Kurdish independence remains Erdogan’s nightmare

On April 18, 2022 Turkey launched a new ground and air offensive against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq.  Supported by helicopters and drones, Turkish jets and artillery struck suspected targets of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and then commando troops crossed into the region by land or were airlifted by helicopters.  In short, in a move disturbingly akin to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s in Ukraine, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan invaded the territory of a sovereign nation – Iraq – in pursuit of a political purpose of his own.

          Erdogan is acutely anxious about where political change might be taking the Kurdish nation as a whole, including Turkey’s substantial Kurdish minority. The 14 million Kurds living in Turkey make up 18 percent of Turkey's population.

Once upon a time the Kurds were a proud and independent nation thriving in their own land.  Subject to many foreign invasions, they refused to be integrated with their various conquerors and retained their distinctive culture.  At the start of the First World War, their country, Kurdistan, was a small part of the Ottoman empire.  Afterwards, in shaping the future Middle East the Western powers, in particular the UK, promised to act as guarantors of their freedom.  It was a promise subsequently broken.  Denied independence in their own homeland, the Kurdish people were split largely between four states newly endorsed by the League of Nations.  They became minorities in the mountains and valleys of southeastern Turkey,  northwestern Iran, northern Iraq, and northern Syria.

The PKK, founded in 1978, was and is an armed political group.  Claiming to represent all people in historically Kurdish regions, it has affiliated itself with other political and social groups including leading political parties in Turkey and Syria. The PKK is also present in Iran, where members fought against the Iranian regime for several years before agreeing to stop military hostilities in 2011.

The PKK’s original objective was to establish a socialist Greater Kurdistan uniting the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Since the mid-2000s, however, there has been a new goal, master-minded by Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader imprisoned by Turkey since February 1999 on İmralı island in the Sea of Marmara, where he is serving a life sentence.. Setting to one side the political aim of uniting the Kurdish people in their own homeland, the new objective, dubbed “democratic confederalism”, seeks to establish autonomous Kurdish areas in Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.  Something of the sort now exists in both Syria and Iraq.

Erdogan is unconvinced.  He is aware that the idea of an amalgamated Kurdish state, involving a change of national borders, remains a dream among Kurdish extremists, and that conflict within Turkey remains a possibility.  The attack on April 18, named Operation Claw Lock, struck shelters, bunkers, caves, tunnels, ammunition depots and headquarters belonging to the PKK, which maintains bases in northern Iraq from where it has attacked Turkey in the past.  Turkey’s Defense Ministry said the new offensive was launched after it was determined that the militants were regrouping and preparing for a “large-scale attack.”

Erdogan is also keen to stamp on the idea that disparate Kurdish communities might amalgamate or integrate. This came to the fore during the conflict in Syria against Islamic State. For example, in 2014 Kurdish volunteers from across the Middle East mobilized behind Syrian Kurdish fighters in the battle for the northern Syrian town of Kobane.  Syrian Kurds benefited from the fighting experience of the Kurdish commanders who had fought with the PKK in its longstanding conflict against the Turkish state.

Guney Yildiz, a researcher and journalist based in London, focuses on Turkey, the Kurds and Syria. He has advised the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Turkey, worked for BBC News and also the Middle East Institute based in Washington D.C.  Yildiz maintains that Kurds across all four nations – Turkey, Iran. Iraq and Syria – are today receiving public and moral support from each other and from the Kurdish diaspora abroad. He believes it is relevant to ask whether Kurds will be content to continue as confederated autonomous areas within nation states, or whether they will seek political independence.

The answer, he believes, lies in how cross-pollination, political recognition, and geography will connect Kurds in Turkey (known to political Kurds as “Northern Kurdistan”), with Kurds in Iraq (known as “Southern Kurdistan”), with Kurds in Iran (“Eastern Kurdistan”), to Kurds in Syria (“Western Kurdistan”). 

This is Erdogan’s nightmare scenario.  The PKK has been an armed group within Turkey’s body politic for decades, seeking Kurdish independence through acts of terror.  As such it was viewed by the Turkish establishment as an existential threat to the state.  In 2016 Joe Biden, then US Vice President, confirmed that Washington regarded the PKK as a danger to Turkey’s integrity and, comparing it to Islamic State, said it was "a terror group plain and simple".

Nothing like unity of policy or purpose reigns within the Kurdish camp as a whole. The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq has an uneasy relationship with the PKK group, whose presence complicates the region’s lucrative trade ties with Turkey.  Erdogan’s Operation Claw Lock was launched two days after a rare visit to Turkey by the prime minister of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region, Masrour Barzani, suggesting that he went to be briefed on Ankara’s plans. Barzani said after his talks with the Turkish president that he welcomed “expanding cooperation to promote security and stability” in northern Iraq.

Turkey routinely carries out attacks in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, where the PKK has bases and training camps in Sinjar and on the mountainous border with Turkey. But the offensives have strained Turkey’s ties with Iraq’s central government in Baghdad.

. Iraq’s President Barham Salih termed the latest incursion “unacceptable”, describing it as a threat to the country's national security and a violation of its sovereignty.  He is certainly not wrong about that.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in Jerusalem Post on-line, 4 May 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-705807

Published in the Eurasia Review, 7 May 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/07052022-kurdish-independence-remains-erdogans-nightmare-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 7 May 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/kurdish-independence-remains-erdogans-nightmare/

Published in Jewish Business News, 6 May 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/05/06/kurdish-independence-remains-erdogans-nightmare/

Visiting the President

  

By the end of March most of Israel had had quite enough of one of the coldest and rainiest winters in decades. Heating bills were soaring and Lake Kinneret was just a few centimeters shy of reaching its upper limit.  And then, literally out of the blue, dawned the harbinger of the summer to come – a cloudless sky and sunshine.  It chanced to be the day set aside months ago for a visit by members of the long-established IBCA (Israel, Britain and the Commonwealth Association) to Beit Hanassi – the President’s Residence in Jerusalem.

