Lebanon - why no second front?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 November 2023

 A much-trumpeted speech on November 3 by Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was, in the event, rather less than overwhelming. 

For starters there was no sign of Nasrallah himself.  Thousands of Hezbollah fighters and supporters packed a square in the southern suburbs of Beirut to greet their leader, but their leader  wasn’t prepared to greet them.  Instead they faced a monster TV screen.  They viewed, and cheered, a videoed speech recorded in some secret location –  perhaps a bomb-proof bunker.  According to one media commentator Nasrallah himself has not been seen in public for a decade.  This address to supporters was his first since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, and expectations were high in some parts of the media that he was about to announce the opening of a second front against Israel.

However he made clear in his opening remarks that Hamas’s October 7 invasion of Israel, the subsequent massacre of 1400 civilians and the abduction of over 240 hostages – an operation which, predictably, he praised –  was a purely Palestinian enterprise.  And, he implied later in his remarks, Palestinian he wanted the subsequent conflict to remain.  He made it clear that Iran and Hezbollah had had no part in its planning or execution, and neither found it expedient in present circumstances to support Hamas by opening full-scale hostilities against Israel.  Although he made no reference to Washington’s clear warning that such a move would bring dire consequences, there is little doubt that the message had been received and understood.

So hostilities would be confined to the recent artillery and rocket exchanges across the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Iranian drone strikes against US stations in Syria and Iraq.  A second front, open warfare with Israel, was demoted to a final resort, triggered by vague, unspecified circumstances.  The speech no doubt came as a disappointment to Hamas leaders who have been pushing, covertly and openly. for active Hezbollah support.

The Lebanese people are in the midst of a familiar emotional dilemma – on the one hand sympathy with Hezbollah’s support of the Palestinian cause; on the other, intense suspicion of Hezbollah and its baggage-train of Iranian requirements in the regime’s self-interest.  For example, public opinion questioned from the start why thousands of Lebanese youth were sent off to fight in Syria under Hezbollah and Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), in support of the ambitions of the Iranian regime to dominate the region.  The Lebanese public, which has little love for Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad, failed to see how its own interests were being served by fighting to sustain him in power.

Hezbollah has entrenched itself deeply into Lebanese society.  It has a dominating position in the financial, economic and political fields, and itself operates a range of social support services.  It has truly become a state within a state, sustained by its own armed militia which is independent of the official Lebanese armed forces (under the presidency of Michel Aoun, a Hezbollah supporter, they did cooperate).  Indeed Hezbollah has acquired so much military power and political influence that it is very nearly ruling Lebanon on its own, especially since the country has lacked a president and an effective government for more than al year.  Moreover it serves Hezbollah’s and Iran’s interest for the stalemate to continue, and every attempt to beak the political deadlock has been thwarted by Hezbollah and its allies.

Just a few months ago the respected Washington Institute published a devastatingly frank assessment by its counterterrorism and intelligence academic expert, Matthew Levitt, concerning the deep-rooted troubles that are paralyzing Lebanon.

“Let’s be clear,” he writes, “corruption is at the heart of Lebanon’s economic and political crises. This economic and political rot is deeply entrenched and is protected by powerful political bosses across the spectrum… yet no Lebanese party presents a greater security threat to Lebanon domestically, and to its neighbors in the region, than Hezbollah – in part because Hezbollah is the de facto militant enforcer of the corrupt political system from which it and other sectarian political parties benefit.”

Levitt explained in a recent media interview that while Hezbollah can prevent government decisions that are against its interests, “it’s not held accountable for what the government does or does not do, and it’s independently able to make decisions of war and peace, life and death, for the entirely of Lebanon – without consulting either the people or the government.”  In short, it has power without responsibility, operating its own mini-administration across the nation with a great degree of impunity. 

Hezbollah is therefore little concerned with the worst economic crisis to grip the country for decades. The value of the country's currency has dropped by over 90 percent since 2019, with essential goods and services increasingly difficult to access. In addition, hours-long power outages are routine in Beirut and other cities.  Lebanon’s declining economic, political, and security conditions are rarely referred to by Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, nor does he mention the resultant demonstrations and labor strikes that are plaguing the country.  In fact demonstrations in reaction to deteriorating socio-economic conditions and perceived government mismanagement have been a regular occurrence in Lebanon since 2019.

Major economic and political reforms will be required to help reverse the crisis, unlock international financial assistance, and address protesters' demands. However, Lebanon is locked in a political stalemate which makes reform, or indeed remedial action of any significant sort, impossible. 

          Nasrallah, clearly with Iran’s concurrence, has wisely decided to hold back on any full-scale conflict with Israel, since he would need support from a people mired in economic, social and political unrest and struggling with a cost of living crisis.  The last thing they need is to be  dragged into a war on top of their other woes.  if Nasrallah tried to involve them, he might find himself facing a popular revolt.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 7 November 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-772005

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 November 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/09112023-lebanon-why-no-second-front-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 14 November 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/lebanon-why-no-second-front/

Israel maintains its gas flow

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 31 October 2023

            From October 17-19 the Energy Intelligence Forum held a three-day conference in the heart of London.  The agenda –“to debate and shape sustainable solutions to the energy challenges of the 21st century” –added to the 5-star hotel location, attracted nearly 100 energy leaders from around the world.

