Iran out-manoeuvres the West

            Vienna and Jeddah are the twin theatres in which Iran's  growing self-assurance and its ability to out-manoeuvre the West have recently been on display.

   Vienna was the setting for the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. Those talks are nominally a diplomatic means of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The negotiations have a July deadline by which to hammer out a final deal aimed at limiting Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons. In exchange, the crippling economic sanctions it faces would be lifted.

It is, however, becoming increasingly obvious that the deal being negotiated will not only enable Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, but will allow it to develop systems to deliver them. In fact, if the testimony of James Clapper, the director of US national intelligence before a Senate Select Committee in January is to be credited, there is reason to believe that Iran is already a nuclear breakout state.

Just ahead of the Vienna meeting the UN Panel of Experts, the body which monitors compliance with the Security Council's sanctions régime on Iran, produced a confidential report which said Iran “has developed methods of concealing procurement, while expanding prohibited activities."  The report added that Iran had "also demonstrated a growing capability to produce key items indigenously".  Over the years Iran has pursued and procured from abroad, among other sensitive dual-use items ─ ie items which could be used in its nuclear programme ─ aluminium, carbon fibre and special valves.

"Iran continues to make extensive use of front companies to procure items for prohibited activities,” says the report. Some companies may be established solely for the purpose of prohibited procurement; others may also be engaged in legitimate business. Sometimes Iran uses legitimate enterprises to acquire key technology. The report cited an example of how Iran used its petrochemical industry as a facade to procure crucial items for its heavy-water nuclear reactor at Arak.

The International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) is also concerned.  In their own recent report they assert that Iran is not revealing information about possible military applications of its nuclear programme, or allowing the IAEA unfettered access to all nuclear sites.

Meanwhile Iran’s so-called “moderate” president, Hassan Rouhani, recently said that he wanted Iran to do a better job of explaining its nuclear programme, so as to prevent "evil-minded'' people misleading world opinion.  He immediately followed this by declaring that Iran would never accept "nuclear apartheid" and "scientific segregation" by giving up its contested programme.

No wonder former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who claims to have been the prime mover in getting Iran to the negotiating table in the first place, has been expressing caution about whether a comprehensive deal can be clinched,

“I personally am sceptical that the Iranians will follow through and deliver,”  said Clinton on May 14. “The progress of Iran’s nuclear programme may be halted, but it is not dismantled.”

On May 12, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel arrived in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to attend a meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) defence ministers, the first for an American defence chief in six years.  Inevitably the discussion turned very largely on the threat that Iran poses to the region, and the need to counter it.

Hegel emphasised that “the most pressing security challenges” - in other words, Iran’s perceived intention to acquire nuclear weapons -  threaten the whole region and demand a collective response. He urged the Gulf states to strengthen the GCC.  That would be the way, he said, for member nations to ensure that their collective defence was more than the sum of its parts.

The negotiations in Vienna, said Hagel, “will under no circumstances trade away regional security for concessions on Iran’s nuclear program.”  US commitment to Gulf security and stability was unwavering, and “the United States will remain postured and prepared to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon, and that Iran abides by the terms of any potential agreement.  No one nation can address these threats alone,” added Hagel. “Our efforts must be coordinated and complementary.”

If the GCC meeting reveals anything, it is that the shadow of Iran looms menacingly over the Gulf states. The meeting specifically addressed defence issues, but was not competent to consider the fact that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are simply the outward manifestation of its wider religio-political aims.  For regional hegemony appears its long-term aspiration.

Iran’s influence extends over a wide range of regional issues. These include the ongoing crisis in Syria ─ both its direct involvement by arming President Bashar Assad, and its indirect involvement on the ground via Hezbollah; its subversive activities in the Gulf States, particularly Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; and, to cast the net wider, its efforts to reshape Iraq and Afghanistan in its own image.

The intense antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia exemplifies the age-old fault line that runs through Islam ─ the conflict between the Sunni and the Shi’ite interpretations of the religion.  Iran and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah organization, which is under its control, together with that part of Syria still governed by Assad, form the bulk of the key Shi’ite grouping ─ an entity dedicated to opposing the Sunni world, led by Saudi Arabia.

