Guardian Council, which is able to veto any legislation passed by the Iranian parliament, is also empowered to bar candidates from standing in any election.
As a result of their scrutiny, no less than 33 of the candidates who had registered were barred on various grounds from standing, and a meagre six finally presented themselves to the electorate. All six, Rohani among them, had cleared all the hurdles – total loyalty to the régime, namely to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and complete adherence to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In Rohani’s case, his loyalty was underwritten by more than twenty years as part of Iran’s vicious national security establishment, while his nuclear credentials as Iran’s top nuclear negotiator spoke for themselves – he it was who had held the UN, and indeed the West, at bay with soft words for month after month, while allowing Iran’s uranium enrichment programme to forge ahead.
The charm offensive, which worked so well in keeping the UN at arm’s length during Iran’s nuclear negotiations, worked equally well for Rohani during the presidential campaign. Khamenei had his reasons for allowing this man into the race speaking, as he did, of liberating society, promoting freedom of expression, freeing political prisoners and opening a dialogue with the West which could lead to an easing of the sanctions that had recently been biting hard. No doubt the Supreme Leader had in mind the near-revolt that followed the previous presidential election, when arch-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been shoe-horned back into the presidency for a second term.
If the Supreme Leader believed that sweet words during the election would deflect popular discontent after it, he was more than justified. Rohani’s spectacular trouncing of his opponents demonstrated the strength of feeling within the country for some loosening of the restrictions, both religious and economic, that have been oppressing the nation.
The extent to which Rohani can turn his honeyed words into action – assuming he wishes to do so – is extremely limited. In the domestic arena he would be subject to the restrictions placed on him by the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC, founded in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the Islamic Republic against internal and external threats, today presides over a vast power structure dominating almost every aspect of Iranian life. More than 100,000 strong, the IRGC is in entire control of Iran’s military operations, but also manipulates the nation’s strategic industries, commercial services, and black-market enterprises.
Rohani will know that he needs to mind his Ps and Qs as far as the IRGC is concerned. In 1999 the Revolutionary Guard sent a threatening letter to President Khatami, who instituted far-reaching reforms, in which they warned against continuing a policy that threatened the Islamic nature of the régime.
In the foreign policy field Rohani’s freedom of manoeuvre is virtually non-existent. Rohani does not formulate Iran’s foreign and nuclear policy; it is dictated by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard. No problem here, though, since there is no reason to believe that Rohani dissents in any way from either Iran’s nuclear aspirations nor its ultimate aim to achieve regional hegemony.
Nevertheless many leaders and opinion formers in the West have seized on Rohani’s election as on a gift from heaven – a chance to avoid grasping the nettle of Iran’s unacceptable ambitions and to by-pass outright confrontation. The 24-hour TV news screens have been filled with optimistic spokesmen equating the Iranian presidential vote to some democratic expression of the people’s will, although a truer picture would be an electorate making the best of a bad job.
“Iran’s new president is brave and outspoken,” trumpets Norman Lamont, one-time British Chancellor of the Exchequer and now a member of the House of Lords. “The West should see him as a Gorbachev. Hassan Rohani is a man we must do business with.”
His is far from a lone voice. The European Union's foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who chairs the nuclear talks between Iran and major powers, said voters had given Rohani "a strong mandate".
"I remain firmly committed to working with the new Iranian leadership towards a swift diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue."
The White House said: “We respect the vote of the Iranian people and congratulate them for their participation in the political process, and their courage in making their voices heard. It is our hope that the Iranian government will heed the will of the Iranian people and make responsible choices that create a better future for all Iranians."
Rohani is scheduled to take office on August 3, 2013. If thereafter the world observes a softening of current policies in Iran, either domestically, or – as reported in the world’s press on June 19 – by a possible suspension of 20 per cent uranium enrichment, then assuredly it would be because the Supreme Leader has judged it opportune to use the election of “moderate” Hassan Rohani in this way to strengthen his régime’s grip on the nation and further advance its unaltered policies.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line edition, 23 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Rohani-may-propose-Khamenei-will-dispose-317427?prmusr=%2bJ%2bCLVnYcyzaxAI%2bS%2fkqXJAY4Q1G6npV5gnP7vwbu8J8KG47qC%2bjkG81Z8%2bf8acD
Published in the Eurasia Review, 19 June 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/19062013-rohani-may-propose-khamenei-will-dispose-oped/
Believe it. He made the statement with assurance, knowing better than anyone that the forthcoming election was pretty much of a charade. No less than 39 men registered originally as candidates (the very idea of a woman putting herself forward as a potential president being outside the realms of the conceivable). Each was then subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the Guardian Council – the unelected but supremely powerful body positioned at the very heart of Iran’s body politic. The Guardian Council, which is able to veto any legislation passed by the Iranian parliament, is also empowered to bar candidates from standing in any election.
As a result of their scrutiny, no less than 33 of the candidates who had registered were barred on various grounds from standing, and a meagre six finally presented themselves to the electorate. All six, Rohani among them, had cleared all the hurdles – total loyalty to the régime, namely to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and complete adherence to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In Rohani’s case, his loyalty was underwritten by more than twenty years as part of Iran’s vicious national security establishment, while his nuclear credentials as Iran’s top nuclear negotiator spoke for themselves – he it was who had held the UN, and indeed the West, at bay with soft words for month after month, while allowing Iran’s uranium enrichment programme to forge ahead.
The charm offensive, which worked so well in keeping the UN at arm’s length during Iran’s nuclear negotiations, worked equally well for Rohani during the presidential campaign. Khamenei had his reasons for allowing this man into the race speaking, as he did, of liberating society, promoting freedom of expression, freeing political prisoners and opening a dialogue with the West which could lead to an easing of the sanctions that had recently been biting hard. No doubt the Supreme Leader had in mind the near-revolt that followed the previous presidential election, when arch-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been shoe-horned back into the presidency for a second term.
If the Supreme Leader believed that sweet words during the election would deflect popular discontent after it, he was more than justified. Rohani’s spectacular trouncing of his opponents demonstrated the strength of feeling within the country for some loosening of the restrictions, both religious and economic, that have been oppressing the nation.
The extent to which Rohani can turn his honeyed words into action – assuming he wishes to do so – is extremely limited. In the domestic arena he would be subject to the restrictions placed on him by the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC, founded in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the Islamic Republic against internal and external threats, today presides over a vast power structure dominating almost every aspect of Iranian life. More than 100,000 strong, the IRGC is in entire control of Iran’s military operations, but also manipulates the nation’s strategic industries, commercial services, and black-market enterprises.
Rohani will know that he needs to mind his Ps and Qs as far as the IRGC is concerned. In 1999 the Revolutionary Guard sent a threatening letter to President Khatami, who instituted far-reaching reforms, in which they warned against continuing a policy that threatened the Islamic nature of the régime.
In the foreign policy field Rohani’s freedom of manoeuvre is virtually non-existent. Rohani does not formulate Iran’s foreign and nuclear policy; it is dictated by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard. No problem here, though, since there is no reason to believe that Rohani dissents in any way from either Iran’s nuclear aspirations nor its ultimate aim to achieve regional hegemony.
Nevertheless many leaders and opinion formers in the West have seized on Rohani’s election as on a gift from heaven – a chance to avoid grasping the nettle of Iran’s unacceptable ambitions and to by-pass outright confrontation. The 24-hour TV news screens have been filled with optimistic spokesmen equating the Iranian presidential vote to some democratic expression of the people’s will, although a truer picture would be an electorate making the best of a bad job.
“Iran’s new president is brave and outspoken,” trumpets Norman Lamont, one-time British Chancellor of the Exchequer and now a member of the House of Lords. “The West should see him as a Gorbachev. Hassan Rohani is a man we must do business with.”
His is far from a lone voice. The European Union's foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who chairs the nuclear talks between Iran and major powers, said voters had given Rohani "a strong mandate".
"I remain firmly committed to working with the new Iranian leadership towards a swift diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue."
The White House said: “We respect the vote of the Iranian people and congratulate them for their participation in the political process, and their courage in making their voices heard. It is our hope that the Iranian government will heed the will of the Iranian people and make responsible choices that create a better future for all Iranians."
Rohani is scheduled to take office on August 3, 2013. If thereafter the world observes a softening of current policies in Iran, either domestically, or – as reported in the world’s press on June 19 – by a possible suspension of 20 per cent uranium enrichment, then assuredly it would be because the Supreme Leader has judged it opportune to use the election of “moderate” Hassan Rohani in this way to strengthen his régime’s grip on the nation and further advance its unaltered policies.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line edition, 23 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Rohani-may-propose-Khamenei-will-dispose-317427?prmusr=%2bJ%2bCLVnYcyzaxAI%2bS%2fkqXJAY4Q1G6npV5gnP7vwbu8J8KG47qC%2bjkG81Z8%2bf8acD
Published in the Eurasia Review, 19 June 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/19062013-rohani-may-propose-khamenei-will-dispose-oped/
Sunday, 9 June 2013
Applying the Duck Test to Turkey
Some media commentators have been at great pains to point out that the riots and popular unrest in Turkey, still scarcely being contained by the government, cannot be equated with the so-called Arab Spring that flickered into life in Tunisia in December 2010, and then spread like a raging forest fire across the Middle East.
Professor Dirk Matten, for example, asserts categorically that what is happening in Turkey is far from those popular protests against repression, human rights abuses, state censorship and the other trammels of dictatorship or absolute monarchy which the Arab masses had endured for decades. Turkey’s popular revolt, he maintains, is much more comparable to what happened in Iran in 2009, following the last presidential elections. Both Turkey and Iran, he says, are Islamist régimes that, despite all their rhetoric, subsist on neo-liberal capitalist policies and are infringing democratic freedoms in order to implement them. He points to the enormous personal fortunes acquired by the ruling élite in Iran from involvement in the state’s major industries, and the rumoured “fairytale fortune” acquired by Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his wider family “which puts him on a par with the Ayatollahs next door.”
Two cables from Eric Edelman, a former US ambassador to Turkey, released in the Wikileaks scandal in 2010, refer to Erdogan’s personal wealth. in July 2004 he told Washington that an anonymous source and Erdogan had both “benefited directly from the award of the Tupraş privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner.” The Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation, or Tupraş, is the state petroleum refinery. A Russian-Turkish consortium paid nearly $1.3 billion for the privatization of the country’s largest-capacity refinery in 2004.