Conceived and organized by IBCA’s dynamic chairperson, Brenda Katten, the visit was in no sense a political event – IBCA is not a political organization. Its purpose, unchanged since its foundation back in 1953, has been to encourage, develop and extend social, cultural and economic relations between the peoples of Israel, Britain and the Commonwealth. One of its earliest chairpersons was the President’s father, Chaim Herzog, who had been a senior officer in the British army during the Second World War. His son, Isaac, who has followed in his footsteps in the presidency, has maintained a link with IBCA throughout his career.

            So, despite the presence of members of the Diplomatic Corps, including the British, Australian and Canadian ambassadors to Israel, the occasion was essentially social.  A few speeches there inevitably were, but the highlights of the occasion were a group photograph of IBCA members with the President, an informed explanation of the artwork that adorns the splendid reception area of Beit Hanassi, and a guided tour of the gardens in which the Presidential residence is sited – an experience enhanced by the unexpected sunshine.

            The group photograph was in the capable hands of Charles Green, for twenty years official investiture photographer at Buckingham Palace, who made Aliyah a few years ago. The guests were grouped on the steps leading down into the gardens, President Herzog joined them in the center of the front row, and Green snapped merrily away.

            The reception hall is a repository of impressive art works.  Perhaps the most striking is the painted ceiling by artist Naftali Bezem – 63 squares of acrylic tracing the story of his journey from persecution in Europe to freedom in Israel.  One wall is enhanced by a 6-meter high stained glass triptych by Reuven Rubin illustrating biblical themes.  At the far end of the hall, facing visitors as they enter, is the Jerusalem Wall of Fame, a loose representation of the Western Wall.

            The current Beit Hanassi is the third Presidential Residence in Israel’s short history. Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, used his private home as the first.  During the term of Israel’s second president, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, the Residence was located in Jerusalem’s Rehavia neighborhood. The current building was conceived, designed and constructed during the 10-year term of President Zalman Shazar, Israel’s third president.

Once the idea of a purpose-built official residence had been approved, Shazar asked that it be built in a residential neighborhood of Jerusalem, in accordance with the biblical verse “Among my own people I dwell”.  Some ten dunams (approximately 2.5 acres) of land was selected on a hill in the Talbiyeh district.

In 1964 the State of Israel announced a competition, open to Israeli architects only, to design the new President’s Residence.  Anything palatial or overblown was ruled out.  The guidelines specified that the building should be unassuming but designed to enable all the functions of the President to be fulfilled. Forty-seven bids were submitted to the committee, which was headed by Teddy Kollek who later became Jerusalem’s longest-serving mayor. The committee chose the design by Abba Elhanani, then one of Israel’s most prominent architects.

Divided into three wings – ceremonial, offices and residential – the Residence is constructed of local materials such as granite from Eilat and Jerusalem stone. The roof, which is rectangular in shape, consists of flat white domes reminiscent of the domes in the Old City of Jerusalem. It was completed in 1971. Splendid yet understated as it is, there is a view that the ceremonial wing might need expanding to take account of Israel’s growing status on the world stage, and the requirement to host larger and more frequent official functions.

For example the guest list for the state dinner on 22 January 2020, hosted by then-President Reuven Rivlin to inaugurate the Fifth World Holocaust Forum, had to be severely restricted for lack of room. No spouses were invited, while large marquees were erected in the front of the building to serve as a reception venue and to accommodate security personnel.and officials accompanying key dignitaries.

As for the IBCA visit, a high point for many of the guests was the guided tour of the gardens.  The grounds are adorned at every turn with sculptures, busts, pieces of ancient architecture and works of art.  

One striking feature is a row of the busts of Israel’s 10 past presidents to date.  Behind each is a large placard bearing an account in Hebrew, English and Arabic, of the main achievements of their presidencies. 

All around the garden are trees planted by distinguished guests to the Residence. A Pope, US Presidents, British royalty – each has left in the grounds of Beit Hanassi a lasting memorial of the fact that they have visited Israel and been hosted by its President. The IBCA members who participated in their own private visit, will have their group photograph as a lasting record of a special and privileged occasion.

          But new opportunities are opening up all the time and suddenly, in the early months of 2022, the chance to enjoy the experience of visiting Beit Hanassi is open to everyone. 

“You are invited to the home of the Israeli President for an unforgettable educational experience,” runs the opening sentence of a new website run by Makom, a branch of the Jewish Agency.  Very recently Makom has started offering English-language tours of the President’s Residence online via Zoom. 

         Makom was established in 2006 as a partnership between the Jewish Agency for Israel and twelve Jewish Community Federations in North America. The organization now also works across the world including in the UK, South Africa, France and Israel, designing and running educational programs aimed at optimizing the possibilities that modern Jewish life affords.

          Their initiative is linked to “Israeli Hope” workshops, a project of former President of Israel, Reuven Rivlin. In their behind-the-scenes tour at the heart of Beit Hanassi, participants hear about the history and role of the Israeli presidency, learn of the impact and influence of former presidents, and explore the relationships between the presidents, Israeli society, and the Jewish world.

          No-one who undertakes a tour of the splendid Beit Hanassi can fail to be impressed by the beauty, artistry and living history embodied in the residence and equally in its garden and grounds.  It has been described as “Israel’s symbolic home” – a view that many visitors, distinguished and otherwise, will surely carry away with them.


Published in the Jerusalem Report and Jerusalem Post on-line, 14 April 2022https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-704164

Lebanon’s make or break election

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 29 April 2022

Lebanon is preparing to go to the polls on May 15. Many observers believe that this parliamentary election promises to be one of the most significant in the country’s modern history (“crucial” and “decisive” are among the terms used).  Three vital issues hang on the result.