Saudi royals have spent vast amounts funding the spread of the Sunni Wahabi school, an ultra-conservative, literal interpretation of Islam, which is the state religion in Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, is dedicated to its own version of political Islam. The founder of the Iranian regime, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a passionate advocate of government by strict Sharia law, condemned the Saudi monarchy as a tyrannical, illegitimate clique that answers to Washington, rather than God.  The current Iranian dictator, Ayatollah Khamenei, regards himself as the repository of true Islam, and regards the ultimate role of Iran as ensuring that Shia Islam eventually triumphs over the Sunni interpretation and over those misguided Muslim states that espouse it. 

To achieve this apocalyptic end it is legitimate to use every means to undermine and destabilize those governments. Above all, one essential step is to transform Iran into a world nuclear power.  Nothing – and certainly not a little dissimulation, deceit and double-dealing ­­─ must be allowed to stand in the way.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 18 May 2014:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Iran-out-maneuvers-the-West-352597?prmusr=us1ReHk8PbYwGw5QRr7449ScZT%2bTSgKFtxdb9X6Qlf1UJFzTwpQC8BEYIUVQNh5D

Published in the Eurasia Review, 19 May 2014:
 http://www.eurasiareview.com/18052014-iran-maneuvers-west-oped/

The Palestinian get-together

The recently trumpeted Fatah-Hamas reconciliation brings to mind the notorious Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 – a totally cynical alliance of sworn enemies, conceived in the temporary self-interest of the two parties without any regard for principle, and destined to be torn asunder within two years.

What did each of the parties hope to gain from this Fatah-Hamas get-together? 

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas must have seen a tempting selection of benefits.

In the first place, it was a certain way to exit gracefully from a peace process that had clearly foundered.  As the nine months allotted to the peace talks ran inexorably out, US Secretary of State John Kerry had been turning somersaults to try to cobble together an agreement from both sides to continue talking.  Abbas saw this last-ditch effort as simply extending the stalemate into an indefinite future.  He knew perfectly well that Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would never agree to continue talks with a PA that incorporated Hamas, dedicated as it was to Israel’s destruction.  So in formalizing the reconciliation with Hamas, Abbas was effectively putting paid to the peace negotiations and setting out on his alternative path to  international recognition.

His plans to by-pass the peace talks and obtain the world’s agreement to the establishment of a sovereign Palestine, in name if not in deed, were already well advanced. Even before the deadline of April 29 had been reached, he had applied to join fifteen international organizations and treaties in the name of the State of Palestine.  Although this was presented at the time as an immediate reaction to Israel’s delay in releasing a last tranche of convicted prisoners, it was an initiative that must have taken months in the planning.  One cannot overnight identify fifteen organisations, obtain their assurance that an application would be successful, and draw up the necessary documents.   At the signing ceremony PLO Secretary-General Yasser Abed Rabbo confirmed that this was a first step towards joining all 60-odd United Nations agencies. 

Coming to terms with Hamas suited Abbas’s book in other ways.  Ever since Hamas had taken up arms against Abbas’s national unity government in 2007 and chased Fatah, bag and baggage, out of Gaza, he had known that he had two options: beat Hamas or join them.  He was perfectly well aware that his claim to speak for all the Palestinian people was a hollow one as long as his writ did not run in what was a significant part of any future sovereign Palestine, namely the Gaza strip.

He was, moreover, equally aware that his personal position as PA President was vulnerable.  He had been elected for a four-year term in 2005.  From 2009 onwards various attempts to set up parliamentary and presidential elections to renew his mandate had been scuppered by Hamas’s intransigence.  And so Abbas had soldiered on, renewing his presidency by diktat from time to time, but clearly suffering from a widening democratic deficit.  The deal with Hamas includes the assurance of parliamentary and presidential elections across the whole of the Palestinian body politic within six months – and thus solves one of Abbas’s intractable problems.  Meanwhile, he is acknowledged by Hamas as president of the PA’s interim government – a reversal of its previous refusal to do so.

So Abbas and Fatah have not done badly out of the reconciliation.  What of Hamas?

The first thing that Hamas have won is an end to the peace talks – a development they rejected from the outset.  Despite occasional oblique references from time to time, by this leading Hamas figure or that, to the possibility of accepting a sovereign Palestine within pre-June 1967 boundaries, Hamas has consistently opposed all negotiations with Israel and all the efforts by Abbas within the United Nations to gain acceptance for a sovereign Palestine as part of a two-state solution.  If Palestine is one of the two states, Israel is the other – and the basis of Hamas’s existence is, as its 1988 charter states, that Hamas "strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine".   