In a second cable to Washington, in December 2004, Edelman wrote: “We have heard from two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks; his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding presents guests gave his son, and that a Turkish businessman is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan children in the US purely altruistically, are lame.”
Professor Matten is not alone. Other Turkey observers also emphasise the enormous differences between Turkey and the countries that underwent – and those that are still in the throes of – the Arab Spring.
To start with, Turkey is a democracy, and Erdogan’s AK party received an impressive 50 per cent of the vote in the last general election. It is unlikely that the whole of this popular support could be eroded in one fell swoop. Then, since 2003 when the current AKP government took power, Turkey has had the fastest-growing economy in the OECD and, unlike the Arab Spring countries, has been generating jobs for its people – 4.2 million jobs, more than the UK, France and Italy put together. A flourishing economy is not the most obvious basis for revolution.
Yet Erdogan has undoubtedly been moving his country ever closer to an Islamist stance, both internally and in the world arena. Inside Turkey, restrictions on press freedom have been growing, and individual freedoms have been encroached on. It was an apparently innocuous announcement on May 28 that the government intended to build a shopping mall on Gezi Park in Taksim, one of the last green public spaces in Istanbul’s cultural and political hub, that proved for many the last straw – the latest unacceptable item on the AKP’s Islamist agenda to curtail people’s freedoms.
The movement against the demolition of Gezi Park, started by a small organisation called the Taksim Platform, called for transparency from decision-makers and the opportunity for citizens to have input into the design of public space. But the initial justification for public protest opened a Pandora’s box of disaffection with the government’s conservative stance on a whole range of issues, including recent restrictions on the use of alcohol and on human rights. Protesters are also worried about Turkey’s support of Syrian rebels, and Erdogan’s plans to strengthen the office of the president, a position he hopes soon to occupy.
As the protests continued, and as the police began using gas shells, rubber bullets, pepper spray and water cannons, the protest caught fire. Thousands of citizens across 67 cities took to the streets, despite arrests and the violence used against them. The extent of the violence was condemned by human rights groups.
“The use of violence by police on this scale,” said John Dalhuisen of Amnesty International, “appears designed to deny the right to peaceful protest altogether, and to discourage others from taking part.”
Now journalists and observers have begun to note calls for prime minister Erdogan to step down. And still the protests continue, if anything growing in strength.
Erdogan left Turkey on June 3 for a visit to North Africa in a defiant mood, dismissing the protesters as looters and declaring that the unrest would be over in a matter of days. He returned, following six days of protests that left two dead and more than 4,000 injured in a dozen cities, to face demands he apologize over the fierce police crackdown and sack those who ordered it. By any count, this has been an unprecedented show of defiance against the perceived authoritarianism of Erdogan and his Islamist AK Party.
People often maintain that things are not what they seem to be. There is a down-to-earth and commonsense way to counter such arguments. It is called the “duck test”. It goes like this: “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.”
Has Turkey latched on to the Arab Spring rather late in the day? Time will tell.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 9 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Applying-the-duck-test-to-Turkey-315909
Published in the Eurasia Review, 8 June 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/07062013-applying-the-duck-test-to-turkey-oped/
Professor Dirk Matten, for example, asserts categorically that what is happening in Turkey is far from those popular protests against repression, human rights abuses, state censorship and the other trammels of dictatorship or absolute monarchy which the Arab masses had endured for decades. Turkey’s popular revolt, he maintains, is much more comparable to what happened in Iran in 2009, following the last presidential elections. Both Turkey and Iran, he says, are Islamist régimes that, despite all their rhetoric, subsist on neo-liberal capitalist policies and are infringing democratic freedoms in order to implement them. He points to the enormous personal fortunes acquired by the ruling élite in Iran from involvement in the state’s major industries, and the rumoured “fairytale fortune” acquired by Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his wider family “which puts him on a par with the Ayatollahs next door.”
Two cables from Eric Edelman, a former US ambassador to Turkey, released in the Wikileaks scandal in 2010, refer to Erdogan’s personal wealth. in July 2004 he told Washington that an anonymous source and Erdogan had both “benefited directly from the award of the Tupraş privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner.” The Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation, or Tupraş, is the state petroleum refinery. A Russian-Turkish consortium paid nearly $1.3 billion for the privatization of the country’s largest-capacity refinery in 2004.
In a second cable to Washington, in December 2004, Edelman wrote: “We have heard from two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks; his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding presents guests gave his son, and that a Turkish businessman is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan children in the US purely altruistically, are lame.”
Professor Matten is not alone. Other Turkey observers also emphasise the enormous differences between Turkey and the countries that underwent – and those that are still in the throes of – the Arab Spring.
To start with, Turkey is a democracy, and Erdogan’s AK party received an impressive 50 per cent of the vote in the last general election. It is unlikely that the whole of this popular support could be eroded in one fell swoop. Then, since 2003 when the current AKP government took power, Turkey has had the fastest-growing economy in the OECD and, unlike the Arab Spring countries, has been generating jobs for its people – 4.2 million jobs, more than the UK, France and Italy put together. A flourishing economy is not the most obvious basis for revolution.
Yet Erdogan has undoubtedly been moving his country ever closer to an Islamist stance, both internally and in the world arena. Inside Turkey, restrictions on press freedom have been growing, and individual freedoms have been encroached on. It was an apparently innocuous announcement on May 28 that the government intended to build a shopping mall on Gezi Park in Taksim, one of the last green public spaces in Istanbul’s cultural and political hub, that proved for many the last straw – the latest unacceptable item on the AKP’s Islamist agenda to curtail people’s freedoms.
The movement against the demolition of Gezi Park, started by a small organisation called the Taksim Platform, called for transparency from decision-makers and the opportunity for citizens to have input into the design of public space. But the initial justification for public protest opened a Pandora’s box of disaffection with the government’s conservative stance on a whole range of issues, including recent restrictions on the use of alcohol and on human rights. Protesters are also worried about Turkey’s support of Syrian rebels, and Erdogan’s plans to strengthen the office of the president, a position he hopes soon to occupy.
As the protests continued, and as the police began using gas shells, rubber bullets, pepper spray and water cannons, the protest caught fire. Thousands of citizens across 67 cities took to the streets, despite arrests and the violence used against them. The extent of the violence was condemned by human rights groups.
“The use of violence by police on this scale,” said John Dalhuisen of Amnesty International, “appears designed to deny the right to peaceful protest altogether, and to discourage others from taking part.”
Now journalists and observers have begun to note calls for prime minister Erdogan to step down. And still the protests continue, if anything growing in strength.
Erdogan left Turkey on June 3 for a visit to North Africa in a defiant mood, dismissing the protesters as looters and declaring that the unrest would be over in a matter of days. He returned, following six days of protests that left two dead and more than 4,000 injured in a dozen cities, to face demands he apologize over the fierce police crackdown and sack those who ordered it. By any count, this has been an unprecedented show of defiance against the perceived authoritarianism of Erdogan and his Islamist AK Party.
People often maintain that things are not what they seem to be. There is a down-to-earth and commonsense way to counter such arguments. It is called the “duck test”. It goes like this: “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.”
Has Turkey latched on to the Arab Spring rather late in the day? Time will tell.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 9 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Applying-the-duck-test-to-Turkey-315909
Published in the Eurasia Review, 8 June 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/07062013-applying-the-duck-test-to-turkey-oped/
Monday, 3 June 2013
Israel-Palestine: breaking the impasse
Back in 1987 Lawrence Susskind, then professor of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published along with co-author Jeffrey Cruikshank a pioneering book about the techniques of resolving public disputes. Its title has subsequently entered the language: “Breaking the Impasse”.
“Breaking the Impasse” is the name chosen for a new business-led initiative aimed at fostering Israeli-Palestinian peace and prosperity. The project was launched at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Jordan on Sunday, 26 May 2013, by a group of prominent Israeli and Palestinian businessmen. The initiative is led jointly by Munib al-Masri, a billionaire member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and Israeli high-tech guru Yossi Vardi.
Vardi, chairman of International Technologies Ventures, said: “Last year I celebrated my 70th birthday. When the conflict began I was an ambitious young man of 25. This conflict has gone on for too long. Enough! Our group includes business people and academics from the whole spectrum – secular and religious – and all of them are determined to help with a two-state solution.”
“Breaking the Impasse” represents some 200 leading Israeli and Palestinian businessmen and also a number from other Arab states including, for example, the head of the Hikma pharmaceutical firm in Jordan. Its leaders have been meeting in private for the past year under the umbrella of the WEF and, according to Palestinian journalist Elias Zananiri, finally agreed a joint paper with parameters acceptable to both sides.
US Secretary John Kerry, who addressed the WEF meeting, was fulsome in his praise of those participating in the initiative: “They represent a courageous and visionary group of people, civic and business leaders, Israelis and Palestinians, who have I think the uncommon ability to look at an ageless stalemate and actually be able to see opportunities for progress. And even as they found plenty to disagree on – and I understand they did in the course of their discussions – even as they fully understand the difficult history that is embedded in this conflict – they refuse to underestimate the potential for the future.”
Kerry, who has proved himself tireless in this current push to reactivate the peace process, clearly sees in “Breaking the Impasse” a valuable instrument for furthering his policy, convinced that fostering economic growth will profoundly improve the chance of the political peace process.
He has, accordingly, taken a firm grip on the initiative and invested it with both US cash and dynamic leadership. He has got Quartet representative, one-time UK prime minister Tony Blair, to head a bold and ambitious plan to develop a healthy, sustainable, private-sector-led Palestinian economy intended to transform the fortunes of a future Palestinian state, “…but also, significantly,” said Kerry, “transform the possibilities for Jordan and for Israel.”
In the six weeks prior to the WEF meeting, the leaders of “Breaking the Impasse” brought together a group of business experts from around the globe representing some of the world’s largest corporations. They spent their time analyzing the opportunities for developing tourism, construction, light manufacturing, building materials, energy, agriculture, and information and communications technology (ICT) within the Palestinian economy, with the aim of mobilizing some $4 billion of investment both internationally and regionally.
Some might question the inclusion of ICT within the list, for the size and extent of ICT within the Palestinian economy is not widely known. It is, in fact, a thriving element with its own trade association – the Palestinian Information Technology Association of Companies (PIT) – representing more than 150 major ICT companies in Palestine’s emerging technology and startup system. In all, there are approximately 250 ICT companies in Palestine, with a market size of around $500 million.
Said Kerry: “The preliminary results already reported to me by Prime Minister Blair and by the folks working with him are stunning.”