   The forum was addressed on its first day by Russell Hardy, CEO (chief executive officer) of Vitol, the world's top independent energy trader.  He told the forum that despite its war with Hamas, Israel is managing to maintain a steady supply of gas both domestically and to its international customers. 

Israel’s Tamar gas field, with estimated reserves of around 315 bcm (billion cubic meters), usually meets around 70% of Israel's energy needs for power generation.  Two days after the Hamas attack on Israel, however, Chevron – a major partner in the consortium operating Tamar – was instructed by Israel’s energy ministry to shut down production.  Reports indicate that the consortium was given to understand that this would be a temporary measure, and production would be resumed when the security situation stabilized.  Tamar is located some 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) off the city of Ashdod along Israel's southern Mediterranean coast. The platform, which can been seen from the northern Gaza Strip on a clear day, is within range of rocket fire from Gaza.

Meanwhile, the energy ministry announced, “the economy’s energy needs will be supplied by alternative fuels…The electricity industry is preparing to use alternative fuels to power its stations.”  Hardy informed the forum of the situation.   Israel is managing "to backfill from some of the other fields,” he said, “so my understanding is gas is still transferring to their customers and their international customers as well, largely in an intact way.”  During his address, perhaps with something of a wink and a nudge, he remarked: “I think they probably have a little bit of spare capacity in the system.”

Three major Israel fields are currently in production – Tamar, Leviathan and Karish,  Between them they  have total estimated reserves of a trillion cubic meters.  Leviathan, Israel's largest offshore gas field, continues to operate normally.  Four more fields have already been discovered, and are awaiting exploitation – Zeus, Athena, Hermes and Kallan – which taken together amount to an estimated further 108 bcm of natural gas.  

Egypt imports Israeli gas from both the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, located in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Israel, to help meet its domestic demand and for LNG exports from its two liquefaction plants.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) took a ess optimistic view than Israel’s energy ministry.  Its gas analyst, Gergely Molnar, speaking in a webinar on October 10, said that Tamar was a "very important" field when it came to Israel and the region's gas supply-demand balance.

"Closing the field temporarily,” he said, “can have impacts both on gas deliveries to the domestic market in Israel, but also on the country's export capability…When we are looking at the upstream sector in Egypt, we have already seen that it is struggling to keep up pace with rapidly rising domestic consumption as well as liquid natural gas ( LNG) exports. If we take out Israeli pipe gas imports from that equation, it will harm the ability of Egypt to export LNG over the coming months."

Reported data showed Egypt exporting only one LNG cargo in August and none in September due to high summer domestic gas demand.  Egyptian LNG exports so far this year have reached just less than half the total for the whole of 2022.

In June 2022, the European Commission, Israel and Egypt signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding on the supply of Israeli gas via Egypt's LNG export infrastructure to the EU.

Because Egypt’s own gas production had been declining for some time, Egypt negotiated a deal with Israel which was ratified on August 23.   Israel announced an increase in its natural gas sales to Egypt. 

Explaining the new Egypt-Israel agreement, Israel’s Energy Minister, Israel Katz, said that gas exports to Egypt, currently about 5 bcm per annum, will be increased by 3.5 bcm per annum over 11 years reaching a total annual sale of 43.5 bcm.  This additional supply from Israel will enable Egypt to continue to meet its contracted exports as well as its domestic needs

"This step will increase the state's revenue and strengthen diplomatic ties between Israel and Egypt," said Katz.

In a separate statement, the energy ministry said that prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government has authorized Katz to order a state of emergency for Israel's energy sector if deemed necessary.  Such a move, it said, would allow the government to allocate natural gas to consumers should supply shortages emerge.

Israel is expected to roughly double its gas output over the coming years, but Yogev Gardos, Israel's budget director, in a letter to the director-general of the Energy Ministry, said that exporting too much "could endanger Israel's energy security" and lead to higher electricity prices. Katz responded to the letter in a robust X or Twitter post: "Decisions on the gas sector take into account broad policy considerations, such as Israel's standing, and the one who will make the decisions is me - the minister elected by the people. Not the professional echelon."

He could afford to respond straight from the shoulder, for he already knew that Israel’s fourth offshore bidding round, launched in December 2022, had been an outstanding success.  Four groups of companies, amounting to nine companies in all, have bid to explore for additional offshore natural gas fields in Israeli waters.  With the forthcoming exploration in the pipeline, Israel’s future, both as regards satisfying its own gas needs and as a remunerative gas exporting nation, seems assured.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled:  "How can Israel  maintaion its gas flow during the war?", 31 October 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-770897 

Hamas conceals its casualties and disguises its fighters

This letter appears in the Sunday Telegraph, 29 October 2023 

Sir

May I make two points to amplify your Editorial Comment (“The UN should not be condemning Israel”, 26 October). First, in a war enemy combatants are legitimate targets of attack, but the Hamas-provided numbers of those killed and wounded make no distinction between Hamas fighters and civilians, leaving the impression that all the casualties are civilians.

Second, Hamas fighters wear no uniform, so once Israel’s ground invasion takes place the rules of war that require attacking forces to distinguish between the enemy and innocent civilians will be stretched to breaking point. The rules surely assume that uniformed soldiers would be fighting a uniformed enemy.