The Hamas leadership is well aware that its glory days are past.  A few years ago it stood tall in the world.  It had actually won a majority of the votes within Gaza in a democratic election, had used this as an excuse to renege from its agreement to form a united Palestinian government, had turned on its political allies Fatah in a bloody fratricidal coup, and seized power in the Gaza strip.

When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt, and its adherent Mohamed Morsi was elected president in June 2012, Hamas’s expectations rocketed.  They hoped for the Gaza-Egypt borders to be flung open, perhaps even for a semi-autonomous Gazan state to be established with Egypt’s blessing.  Hamas’s rocket attacks on Israel increased exponentially, and when Israel’s patience finally snapped and it launched Pillar of Defense – its second response in four years – it was Hamas who, in Palestinian eyes, was conducting the “armed struggle” against Israel. And finally it was Hamas, as one of the two principals, which agreed the cease-fire terms negotiated under the auspices of Egypt’s President Morsi.  The result – a self-declared “victory” − greatly increased Hamas’s prestige in Palestinian popular opinion.

Building on that, Hamas made continuous attempts to undermine Abbas’s authority. Not only did it refuse to recognise Abbas as PA president, it began infiltrating supporters into the West Bank, recruiting university students through a  program called “Kutla,” which entailed spreading jihadi ideology among them, and through its “Da’wa” social aid program mixed with indoctrination, attempting to enhance its standing among the general population.

All that is past.  The Muslim Brotherhood – and with it Hamas’s prestige – have plummeted.  Not only did the Brotherhood and its president lose power in Egypt after little more than a year, but it has since been declared an illegal terrorist organisation in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. So now Hamas can see positive hope in the prospect of the parliamentary and presidential elections in-built into the terms of the reconciliation with Fatah.

Given the result of the last Palestinian ballot, it is not unreasonable for Hamas to expect to emerge from the forthcoming elections much strengthened.  It will then have achieved, by democratic means, the control over the West Bank that it has been seeking since 2007.  Moreover, Abbas is in his 80th year; he cannot go on forever.  With increased political power, Hamas might be able to ensure a new president more to its liking. The result? A Hamas-dominated PA, and with it a probable renewal of terrorist activity – rockets emanating not only from Gaza, but from the West Bank. 

So the likely outcome of this Fatah-Hamas reconciliation is further Palestinian-Israeli conflict – conducted diplomatically if Fatah prevails, and if Hamas does, militarily.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 7 May 2014:

http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-Palestinian-get-together-351510?prmusr=K2ZONhMD7jVzWgiiPLuzVsL2NwTO2NOK2Lo7GYCuH%2b2UuuoYu9LQiKx13so7mMLo

Israel-Palestine: The End of the Affair

So this is how it was all fated to end – not with a bang, but with a whimper.  No triumphant three-party gathering on the White House lawn, no media coverage of an historic handshake between Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, presided over by a beaming US President Obama, as the infinitely long-running dispute between Israel and the Palestinians was finally resolved. Not even a media conference at which US Secretary of State John Kerry presented the world with a carefully constructed “framework agreement”, under which Israel and Palestine agreed to continue talking beyond the original nine-month deadline.

 

Nothing like that.  Instead a sudden meeting in the Gaza Strip between Fatah and Hamas, the so-far irreconcilable wings of the Palestinian body politic – a meeting with no prior warning, which takes Washington by surprise – and the announcement of an “historic” reconciliation which is to result in a united Palestinian government within five weeks, and presidential and parliamentary elections within six months.

The inevitable result was an immediate cessation of the peace negotiations. President Abbas “can have peace with Israel,” said Netanyahu in a TV interview on the BBC, “or a pact with Hamas – he can't have both. As long as I'm prime minister of Israel, I will never negotiate with a Palestinian government that is backed by Hamas terrorists that are calling for our liquidation."

So the peace talks have come to an abrupt end, less than a week before April 29, when the official nine months allotted to them expires.  The current phase of efforts to reconcile Israel and Palestine is at an end. 

In point of fact, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has always had a straight choice – beat Hamas or join them.  Since the moment in 2007, when Hamas reneged on its pledge to form a united government with Fatah, and instead chased them from the Gaza Strip in a bloody fratricidal coup, the two organizations have been at daggers drawn. 