First, Lebanon’s failing economy depends on the radical reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) being enacted before their essential financial package is put in place. Nothing can be done until the new government is up and running.  Secondly, President Michel Aoun’s term of office has ended, and the new parliament will have the task of electing and confirming his successor in office.  Thirdly, and perhaps most critical of all, this election campaign has produced a significant weight of anti-Hezbollah political feeling among a number of disparate political groups.  Given a modicum of leadership, they could be brought together to reduce the baleful influence of the Iran-supported extremist group once and for all

The elections come as Lebanon’s currency has lost more than 90 percent of its value in the past two years, plunging more than half of the 6 million Lebanese population into poverty.  The economic crisis was aggravated by the massive explosion at Beirut Port on August 4, 2020, when a large part of the capital was destroyed, more than 200 people killed, thousands injured, 300,000 people left homeless and billions of dollars in material damage was caused. Responsibility is yet to be determined, as powerful figures linked to Hezbollah do their best to frustrate the public Inquiry.

The World Bank has described Lebanon’s financial and economic crisis as among the worst in the world in 150 years. The IMF requires, among other measures, that the Lebanese government approve a restructuring of the banking system that takes account of the large losses in the sector, while protecting small depositors and limiting their recourse to public resources.  

Lebanon's political and financial elite have been at odds over such a plan for two years, particularly on how to distribute some $70 billion of losses between banks, the state, and depositors.  Lebanon's banking sector maintains that the government and central bank should bear the lion's share of losses.  Goldman Sachs has said the most challenging reform would be the restructuring of the local banks, “The distribution of losses between the government, bank shareholders and depositors is…unlikely to be resolved easily."  All the same resolved it will have to be after the election, if Lebanon is to be assisted by the IMF to regain a degree of financial stability.

Since his return to Lebanon in 2005 from France, where he lived in exile for 14 years, President Michel Aoun, aided by his son-in-law Gebran Bassil, both allied with Hezbollah, has been a destabilizing force in Lebanese politics.  In 2016 Hezbollah’s support for Aoun’s presidential bid was the primary factor leading to his election.

Once in office Aoun allowed, if he did not positively encourage, Bassil to engage in lucrative patronage activities. In addition the president and his son-in-law have been trying to ensure that Bassil succeeds Aoun in office. These aspirations were dealt a severe blow in November 2020 when the US sanctioned Bassil, accusing him of being at the forefront of corruption. Nonetheless Bassil is trying to lead his party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to victory in the parliamentary elections, and no doubt hopes to capture the presidency if he does. At least he is a Maronite Christian, an essential prerequisite for holding that office.

Modern Lebanon, founded in 1944, was established on the basis of an agreed "National Pact".  Political power is allocated on a religious or "confessional" system, with seats in the parliament allocated 50-50 as between Muslims and Christians. The top three positions in the state are allocated so that the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim.

Theoretically no system could seem more designed to satisfy all parties in a multi-sectarian society. Theory, however, has had to bow to practical reality.  Lebanon has been highly unstable for much of its existence, and its unique constitution has tended to exacerbate, rather than eliminate, sectarian conflict.

Hezbollah’s many opponents from within both Christian and Muslim parties accuse the Iran-supported organization of running a mini-state within Lebanon, disregarding the nation’s sovereignty. They are treating these elections as an opportunity to end what they see as its domination of the country’s political decision-making and Iran’s occupation of Lebanon through its powerful proxy.

As a result, two opposing camps are jockeying to gain the majority in the next parliament:  the anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces party and its allies, who are determined to challenge Hezbollah’s influence and its dominance of the country’s administration; and Hezbollah and its supporters, who will fight to retain the majority they currently hold in parliament, and counter efforts to normalize ties with Israel.

Earlier this year, Fares Souaid, an outspoken critic of Hezbollah, established what he termed “a national council for ending Iranian occupation” of Lebanon. The council includes Muslim and Christian politicians, academics and key figures of civil society opposed to Hezbollah’s influence.

Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces party, which has the second largest Christian bloc in Parliament and is an arch enemy of Hezbollah, is campaigning with the outright aim of wresting the country’s sovereignty from Hezbollah’s clutches. Geagea hopes to overturn the majority won in the last election by the pro-Hezbollah group, which includes the Free Patriotic Movement founded by Aoun, and the Amal Movement led by parliamentary Speaker, Nabih Berri.  Geagea argues that a solution to the economic crisis begins with defeating Hezbollah, which he blames – with some reason – for Lebanon ‘s economic collapse.

This parliamentary election offers the Lebanese people a real chance to cast off the dead weight of the past, regain its sovereignty under a new president, and implement the reforms that will enable the IMF to sign off on a financial package designed to revitalize the country’s economy.  It is all up to them.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 29 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-705384

Published in Eurasia Review
https://www.eurasiareview.com/30042022-lebanons-make-or-break-election-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanons-make-or-break-election/

Published in Jewish Business News:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/29/lebanons-make-or-break-election/

When will the Saudi-Israeli connection go public?

This article appears in the Jerusalem Post, 24 April 2022 

           Israel and Saudi Arabia have no diplomatic relations with each other – a situation that normally means hostility between nations. Yet on March 3, 2022, Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) said: “We don’t look at Israel as an enemy.” It was scarcely a surprising remark, since for several years extensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been an open secret, including a covert visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2020 by then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

            MBS went on to describe Israel as “a potential ally, with many interests we can pursue together. But,” he added, “we have to solve some issues before we get to that.”

            What are the issues that inhibit Saudi Arabia from joining its main Gulf allies —the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain — in normalizing relations with Israel, as those Gulf states did in September 2020 in the Abraham Accords?  