Yours
Neville Teller

Beit Shemesh

Israel

Hamas and the BBC

Published in the new issue of the Jerusalem Report, dated 6 November 2023

On 12 October two British Israelis whose families are being held hostage in Gaza attended a media conference in London, an event carried by the major TV networks.  Noam Sagi and Sharon Lifschitz both have parents who were taken hostage during the Hamas attack on 7 October.

Sagi, a London-based psychotherapist who grew up in Israel, said that his mother, Ada Sagi, was taken hostage from Nir Oz kibbutz.  He said that as he spoke, “I should have been on the way to Heathrow to pick up my mum, who was coming to celebrate her 75th birthday here today in London."

Speaking direct to camera, he called on the BBC to call Hamas “for what it is”.

He was referring to the storm of controversy that began sweeping across the UK from the  moment the BBC started reporting on the Hamas atrocity on Saturday 7 October. 

The next day Britain’s Sunday Telegraph published an article by a former director of BBC Television deploring the fact that the BBC was deliberately avoiding describing those who had perpetrated the shocking slaughter as terrorists.

“Across its platforms,” he wrote, “the BBC describes the actions of ‘militants’, as if shooting children in cold blood is some part of conventional military warfare. It is nothing of the sort. It is murder, pure and simple. It is terrorism.”

Jewish groups took up the call. “The murder and massacre of innocent civilians,” declared  the Simon Wiesenthal Center, “is terrorism, straight and simple”, and the UK’s national broadcaster should describe it as such.

The BBC’s Editorial Guidelines for its journalists and news staff have a specific section on Israel and Palestine:  “care is required in the use of language that carries value judgments,” they state.  The guidelines forbid the use of the word “terrorist” in the BBC’s own reports, but permit its use when it can be attributed to an individual or organization. They advise using terms “such as ‘bomber’, ‘attacker’, ‘gunman’, ‘kidnapper’, ‘insurgent’, and ‘militant’.

            By 11 October other powerful voices had been raised in condemnation of the BBC’s policy, starting at the top.  Britain’s prime minister, Rishi Sunak, deplored the use of the word 'militants' - meaning fighting forces. “Hamas are not militants,” he said, “they are not freedom fighters. They are terrorists."

Britain's chief rabbi, Sir Ephraim Mirvis, said in a broadcast interview "I noticed that the BBC has a reluctance to use the term 'terrorist’.  If one doesn’t use the term 'terrorist', it is as if one is providing a window of opportunity for justification, and nothing can justify this."

Others have also spoken out against the BBC's coverage. Marie van der Zyl, president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, has said that she complained to the BBC’s Director General, Tim Davie, about  its coverage, but the BBC refused to change its Editorial Guidelines.  Instead, the broadcaster put up one of its most senior and respected journalists, John Simpson, to explain its position.

Writing on the BBC’s webpage on 12 October, he said: “Terrorism is a loaded word which people use about an outfit they disapprove of morally. It's simply not the BBC's job to tell people who to support and who to condemn…We regularly point out that the British and other governments have condemned Hamas as a terrorist organization, but …the key point is that we don't say it in our voice…We don't take sides…That's why people in Britain and right round the world, in huge numbers, watch, read and listen to what we say, every single day.”

A few days later eminent journalist and historian, Simon Heffer, responded. 

“I  simply cannot agree with the defence he has made of the Corporation’s decision not to call Hamas “terrorists”…Parliament designated Hamas in its entirety as “a proscribed terrorist organization” in November 2021… That legitimizes calling Hamas “terrorists”…

“Simpson says that “it’s simply not the BBC’s job to tell people who to support and who to condemn.”  Describing a group using a legally defined-term that our legislators have decided to apply to it does not instruct people whom to support and whom to condemn: it simply recognizes a legal fact that is obvious to most of the BBC’s audience…”

On 12 October the Daily Telegraph devoted its leader to the subject.  “How do we describe people who, armed to the teeth, infiltrate peaceful gatherings and commit wanton slaughter of men, women and children?...Most people would have little difficulty calling this terrorism and yet the BBC refuses to do so. The Hamas gunmen who committed these atrocities are described as militants, or activists or insurgents…. There should be no moral ambiguity here. It is time for the BBC and others to call Hamas what it is: a terrorist organization.”

On 20 October the BBC appeared to yield just a fraction, but in fact it moved scarcely at all.  In future, it announced, its journalists will describe Hamas as a group “proscribed as a terror organization by the UK Government and others”.  In other words, the BBC still forbids its journalists from calling them terrorists outright.  The BBC will also refrain from invariably  describing them as “militants” though it reserves the right to do so on occasion.  A more mealy-mouthed retraction it would be difficult to imagine.  So the controversy continues.

Solidarity from the Arab-Israeli community

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2023:

          On the afternoon of Saturday, October 7, as the full scale and brutality of Hamas’s incursion into Israel was becoming clear, Mansour Abbas, Knesset member and leader of the Islamic party Ra’am wrote to his 300,000 followers on social media. “I call on Arab citizens and all Arab and Jewish citizens to maintain restraint and behave responsibly and patiently, and to maintain law and order." Referring to the “unfortunate, tragic and reprehensible events” still in progress, he also called on the leadership of the Palestinian factions in Gaza to "release the captives in your hands. Islamic values command us not to imprison women, children and the elderly."