How could it be otherwise?  Even if the final aims of the two entities are precisely the same – a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea”, in other words the whole of British mandated Palestine – while Fatah has decided that embracing the two-state solution is the best tactic to achieve their ultimate objective, Hamas, utterly rejecting Israel’s right to exist, has committed itself to Israel’s destruction.

 

So Hamas opposed Abbas’s bid at the United Nations for international recognition of a sovereign Palestine, because the logical corollary of recognizing a sovereign Palestine within the pre-1967 borders would be recognition of Israel beyond them.  Moreover, it has subjected Abbas to seven years of unremitting harassment – indeed, until the recent meeting in Gaza, they refused to recognise him as PA president at all, on the grounds that his presidential mandate, granted in 2005, was for a four-year term which has long expired.  Hamas has, moreover, consistently attempted to undermine his PA administration by forming militant cells within the West Bank aimed at launching attacks on Israel.

The terms of the “historic” reconciliation between the two have not been made public, and it is unlikely that they will see the light of day in their entirety.  Statements from leaders of the PA, including Abbas himself, seem to imply that the inclusion of Hamas in a government of national unity will make no difference to the Palestinians’ aim of achieving a sovereign state based on the two-state solution.

 

“There is no incompatibility,” Abbas is quoted as saying, “between reconciliation and the talks”. But this can scarcely be correct.  Putting the two together is like mixing chalk and cheese.  Hamas’s visceral opposition to the very existence of Israel is a basic tenet of its founding philosophy, and jihad against Jews in general, and Israel in particular, is basic to its existence. 

So it is legitimate to wonder how the three principles for Israel-Palestine peace, outlined by the Middle East Quartet (the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Russia), would be met by a Palestinian government including Hamas.  These are: recognizing the State of Israel, without prejudging what various grievances or claims are appropriate; abiding by previous diplomatic agreements; and renouncing violence as a means of achieving goals.

“The government reports to me,” says Abbas, “and follows my policies. I recognize Israel and so will the government. I renounce violence and terrorism, and I recognize international legitimacy, and so will the government.”

Hamas would have to turn somersaults to adhere to these requirements.  Is it prepared to do so?  And can the “reconciliation” stick?

Past numerous attempts to paper over the gaping differences between Hamas and Fatah have failed again and again.  Admittedly Hamas has been considerably weakened by recent reverses suffered by the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East, but it seems inconceivable that it would sit round a cabinet table, with Abbas at its head, and agree to discuss how a sovereign Palestine might live side by side with an Israel finally recognized as a permanent presence in the region.

Perhaps Hamas is hoping that, out of the promised elections envisaged for the whole of the Palestinian territories including Gaza, it will emerge much strengthened – a not unlikely scenario.  It will then have achieved, by democratic means, the control over the West Bank that it has been seeking since 2007.  Moreover, Abbas is in his 80th year; he cannot go on forever.  With increased political power, Hamas might be able to ensure a new president more to its liking.  The result would be a renewal of terrorist activity, probably much heightened, on the Palestinian side – rockets emanating not only from Gaza, but from the West Bank – and increased efforts to contain it on the Israeli.  In short, further limitless conflict.

Meanwhile, for the next six months while elections are being prepared, Abbas might be able to maintain control of his new administration.  Despite his declared wish to continue the peace talks, the conditions he is imposing to do so, together with the fact that Hamas will be included in his administration, make the prospect of Israel agreeing virtually non-existent. 

Much more likely is a renewed diplomatic intifada by the PA – an attempt to gain recognition for Palestine by the United Nations as a virtual sovereign state, and admittance to a much wider range of United Nations organizations than the fifteen Abbas recently applied to.  Increased efforts to delegitimize and isolate Israel through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement are not unlikely, as are moves to indict Israel or Israeli officials through the International Court of Justice.

 It is now apparent that US Secretary of State  John Kerry, Tzipi Livni for Israel and Saeb Erekat for the Palestinians – the prime movers in this latest effort to bring peace to this troubled region – have spent the best part of nine months constructing a house of cards which has collapsed around them.  If peace is ever to be achieved, a different, more robust, edifice must be devised – an edifice constructed on deep, strong foundations.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 30 April 2014:

http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Israel-Palestine-The-End-of-the-Affair-350865?prmusr=tZmQ3iz1zn%2fbqUBUodieYFkibYG3kpPbPo3g29HnYrTkqhbmN9RJA42r9tGo358l

Published in the Eurasia Review, 27 April 2014:

http://www.eurasiareview.com/27042014-israel-palestine-end-affair-oped/

A Moscow-Cairo-Jerusalem axis?