And indeed they are, for the group of experts apparently believe that the Palestinian GDP could be increased by as much as 50 per cent over the next three years, and unemployment reduced by nearly two-thirds, with up to a three-fold increase in the value of agriculture and tourism.
Kerry clearly believes in the potential upsurge in commercial and economic activity that “Breaking the Impasse” could unleash, and feels passionately that economic advancement is a vital key to success in the political process. Not least of its benefits is the knock-out blow it would deliver to the malevolent Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, that cloaks the current upsurge in “respectable” anti-Semitism worldwide.
“Think of all that can change,” said Kerry. “That’s what should motivate us. With renewed and normal relations between Israel and the Arab nations, we could end the regional boycott of Israeli goods. New markets would open up and would connect to one another, and jobs would follow in large numbers. With renewed strength, the new neighbor states of Israel and Palestine could actually become another hub in the Middle East for technology, finance, tourism.”
In short, think of a new Hong Kong or Singapore on the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean – a thriving commercial and financial enterprise zone comprising Israel, Palestine and Jordan in the first instance, and perhaps later extending to include a Hezbollah-free Lebanon. The vision is inspiring; the political slog of attempting to achieve it daunting, not to say totally discouraging.
The ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao-Tzu, provides us with a calm, rational approach to conquering such overwhelming despondency: “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30052013-israel-palestine-breaking-the-impasse-oped/
“Breaking the Impasse” is the name chosen for a new business-led initiative aimed at fostering Israeli-Palestinian peace and prosperity. The project was launched at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Jordan on Sunday, 26 May 2013, by a group of prominent Israeli and Palestinian businessmen. The initiative is led jointly by Munib al-Masri, a billionaire member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and Israeli high-tech guru Yossi Vardi.
Vardi, chairman of International Technologies Ventures, said: “Last year I celebrated my 70th birthday. When the conflict began I was an ambitious young man of 25. This conflict has gone on for too long. Enough! Our group includes business people and academics from the whole spectrum – secular and religious – and all of them are determined to help with a two-state solution.”
“Breaking the Impasse” represents some 200 leading Israeli and Palestinian businessmen and also a number from other Arab states including, for example, the head of the Hikma pharmaceutical firm in Jordan. Its leaders have been meeting in private for the past year under the umbrella of the WEF and, according to Palestinian journalist Elias Zananiri, finally agreed a joint paper with parameters acceptable to both sides.
US Secretary John Kerry, who addressed the WEF meeting, was fulsome in his praise of those participating in the initiative: “They represent a courageous and visionary group of people, civic and business leaders, Israelis and Palestinians, who have I think the uncommon ability to look at an ageless stalemate and actually be able to see opportunities for progress. And even as they found plenty to disagree on – and I understand they did in the course of their discussions – even as they fully understand the difficult history that is embedded in this conflict – they refuse to underestimate the potential for the future.”
Kerry, who has proved himself tireless in this current push to reactivate the peace process, clearly sees in “Breaking the Impasse” a valuable instrument for furthering his policy, convinced that fostering economic growth will profoundly improve the chance of the political peace process.
He has, accordingly, taken a firm grip on the initiative and invested it with both US cash and dynamic leadership. He has got Quartet representative, one-time UK prime minister Tony Blair, to head a bold and ambitious plan to develop a healthy, sustainable, private-sector-led Palestinian economy intended to transform the fortunes of a future Palestinian state, “…but also, significantly,” said Kerry, “transform the possibilities for Jordan and for Israel.”
In the six weeks prior to the WEF meeting, the leaders of “Breaking the Impasse” brought together a group of business experts from around the globe representing some of the world’s largest corporations. They spent their time analyzing the opportunities for developing tourism, construction, light manufacturing, building materials, energy, agriculture, and information and communications technology (ICT) within the Palestinian economy, with the aim of mobilizing some $4 billion of investment both internationally and regionally.
Some might question the inclusion of ICT within the list, for the size and extent of ICT within the Palestinian economy is not widely known. It is, in fact, a thriving element with its own trade association – the Palestinian Information Technology Association of Companies (PIT) – representing more than 150 major ICT companies in Palestine’s emerging technology and startup system. In all, there are approximately 250 ICT companies in Palestine, with a market size of around $500 million.
Said Kerry: “The preliminary results already reported to me by Prime Minister Blair and by the folks working with him are stunning.”
And indeed they are, for the group of experts apparently believe that the Palestinian GDP could be increased by as much as 50 per cent over the next three years, and unemployment reduced by nearly two-thirds, with up to a three-fold increase in the value of agriculture and tourism.
Kerry clearly believes in the potential upsurge in commercial and economic activity that “Breaking the Impasse” could unleash, and feels passionately that economic advancement is a vital key to success in the political process. Not least of its benefits is the knock-out blow it would deliver to the malevolent Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, that cloaks the current upsurge in “respectable” anti-Semitism worldwide.
“Think of all that can change,” said Kerry. “That’s what should motivate us. With renewed and normal relations between Israel and the Arab nations, we could end the regional boycott of Israeli goods. New markets would open up and would connect to one another, and jobs would follow in large numbers. With renewed strength, the new neighbor states of Israel and Palestine could actually become another hub in the Middle East for technology, finance, tourism.”
In short, think of a new Hong Kong or Singapore on the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean – a thriving commercial and financial enterprise zone comprising Israel, Palestine and Jordan in the first instance, and perhaps later extending to include a Hezbollah-free Lebanon. The vision is inspiring; the political slog of attempting to achieve it daunting, not to say totally discouraging.
The ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao-Tzu, provides us with a calm, rational approach to conquering such overwhelming despondency: “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30052013-israel-palestine-breaking-the-impasse-oped/
Monday, 27 May 2013
Jordan and Israel – interests in common
The Jordan-Israel connection is on the up-and-up. Strangely enough, one circumstance that has strengthened the somewhat uncertain alliance is the civil war in Syria. It was only a few days ago that a senior Jordanian official, close to King Abdullah, was reported as saying that the two countries are “working as one over Syria”, adding that if the need arose, “of course we will allow Israel to use Jordanian air space for another attack on Syria”. During the course of the interview, he remarked, as if in passing, that Jordan is currently allowing Israel to fly unmanned drones over its air space, as part of Israel’s monitoring of the situation.
The same report indicates that Jordan is “in deep discussions” with Israel over a route map for any Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. No final decision has been taken on the level of Jordan’s co-operation, but it was “near certain” that they would help facilitate any Israeli attack. “Although,” he is reported to have added, “we will of course condemn it publicly.”
Within Jordan, government circles are concerned about the increasingly strident Islamist opposition. For over two years Jordan has experienced almost weekly demonstrations, led primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), demanding an end to steadily declining living standards and calling for the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy.
So far, King Abdullah has effectively contained the internal forces ranged against him while maintaining a “hands-off” attitude to involvement in discussions about the future of the West Bank, but regional developments have forced a reassessment of where Jordan’s real interests lie. Iraq, once US troops have departed, could easily descend into a civil war even more violent than that Syria is currently enduring. The possibility of a chaotic Iraq equalling the chaos in Syria is not one that appeals to Jordan, especially if the outcome in either country is the triumph of jihadist forces in general, or Al-Qaeda in particular. Abdullah is well aware that Al-Qaeda is already trumpeting the existence of an “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.”
As for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, now being given a mighty shove forward by energetic US Secretary of State John Kerry, the last thing that Jordan needs is a weak Palestinian state some 15 minutes from Amman that could be overrun by Hamas. They view with apprehension the prospect of a West Bank transferred to the PA which – as Gaza was – is subsequently taken over by Hamas to become a possible base for Iranian Revolutionary Guards and jihadist elements keen on overthrowing not only Israel, but Jordan as well.
And so now Jordan wants a say in what emerges in the West Bank, and Abdullah is asserting a leading role in pushing the peace process forward. Again, there is undoubtedly a community of interests at work. Abdullah is as anxious as Israel that there should be a long-term Israeli security presence along the Jordan River, and that this should be written into any final peace agreement. Israel must insure itself against a jihadist takeover of a newly created Palestine that could result in a viscerally hostile presence in Israel’s very heartland; for Jordan a strong Israeli presence could act to prevent jihadist elements from making their way east, to strengthen the already over-powerful disruptive Islamist presence in the country. So Jordan, like Israel, is intent on ensuring that the border between a sovereign Palestine on the West Bank and Jordan is as secure as possible.
The deal to accord Jordan a leading role in the current push towards peace was signed and sealed at a meeting in Rome, a few weeks ago, between Kerry and Jordanian foreign minister, Nasser Judeh. Afterwards Kerry declared: “It is absolutely critical … everybody understands we are engaged in a serious process to reopen negotiations. Jordan will play a key role in that.”
Accordingly there has been a distinct warming of relations at official level between Jordan and Israel.
For example, a few weeks ago Jordanian Members of Parliament (MPs) passed a resolution by a large majority demanding that the government expel the Israeli ambassador. The reasons given were attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians, and alleged Israeli attempts to occupy the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The move was pretty quickly shot down under pressure from the palace, the government and security officials. MP Yaya Saoud, who had orchestrated the move, later asked the speaker of the parliament to shelve the motion. The resolution is dead in the water.
Of greater significance is the fact that Israel has recently begun to facilitate Jordanian trade with Iraq and Turkey by allowing goods to be transported by truck via the Jordan river crossing near Beit She'an. It is reported that the Jordanian goods are loaded on to Israeli trucks, taken to Haifa and Ashdod ports and shipped from there. The arrangements, which also operate in the opposite direction, were concluded following secret talks between Israeli, Turkish and Jordanian officials following incidents in which merchandise transported by convoys to and from Turkey to Iraq and Jordan was stolen. The trade, which has been estimated at tens of millions of dollars a month, involves a unique cooperation between the customs authorities and transportation officials in Jordan Iraq and Turkey, and Tax Authority and other government officials in Israel.
And now the latest moves at reactivating the peace process have taken place in Jordan. On Sunday, at a meeting of the World Economic Forum in the King Hussein Convention Center in Amman, John Kerry, Israel’s president Shimon Peres and PA president Mahmoud Abbas are pictured in a three-way handshake sealing their pleasure at the US’s $4 billion economic plan to revitalize the Palestinian economy as a major step towards a resumption of peace negotiations. It is reported that Quartet special envoy, Tony Blair, will head the initiative, with the help of the international business community.
There is undoubtedly a new buzz in the diplomatic theatre, and Jordan’s King Abdullah must be delighted to find Jordan playing a major role, centre stage.