   One main consideration is that Saudi Arabia, guardian of Islam's two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, is viewed by vast numbers of Muslims the world over as the custodian of Islamic values.  Inevitably this makes the idea of normalization with Israel a more sensitive issue for Saudi than for other Gulf states.  However there would be nothing shocking or unprecedented in Saudi Arabia taking this step.  The precedent has been set with the Abraham Accords. 

            Another restraining factor is that Saudi’s King Salman is acutely aware that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was conceived and proposed by his half-brother (and predecessor on the throne), then-Crown Prince Abdullah.  

           The Plan, endorsed on three occasions by the Arab League, advocates a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute, requiring the establishment of a sovereign Palestine on territories overrun by Israel during the Six-Day War, namely the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.  Given that, and a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, the Plan promises full normalization of relations between the Muslim world and Israel.

            In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Salman – ignoring the fact that the Abraham Accords have breached the one-time Muslim consensus on the Initiative – again committed Saudi Arabia to it, asserting that it offers a "comprehensive and just solution" to the Palestine-Israel conflict

More recently MBS, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and other Saudi spokespeople, have not referred to the Initiative, but all have said repeatedly that normalization would not be possible until the Israel-Palestine dispute is resolved.

"The priority now,” Saudi foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud told Hebrew-language newspaper Maariv recently, “is to find an arrangement so that Israelis and Palestinians can sit together and have a peace process…This will make it easier for all countries that do not yet have relations with Israel.  For us, this will happen when a just solution is found." 

He went on to acknowledge: "The integration of Israel in the region will be a huge benefit not only for Israel itself but for the entire region."

   Yet MBS must be aware that the Palestinian Authority’s advocacy of the two-state solution is not its real objective.  The true aim of the Palestinian leadership, like that of Hamas and a substantial proportion of Palestinian opinion, is to remove Israel and acquire the whole of mandate Palestine “from the river to the sea”. It is an objective repeated again and again to  the domestic audience.

However the two-state tactic is itself a flimsy device. Supporting the concept fulfils a useful public relations function, but no Palestinian leader would be foolhardy enough to sign up to two states, which is why every attempt at a peace deal over the years – and there have been many – has foundered.  Acknowledging Israel’s legal rights in the region would bring a charge of treachery to the Palestinian cause down on his head.  Hamas would exclude Gaza from any such deal, and internal political upheaval might well follow. Yet along with the UN, the EU and much of the Western world, the official Saudi line is to persist in believing that an Israel-Palestinian deal which recognizes Israel’s legitimate status in the region is a practical possibility. 

All four Muslim states that have so far signed up to the Abraham Accords maintain their support for Palestinian aspirations, but they have decided that solving the intractable Israel-Palestinian dispute should no longer be a pre-requisite for normalizing relations with Israel.  They will support efforts to reach an accord, but they prioritize developing a flourishing Middle East for the benefit of all its citizens.

Each of the four had particular reasons for joining the Accords. The UAE is intent on countering the regional dominance sought by Iran and Turkey, but it is also developing commercial and hi-tech scientific links with Israel, increasing defense cooperation, and obtaining from Washington weapon systems like the F-35 fifth-generation fighter jet. Bahrain, too - its leaders Sunni, its population majority Shia - appreciates Israel’s strength in opposing not only Iran, but also the violent extremist groups supported by Iran in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.  On joining the Accords Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, while Morocco gained US recognition of its claims over Western Sahara.

When Saudi Arabia weighs the pros and cons of normalizing its relationship with Israel, or formally joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s determination to counter Iran’s ambitions to dominate the Middle East would be a major consideration.  MBS would also hope the move would help repair Saudi’s strained relations with Washington.  The murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. continues to reverberate in US political circles.  Normalizing relations with Israel could change perceptions about Saudi Arabia in both main parties, and help restore MBS’s status among the US elite.

So MBS has been careful to keep the normalization option open. Far from condemning its neighboring Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has signaled tacit support for the UAE and Bahrain. It has allowed unprecedented access to Saudi airspace for Israeli commercial planes, and reports of high-level meetings between Saudi and Israeli representatives continue to appear in the media. It was no doubt a source of regret that it could not participate along with the UAE and Bahrain in the so-called Negev Summit on 28 March.

The omens for Saudi Arabia and Israel soon formalizing what is already something close to a partnership seem good. 

Published in Jerusalem Post, 24 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-704889

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 April 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22042022-when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 23 April 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public/

Published in Jewish Business News, 22 April 2022

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/22/when-will-the-saudi-israeli-connection-go-public/

Hope at last for Yemen

 

The two-month truce between the combatants in the Yemen civil war, brokered by the UN on April 2, has been swiftly followed by dramatic action calculated to bring about a more permanent end to the hostilities, and even the start of a reconstruction program. 

On Thursday, April 7 Yemen’s ineffective, unpopular and largely absent president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, dismissed his vice president and went on TV to announce that he was abdicating in favour of a new presidential council that had been established for just that purpose. “I irreversibly delegate to the Presidential Leadership Council my full powers,” he said.

According to his statement, the new body will assume the duties of both the president and his deputy, and will carry out political, military and security duties for the Yemeni government during what he refers to as a "transitional period".

No sooner were details of the unprecedented political changes in the public domain than Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced a support package for the new Yemeni presidential council to the tune of $3 billion – a vast sum, but arguably only enough to start the immense task of repairing the ravages of seven years of conflict.

Seven years of civil war left Yemen divided between an internationally-recognised government led by Hadi and backed by Saudi Arabia based in the southern city of Aden, and the Houthis based in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, which they captured back in 2014, controlling a fair chunk of territory in the west of the country.

The new 8-member Leadership Council is chaired by Rashad Al-Alimi, a minister during the presidency of Hadis’s predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi has the support of Saudi Arabia, but he also has a close relationship with Yemen’s major political group, the Islamist Islah party.