Being played out on the world stage, in this early part of 2014, is what might superficially be taken as a repeat of the communism versus capitalism Cold War of the 20th century.  It is nothing of the kind. There is no clash of political philosophies here.  The drama now being enacted, with Russia’s President Putin in the lead role, is the far older tale of lust for power.  The story, as it unfolds, has added poignancy because this generation of world leaders has forgotten two vital lessons: How to oppose the ruthless pursuit of dominance, and the fact that in international politics might is so often right – in other words, strength is respected and weakness despised.

It is now clear that Putin is determined to re-establish Russia as a major force in world politics.  It took some time for the realisation to sink in, and there has accordingly been little attempt to obstruct him. In Winston Churchill’s memorable words, US President Obama and his administration have consistently reacted with “jaw jaw rather than war war” – forgetting that this was far from Churchill’s attitude in the 1930s to Adolf Hitler’s insatiable appetite for power and territory.  While Obama havered and wavered, the relative balance of influence began to tilt against the United States and the West, while the world in general, and the Middle East in particular, started to reassess where its best interests lay.

Take the Syrian civil conflict.  From the start Russia and the United States stood on opposing sides.  Russia had a close working relationship with Syria’s President Bashar Assad, for under a 1971 agreement a permanent naval facility, Russia’s only Mediterranean fuelling, repair and replenishment base, was sited in Syria’s second largest port city, Tartus.  Accordingly, when a political movement dedicated to establishing a democratic alternative to the corrupt Assad regime surfaced in Syria, Russia backed Assad.

The US and the West, on the other hand, attempted to give some backbone to the loose, disparate and ineffective opposition.  During the early stages of the civil conflict there was a window of opportunity when effective military support for the domestic opposition might have resulted in Assad’s overthrow.  No such support was forthcoming, and the window soon closed.  Instead, the conflict attracted wild-eyed extremists of all sorts with agendas of their own, far removed from any attempt to replace Assad with a democratic alternative. 

Determined to cling to power by whatever means, in 2013 Assad resorted to using chemical weapons against the opposition and any civilians who chanced to get in the way. Obama had repeatedly threatened an immediate and salutary response to their use, but in a diplomatic coup Putin brokered an agreement with Assad to dispose of his chemical arsenal.  Obama gave way. No punishment was meted out to the guilty Assad, and in the event the disposal of Assad’s chemical weaponry is far from achieved, for recently further chemical attacks – notably the use of chlorine gas – have been reported in Syria.     

A short time afterwards Putin duplicated this diplomatic triumph by successfully spiking any threat of an attack by the US or Israel on the nuclear facilities of his ally, Iran.  By brokering negotiations nominally aimed at preventing Iran achieving nuclear weapon capability – another opportunity for avoiding military action seized on avidly by the US, the EU and the West – Russia again stood tall on the world stage.  And again, there is every reason to believe that Iran’s capacity to build atomic bombs has been little affected by the negotiations. 

   The pattern had been set – bold, self-interested and successful political action by Russia matched by abject and week-kneed political reaction by the West.

   Putin crowned his series of political achievements by violating Ukrainian sovereignty and engineering the annexation of Crimea.  Huffing and puffing by the West, the imposition of sanctions and the threat of more, had little effect on Russia. which proceeded to take the same course of action in the Russia-supporting eastern provinces of Ukraine.  A fragile agreement aimed at both sides exercising restraint, even if it holds, will not alter the fact that any plans the West might have had for binding Ukraine into the EU and NATO have been successfully scuppered.  By the ruthless exercise of power politics, Russia has swallowed Crimea whole, and successfully asserted its influence over the future of Ukraine.

   This resurgence of Russian power has not gone unnoticed in the Middle East.

   Early in April a 19-member Russian military delegation arrived in Cairo, the third visit in less than two months. The move followed a report that the White House was imposing a partial aid and weapons freeze on Egypt, as punishment for the military coup led by al-Sisi, and the crackdown on former president Mohamed Morsi and his supporters.  According to senior Egyptian sources, Field Marshal al-Sisi has concluded an arms deal with Russia that includes advanced aircraft, monitoring equipment and other sophisticated weapons to be used fighting Islamist terrorism in Sinai.