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 27 May 2013, as:
"Jordan and Israel - the revival of a new-old alliance"
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Jordan-and-Israel-The-revival-of-a-new-old-alliance-314491?prmusr=8d2jVUWY6FUJAOzTyH6ARQ%2bgfN3n7TauQvx6n%2bbsZ1bRMAKUNFmCtKXrtWa7YUuq
Published in the Eurasia Review, 27 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/27052013-jordan-and-israel-interests-in-common-oped/
Wednesday, 22 May 2013
Jihadists in Syria - a struggle for power
There is more than meets the eye to the civil war raging in Syria. On the surface it is an armed conflict between forces of the Assad régime and a popular opposition bent on overthrowing it. However a variety of individuals and groups have flocked to the two banners, some with vested interests and agendas of their own, and some more set on destroying their own deadly rivals in the opposing camp than in the fate of Syria and its people.
“Syria is now the number one destination for jihadists anywhere in the world,” said UK foreign minister, William Hague, on May 20, worried – as indeed are a number of European governments – at the effect on home-grown extremists of exposure to this ruthless intra-Islamist strife.
One crucial dividing line separates the protagonists – the fault line in Islam itself between Muslims of the Shia and those of the Sunni persuasion. The Assad régime represents the Alawite tradition of Shi’ite Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran is solidly Shia, and so is the puppet organisation that it created in Lebanon, and that it funds and supports – Hezbollah. Assad’s recent modest successes against the rebels is due in no small measure to the 150,000-strong fighting force that Hezbollah, under instructions from Tehran, has thrown into the fight.
On the Sunni side of the battlefield are ranged the forces not only of the official opposition, but also of the jihadists, Islamists and extremists, including Al-Qaeda, seeking a long-term advantage out of the current chaos.
Al-Qaeda, in particular, has featured in the latest reports of in-fighting amongst supposedly united anti-Assad forces. Al-Qaeda seems set on replicating in Syria the carnage it orchestrated in post-Saddam Iraq. Al-Qaeda's leader, since the death of Osama bin Laden, is Ayman al-Zawahiri. He recently appointed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former head of the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq”, as head of a new merged organisation which they dub “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.”
Baghdadi is reported to favor using intense violence to break down society in order to allow jihad to flourish. Proclaiming the need for an international caliphate, ending national borders, he must have seemed an ideal candidate to head an Al-Qaeda-led Sunni entity covering the whole of Iraq and Syria.
This active intervention by Al-Qaeda has paid dividends. The major militant jihadist group fighting the government in Syria is Jabhat al-Nusra. A successful fighting force, it has taken control of large rebel-held areas of northern Syria. But the group was infiltrated by hardline jihadists from Iraq, and they recently gained control of the organisation. Shortly afterwards Jabhat’s Syrian leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, publicly proclaimed allegiance to Al-Qaeda.
The result of his declaration was to split Jabhat al-Nusra in two, and troops unwilling to align themselves with Al-Qaeda are reported to have disowned their leader and withdrawn from the front line fighting the Assad régime in Aleppo. One report affirmed that recently an entire unit of 120 men left Jabhat al-Nusra to rejoin the biggest “official” brigade in Aleppo, Liwa Tawhid, a branch of the so-called “Free Syrian Army”. Many of the young men in Jabhat claim they are Syrians first and joined Jabhat simply to rid the country of President Bashar al-Assad. Such fighters would be uninterested in becoming embroiled in a struggle for power between Sunni and Shi’ite jihadists.
Meanwhile Jabhat fighters in the east of the country still loyal to al-Jolani are reported to have started calling themselves the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" on videos posted online – in accordance with instructions from the international Al-Qaeda leadership.
In short, alongside the conflict in which Assad is fighting to retain control of the levers of power in Syria, another battle is being waged for ultimate mastery of the country. On the one hand Shi’ite Iran, via Hezbollah, is desperately anxious to ensure that Syria remains in its sphere of interest – Mehdi Taaib, who heads the think tank of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran.” Iran’s cover story for the young men from south Lebanon who have joined the Hezbollah contingent to support Assad – and for the grieving parents of those killed or wounded – is that they are fighting to defend their Shia religious beliefs, and that if Sunni extremists win in Syria, the next battle will take place in Lebanon itself.
On the other hand Al-Qaeda, in the interest of Sunni Islam, is seeking to establish an “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” on the ruins of a Syria they have devastated, just as Iraq was devastated after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is a grim prospect, and one the rest of the world must take fully into account before it starts arming one side or the other.
Unlike a fair proportion of the western world which is calling for the departure of Assad and the triumph of the Free Syrian Army – although none are yet prepared to commit themselves much beyond declarations of support – Israel has said that it favors neither side in the Syrian civil conflict. Its main concern is to prevent the Syrian government’s vast stocks of conventional and non-conventional weaponry falling into the hands of its Shi’ite Islamist allies – Iran or Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Israel must view the prospect of a post-Assad Syria in the hands of jihadists of any hue – Shi’ite or Sunni – with some concern. The best outcome for all concerned would be to establish some means of boosting the military capability of the Free Syrian Army while ensuring beyond a peradventure that its Islamist camp-followers and hangers-on do not get their hands on the weaponry. There may, unfortunately, be no guaranteed way of squaring that particular circle.
Published in the Jeruslaem Post on-line, 10 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/PArticle.aspx?id=316052&prmusr=BiWOh4IZztHwRoJ8B4Ssf%2baPj6baagrGQ0fNJcWCccGQXD47%2fJtzQPQaOaQ3LKtb
“Syria is now the number one destination for jihadists anywhere in the world,” said UK foreign minister, William Hague, on May 20, worried – as indeed are a number of European governments – at the effect on home-grown extremists of exposure to this ruthless intra-Islamist strife.
One crucial dividing line separates the protagonists – the fault line in Islam itself between Muslims of the Shia and those of the Sunni persuasion. The Assad régime represents the Alawite tradition of Shi’ite Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran is solidly Shia, and so is the puppet organisation that it created in Lebanon, and that it funds and supports – Hezbollah. Assad’s recent modest successes against the rebels is due in no small measure to the 150,000-strong fighting force that Hezbollah, under instructions from Tehran, has thrown into the fight.
On the Sunni side of the battlefield are ranged the forces not only of the official opposition, but also of the jihadists, Islamists and extremists, including Al-Qaeda, seeking a long-term advantage out of the current chaos.
Al-Qaeda, in particular, has featured in the latest reports of in-fighting amongst supposedly united anti-Assad forces. Al-Qaeda seems set on replicating in Syria the carnage it orchestrated in post-Saddam Iraq. Al-Qaeda's leader, since the death of Osama bin Laden, is Ayman al-Zawahiri. He recently appointed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former head of the so-called “Islamic State of Iraq”, as head of a new merged organisation which they dub “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.”
Baghdadi is reported to favor using intense violence to break down society in order to allow jihad to flourish. Proclaiming the need for an international caliphate, ending national borders, he must have seemed an ideal candidate to head an Al-Qaeda-led Sunni entity covering the whole of Iraq and Syria.
This active intervention by Al-Qaeda has paid dividends. The major militant jihadist group fighting the government in Syria is Jabhat al-Nusra. A successful fighting force, it has taken control of large rebel-held areas of northern Syria. But the group was infiltrated by hardline jihadists from Iraq, and they recently gained control of the organisation. Shortly afterwards Jabhat’s Syrian leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, publicly proclaimed allegiance to Al-Qaeda.
The result of his declaration was to split Jabhat al-Nusra in two, and troops unwilling to align themselves with Al-Qaeda are reported to have disowned their leader and withdrawn from the front line fighting the Assad régime in Aleppo. One report affirmed that recently an entire unit of 120 men left Jabhat al-Nusra to rejoin the biggest “official” brigade in Aleppo, Liwa Tawhid, a branch of the so-called “Free Syrian Army”. Many of the young men in Jabhat claim they are Syrians first and joined Jabhat simply to rid the country of President Bashar al-Assad. Such fighters would be uninterested in becoming embroiled in a struggle for power between Sunni and Shi’ite jihadists.
Meanwhile Jabhat fighters in the east of the country still loyal to al-Jolani are reported to have started calling themselves the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" on videos posted online – in accordance with instructions from the international Al-Qaeda leadership.
In short, alongside the conflict in which Assad is fighting to retain control of the levers of power in Syria, another battle is being waged for ultimate mastery of the country. On the one hand Shi’ite Iran, via Hezbollah, is desperately anxious to ensure that Syria remains in its sphere of interest – Mehdi Taaib, who heads the think tank of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran.” Iran’s cover story for the young men from south Lebanon who have joined the Hezbollah contingent to support Assad – and for the grieving parents of those killed or wounded – is that they are fighting to defend their Shia religious beliefs, and that if Sunni extremists win in Syria, the next battle will take place in Lebanon itself.
On the other hand Al-Qaeda, in the interest of Sunni Islam, is seeking to establish an “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” on the ruins of a Syria they have devastated, just as Iraq was devastated after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is a grim prospect, and one the rest of the world must take fully into account before it starts arming one side or the other.
Unlike a fair proportion of the western world which is calling for the departure of Assad and the triumph of the Free Syrian Army – although none are yet prepared to commit themselves much beyond declarations of support – Israel has said that it favors neither side in the Syrian civil conflict. Its main concern is to prevent the Syrian government’s vast stocks of conventional and non-conventional weaponry falling into the hands of its Shi’ite Islamist allies – Iran or Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Israel must view the prospect of a post-Assad Syria in the hands of jihadists of any hue – Shi’ite or Sunni – with some concern. The best outcome for all concerned would be to establish some means of boosting the military capability of the Free Syrian Army while ensuring beyond a peradventure that its Islamist camp-followers and hangers-on do not get their hands on the weaponry. There may, unfortunately, be no guaranteed way of squaring that particular circle.
Published in the Jeruslaem Post on-line, 10 June 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/PArticle.aspx?id=316052&prmusr=BiWOh4IZztHwRoJ8B4Ssf%2baPj6baagrGQ0fNJcWCccGQXD47%2fJtzQPQaOaQ3LKtb
Monday, 20 May 2013
Iran – new president, new direction?
On 11 May 2013, only minutes before the deadline, a surprise candidate registered himself to stand in the Iranian presidential elections due to be held on 14 June. The current incumbent – the controversial Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – has served his statutory two terms, although whether he was in fact entitled to his second period in office remains a matter of intense speculation both inside and outside Iran.