          A little later, when Hamas leaders began calling on Israel's Arab citizens to join the fight, Arab Knesset member Ayman Odeh responded angrily. In a media interview, he said: "Any call for militant actions and igniting a war between Arabs and Jews inside Israel is something we will not accept."

       It quickly became clear that the two Arab Israeli politicians were speaking for the vast majority of their community, not least because Arabs were also killed, abducted and injured in the Hamas raid on southern Israel and as a result of its continuous rocket barrages. A former member of the Knesset, Walid al-Hawashla, the head of relief work in the Negev area, told of 18 Bedouin killed in the region, "six because of rockets that hit their houses, and 12 who were working in agriculture in the area around Gaza on the first day of the Hamas attack."

          The news website Barron reported Alaa Abu Jamaa saying that on the morning of October 7, just as Hamas launched its assault against Israel, he was driving home to Ararat an-Naqab with breakfast for his children. As he left the car at his front door, he was hit by the blast of a rocket exploding near him, and was sent flying.

          A five-year-old boy named Yazan "was standing at the door of his house near another car,” said Jamas. “When the rocket exploded…Yazan was killed. He was blown to pieces." He said the rocket left a crater "more than three meters deep."

          The news report adds that Yazan's father Zakaria, a driver, recalled with tears that he "was in Eilat on Saturday morning when I learned of my son's death. I came back in the midst of the exchange of bombing between Hamas and Israel and saw my son in the hospital."

          The stories appearing in the press of acts of mutual aid, and simple kindness and friendship between ordinary Jews and Arabs in the face of Hamas’s assault on the nation, run completely counter to the initial reaction of Israel’s national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir. Responsible for Israel’s police force, he ordered them to prepare for riots, warning that Arab-Israeli violence in cities like Lod, as occurred in 2021, was likely.

          During a visit to a police station in Sderot, Ben Gvir said he had instructed Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai to be prepared for severe inter-communal riots in mixed Jewish-Arab cities. In 2021 an IDF operation against Hamas in Gaza, code-named ‘Guardian of the Walls’, was in progress.

          “I have instructed the police commissioner to be prepared for a ‘Guardian of the Walls 2’ scenario,” he said, “… to be prepared for the infiltration of towns.”
 
          A spokesman for Ben Gvir confirmed he was referencing the possibility of Arab citizens of Israel rioting in mixed Jewish-Arab cities.

          His remarks were condemned across the political spectrum, with police sources accusing him of fearmongering. Senior government officials criticized his comments as irresponsible. Social Equality minister, Amichai Chikli, wrote: “Thus far, the Arab population has shown much solidarity and responsibility, and this is especially true for the Bedouin population in the Negev.” One police source is quoted in the Hebrew language daily Maariv as saying that Hamas has been trying to incite Arab Israelis to instigate violence, and that Ben Gvir’s words could inflame tensions.

          The Arab Israeli politicians’ remarks advocating solidarity with the rest of Israel clearly resonated with their voters. The respected news website Al Monitor reported a resident of the Galilee Jewish community of Atzmon, two of whose residents were killed in the Hamas assault, praising the support of her neighbours from the Arab town of Sakhnin.

          "Many stores ran out of water,” she said, “but we found a grocery store in Sakhnin that gave us water and refused to accept payment.” The grocer told her that since hearing about the horrors perpetrated by Hamas, he had been thinking of ways to help.

          Such sentiments were reciprocated. Awad Darawsheh, a resident of the village of Iksal, was killed while working as a paramedic at the music festival on the Gaza border. A convoy of motorcycles and ambulances operated by a Jewish company accompanied the body and brought it for burial in his home town.

          Rula Daoud, co-director of the Standing Together movement, reacted angrily to Ben-Gvir’s suggestions that the Arab community might rise up in solidarity with Hamas.

          "In our Arab society, ” he said, we are ".... building an entire [emergency and relief] system in mixed Jewish-Arab cities in order to strengthen the community in every way and prevent violence.”

          Social activist Hosam Mawasi, who volunteers with emergency aid organisations, told Al-Monitor he was not surprised by the Arab public's reaction.

          "Quite a few Arabs work with Jews on a daily basis,” he said, “and there is a full understanding that the two populations in Israel have more in common than what separates them. And therefore there are those who think about the day after the war."

          A last word from Mohammad Magadli, one of Israel’s most prominent Arab journalists. Unlike in 2021, he told the New York Times, “the Arab and Jewish societies are more aware of each other’s pain, and can understand how destructive the consequences can be if they don’t consider each other’s feelings…There is greater responsibility between the two societies.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online as: "The Arab-Israeli community stands in solidarity against Hamas", 24 October 2023

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-769843

Published in Eurasia Review, 27 October 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/27102023-solidarity-from-the-arab-israeli-community-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 October 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/solidarity-from-arab-israeli-community/

Sisi seeks renewed mandate

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 October 2023 

             If all goes according to plan, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will be re-confirmed in office before the end of the year, and will – heaven willing – be in power until 2030 at least.  Whether he will then retire gracefully from the political scene, only time will tell.  When he was last re-elected, in 2018, Egypt’s constitution specified that the president could serve no more than two terms, each of four years.  But constitutions can be amended.  By 2019 any president of Egypt could serve three terms, and the presidential term of office was extended to six years.