Now, the fight against Islamist terrorism in Sinai has turned into a closely coordinated effort by Egyptian and Israeli forces, who are currently cooperating in unprecedented ways, bypassing treaty restrictions on the battlefield deployment of Egyptian military forces and arms. Informed Israelis also speak of unprecedented Israeli-Egyptian intelligence cooperation in the area, "beyond anything dreamed of during Mubarak's rule."  So Israel is supporting al-Sisi, while the US is still reluctant to do so, on the grounds that democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi was overthrown by something akin to a military coup engineered by al-Sisi.

This comparatively minor divergence of interests between Israel and the US was exacerbated by Israel’s "neutrality" over Russia's invasion of Crimea. Senior US officials were shocked at Israel’s lack of support on the Ukraine crisis, and especially at Israel's abstention from the UN General Assembly vote deploring the Russian invasion and expressing support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Ever since, intense efforts have been deployed to try to mend fences.  At a series of meetings Israel has explained to the United States that taking a public stance against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine could cause real damage to its security interests.  “We are close to the chemical weapons in Syria,” Israeli officials are reported to have told their US opposite numbers, “and to the Iranian nuclear program, over which Russia has a decisive influence, and so a clash with Moscow could hurt our security.” 

If Israel has indeed adjusted its relationship towards Moscow and Cairo, the change may be significant, but it is not substantive. The community of interests between the US and Israel is too great to be seriously threatened by these minor upsets.  

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 22 April 2014: 
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/A-Moscow-Cairo-Jerusalem-axis-350068?prmusr=KmRnLSpyX9OS8tSRHDqq5oJUdRVhe0w2OgLe%2f98KUCfwqBaISTpTwHT02LqhGLgh

Published in the Eurasia Review, 21 April 2014:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21042014-a-moscow-cairo-jerusalem-axis-oped/

Who succeeds Mahmoud Abbas?

Lurking in the backwoods of Palestinian politics is a man whom 79-year-old President Mahmoud Abbas recognizes as his deadly rival.  Thirty years younger than Abbas, he has been a thorn in the President’s flesh from the moment of his election, continually criticizing him for weak leadership and corruption, a charge he extends to Abbas’s two sons.  In response, Abbas has had him and his followers expelled from the Fatah party and exiled from the West Bank, and has hurled a barrage of  accusations against him, including that of colluding with Israeli agents to poison the revered ex-Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat.

This 52-year-old hate figure – hated and feared not only by Abbas, but by all within the Fatah movement with aspirations to succeed the ageing President – is Mohammed Yusuf Dahlan.

Born in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza strip in 1961, Dahlan became politically active as a teenager, and in 1981 helped to establish the Gaza branch of the Fatah Youth Movement, “Fatah Hawks”.  His CV contains the necessary passport to political acceptance in Palestinian circles – time spent in an Israeli jail for terrorist activities.  Between 1981 and 1986, he was arrested no less than 11 times.  In 2007, consistent with his pro-Fatah – and therefore anti-Hamas – stance, Dahlan assisted in an abortive US plan to overthrow the Hamas administration that had seized power in Gaza in a bloody confrontation with Fatah.

To fund this operation, reports have it that he extracted from the US government a huge sum – estimated at $1 billion – but though he never delivered, he refused to refund the money. That is one US count against him. Another is that he has thrown in his lot with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the interim Egyptian government under Field Marshal (soon to be President) al-Sisi, and is supporting their offensive against the Middle East policies of US President Obama.

This Palestinian renegade acquired his formidable political status by way of UAE Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who is one of al-Sisi’s most generous bankers, and who stands at the forefront of the Saudi-UAE life-and-death campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood. Now Dahlan has established himself in Cairo, within al-Sisi’s inner circle of advisers on the Palestinian question –which explains the extraordinary diatribe spouted by Abbas, a few weeks ago, to a closed meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. During an hour-long harangue he accused Dahlan, along with Khaled Islam, a former economic adviser to Arafat, and ex-PA minister Hassan Asfour, of acting as spies for Israel.  He had knowledge, he claimed, of ties between Dahlan and Israeli leaders.

He followed this up by asserting that Dahlan and his followers were involved in the assassination of Salah Shahadeh, the leader of Hamas’s military wing, who was killed by an Israeli airstrike in 2002.  Then he topped the list of accusations by again hinting, as he had done some years ago, that Dahlan and his associates – “the three spies” Abbas dubbed them – were involved in the death of Yasser Arafat.