Yemen’s misery started during the sadly misnamed “Arab spring” of 2011. Its political activists responded to the wave of protest sweeping the Arab world with its own mass protests and a near-assassination of the then president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Saleh was eventually forced to step down in favour of his vice-president, Hadi, who attempted to meet some of the activists’ demands.  In 2015 he tried sponsoring a draft constitution which proposed a federal system split between northerners and southerners, but the Iran-backed Houthi rebels rejected it.

The Houthis are a fundamentalist Shia group supported by Iran.  Saleh, although a Sunni Muslim, gave up the presidency with great reluctance, and then sought to manoeuvre a return to power in collaboration with his erstwhile enemies. It was through Saleh that the Houthis were able to gain control of most of the Yemeni military, including its air force. As a result, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, they overran large tracts of the country.

Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from consolidating a strong presence in the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to beat back the Houthis. The fighting has continued ever since, with neither party able to gain a clear advantage.

When Hadi took over the presidency in 2012, he was supposed to be in power for two years and serve as a transition to a full, inclusive Yemeni democracy.  He proved a sad disappointment, and the end of his period in power is not being mourned by many Yemenis.  Hadi never rose to the challenge of being a wartime leader.  He was a silent president who spoke to his people on camera only a handful of times. As Saudi Arabia launched its attack on the Houthis in March 2015, he fled to Saudi Arabia, and holed up in its capital, Riyadh.

As for the new Presidential Leadership Council, seeds of disunity are unfortunately already sown within in.  One of the eight members is Aidarous al-Zubaydi, who supports an independent South Yemen and labels himself its president. 

South Yemen has a checkered history. Back in 1967, just after Britain left its South Arabia protectorate, South Yemen became an independent communist state backed by the USSR. It was only in 1990, with the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, that South Yemen agreed to unite with the north to form the Unified Republic of Yemen.  The glue binding the two quickly became unstuck. It took only four years for the south to try to break away again. A short civil war ended with the south being overrun by northern troops and the national government back firmly in control. In 2020 South Yemen again declared independence. It is now governed by a Southern Transitional Council (STC), but there is cooperation and dialogue with the Yemeni government.   

To be successful the new Council will need to set aside their differences and cooperate in the interests of the nation as a whole.  It has clearly won the confidence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the task of disbursing its windfall $3bn to best effect is likely to occupy a good deal of its time and attention. 

As for the Houthis, they refused to attend the Riyadh talks that preceded the establishment of the presidential council, and have subsequently denounced it as a foreign and illegitimate imposition.  This reaction is perhaps not unexpected, but the current two-month ceasefire is a reality, brought about by extensive Saudi-Houthi negotiation.  If negotiations continue, the ceasefire could be extended into something approaching a truce. 

What Yemen needs are elections, an inclusive government, and a new structure for the state. UN Resolution 2216 aims to establish democracy in a federally united Yemen. The Houthis must be given the opportunity to choose. Do they wish to remain an outlawed militia permanently, or would they prefer to become a legitimate political party, able to contest parliamentary and presidential elections and participate in government? The price would be serious engagement in negotiations aimed at a peaceful transition to a political solution for a united Yemen.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and Jerusalem Post on-line, 13 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-703979

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 April 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/15042022-hope-at-last-for-yemen-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 April 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/hope-at-last-for-yemen/

Lebanon's dilemma

 This article appears in the Jerusalem Post of 7 April 2022

The good news is that a two-month truce between the warring parties in Yemen, brokered by the UN, went into effect on April 2.  At last there is some hope of relieving the humanitarian disaster that has overwhelmed the Yemeni people. The issues that led to the conflict, however, remain unresolved.

The bad news, from Lebanon’s point of view, is that the truce will do nothing to solve the political dilemma facing Lebanon, caught as it is between a rock and a hard place.  Its weak and vacillating government finds itself trapped between two warring and irreconcilable forces, Iran and Saudi Arabia – the one supporting the Houthis in Yemen, the other battling to defeat them.

Lebanon’s situation is exacerbated by the dire state of its economy. The Lebanese lira has lost more than 90 per cent of its pre-crisis value, and this has led to soaring inflation and widespread hardship. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of Lebanon’s population now live in poverty. Gasoline stations have run dry, medicine and many basic foods are in short supply, and critical social infrastructure is shutting down.   

In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) boosted the Lebanese economy with a massive loan. In 2020, in the face of a financial system spiralling out of control, the government again appealed to the IMF for help.  A rescue plan was approved by the majority parties in parliament.  Then a parliamentary committee, supported by the Banque du Liban and the other Lebanese banks, advocated a diametrically opposite approach, on the grounds that it was defending the interests of depositors. It was clear to the IMF that administrative reforms were needed before necessary economic measures could be implemented.

It is against this background that Lebanon’s political dilemma is being played out. Iran-backed Hezbollah is so entrenched in the country’s institutions that it would require close to a revolution to dislodge it. Moreover, the nation’s ruling cliques have been infiltrated by Hezbollah and its allies.  Lebanon’s current difficulties stem from comments made by Information Minister George Kordahi in October 2021, criticizing Saudi Arabia’s role in the conflict in Yemen.

In 2011 Yemen’s president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, a victim of the so-called Arab Spring, gave up the keys of office with a very bad grace.  He allied himself with his erstwhile enemies, the Houthis, in an attempt to maneuver his way back to power. Supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Houthis overran large tracts of the country, including the capital city, Sanaa. 

Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from extending its footprint into the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to help beat them back.  Saudi’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, assembled a coalition of Arab states, obtained the diplomatic backing of the US, UK, Turkey and Pakistan, and launched a series of air strikes against the rebels. Civilian casualties were high, and Yemen degenerated into a humanitarian disaster area.  Seven years later both parties remain entrenched in various parts of Yemen.

Appearing on an Al Jazeera TV show on October 25, 2021, Kordahi was asked his views of the war in Yemen.  Mirroring the Iranian point of view, he said the Houthi rebels fighting the Saudi-led coalition were acting in self-defence. “They are defending themselves against external attacks launched for years against Yemen."