   On September 30 the Egyptian public could not avoid the launch of a three-day government-backed national conference titled “The Story of a Homeland”, broadcast in its entirety by the Extra News TV channel, which is reputed to have close links to Egyptian security agencies.  The event was staged at the Al-Massa Hotel in the prestigious New Administrative Capital, under the patronage and in the presence of the president, with the country’s leading politicians and a large number of representatives of Egyptian society in attendance.

It was toward the end of the event, during which a range of projects implemented over the past 9 years had been heavily promoted, that Sisi announced that he would be standing as a candidate in the forthcoming presidential election.  His term of office would not end officially until March 2024, but he had decided to bring the vote forward by six months. 

In the hours leading up to Sisi's announcement, correspondents reported patriotic music blaring from speakers across the capital, where convoys of buses shrink-wrapped with campaign slogans blocked major streets.  The sails of boats on the Nile were emblazoned with Sisi's photo and with slogans including "yes to stability".

The National Elections Authority has stipulated that the presidential election will be held over three days – December 10-12 ­– with the result being announced on December 18.   In the unlikely event of no candidate receiving more than 50% of the vote (in 2018 Sisi was reported to have secured 97%), a runoff would be held over January 8-10.

The qualification criteria for aspiring presidential candidates are formidable. Anyone wishing to stand must secure the backing of either 20 members of parliament or at least 25,000 members of the public drawn from 15 different governorates.  All nominations had to be registered by October 14. 

Opposition politician Ahmed al-Tantawi, acknowledged to be Sisi’s most formidable opponent, said early on that he will run, and accused security agencies of arresting some of his supporters. 

Other candidates announcing their bids include Farid Zahran, head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party; Abdel-Sanad Yamama, head of the Wafd Party; and Gameela Ismail, head of the liberal Constitution (Dostour) Party.

Opposition parties said that individuals seeking to support anti-Sisi candidates have been obstructed from doing so. During a press conference on October 4, individuals provided details  of how they had been blocked in various ways.

          Rania el-Sheik said she had been trying to register to support Tantawi when a scuffle broke out at the notary’s office provoked, she said, by “thugs”. “In every place, public employees have pre-determined reasons [for obstructing the process]” she declared. “The system is down, the internet isn’t working, the power is cut, your ID card isn’t showing for us.”

          Tantawi’s campaign team has complained that people trying to register support for him have been blocked, and that more than 80 of his supporters have been arrested. Tantawi himself has repeatedly accused the regime of harassing and detaining his supporters, preventing them from filing nominations and tapping his phone. His campaign has been posting videos of him accompanying supporters to registry offices.

          "In the end, they won‘t be able to say 'sorry, you don't have enough nominations'," he told supporters.

          Magdy Hamdan, a Conservative Party official, said he was also blocked from submitting his endorsement at one notary’s office. When he tried to enter a second, a group of men brought in some rubbish collectors and beggars and began spraying them – and him – with water.

          Egypt’s National Election Authority has said it has investigated complaints and that such allegations are baseless. The final list of qualified candidates will be released on November 9.

          Egypt is in the midst of an economic crisis. Record inflation and a shortage of foreign currency has caused the Egyptian pound to lose more than 50% of its value against the dollar in the last 18 months. Foreign debt has soared to a record high of $165.4 billion this year, which experts say has been largely used to fund a range of megaprojects including the new $58-billionNew Administrative Capital. In consequence the country's external debt bill has tripled in the past ten years, and about half the 2023/24 budget is allocated to debt servicing.

          Prior to the crisis, roughly 30% of the population was already living below the poverty line, with an additional 30% considered vulnerable to poverty. More recently Egypt has been hit hard from the fallout from the war in Ukraine. Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, and has traditionally purchased most of its grain from eastern Europe.

          These are not circumstances in which any democratic government would choose to go to the country. Given the choice, most would strive to put a package of reform measures in place in the hope of improving matters. One reason why Sisi might have decided on an early election (thus depriving himself of six months in power) is that he adjudged that by March 2024 the situation is likely to have become worse rather than better, with a consequential loss of public support. On the other hand economic relief might be forthcoming from a deal with the US. Word has it that the US might waive a chunk of debt repayment in exchange for Egypt agreeing to allow a certain number of Gazan refugees into Egypt by way of the Rafah crossing.

          Given his grip on power, Sisi will certainly win his third term in office, but he knows that a long, hard, uphill struggle lies ahead.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post on-line, 18 October 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-768988

Published in Eurasia Review, 20 October 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/20102023-egypts-sisi-seeks-renewed-mandate-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 23 October 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/egypts-sisi-seeks-renewed-mandate/

Yemen needs help

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 October 2023

          Even in the midst of a war forced upon it, Israel cannot forget that not so far way people are actually starving to death through the malign actions of the self-same enemy that bolsters Hamas - Iran. That Yemen could soon become an outpost of the Iranian empire is within the bounds of possibility. If the Houthi organization, in hoc to Iran for its military and financial support, consolidates its already considerable grip on the country, Iran’s so-called Shia Crescent will have been extended right down to the south of the Arabian peninsula. Such an outcome would represent a major political triumph for the Iranian regime, and a boost to its ambition to dominate the region.