Dahlan, declared Abbas, would never be allowed back in Fatah, nor, he suggested, was there room in the party for those still loyal to him.

In response, Dahlan asserted on his Facebook page that Abbas’s speech was “full of lies and deception” which he proposed one day to disclose. Meanwhile senior Hamas figures like Taher al-Nunu, and Salah el-Bardawil, demanded a full and transparent enquiry into the assassination of Salah Shahadeh. On his Facebook page, al-Nunu wrote: “if there is truth to the matter, why has [Abbas] kept his silence and appointed Dahlan to high-level positions? How do we know that Abbas did not know about it?” 

In short, it is clear that the relationship between Abbas and Dahlan has reached an all-time low, while Dahlan himself seems to be riding high. Fueled by millions in Gulf aid dollars, raised in part by himself from business people and charities in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, he seems to be orchestrating a comeback that could position him as a possible successor to Abbas.

Like all potential candidates for high office, Dahlan modestly denies that he is seeking it. In a recent newspaper interview,Dahlan said he was “not looking for any post” after Abbas retires, but during an interview on Egyptian TV on March 16, he declared: “The Palestinian people can no longer bear a catastrophe like Mahmoud Abbas.”

That Abbas may retire following the virtual failure of the current peace process is certainly on the cards.  Putting aside his age and other political considerations, his personal status as President is questionable.  He was elected in 2005 for a four-year term, but 2009 came and went, his presidency was extended by diktat, the Hamas-Fatah feud has precluded any elections, and here we are in 2014 with Abbas still clinging to office.

Besides Dahlan who is in the running?  There is the man whom Hamas declare is the legitimate acting Palestinian President according to the constitution - Abdel Aziz Duwaik, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council since January 2006.

Duwaik, once a professor of urban geography, has never been accused of involvement in terrorism and has told journalists that he views Hamas's call for the creation of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine, including Israel, to be "nothing but a dream, and unrealistic." He might be a preferred presidential successor from Israel’s point of view, but is unlikely to command popular support.

The Palestinian politician with the broadest appeal, according to the polls, is 54-year-old Marwan Barghouti, a charismatic Palestinian leader currently convicted of  murdering four people during terrorist operations in 2001 and 2002, and serving multiple life sentences in an Israeli jail.  The polls, by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, show that Barghouti would easily come out on top of a three-way race involving also Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas.  An ardent supporter of the two-state solution and Palestinian resistance, he is considered top contender for the presidential post, and perhaps the only figure who can reunite the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The PA is demanding Barghouti’s freedom as part of a deal to save the peace talks from collapse. If he is released, as part of some last ditch rescue attempt, he becomes a formidable alternative to Dahlan. If Israel keeps him in prison, then Dahlan is well placed to sweep Mahmoud Abbas aside and become the next Palestinian president.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 13 April 2014:

 http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Who-succeeds-Mahmoud-Abbas-348368?prmusr=HKAiGugcbQ7G3gE1j5caQFNgZqalPkxc8Yp1xmAOtrA9c4oWbg4dZtGaMAzTOnKQ

Published in the Eurasia Review, 14 April 2014:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/14042014-who-succeeds-mahmoud-abbas-oped/

Israel-Palestine peace talks: the endgame

Who defined the art of successful politics as “keeping abreast of changing circumstances, and turning each change to your advantage”?  They might have had John Kerry, US Secretary of State, in mind. No astuter politician is currently operating in the global arena. But even the wiliest operator can be overwhelmed by events and, with the end of April looming, an air of desperation has pervaded what might be called “the peace camp”.

            Kerry’s brief from newly re-elected President Barack Obama, just starting his second term in January 2013, was to give high priority to achieving a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.  Obama had had a first shot at this, back in 2010, and had indeed succeeded in bringing the two principals – Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas – to the negotiating table.  Optimism had been high, all the building blocks necessary to construct a full accord had been identified, and all the parties present pledged to have an agreement in place within a year. 

In the event, the initiative was dead within a month, sunk on the insistence by Abbas that Israel’s 10-month freeze on construction in the West Bank be extended – a demand that was impossible for Netanyahu to grant, given the fragile nature of the coalition that sustained his government.