In subsequent media conferences Kordahi refused to apologize.  Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were outraged. Saudi expelled Lebanon’s ambassador and said it was ending all imports from the country. The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain followed suit and recalled their ambassadors.  George Kordahi resigned.

Saudi Arabia and its fellow wealthy neighbors once spent billions of dollars in aid in Lebanon, and still host a huge Lebanese diaspora. But the friendship has been strained for years by the growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The powerful Iranian-backed Shia movement, which has come to dominate Lebanon‘s political  and economic establishment, represents a vital building block in Iran’s bid to dominate the region. Hezbollah and its allies are integrated into the ruling elites, which are mired in venality, corruption and self-interest.  Arab News warned recently that their unwillingness to put Lebanon's interests ahead of their own could destroy the nation.

A major issue uniting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is their determination to thwart Iran’s effort to undermine and overturn Sunni Muslim states, acquire a nuclear arsenal and dominate the Middle East.  In this they are at one with Israel, which is also the object of Iran’s visceral hatred.  The Abraham Accords, which may yet be expanded, is a sign of their common purpose.

Despite Iran’s strong influence within Lebanon through its proxy, Hezbollah, ministers have tried hard to mend fences with Saudi and the Gulf.  Very recently a green shoot has surfaced.  On March 19 Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati visited Doha Forum in Qatar, met the Emir, Sheikh Tamim al-Thani, and discussed ties between Lebanon and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

In a press conference later Mikati said: “Lebanon is meant to always have excellent relations with the Arab countries and the Gulf states. Lebanon is one of the founders of the Arab League and we strongly believe in such ties.”

Speaking about Lebanon’s diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Mikati stressed: “It was a summer cloud that passed. God willing, it will entirely fade out with the visits that I will make to the Arab countries, and with the restoration of diplomatic ties between Lebanon and the Gulf states. We need these ties, especially with Saudi Arabia.”

On March 22 the Saudi ministry welcomed Mikati’s statement, and said it hoped it would “contribute to the restoration of Lebanon’s role and status on the Arab and international levels.”

It was a first step, but the way out of the forest for Lebanon is likely to be long and difficult.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 April 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-703436

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 April 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/09042022-lebanons-dilemma-oped/

Published in Jewish Business News, 8 April 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/08/lebanons-dilemma/

Published in the MPC Journal, 9 April 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/lebanons-dilemma/

The IRGC in Iranian politics

IRGC stands for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian armed forces.  It was founded shortly after the Iranian revolution in 1979 specifically to consolidate the ayatollahs’ grip over post-revolutionary Iran. Starting small, it has mushroomed into an enormously powerful organization, deeply entrenched in Iran’s body politic and highly influential both at home and across the Middle East.  Forty-two years on from the revolution, the IRGC is now operating as a state within a state with its own military, economic, cultural, political and intelligence arms.

          In April 2019 then-US President Trump designated the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).  Officials explained that the IRGC was an “active and enthusiastic participant in acts of terror,” including the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in which 241 American serving people lost their lives, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, in which 19 US Air Force personnel were killed and 498 of many nationalities wounded.

Recently rumors emanating from Vienna, where a revitalized nuclear deal with Iran is being negotiated, suggested that President Joe Biden is considering removing the IRGC from the US’s terror blacklist.   Accounts of what the quid pro quo might be for this major concession are vague – which might explain remarks made recently by ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov, head of Russia’s delegation to the Vienna talks: “Iran got much more than it could expect, much more…This is a matter of fact.” 

The rumors were backed by former US Vice President Mike Pence, when he visited Israel recently and told prime minister Naftali Bennett and foreign minister Yair Lapid that a delisting of the IRGC as a terrorist organization was on the table.  Pence claimed that the delisting would be in return for a commitment that the IRGC would not target Americans.

          Accordingly, on March 18 Bennett and Lapid issued a joint statement deploring the idea of delisting the IRGC. They described the IRGC as: "Hezbollah in Lebanon, they are Islamic Jihad in Gaza, they are the Houthis in Yemen, they are the militias in Iraq, The IRGC is responsible for attacks on American civilians and American forces throughout the Middle East, including in the past year…They are an integral part of the brutal machine of oppression in Iran. Their hands have on them the blood of thousands of Iranians…The attempt to delist the IRGC as a terrorist organization is an insult to the victims.”

The IRGC has become a major military, political and economic force in Iran, with close ties to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many other senior figures including, significantly, the recently elected president, Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi. 

The IRGC controls the Basij Resistance Force, an Islamic volunteer militia of about 100,000 men and women. The Basij are loyalists to the revolution who are often called onto the streets to use force to dispel dissent. The IRGC and Basij are active in suppressing the mass opposition protests that erupt from time to time, for example in 2009 after the disputed re-election of then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Dozens of opposition supporters were killed and thousands detained.

With some 190,000 active personnel, the IRGC is considerably smaller than the regular military, but it is considered the dominant military force in Iran.  It operates its own armed, naval and air forces, and is behind many of the country's key military operations.

The IRGC navy is tasked with patrolling the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway connecting the Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which 20% of the world's oil supply passes. The force's small boats have intercepted US warships that it says have approached Iran's territorial waters, and detained or diverted international shipping. Its air force is responsible for Iran's missiles. Iran is believed to have more than 10 ballistic missile systems either in its inventory or in development, and a stockpile of hundreds of missiles.

The IRGC also has a powerful presence in Iran's civilian institutions. It controls around a third of Iran's economy through a series of charitable foundations and trusts known as the bonyads, which run a considerable part of the economy.  Apart from military industries, the IRGC is active in housing development, dam and road construction, oil and gas projects, food, transportation, engineering and even educational and cultural activities.