          October 2, 2023 marked a year to the day since the Houthis, controlling a large part of Yemen including the capital, Sana’a, refused to renew a UN-sponsored truce. Painstakingly put together by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg, the armistice between Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG) and the Houthis came into effect in April 2022. Extended twice, it resulted in the longest period of stability in Yemen since the start of its civil war.

          So on October 2 that negative anniversary was marked by no less than 48 organizations, struggling inside Yemen to cope with what the UN has called “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world”, publishing a long, heartfelt plea for action from those involved, and the world, to help relieve the situation and resolve the conflict.

          Their document describes Yemen’s economy as “on the verge of collapse”. It says growing inflation, combined with the collapse of public services, especially in IRG-controlled areas, is making life “unbearable”. Since Yemen’s refineries are not operating, say the civil society bodies, “power stations are shutting down due to a lack of fuel… power outages in Aden are reaching 17 hours per day, amid soaring temperatures.”

          The UN believes the nine-year civil conflict has left 80 percent of the population – some 24 million people, including almost 13 million children – in urgent need of aid and protection. More than 14 million people in Yemen are in acute need. Starvation is widespread. UNICEF (the UN’s Children’s Fund) reports that as 2022 ended, around 2 million children under the age of 5 were experiencing starvation-induced wasting, severely in more than 500,000 cases.

          Meanwhile the Houthis and the other major player on the scene, Aidarus al-Zoubadi, head of Yemen’s breakaway Southern Transitional Council (STC), continue their ruthless pursuit of power. The Houthis are intent on defeating the IRG and gaining control of the whole of Yemen, Zubaidi and the STC are determined to establish an independent state in the south of the country.

          Zoubadi has a highly equivocal role in Yemeni politics. He is vice president of the country and therefore a member of the IRG based in Aden, but he is also the leader of the STC which advocates seceding from the IRG. Vice president though he is, Zoubadi is on record as believing that real power in Yemen now rests with the Houthis, and on September 22 he announced that he intends to negotiate with them over the creation of a separate nation state of South Yemen comprised of eight governorates in the south of the country, including Aden.

          Zoubadi’s comments came shortly after a marathon five-day round of talks between Houthi and Saudi officials in Riyadh. Houthi negotiators, together with Omani mediators, returned to Yemen on September 19. Word from the discussions was that they were negotiating a potential end to the conflict in Yemen, and that some progress was made, including a timeline for foreign troops to leave the country and a mechanism for paying public wages.

          Some sources link the progress to suggestions that the US has pressured Saudi Arabia to end the war, perhaps linking its request to the complex US-Saudi-Israel normalization negotiations currently in progress.

          An agreement would allow the UN to restart a broader political peace process involving other parties to the Yemeni conflict, including the Yemeni government and the STC.  

          Aware that the head of the IRG, Rashid al-Alami, was due to address the 78th session of the UN General Assembly in New York and that he was far from supportive of the STC, Zoubadi decided to visit New York himself. His aim: to meet as many world leaders as possible and press the case for an independent state in south Yemen. While there, he told an Associated Press reporter that the Riyadh talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia were still at an early stage, and that his STC was planning to participate later.

          “We are asking for the return of the southern state,” he said, “with complete sovereignty, and this will happen through beginning negotiations with the Houthis… This is the goal of our strategy...”

          On his return to Yemen, Zoubadi issued a release to the media under the auspices of the STC. Designating himself “President of the STC”, the release begins: “President Zoubadi stated: My inaugural visit to the UN General Assembly has been a deeply impactful and meaningful experience. I have had enlightening and informative dialogue with leaders from around the world. My message was the same to every person that I met: the only viable solution to the conflict is an inclusive and comprehensive political process under the UN's auspices. This process must include a mechanism for the Southern people to determine their own destiny, as is their right under international law."

          While these power games are being played out, the condition of the people of Yemen continues to deteriorate. In their appeal to the world, the 48 humanitarian bodies struggling to cope paint a heart-breaking picture of what existence has degenerated to for large numbers of the population throughout Yemen. To quote from just one section:

          “Across the country, women and children are disproportionately impacted. Women often eat least and last, giving priority to children and other family members…Girls are at increased risk of early marriage to reduce the number of family members to feed, and as a source of income. Increasingly people in Yemen are being forced to…[beg] for food and money, while children are at increased risk of child labor and begging…”

          In fact the situation is intolerable. Negotiations aimed at ending the civil conflict need to be conducted with a great deal more urgency, while Yemen undoubtedly merits an internationally backed humanitarian rescue effort.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 9 October 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-765279

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 October 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/15102023-yemen-needs-help-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 16 October 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/yemen-needs-help/

What Netanyahu did not say

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 2 October 2023  

            On September 22 Benjamin Netanyahu stepped onto the podium at the UN General Assembly in New York, and addressed a plenum that was half-empty – understandably so, since it was 9.15 am.  Word has it that the PM considered this slot preferable to the time originally scheduled for his address – the evening of the previous day, which would have been late at night in Western Europe and the middle of the night in Israel and the Middle East generally.  As it was, the prime minister’s speech appeared on Israeli TV screens at 4.15 pm  on a Friday afternoon, far from an ideal viewing time.  Yet there may well have been method in the apparent madness, for we later learned that his address had been screened live across Saudi Arabia – well after Friday prayers on a rest day, guaranteeing mass viewings.