Electoral fraud on a massive scale was alleged in the 2009 presidential ballot – and massive it must have been if it occurred, since Ahmadinejad’s share of the vote was announced as 63 per cent, against the 37 per cent won by his main rival. On the day of the disputed election, a woman prominent in the Iranian establishment, Efrat Marashi, called on the public to take to the streets if the vote was rigged. And indeed, on the day of Ahmadinejad’s inauguration, there were widespread street demonstrations. Hundreds of riot police met opposition protesters outside parliament and elsewhere in Tehran. Responding to the allegations of vote-rigging, the US, the UK , France and Germany refrained from sending the re-elected president the usual letters of congratulation.
The street protests continued well beyond inauguration day, and on Friday, 17 July 2009 some 1.5 million worshippers attended a particular Friday Prayer meeting. In the subsequent sermon, the speaker called for national reconciliation, the release of political prisoners and freedom of the press.
The speaker that Friday was Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who had served as Iranian president from 1989 until 1997. And it is Rafsanjani who has now declared himself a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections.
Rafsanjani and his wife – for that is who Efrat Marashi is – have proved themselves a thorn in the side of the ruling Iranian élite in general, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in particular. But Rafsanjani is too powerful, and with too great a popular following, to be entirely crushed. Instead the government has taken to harrying him. Senior members of his Construction Party, including Hossein Marashi, Mrs Rafsanjani's cousin, were detained after the election. His daughter was arrested during the street protests and later sentenced to six months in jail on charges of spreading propaganda against the Islamic Republic. His official website was blocked by the Iranian judiciary for refusing to remove the transcript of his famous Friday Sermon.
Now the Iranian constitution requires a new president to be elected, and Rafsanjani’s entry into the contest radically alters what was previously seen as a contest between rival conservative groups. Not that Rafsanjani currently is more than a relative moderate – currently, because in his time he has veered sharply from side to side across Iran’s political spectrum; and relatively moderate because, although he now favours a domestic free market, privatization of state-owned industries, and a moderate position internationally, he is still sought by the Argentinian government for ordering the 1994 bombing of a Jewish centre in Buenos Aires in which 85 people were killed and hundreds injured; while in 1997, during the trial in Germany into an assassination of Iranian opposition activists in Berlin’s Mykono restaurant, it was declared that Rafsanjani (then president of Iran) along with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and others had authorised the operation. Rafsanjani, moreover, still supports Iran’s nuclear programme – although he has indicated that he would be much more flexible than Ahmadinejad in negotiating with the UN, the US and the West about its future.
Rafsanjani’s chances of heading the poll depend on a variety of uncertain factors. His age might possibly count against him – he is 78 – but he is in good health. Given his status in Iranian society, the fact that more than 400 other candidates have thrown their hats into the ring may not be as daunting as at first glance. Rafsanjani stands head and shoulders above all of them. It is, perhaps, significant that Rafsanjani did say some time ago that, in a desire to avoid conflict and dispute, he would not enter the field without the consent of Ayatollah Khamenei. It is, therefore, possible that a last minute agreement with the Supreme Leader may have opened the way for his registration.
If however he did not come to such an agreement before the poll, the vast field of candidates does give the Supreme Leader and his immediate supporters in the higher echelons of government the opportunity to throw their weight behind some other candidate – as they did for Ahmadinejad, prior to his second ballot success. For example, there is Saeed Jalili, a hardline conservative who is seen as close to Khamenei. Jalili has been leading Iran’s team in its so-far fruitless negotiations with world powers about curtailing its nuclear programme.
Professor Shaul Bakhash is a leading expert in Iranian studies at George Mason University in Virginia. "Rafsanjani is above all a pragmatist,” says Bakhash, “a problem solver. He looks for ways to get things done. As president, if Khamenei allows him, I think he would move quickly to hold direct negotiations with the US, zero in on getting sanctions lifted, considerably moderate Iran's foreign policy rhetoric and take steps to create conditions for foreign investment.”
An intriguing prospect. The election and its outcome are only a few weeks away. We shall learn soon enough whether Iran is to be set on a new path – and whether it will be Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who leads the way.
[21 May 2013 - Iran's electoral watchdog announces it has banned Hashemi Rafsanjani from participating in the presidential election. The grounds given are his "advanced age".]
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 19 May 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=313610&prmusr=YCnv4CmeXYJeBHoRny4jFdUEzQY%2bgGVAb4PCzY4ILuaMdEX1zyDZq%2f6LAMyf2vrm
Monday, 13 May 2013
The persistent Mr Kerry
The rusting engine of the peace process seems to be coughing its way back into life. Stalled since September 2010, when Israel’s 10-month freeze on construction in the West Bank came to an end and was not renewed, US President Obama – just starting his second term – seems determined to kick-start the motor into action. Will he ever get it to a desirable destination, humming along on all eight cylinders? Precedent and the odds are against him, but politics is an unpredictable game.
The new US Secretary of State, John Kelly, charged with reinvigorating Arab-Israeli relations, has set about his task with a refreshing enthusiasm.
An early success was initiating a rapprochement between Israel and Turkey – a month later still somewhat shaky, but undeniably in existence. Since then he has, with dash and dynamism, striven to facilitate a resumption of face-to-face negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (the PA). It was a triumph of diplomatic adroitness on his part to organise a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers in Washington on 29 April, hosted by him in conjunction with Vice-President Joe Biden. It was an even greater coup to obtain from them a concession – tiny though it may seem, and instantly rejected by hostile voices as it was – that modified the spirit of the original Arab Peace Proposal of 2002. Following the discussions, the Arab League ministers conceded that the borders of a future sovereign Palestine need not be precisely the boundaries between Israel and the West Bank on 4 June 1967 (the day before the Six-Day War), but could be the subject of “minor land swaps.”
The statement by Qatari Prime Minister Sheik al-Thani at the end of the meeting, confirming the delegation’s agreement to this modification, acted as a political catalyst. It suddenly seemed, in both Washington and Jerusalem, that meaningful peace negotiations might once again be a possibility.
A flurry of diplomatic activity ensued. Tzipi Livni, Israel’s Justice Minister responsible also for peace negotiations, flew over to Washington to discuss the developing situation with him. A few days later, Kerry was off to Rome to meet with Jordanian foreign minister, Nasser Judeh. The result? A declaration by Kerry that Jordan, because of its geographical and diplomatic affinity with Israel, was an essential partner to peace.
“It is absolutely critical,” said Kerry, “for all of us to try to move speedily and with focus to try to get to a place where everybody understands we are engaged in a serious process to reopen negotiations. Jordan will play a key role in that.”
Meanwhile Tzipi Livni repacked her overnight bag, and took her own flight to Rome, where once again she was on the scene to follow up Kerry’s breakneck initiative. Back in Israel, Livni lauded Kerry’s dynamism which, she said, had given the peace process a new momentum.
Even Fatah seems to have caught a whiff of the new “can-do” spirit. On 11 May 2013 the Fatah Central Committee not only welcomed US efforts to revive the peace process, but formally accepted the Arab League’s proposal to authorise land swaps with Israel when determining the borders of a future Palestine. Hamas would endorse neither position.
The real question, of course, is whether all this energy and enthusiasm is leading either Israel or the Palestinians to a desirable destination. The declared objective is two states living side by side in peace and cooperation. Rejected are two versions of the one-state solution – the Hamas doctrine of Palestine “from the river to the sea” with Israel eliminated from the scene, and the bizarre proposal from Israel’s hard-liners to annex Judea and Samaria and pay its Arab inhabitants to re-settle elsewhere. The consequence of this hare-brained scheme seems obvious – not a government in the world would recognise this land-grab. Israel would have added its friends to the already long enough list of its enemies, and guaranteed for itself a future of continuous conflict both diplomatic and military.
On the other hand, continuous conflict is the fear underlying Israel’s right-wing extremists. Inviting one’s enemy into one’s drawing-room, so that he can the more easily cut your throat, seems to them quixotic – and would indeed be so, unless copper-bottomed guarantees of future security for Israel are built into any final peace accord. Can such assurances indeed be formulated and agreed between the parties? One of the many questions still hanging in the air.
No doubt another tricky conundrum is exercising John Kerry and his officials – how to achieve a sovereign Palestine when a vital piece of the jigsaw, namely the Gaza strip, home to well over a million Palestinians, is missing. They have no doubt considered that one unsatisfactory, and interim, outcome to Kerry’s current peace efforts might be a West Bank Palestine run by the Fatah-dominated PA, and a Gazan mini-Islamist state run by Hamas. They may calculate that once Gazan Palestinians see an actual sovereign Palestine up and running, the political atmosphere might change, rejectionism might lose its appeal, and the PA might be able to resume its authority within Gaza. Wishful thinking? Undoubtedly.
Meanwhile it appears that John Kerry has given himself until 7 June to announce the results of his current efforts to resume peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. One authoritative speculation, which describes itself as an “exclusive”, affirms that Kerry has obtained the agreement of both Netanyahu and Abbas for a novel plan to run peace negotiations simultaneously on twin tracks: the first would see Israel facing the PA across the table; the second, Israel facing the Arab League in direct discussions, for the first time ever. He will be back in Israel on 23 May, perhaps to advance this very plan.
We wait with bated breath.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 13 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13052013-the-persistent-mr-kerry-oped/
Sunday, 12 May 2013
Post-conflict Syria
When the dust settles on Syria’s civil war, what sort of a situation will the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, be facing? Even if Russia and the US manage in their current discussions to agree that a negotiated settlement is the way forward, there is no guarantee that either the Assad régime or the official opposition would come to the table without imposing conditions that the other side would find unacceptable. A negotiated settlement, moreover, takes no account of the aims, ambitions and interests of the score of other bodies – jihadists, Islamists, extremists – that have attached themselves to one side or the other in the conflict, hoping to achieve some particular advantage at the end of the day.
Chief among these “hangers-on”, in what began as a home-grown protest movement à la Arab Spring, is the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran has long had political ambitions regarding Syria. Over the years it has invested huge resources in converting Syria to the Shi’ite version of Islam, and in its heyday the Assad régime freely allowed Iranian missionaries into the country to strengthen the Shi’ite faith. Now, in addition to instigating the transfer of tens of thousands of Hezbollah troops from Lebanon to fight for Bashar Assad in Syria, Iran is reported to be building up a sister organisation to Hezbollah, recruited from Shi’ite forces in Iraq, to further strengthen Assad’s régime. The particular mission of these troops, known as the League of the Righteous and Kateeb Hezbollah, is to defend the Shi’ite centres in Damascus.