The most prominent IRGC entity in recent years has been the Quds Force, used to implement its foreign policy goals. Considered Iran's primary instrument for cultivating terrorist groups across the Middle East, Quds actively supports Lebanon's Hezbollah movement and Palestinian Islamic Jihad with funding, training, weapons and equipment. Iran has acknowledged its role in the conflicts in Syria, where it has advised forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and armed thousands of Shia Muslim militiamen fighting alongside them, and Iraq, where it has backed a Shia-dominated paramilitary force that helped defeat IS.

Iranian president Raisi is intent on further empowering the IRGC. The ageing Supreme Leader, in dubious physical health, is seeking to ensure a hardline Islamist regime after his death. His chosen successor, it is widely believed, is Raisi.  Raisi is fully aware that if he is to become the next supreme leader, he will need the IRGC’s backing, since anti-regime sentiment is rising among the Iranian population   In expanding the power of the IRGC, Raisi will be seeking to boost his support when the time comes to select Khamenei’s successor.

The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change believes that the IRGC will be a critical element in any possible scenario for Iran’s future. Understanding the dynamics of the IRGC’s higher echelons, it asserts, is therefore of the utmost importance. Western and international policymakers must be able to read the Guard’s inner workings, it says, and the Institute has accordingly published a new model to aid understanding of the internal structures, relationships and intra-elite alliances and rivalries within the IRGC. 

“Know your enemy,” said the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu, “and know yourself; and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-702557

Published in Eurasia Review, 1 April 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/01042022-the-irgc-in-iranian-politics-oped

Published in the MPC Journal, 3 April 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/the-irgc-in-iranian-politics/

Published in Jewish Business News, 1 April 2022:
https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/04/01/the-irgc-in-iranian-politics/

The US’s new non-NATO ally

“Major non-NATO Ally” (MNNA) is a US legal designation conferred on nearly 20 countries including Australia, Israel, Japan and Brazil.  On March 10, President Joe Biden formally confirmed his grant of the status to Qatar.

The MNNA designation, a powerful symbol of friendship and close collaboration, provides foreign partners of the US with a range of benefits and privileges, especially in the areas of defense, trade and security cooperation. By conferring the designation on Qatar, the Biden administration is signaling it wants an even closer relationship with the Gulf state than it already enjoys.

The actual decision was made at the end of January, during the visit to Washington of Qatar’s Sheikh, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. With Biden’s announcement, Qatar becomes the third country in the Gulf region, after Kuwait and Bahrain, to become a US major non-NATO ally.

What led to the decision?  One factor was the important role played by Qatar in the events leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.  Collaborating closely with the US, Qatar acted as mediator between the Taliban and what was left of the previous Afghan administration in assisting the evacuation of refugees.

Another consideration must be the current global concern over energy supplies and surging fuel prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Qatar is among the world’s largest producers of liquified natural gas (LNG), and could play a vital role if the flow of fossil fuels from Russia were reduced, either through the EU cutting its demand or by Russia reducing its supply.

Yet this elevation of Qatar’s status needed Washington to turn a blind eye to a range of rather dubious activities by the Gulf state.  While offering itself as a key US ally, Qatar has long pursued a strategy of backing Islamists − from Hamas in Gaza, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to hard-line Syrian opposition fighters.  Although the US Air Force had a base at al-Udeid, about 20 miles from Qatar’s capital, Qatar also allowed the Taliban to establish a political office in Doha.

Even before the Afghanistan debacle, Qatar had become recognized as a regional power broker because of its major role in the delicate Israel-Hamas-Palestinian situation in Gaza.  Financial aid to the tune of millions of dollars has flowed into Gaza from Qatar over the years.  Some of it was earmarked for Gazan families, reconstruction or fuel supplies and was closely audited, but much was provided with too little accountability attached.  Media reports suggest that large sums of Qatari money were simply pocketed by Hamas.

Qatar’s wayward policies, especially with regard to Islamist groups, had long infuriated its neighboring Arab states, and on 5 June 2017 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain broke off diplomatic relations with Qatar for a second time, and virtually imposed a trade blockade.

For three-and-a-half years, largely through trade agreements with Turkey and Iran’s ayatollahs, Qatar withstood the worst that the Egypt-led alliance could inflict – and in January 2021 diplomatic relations were restored without any concessions by Qatar, which continued its contacts with Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist interests.

The embrace of Qatar, warts and all, by the US reflects Biden’s desire to deepen economic and security ties with the Gulf state, a desire given instant substance by the announcement by Akbar Al Baker, chief executive of Qatar Airways, of a $34 billion deal to purchase planes from Boeing.  

The deal involves Qatar Airways buying the new super cargo plane from Boeing, the 777-8 freighter. Baker called it “the most significant new freighter aircraft for a generation.”  White House officials described the deal between the two companies one of the largest in Boeing’s history, supporting tens of thousands of jobs at Boeing and its affiliated companies.

Brian Deese, director of Biden’s National Economic Council, said in a tweet: “this deal boosts America’s civil aviation industry, promoting greater domestic production capacity, a healthy hybrid commercial-defense industrial base and strong supply chains, while uplifting the hundreds of small businesses that feed into Boeing’s supply chains.”

On the positive side Qatar has transformed itself into a major diplomatic player and a commercial hub, and is well on its way to becoming a cultural, sports and tourist center for the Gulf as a whole – a position likely to be consolidated when Qatar hosts the FIFA World Cup in the winter of 2022. 

Even though Qatar now joins Israel as a major non-NATO ally of the US, there seems no immediate prospect of it following its Gulf neighbors, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Bahrain, in concluding an Abraham Accord with Israel.  Qatar seems unable, as four other Muslim states have done, to normalize relations with Israel while at the same time maintaining its support for Palestinian aspirations.