            Saudi Arabia featured strongly in Netanyahu’s speech as he dealt at length with the mounting expectation of a normalization deal with Israel.  He was, in fact, echoing the optimistic comments made only two days earlier by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in a rare interview with Fox News. He told his interviewer that the prospects of normalized relations with Israel were getting closer by the day. 

Not surprisingly, however, MBS reiterated the qualification that has always accompanied the Saudi position on normalization.  Calling the potential accord "the biggest historical deal since the end of the Cold War," he said it would all depend on agreements aimed at “giving the Palestinians their needs”.

This is one of several issues notably absent from Netanyahu’s address.  He included a list of the steps the Palestinians would need to take in order to achieve a genuine peace (such as stopping the spread of Jew-hatred, and reconciling themselves to the right of the Jewish people to have a state of their own in their historic homeland).  What he failed to do was to open the world’s eyes to the realities behind the universally-supported nostrum of a two-state solution. 

He did not mention the word Hamas once.  Yet up to half the Palestinian population lives in the Gaza Strip under the pernicious governance of the Hamas organization.  How could the two-state solution – the concept of a sovereign Palestine living alongside a sovereign Israel – be a practical possibility when Hamas, and those Palestinians outside Gaza who subscribe to its philosophy, regard the whole area “from the river to the sea” (that is, from the Jordan to the Mediterranean) as Arab territory to which Israel has no right?  The prime purpose of Hamas, its very raison d’être, is to eradicate Israel altogether and ensure that no Jews remain in the area. 

            The 2002 Arab Peace Plan, to which Saudi Arabia still subscribes, was conceived before Hamas was of any major significance, and well before it had seized control of Gaza and virtually kidnapped a great mass of the Palestinian people.  Netanyahu did not ask the world why so little thought has been given to the practical hurdles in the path of achieving its much advocated two-state solution.  Since Hamas would never be a signatory to such a deal, Gaza would be excluded from the arrangement. What sort of sovereign Palestine could it be, shorn of half the Palestinian population?  In short, Netanyahu could have provided world opinion with some home truths, among them that the prerequisite to achieving a genuine two-state solution is the disempowerment of Hamas.  

            Another word that did not pass Netanyahu’s lips was “apartheid” - the charge used to tar Israel by bodies like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and a whole host of anti-Israel groups and individuals. He could have provided the world with a brief lesson on the total lack of ethnic, racial or religious discrimination of any kind within the sovereign state of Israel – and demonstrated with facts and figures the increasingly successful integration of Israel’s Arab population into the social, political and judicial structure of the state. 

            Netanyahu might also have called for some understanding of the complex administrative nightmare bequeathed to Israel by the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, that failed attempt to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue.  Although most of the 3 million Palestinians living in the West Bank are governed, either wholly or largely, by the Palestinian Authority in Areas A and B set up in the Oslo Accords, the situation for the 300,000 living in Area C under military law is far from satisfactory.  It is nothing approaching apartheid, but the whole situation does require resolution, and could be resolved within the terms of the normalization package currently being negotiated with Saudi Arabia. 

   Another matter to which Netanyahu made no reference at all is the one Israeli issue that has been dominating the world’s headlines for the past months – the matter of judicial review, and the fears aroused, both within Israel and beyond, that restricting the power of the Supreme Court to hold the whole governmental structure to account could lay the road open to a possible dictatorship.

Most people now realize that the clash of public opinion in Israel has arisen largely because, over time, the distinction between the legislative and the judicial roles within the system of governance has become increasingly blurred.  The judiciary has over time been forced, in addition to its main functions, to assume the role that belongs to the second chamber in a bi-cameral legislature – to scrutinize proposed new law and suggest improvements.

Both the US and the UK have bi-cameral legislative systems, but even so powerful voices have been declaring for some time that the judiciary has been exceeding its proper function by venturing too far into the political arena.  Last year the USA Politico journal remarked: “The Supreme Court has usurped the power of the elected branches to interpret the Constitution...It has accomplished this power grab through unfounded assertions of judicial supremacy.“  Or, as Britain’s prestigious Prospect magazine put it a while ago: “The judiciary has made a slow march to the heart of politics.“  

   So there seems to be room for modest reform of Israel’s system by devising a better balance between the democratic mandate handed to members of the Knesset by the electorate, and the powers of the judiciary to defend groups and individuals against gross infringements of their democratic rights.  Netanyahu might well have seized the opportunity of his address on the world stage to defuse this matter among the others.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online under the title: "Netanyahu's speech at the UN General Assembly - what he didn't say", 2 October 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-761230 

Published in Eurasia Review, 6 October 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06102023-what-netanyahu-did-not-say-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 10 October 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/what-netanyahuh-did-not-say/

Turkey and Greece shake hands

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 September 2023

           On September 5 the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece – Hakan Fidan and Giorgos Gerapetritis – met in Ankara.  At the subsequent press conference, standing side by side, they announced that a new era of friendly cooperation had dawned between their countries.  