        

        Nothing daunted, Obama on being re-elected charged his new Secretary of State, John Kerry, to get the Israelis and Palestinians face-to-face again.  His motives in twice biting into this Middle Eastern hot potato, as part of a wider and woefully misguided global strategy, would merit a book in itself – and columnist Jonathan Rosenblum has made a insightful first step in this direction.  But Kerry accepted the brief, and succeeded.  So it was that, on 29 July 2013, under his benign eye, peace negotiators Tzipi Livni for Israel, and Saeb Erekat for the PA, shook hands in Washington to launch "sustained, continuous and substantive" talks aimed at reaching agreement on the long-sought final status between Israel and Palestine – talks with the declared objective of establishing a sovereign Palestine side by side with Israel.

            

        Optimism was, if anything, even higher than in 2010, for this time all declared that no more than nine months was necessary as the gestation period to achieve a deal.  Talks started formally on 29 July 2013, and the agreement would be born by 29 April 2014.

That the discussions would be long, complex and difficult could have been  foreseen.  Many groups and individuals on both sides – some with crucial political clout – had no interest in achieving a two-state solution to the long-running dispute, and opposed the initiative from the start. Even those who supported it would scarcely have believed, at the start of the process, that the stark irreconcilabilities of the two parties would scupper the original timetable.

But finally it became abundantly apparent that no final status agreement was conceivable within the widely announced nine-month period. Acknowledging the impasse. the optimistic Kerry turned the altered circumstances to his advantage by adroitly shifting the goalposts. In a master stroke the objective of the nine-month negotiations was altered.  No longer were the parties striving to achieve a peace deal within that constricted timeframe.  Now Kerry announced that that this first nine-month phase would be used to produce a “framework agreement”, endorsed by both parties, which would encapsulate the principles – including areas of non-agreement – that would form the basis of on-going discussions.

With every likelihood that such a document would merely be a re-statement of the obvious, it was not a very inspiring prospect. But if the end-result was something signed by both sides, and if both sides had agreed to continue talking, Kerry would have snatched a brand from the burning.

It was not to be.  As March 2014 ended, yet more political ducking and diving was called for. According to the agreement originally brokered by Kerry – the agreement that underwrote the peace negotiations – Israel undertook to release around 100 Palestinian prisoners in four batches, the last batch on March 29, 2014.  However, by the due date no negotiations had taken place between the two sides since November 2013, and in the interim the PA president had flatly refused to consider acknowledging Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, and had sought and obtained the endorsement of the Arab League to the same refusal.  He had also indicated that he had little interest in continuing peace talks beyond the April 29 deadline.  It seemed that Abbas proposed to accept the final batch of released prisoners, and forthwith end the negotiations. So Israel balked at that final commitment. 

The reaction of Abbas was to renege on his undertaking not to seek membership in international bodies until the April 29 deadline.  In a heavily publicized event, he formally applied to join 15 international agencies, a move aimed at gaining the benefits of statehood outside the negotiation process.

The result?  Kerry cancelled a planned return to the region during which he had expected to complete an agreement aimed at extending negotiations into 2015. In that emerging deal, rumour was that the United States would release Jonathan Pollard, convicted of spying for Israel some 30 years ago, while Israel would free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and slow down construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

So turmoil marks the final days of Kerry’s original nine-month timetable.  The endgame is chaos, confusion and disarray as Kerry’s right-hand man – Middle East envoy Martin Indyk – shuttles back and forth between the Palestinian and Israeli negotiating teams in an ever-more desperate effort to snatch some sort of victory from the jaws of defeat.  Telephone lines between Washington, Jerusalem and Ramallah must be red-hot, as Kerry attempts to persuade or cajole Netanyahu and Abbas to give way on some modest elements of their demands, so as to allow a compromise of sorts to emerge.  The US President and his Secretary of State have invested so much time, effort and prestige in this Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative that total failure would be a major humiliation – one that they may indeed be gearing themselves to face.

Stark reality seems to dawning even on the persistent, canny John Kerry. “There are limits to the amount of time and effort that the United States can spend,” he is reported to have said, “if the parties themselves are unwilling to take constructive steps to move forward.  We’re not going to sit there indefinitely. So it’s reality check time.”

The count-down to reality has begun.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 7 April 2014:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/Israel-Palestine-peace-talks-The-endgame-347807?prmusr=30pNCKytJXtRfVrR%2flZDoBR9Hw4vqorFyWPsZq%2fdjiuauDDDU8Mx8XlsY5fU%2fvJj

Published in the Eurasia Review, 7 April 2014:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/08042014-israel-palestine-peace-talks-the-endgame-oped/