          Sheikh al-Thani is reported as saying that Qatar would continue its “working relationship” with Israel in order to help the Palestinians, but that it seemed to him unrealistic to enter into an agreement with Israel like the UAE or Bahrain “in the absence of a real commitment to a two-state solution.”  Yet he must be aware that supporting a two-state solution is only a tactic, not a real commitment, of his Islamist friends.  Al-Thani must know that they would never agree to endorsing Israel’s legal rights in the region, since their true objective is to acquire the whole of mandate Palestine “from the river to the sea”.  

          The US will need to keep a wary eye on its newest non-NATO ally.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 22 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-701948

Published in Eurasia Review, 26 March 2022:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/26032022-the-us-new-non-nato-ally-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 24 March 2022:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-uss-new-non-nato-ally/

Can Israel help Europe with its energy needs?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in unprecedent unity of action by the Western world.  Acting in concert, the West has imposed the heaviest sanctions yet on Russia and its leaders.  The country has been isolated across a wide variety of fields from banking to sport, from the use of air space to the transmission of television shows. There seems complete unanimity in the West – every possible obstacle will be put in the way of Putin’s ill-advised adventurism.  He must not be allowed to succeed. 

One anomaly in this consensus sticks out like a sore thumb.  At the moment Europe is continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas in vast quantities, and Russia is continuing to receive hundreds of millions of dollars every day from European nations.  This reflects the fact that around 40 percent of Europe's energy needs are imported from Russia.  The EU is determined to reduce its dependency, and on March 8 the European Commission published plans to cut EU demand for Russian gas by two-thirds and make Europe "independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030".

On the same day, the US and the UK both announced that they would ban Russian oil imports in an attempt to increase the financial pressure on the Kremlin. US President Joe Biden signed an executive order blocking US imports of Russian oil, natural gas and coal, while UK Business minister Kwasi Kwarteng said Britain would “phase out” imports of Russian oil by the end of 2022 and was “exploring options” to end Russian gas imports.

In the short term the soaring price of fossil fuels makes trade even more profitable for Russia than before the crisis. At the same time, the situation gives Russian president Vladimir Putin a vital political bargaining chip.  He can hold the threat of slowing or cutting off supplies of oil and gas altogether over the EU’s head, and in certain eventualities he might consider doing so.

Germany, the European country most heavily dependent on Russian fuel supplies, is taking urgent action.  On February 27 Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced plans to build two liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, in order to diversify supply. Natural gas is being recognized as a “transitional fuel”, an interim lower carbon source of energy for use while the world struggles to reach the optimistic targets it has set itself for reducing carbon emissions from fossil fuels.

 Europe's LNG imports hit a record high in January.  Nearly half came from the United States, second only to Russia in its reserves, but there are other potential sources of LNG, including the Middle East in general, and perhaps Israel in particular.

All the same some hard facts need to be taken into account.  The reserves of natural gas recently discovered off the coast of Israel and beyond, huge as they are, dwindle in significance when compared with those held by Russia. For example, Israel’s two primary natural gas fields off the western shore of the country are Tamar and Leviathan.  Tamar contains approximately 10.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and Leviathan, 22 trillion cubic feet.  Russia holds a total proved resource of 1,341 trillion cubic feet.  Israel and its partners Greece, Cyprus and Italy, and even its potential partner Turkey, could only ever supplement, never satisfy, Europe’s enormous appetite for energy – and that assumes establishing effective distribution methods. 

The EastMed pipeline, meant to transfer natural gas from Israeli waters to Europe via Greece and Cyprus, was announced in 2016, and several agreements have been signed between the three countries on the subject. The three states aimed to complete the €6 billion project by 2025, but no financing had been secured for it.  Progress came to a shuddering halt in January, when the Biden administration withdrew US support for the project.

No formal explanation for the change of policy was provided, but in a TV documentary Amos Hochstein, then a senior State Department energy adviser, said: “Why would we build a fossil fuel pipeline between the EastMed and Europe when our entire policy is to support new technology?…This project probably will not happen because it’s too complicated, too expensive and too late in the arch of history.”

Biden’s decision may have been influenced by a parallel, and extremely ambitious scheme, which has indeed received EU financing to the tune of $732 million – the EuroAsia interconnector, a project designed to connect the electricity networks of Cyprus and Greece as the first step in linking the power grids of Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Europe.  A 1,208 km undersea cable will create an "energy highway" ensuring a secure supply of electricity from Cypriot and Israeli gas reserves as well as from renewable energy sources. Construction is planned to begin this year, to be completed by the end of 2025 and to be commissioned in the first half of 2026.

          When British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was asked what was most likely to blow governments off course, he replied: “Events, dear boy, events”. The event that has rendered the thinking of only a couple of months back obsolescent is Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now all options aimed at radically reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy are back on the table. Turkey, which has never supported the EastMed project because of Greece’s involvement, is nevertheless keen on an LNG pipeline running through Turkey to Europe.

          On February 25 former energy minister Dr Yuval Steinitz, a prime mover of the EastMed project in 2017, tweeted that the government should now give top priority to the rapid promotion of its construction. Nor are pipelines the sole method of distributing LNG. Seaborne cargoes are creating a global market, similar to oil. In 2019, alongside pipeline flows from Norway, the UK and the EU imported almost 20 per cent of its gas through LNG shipments. Israeli LNG could also find its way to European and UK markets via giant tankers.

          One way or another, there is pressure for the LNG bonanza that unexpectedly came Israel’s way a decade or so ago to come to the aid of Europe in its hour of need.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 14 March 2022:
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-701174

Published in Eurasia Review, 19 March 2022:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19032022-can-israel-help-europe-with-its-energy-needs-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 17 March 2022:
https://mpc-journal.org/can-israel-help-europe-with-its-energy-needs/

Published in Jewish Business News, 18 March 2022:

https://jewishbusinessnews.com/2022/03/18/israel-help-europe-with-its-eastmed-pipeline/