Syria is an indispensible element in Iran's strategy to achieve hegemony in the Middle East. In January 2012 General Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, declared that, in “one way or another”, the Islamic Republic controlled Iraq and South Lebanon. Now, with the old collaborative arrangement between two independent régimes looking increasingly shaky, control of Syria is in their sights. Mehdi Taaib, who heads the think tank of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran and it has greater strategic importance for Iran than Khuzestan [an Arab-populated district inside Iran].”
A few weeks ago, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah paid a secret visit to Tehran where he met with the top Iranian officials headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and General Suleimani, who had prepared an operational plan for winning the civil conflict in Syria. The Arab political weekly, Al-Shiraa, published in Lebanon, reported on 15 March 2013 that the Suleiman plan includes three elements:
1) the establishment of a popular sectarian army made up of Shi’ites and Alawites, to be backed by forces from Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah, and symbolic contingents from the Persian Gulf;
2) this force is to total 150,000 fighters;
3) it will be integrated with the Syrian army.
Suleimani himself visited Syria in late February-early March to prepare for the implementation of his plan.
It is, perhaps, significant that all this Iranian-led manipulation of Hezbollah does not go unchallenged within Lebanon. NOW is an on-line Lebanese journal, published in English and Arabic, covering Lebanon, the Lebanese diaspora and the Middle East. On 4 May it published an article claiming that, in his visit to Iran, Hassan Nasrallah received guidance on how to present Hezbollah’s escalating – and increasingly unpopular – involvement in Syria to the Lebanese public.
Hezbollah, though in fact a sectarian Shi'ite militia, has long sought to enhance its legitimacy in the Sunni Arab world by presenting itself as a non-sectarian, pan-Islamic resistance movement against Israel. But its activities in Syria do not fit this picture, and Hezbollah has been having trouble in portraying its involvement to the Lebanese public, especially in view of the increasing number of fighters killed in the conflict
Subhi Tufayli, the first head of Hezbollah who was dismissed from its leadership by Iran at the start of the 1990s, has been one of the prominent critics of Hezbollah’s incursion into Syria. Tufayli recently claimed that 138 Hezbollah fighters had been killed there along with scores of wounded who were brought to hospitals in Lebanon. Ceremonies for burial of the dead are frequently held clandestinely, sometimes at night, so as to avoid anger and resentment. The families, however, have raised harsh questions about such unnecessary sacrifice that is not within the sacred framework of jihad against Israel, which Hezbollah claims as its raison d’être.
Hezbollah needs a convincing narrative, beyond the fact that it serves Iran’s regional interests, to justify the toll of dead and wounded from its Syrian adventure. Conjuring up the spectre of hostile Sunnis coming after Shi’ite villages and religious places serves that purpose. So, in a recent speech on Hezbollah’s TV station, Nasrallah offered that up as the rationale for the movement’s involvement in Syria.
But Hezbollah, and Iran standing behind it, relies on its pan-Islamic, anti-Israel stance for its popular support. Which explains the despatch of a drone over northern Israel a few weeks ago. . As NOW put it: “Although Nasrallah reiterated his party’s denial that it was behind the drone he, and the group more broadly, were clearly taking credit for it and boasting about it as an achievement.”
The drone was almost certainly authorised by Iran’s leaders during Nasrallah’s visit to Tehran – as was Hezbollah’s reaction following it. The drone, via a nod and a wink, would be Hezbollah refocusing the public’s attention on its anti-Israel activities, but it would not go the whole hog and claim responsibility. A retaliatory Israeli attack on Lebanon is far from what Iran’s leaders want at present; they would prefer to safeguard Hezbollah’s military capabilities in readiness to counter any strike on their nuclear programme.
So in Syria Hezbollah is engaged in building Iran’s new strategy, acting in tandem with Iran against the Sunni Islamic groups that threaten Iran’s interests in that benighted country. For at the end of the day, Hezbollah is not a Lebanese national movement but a creation of Iran and subject to its exclusive authority.
As Dr Shimon Shapira, of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, wrote recently: “For the Islamic Republic, this is a war of survival against a radical Sunni uprising that views Iran and the Shi'ites as infidels to be annihilated. This is the real war being waged today, and it is within Islam. From Iran’s standpoint, if the extreme Sunnis of the al-Qaeda persuasion are not defeated in Syria, they will assert themselves in Iraq and threaten to take over the Persian Gulf, posing a real danger to Iran’s regional hegemony. Khamenei does not intend to give in.”
Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line magazine, 13 May 2013:
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Opinion/Article.aspx?id=312997&prmusr=70l5TDetZc4NWv8%2fSI14YkGYvAjkxc%2bEqMfZ%2fdhwwqqrMecR7q3y4oZdzQ6R4XBa
Published in the Eurasia Review, 15 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15052013-post-conflict-syria-oped/
Wednesday, 8 May 2013
Iran and the Sunni extremists
Iran is a non-Arab Muslim state that adheres to an extreme form of Shi’ite Islam. In the Shi’ite axis through which Iran conducts its regional policy (Iran-Syria-Hezbollah in Lebanon), Syria forms a vital link – which is why Iran is expending every effort to keep Bashar Assad in power. Supported by Iran, Shia fundamentalists in their thousands have flocked to Assad’s banner, and are in deadly conflict with the thousands of Sunni jihadists who have joined the opposition forces that are battling to overthrow the Assad régime.
For example, the assassination attempt on the Syrian Prime Minister, Wael Al-Halki, on Monday 29 April, was pretty clearly an operation carried out by one of the extremist Sunni groups that have affiliated themselves to the anti-Assad rebellion.
In particular the military wing of Hezbollah, the terrorist organisation set up in Lebanon by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the 1980s, is heavily engaged in the Syrian civil conflict, determined to ensure that the Assad régime is not swept away. If eventually a political settlement is reached between the Syrian rebels and the Syrian government, then Hezbollah’s power and influence, already great and growing within Lebanon’s body politic, would have spilt over into its vastly larger Syrian neighbour. In that eventuality the Gulf states, all of which, with the exception of Bahrain, are Sunni Muslim, would be locked in a sort of Shi’ite pincer – and, as the recent release of Wikileaks documents revealed, virtually all of them greatly fear that Iran aims to topple their régimes and dominate the region.
Yet in the convoluted, Byzantine world of Islamic fundamentalism, “my enemy’s enemy is sometimes my friend”, and Shi’ite and Sunni jihadists are agreed at least on a common enemy – Israel. A visceral hatred of Judaism and Jews has been hot-wired into the extreme Islamist world view, and to jihadists of either persuasion Israel as a Jewish state is literally intolerable. As a result, Shi’ite Iran has been far from consistent in its relations with Sunni extremists.
For example, united by a desire to destroy Israel, Iran has consistently supplied the Sunni terrorist organisation Hamas in the Gaza strip with ever-more sophisticated weaponry. As a result the volume and range of the rockets fired from Gaza indiscriminately on civilian targets inside Israel increased to a point when, in 2012, Israel felt obliged for a second time to respond to the continued provocation by a direct military assault.
Now, evidence is emerging that Iran is looking for new ways to reopen its supply lines to Hamas. Rather than risk detection by the Israeli navy, Iran is trying to link up with the hard-line Sunni Muslim government in Sudan to smuggle arms to Gaza, passing through Egypt where another Islamist Sunni government is in power.
“In short,” wrote the distinguished columnist Con Coughlin recently, “Iran has no problem working with its Sunni rivals when it suits its interests to do so – and this should worry us.”
Another disturbing phenomenon is the on-off working relationship between Shi’ite Iran and Sunni Al-Qaeda. Divided by race and religion, they are not natural allies: what unites them is their loathing of the US and Israel. This common hatred was sufficient, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, to persuade Iran to grant refuge to bin Laden’s daughter, Fatima, and four of his sons – Othman, Mohammed, Laden and Sa’ad – along with various other key Al-Qaeda figures Including former security chief, Saif al-Adel. Now the US believes that Saif al-Adel's father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, is the link between Al-Qaeda and the Iranian government.
A recent incident linking them is the pre-emptive arrest last week of two men suspected of a plot to derail a passenger train in Toronto. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said the surveillance operation leading to the arrests was "a result of extensive collaborative efforts" – FBI agents from the US were said to be involved in helping foil the attack – and that the terrorist operation had been planned with support from Al-Qaeda elements in Iran.
Canada's Globe and Mail, reporting that the arrested men had been under investigation for months, asserted that the planned terrorist attack involved a Toronto-New York City train and, in the words of New York Republican Representative Peter King, was intended "to cause significant loss of human life including New Yorkers."
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi described the accusation as “the most hilarious thing I've heard in my 64 years." However Jonathan Eyal, head of security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has said: ”The Canadian claim that this plot has been engineered on Iranian soil is entirely plausible. Western intelligence agencies have known for a long time about the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran.”
So yes, as and when it suits the Iranian regime and advances their global strategic objectives, Iran will provide support to extremist Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda and Hamas, and these Sunni fundamentalists will accept it. But outside observers need to bear in mind that, in the eyes of hard-line Sunni salafists, the Shia faith is a heresy – indeed some challenge the right of Shi’ites to call themselves Muslim at all. Some Wahabi groups, often designated “takfiri” and sometimes linked to Al-Qaeda, have even advocated the persecution of the Shia as heretics. Such groups have been allegedly responsible for violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shi’ite gatherings at mosques and shrines, most notably in Iraq during the Ashura mourning ceremonies in 2005, where hundreds of Shias were killed in coordinated suicide bombings.
It is some consolation to reflect that cooperation resting on such uncertain foundations is unlikely to be either solid or permanent – and that, effectively challenged, it would almost certainly prove vulnerable.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042013-iran-and-the-sunni-extremists-oped/
For example, the assassination attempt on the Syrian Prime Minister, Wael Al-Halki, on Monday 29 April, was pretty clearly an operation carried out by one of the extremist Sunni groups that have affiliated themselves to the anti-Assad rebellion.
In particular the military wing of Hezbollah, the terrorist organisation set up in Lebanon by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the 1980s, is heavily engaged in the Syrian civil conflict, determined to ensure that the Assad régime is not swept away. If eventually a political settlement is reached between the Syrian rebels and the Syrian government, then Hezbollah’s power and influence, already great and growing within Lebanon’s body politic, would have spilt over into its vastly larger Syrian neighbour. In that eventuality the Gulf states, all of which, with the exception of Bahrain, are Sunni Muslim, would be locked in a sort of Shi’ite pincer – and, as the recent release of Wikileaks documents revealed, virtually all of them greatly fear that Iran aims to topple their régimes and dominate the region.
Yet in the convoluted, Byzantine world of Islamic fundamentalism, “my enemy’s enemy is sometimes my friend”, and Shi’ite and Sunni jihadists are agreed at least on a common enemy – Israel. A visceral hatred of Judaism and Jews has been hot-wired into the extreme Islamist world view, and to jihadists of either persuasion Israel as a Jewish state is literally intolerable. As a result, Shi’ite Iran has been far from consistent in its relations with Sunni extremists.
For example, united by a desire to destroy Israel, Iran has consistently supplied the Sunni terrorist organisation Hamas in the Gaza strip with ever-more sophisticated weaponry. As a result the volume and range of the rockets fired from Gaza indiscriminately on civilian targets inside Israel increased to a point when, in 2012, Israel felt obliged for a second time to respond to the continued provocation by a direct military assault.
Now, evidence is emerging that Iran is looking for new ways to reopen its supply lines to Hamas. Rather than risk detection by the Israeli navy, Iran is trying to link up with the hard-line Sunni Muslim government in Sudan to smuggle arms to Gaza, passing through Egypt where another Islamist Sunni government is in power.
“In short,” wrote the distinguished columnist Con Coughlin recently, “Iran has no problem working with its Sunni rivals when it suits its interests to do so – and this should worry us.”
Another disturbing phenomenon is the on-off working relationship between Shi’ite Iran and Sunni Al-Qaeda. Divided by race and religion, they are not natural allies: what unites them is their loathing of the US and Israel. This common hatred was sufficient, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, to persuade Iran to grant refuge to bin Laden’s daughter, Fatima, and four of his sons – Othman, Mohammed, Laden and Sa’ad – along with various other key Al-Qaeda figures Including former security chief, Saif al-Adel. Now the US believes that Saif al-Adel's father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, is the link between Al-Qaeda and the Iranian government.
A recent incident linking them is the pre-emptive arrest last week of two men suspected of a plot to derail a passenger train in Toronto. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said the surveillance operation leading to the arrests was "a result of extensive collaborative efforts" – FBI agents from the US were said to be involved in helping foil the attack – and that the terrorist operation had been planned with support from Al-Qaeda elements in Iran.
Canada's Globe and Mail, reporting that the arrested men had been under investigation for months, asserted that the planned terrorist attack involved a Toronto-New York City train and, in the words of New York Republican Representative Peter King, was intended "to cause significant loss of human life including New Yorkers."
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi described the accusation as “the most hilarious thing I've heard in my 64 years." However Jonathan Eyal, head of security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has said: ”The Canadian claim that this plot has been engineered on Iranian soil is entirely plausible. Western intelligence agencies have known for a long time about the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran.”
So yes, as and when it suits the Iranian regime and advances their global strategic objectives, Iran will provide support to extremist Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda and Hamas, and these Sunni fundamentalists will accept it. But outside observers need to bear in mind that, in the eyes of hard-line Sunni salafists, the Shia faith is a heresy – indeed some challenge the right of Shi’ites to call themselves Muslim at all. Some Wahabi groups, often designated “takfiri” and sometimes linked to Al-Qaeda, have even advocated the persecution of the Shia as heretics. Such groups have been allegedly responsible for violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shi’ite gatherings at mosques and shrines, most notably in Iraq during the Ashura mourning ceremonies in 2005, where hundreds of Shias were killed in coordinated suicide bombings.
It is some consolation to reflect that cooperation resting on such uncertain foundations is unlikely to be either solid or permanent – and that, effectively challenged, it would almost certainly prove vulnerable.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 April 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30042013-iran-and-the-sunni-extremists-oped/
Thursday, 2 May 2013
Israel and Palestine: signs of a thaw
Yes, in these early days of May 2013 cracks are appearing in the solidly frozen iceberg that has been the Israel-Palestine peace process over the past two-and-a half-years. Is this the start of a genuine thaw? Too early to say – but the atmosphere is certainly warming up.
From the moment US President Barack Obama assumed office for his second term in January 2013, he made it clear that his administration would accord a high degree of priority to tackling the Arab-Israel conflict in general, and the Israel-Palestine issue in particular. In point of fact he had attempted to do just that, back in January 2009, but subsequent events had demonstrated all too clearly that his first effort had gone disastrously wrong. He would not make the same mistakes a second time.
It was on 22 January 2009, in a special ceremony in the White House, that newly-elected President Barack Obama named George Mitchell his "special envoy to the Middle East" charged with seeking a "comprehensive peace". The event, attended also by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was widely interpreted as a determination on Obama's part to involve himself and his new administration in working for, and in finally achieving, a settlement to the long-running Arab-Israel dispute.
At the ceremony Mitchell said that, along with Obama and Clinton, he believed the objective of a Jewish state and a Palestinian state living side by side was possible, and that the conflict, old as it was, could be resolved.
In March 2009 the Obama administration explicitly incorporated into US policy the 2002 Arab League peace plan, originally mooted by Saudi Arabia, under which the Arab world undertook formally to recognise Israel and enter into normal relations with her in exchange, inter alia, for Israel's withdrawing from territories captured in the 1967 war. Three months later President Obama, in an unprecedented move, reached out to the Muslim world in a speech in Cairo. The "cycle of suspicion and discord" between the United States and the Muslim world, he declared, must end. He called for a "new beginning"; both sides needed to make a "sustained effort... to respect one another and seek common ground". The US bond with Israel was unbreakable, he said, but the Palestinians' plight was "intolerable".
To the fledgling administration in Washington, this initiative by America’s first black president must have seemed a bold, unprecedented step well worth the effort. Perhaps this president, with his Black Power background, could achieve things that no other could even have contemplated.
It was not long before reality overtook aspirations. It quickly became apparent that all the overtures in the world counted for nothing against the reality of Iran's nuclear ambitions. As for Syria, when reports emerged of their transfer of a batch of highly sophisticated Scud missiles to the terrorist organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon, Obama’s plan to reinstate formal diplomatic relations was put on hold. In Gaza, the Islamist terrorist group Hamas, having seized control of the Strip in a bloody internecine coup d'état, remained virtually at war with Fatah, its rivals within the Palestinian Authority, and deeply opposed to any accommodation with, or even recognition of, Israel.
So although George Mitchell’s unremitting efforts did result, in September 2010, in the first of a few face-to-face meetings between Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, they soon petered out. They foundered on Obama’s own outright condemnation of the resumption of construction in Israel’s West Bank settlements, following the 10-month building freeze that he had persuaded Netanyahu to institute. Construction in the West Bank had never previously inhibited peace talks between the PA and Israel, but with the US President condemning them outright, Abbas had been painted into a corner and could scarcely do less.
Obama’s second effort has so far endeavoured to by-pass the obstacles in his first. There has been no renewal of his overtures to the Muslim world. On the contrary, he made a point of visiting Israel early in his second term, and reiterating his support for a renewal of the peace process – a support which made no direct reference to construction in the West Bank. He has voiced a hard line against Iran’s continued nuclear activity, although not perhaps as hard a line as Israel’s prime minister – also in office for a further term – might wish. He has called for Syria’s President Bashar Assad to step down, in light of the remorseless hammering of his own civilian population in the course of his civil conflict.
And to carry forward the administration’s policy of achieving a settlement of the Israel-Palestine dispute, President Obama has designated not a “special envoy” but the Secretary of State himself, John Kerry.
Kerry has been notably vigorous and enthusiastic in tackling his formidable task. Unsparing of his personal convenience, he began his new effort with a succession of visits to the region – three in as many weeks. An early, if partial, success was his brokering of a somewhat shaky rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Meanwhile the US quietly unblocked almost $500 million in aid to the PA which had been frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance in developing the Palestinian economy, presumably as a sweetener to the PA to return to meaningful negotiations.
Kerry wanted the Arab League to play a role in the process, to ensure that any future peace negotiations had as wide a backing across the Arab world as possible, and to out-manoeuvre the Islamist rejectionists. Most members of the League are hostile to Islamist fundamentalists, opposed as the jihadists are to any accommodation with Israel, but also to many stable Arab régimes which they regard as over-secular in character.
On the last day of April 2013, Kerry and US Vice-President Joe Biden hosted an Arab League delegation, which included the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, and senior officials from Lebanon, the PA and Saudi Arabia. The discussions focused on the principles of the 2002 Arab League Initiative, which proposed full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for a return to the boundaries of 4 June 1967 (the day before the outbreak of the Six-Day War), the inclusion of East Jerusalem in a future Palestinian state and the return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel.
Israel had never formally rejected the Arab peace plan, but nor did it ever accept it. One objection, of several, was the principle of establishing the border of a sovereign Palestine along the cease-fire line of the Israeli and Jordanian armies in 1949 – which is what the 1967 boundary was. In 1967 there was no recognized international border between the West Bank and Israel. The Armistice line was the position on the ground when the fighting stopped. In fact, Article II of the Armistice with Jordan explicitly specified that the agreement did not compromise any future territorial claims of the parties, since it had been "dictated exclusively by military considerations."
As Dr Dore Gold, the renowned expert on Middle East affairs, has pointed out, after the Six-Day War the architects of UN Security Council Resolution 242 insisted that the old armistice line had to be replaced with a new border. "Which is why," Dr Gold writes, "Resolution 242 did not call for a full withdrawal from all the territories that Israel captured in the Six Day War; the 1949 Armistice lines were no longer to be a reference point for a future peace process."
US President Lyndon Johnson made this very point in September 1968: "It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of 4 June 1967 will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders."
The 1949 Armistice line, of course, takes no account of geographical and demographic changes over the past 64 years, so it must be regarded as something of a triumph for John Kerry that, in his meeting with them, the Arab League delegation softened its stance on this issue. Qatari Prime Minister Sheik al-Thani said that the delegation agreed to the possibility of “comparable,” mutually agreed and “minor” land swaps between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
“We’ve had a very positive, very constructive discussion,” said Kerry. “The Arab League delegation affirmed…the two-state solution on the basis of the 4th of June 1967 line* [*note “line” not “border” - NT], with the (possibility) of comparable and mutual agreed minor swaps of the land.”
Israel’s President Shimon Peres, in his visit to Pope Francis on 30 April, designated this development as “a new opportunity for peace.” Prime Minister Netanyahu said on 2 May to a visiting delegation of five US congressmen: “We’re engaged right now in an effort that we appreciate, led by President Obama and Secretary John Kerry, to restart the peace negotiations between us and the Palestinians. We’re eager to do it; we have no preconditions.”
What was not said in the statement by the Arab League, however, is almost as significant as what was – for the League made no mention of Hamas, the Islamist terrorist organization that is the elephant in the room. Controlling a large proportion of any future sovereign Palestine, viscerally opposed to recognizing, let alone negotiating with, Israel, and almost certainly aiming to oust both Abbas from the PA presidency and Fatah from control of the PA, Hamas represents a major obstacle to any peace process as long as it remains in control of Gaza. Most of the knotty problems requiring resolution in a final peace agreement have been discussed ad nauseam in the years of previous negotiations between the two sides, and have pretty obvious answers. What to do about Hamas and the Gaza Strip in any final accommodation remains a loose end.
Kerry’s next move? Well, according to some sources it could be hosting a four-way summit, as a precursor to renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This speculation – which, it must be acknowledged, has been denied by official US spokespersons – also indicated that Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries might be invited to participate in the summit, though at what level was not made clear. According to these sources, Kerry discussed the planned summit in his recent meetings in Istanbul with the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers, as well as with PA President Abbas. It might also have been be discussed at the White House meeting between President Obama and King Abdullah on 26 April, and could feature on the agenda in the planned mid-May Washington visit by Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Putting aside all speculation, it seems clear that Kerry has taken up his Middle East challenge with energy and enthusiasm. Through undoubted diplomatic skill and the application of sheer persistence, he has injected renewed animation into what many had already written off as a defunct corpse. Whether he and President Obama can succeed in the major enterprise to which they have dedicated themselves – the conclusion of a genuine peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians – where so many have failed before them, time alone will tell. From the standpoint of these early days of May 2013, all we can say is that they have made a positive start.
Published in shortened form in Eurasia Review, 2 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02052013-israel-and-palestine-signs-of-a-thaw-oped/
From the moment US President Barack Obama assumed office for his second term in January 2013, he made it clear that his administration would accord a high degree of priority to tackling the Arab-Israel conflict in general, and the Israel-Palestine issue in particular. In point of fact he had attempted to do just that, back in January 2009, but subsequent events had demonstrated all too clearly that his first effort had gone disastrously wrong. He would not make the same mistakes a second time.
It was on 22 January 2009, in a special ceremony in the White House, that newly-elected President Barack Obama named George Mitchell his "special envoy to the Middle East" charged with seeking a "comprehensive peace". The event, attended also by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was widely interpreted as a determination on Obama's part to involve himself and his new administration in working for, and in finally achieving, a settlement to the long-running Arab-Israel dispute.
At the ceremony Mitchell said that, along with Obama and Clinton, he believed the objective of a Jewish state and a Palestinian state living side by side was possible, and that the conflict, old as it was, could be resolved.
In March 2009 the Obama administration explicitly incorporated into US policy the 2002 Arab League peace plan, originally mooted by Saudi Arabia, under which the Arab world undertook formally to recognise Israel and enter into normal relations with her in exchange, inter alia, for Israel's withdrawing from territories captured in the 1967 war. Three months later President Obama, in an unprecedented move, reached out to the Muslim world in a speech in Cairo. The "cycle of suspicion and discord" between the United States and the Muslim world, he declared, must end. He called for a "new beginning"; both sides needed to make a "sustained effort... to respect one another and seek common ground". The US bond with Israel was unbreakable, he said, but the Palestinians' plight was "intolerable".
To the fledgling administration in Washington, this initiative by America’s first black president must have seemed a bold, unprecedented step well worth the effort. Perhaps this president, with his Black Power background, could achieve things that no other could even have contemplated.
It was not long before reality overtook aspirations. It quickly became apparent that all the overtures in the world counted for nothing against the reality of Iran's nuclear ambitions. As for Syria, when reports emerged of their transfer of a batch of highly sophisticated Scud missiles to the terrorist organisation Hezbollah in Lebanon, Obama’s plan to reinstate formal diplomatic relations was put on hold. In Gaza, the Islamist terrorist group Hamas, having seized control of the Strip in a bloody internecine coup d'état, remained virtually at war with Fatah, its rivals within the Palestinian Authority, and deeply opposed to any accommodation with, or even recognition of, Israel.
So although George Mitchell’s unremitting efforts did result, in September 2010, in the first of a few face-to-face meetings between Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, they soon petered out. They foundered on Obama’s own outright condemnation of the resumption of construction in Israel’s West Bank settlements, following the 10-month building freeze that he had persuaded Netanyahu to institute. Construction in the West Bank had never previously inhibited peace talks between the PA and Israel, but with the US President condemning them outright, Abbas had been painted into a corner and could scarcely do less.
Obama’s second effort has so far endeavoured to by-pass the obstacles in his first. There has been no renewal of his overtures to the Muslim world. On the contrary, he made a point of visiting Israel early in his second term, and reiterating his support for a renewal of the peace process – a support which made no direct reference to construction in the West Bank. He has voiced a hard line against Iran’s continued nuclear activity, although not perhaps as hard a line as Israel’s prime minister – also in office for a further term – might wish. He has called for Syria’s President Bashar Assad to step down, in light of the remorseless hammering of his own civilian population in the course of his civil conflict.
And to carry forward the administration’s policy of achieving a settlement of the Israel-Palestine dispute, President Obama has designated not a “special envoy” but the Secretary of State himself, John Kerry.
Kerry has been notably vigorous and enthusiastic in tackling his formidable task. Unsparing of his personal convenience, he began his new effort with a succession of visits to the region – three in as many weeks. An early, if partial, success was his brokering of a somewhat shaky rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Meanwhile the US quietly unblocked almost $500 million in aid to the PA which had been frozen by Congress for months, and Kerry promised further economic assistance in developing the Palestinian economy, presumably as a sweetener to the PA to return to meaningful negotiations.
Kerry wanted the Arab League to play a role in the process, to ensure that any future peace negotiations had as wide a backing across the Arab world as possible, and to out-manoeuvre the Islamist rejectionists. Most members of the League are hostile to Islamist fundamentalists, opposed as the jihadists are to any accommodation with Israel, but also to many stable Arab régimes which they regard as over-secular in character.
On the last day of April 2013, Kerry and US Vice-President Joe Biden hosted an Arab League delegation, which included the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, and senior officials from Lebanon, the PA and Saudi Arabia. The discussions focused on the principles of the 2002 Arab League Initiative, which proposed full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for a return to the boundaries of 4 June 1967 (the day before the outbreak of the Six-Day War), the inclusion of East Jerusalem in a future Palestinian state and the return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel.
Israel had never formally rejected the Arab peace plan, but nor did it ever accept it. One objection, of several, was the principle of establishing the border of a sovereign Palestine along the cease-fire line of the Israeli and Jordanian armies in 1949 – which is what the 1967 boundary was. In 1967 there was no recognized international border between the West Bank and Israel. The Armistice line was the position on the ground when the fighting stopped. In fact, Article II of the Armistice with Jordan explicitly specified that the agreement did not compromise any future territorial claims of the parties, since it had been "dictated exclusively by military considerations."
As Dr Dore Gold, the renowned expert on Middle East affairs, has pointed out, after the Six-Day War the architects of UN Security Council Resolution 242 insisted that the old armistice line had to be replaced with a new border. "Which is why," Dr Gold writes, "Resolution 242 did not call for a full withdrawal from all the territories that Israel captured in the Six Day War; the 1949 Armistice lines were no longer to be a reference point for a future peace process."
US President Lyndon Johnson made this very point in September 1968: "It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of 4 June 1967 will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders."
The 1949 Armistice line, of course, takes no account of geographical and demographic changes over the past 64 years, so it must be regarded as something of a triumph for John Kerry that, in his meeting with them, the Arab League delegation softened its stance on this issue. Qatari Prime Minister Sheik al-Thani said that the delegation agreed to the possibility of “comparable,” mutually agreed and “minor” land swaps between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
“We’ve had a very positive, very constructive discussion,” said Kerry. “The Arab League delegation affirmed…the two-state solution on the basis of the 4th of June 1967 line* [*note “line” not “border” - NT], with the (possibility) of comparable and mutual agreed minor swaps of the land.”
Israel’s President Shimon Peres, in his visit to Pope Francis on 30 April, designated this development as “a new opportunity for peace.” Prime Minister Netanyahu said on 2 May to a visiting delegation of five US congressmen: “We’re engaged right now in an effort that we appreciate, led by President Obama and Secretary John Kerry, to restart the peace negotiations between us and the Palestinians. We’re eager to do it; we have no preconditions.”
What was not said in the statement by the Arab League, however, is almost as significant as what was – for the League made no mention of Hamas, the Islamist terrorist organization that is the elephant in the room. Controlling a large proportion of any future sovereign Palestine, viscerally opposed to recognizing, let alone negotiating with, Israel, and almost certainly aiming to oust both Abbas from the PA presidency and Fatah from control of the PA, Hamas represents a major obstacle to any peace process as long as it remains in control of Gaza. Most of the knotty problems requiring resolution in a final peace agreement have been discussed ad nauseam in the years of previous negotiations between the two sides, and have pretty obvious answers. What to do about Hamas and the Gaza Strip in any final accommodation remains a loose end.
Kerry’s next move? Well, according to some sources it could be hosting a four-way summit, as a precursor to renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This speculation – which, it must be acknowledged, has been denied by official US spokespersons – also indicated that Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries might be invited to participate in the summit, though at what level was not made clear. According to these sources, Kerry discussed the planned summit in his recent meetings in Istanbul with the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers, as well as with PA President Abbas. It might also have been be discussed at the White House meeting between President Obama and King Abdullah on 26 April, and could feature on the agenda in the planned mid-May Washington visit by Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Putting aside all speculation, it seems clear that Kerry has taken up his Middle East challenge with energy and enthusiasm. Through undoubted diplomatic skill and the application of sheer persistence, he has injected renewed animation into what many had already written off as a defunct corpse. Whether he and President Obama can succeed in the major enterprise to which they have dedicated themselves – the conclusion of a genuine peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians – where so many have failed before them, time alone will tell. From the standpoint of these early days of May 2013, all we can say is that they have made a positive start.
Published in shortened form in Eurasia Review, 2 May 2013:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02052013-israel-and-palestine-signs-of-a-thaw-oped/
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