It all began with the summer elections in 2023.  By the end of May Turkey’s Recep Tayyyip Erdogan had won his follow-up poll and was re-installed in the presidential palace.  At the end of June Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis was re-elected in a resounding victory at the polls. The two nationalist leaders were safely back at the helm.   In a move virtually unthinkable only a year before, Erdogan – an incarnation of the “big bad wolf” to many Greeks – phoned Mitsotakis to congratulate him.

This amiable gesture did not come completely out of the blue.  Following the devastating Turkey-Syria earthquake in February, Greece had swiftly responded with assistance, and as a result a relatively friendly climate had been generated.  This had been strengthened when, after a deadly train accident in Greece on May 1 that killed at least 32 people, Erdogan extended his condolences.  His action was echoed by many Turkish citizens who offered support and solidarity via social media.

During their chat on the phone, Erdogan and Mitsotakis, realizing that they would both be attending the NATO summit scheduled to take place in Lithuania in July, agreed to meet on the sidelines for an informal discussion.

That discussion duly took place, and proved surprisingly productive.  The two leaders produced a “roadmap” intended to expand the developing rapprochement between their nations.  They agreed that their foreign ministers would hold talks aimed at fostering confidence-building measures, and that the long-suspended High Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) would be revived.

The HLCC was inaugurated on 14 May, 2010, during a visit of Turkey’s then-prime minister Erdogan to Athens.  It was an attempt to establish a forum where the two countries, almost continuously at odds with each other, could at least discuss their differences.  Over the years four sessions were held, the last in March 2016.  Now the Council was to be revitalized and, it was agreed, by the end of the year Greece and Turkey would be sitting together round the table in Thessaloniki. 

This was the background to the meeting on September 5 between Fidan and Gerapetritis. During their subsequent media conference Fidan thanked Greece for its assistance after the unprecedented earthquakes that had killed more than 50,000 people, and said that Turkey was "ready to help" as Greece battles weeks of deadly wildfires.

Turning to the Turkey-Greece rapprochement they were initiating, Gerapetritis said:

"We don't have our heads in the clouds.  We know that the…passions passed on from generation to generation cannot be erased with one stroke. But we have the disposition and the will to invest in candor and mutual understanding so as to seek common ground, break with established opinions and, where there are disagreements, at least not have them lead to crises." 

Fidan sang from the same hymn-sheet.

"We have entered a new and positive era in our relations with Greece," he said. "We are ready to continue dialogue with our neighbor Greece without any preconditions, and to develop our relations in all fields based on common interests."

Not everyone believed him.  Only three years earlier the two nations had been on the brink of military conflict over sovereignty in areas of the Mediterranean, and related rights to drill for oil in the disputed ocean zones. The Greek and Turkish navies were shadowing each other in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean for much of the summer of 2020, after Turkey sent a survey ship to prospect for oil and gas in waters Greece claims as its jurisdiction under international law.

The dispute rumbled on, exacerbated in Erdogan’s eyes by the emerging Greek, Cypriot, Israeli and Egyptian oil and gas alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, backed by the US.  The relationship soured further when in May 2022 Mitsotakis, during an address to the US Congress, joined a campaign to deny US military jets to Turkey.  Erdogan, furious at the Greek prime minister, vowed never to speak to him again.

          Since then Erdogan has taken steps to repair relations with both Israel and Egypt, while Turkey’s standing in Washington has been greatly strengthened by Erdogan’s agreement to allow Sweden to join NATO.  As part of that deal, the US Congress has promised Turkey dozens of F-16s, with Greece also getting fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets.

          ​​The two foreign ministers confirmed that their respective leaders planned to carry the initiative forward by meeting later in September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly ​in New York.  On Erdogan’s shopping list is his wish to revive Turkey's accession track to the EU. A better relationship with Greece could help that. High among other unresolved issues is delineating the two nations’ exclusive economic zones in the Mediterranean, while way out on the horizon is even the possible reunification of Cyprus.

Meanwhile​ on September 20 the ​long-delayed meeting between Erdogan and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu took place  at Turkish House in New York​, when they came face to face for the first time. ​ The​y discussed regional and international issues, including normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia​, and decided to continue advancing bilateral relations in trade, economic matters and energy.​  The word from the meeting is that Erdogan plans to visit Jerusalem as soon as October. 

          Back in 2016 Israel, Cyprus and Greece forged a tight cooperative relationship spanning a wide spectrum of activities including trade, energy, defense, hi-tech and security.  Netanyahu took advantage of the New York gathering of world leaders to meet up with his Greek and Cypriot partners.  Not to be outdone, Erdogan also organized a discussion with Mitsotakis.  Erdogan is intent on drawing closer to both Greece and Israel to ensure that Turkey is not disadvantaged by this thriving alliance, or perhaps to snatch an advantage by way of a bi-lateral deal with one or other of the partners.  He seems to have decided for the moment to follow Winston Churchill’s famous aphorism:  “Jaw-jaw is better than war-war.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "Are Turkey and Greece allies now?", 27 September 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-760569

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 September 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29092023-turkey-and-greece-shake-hands-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 2 October 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/turkey-and-greece-shake-hands/

Why Egypt needs Israel’s gas

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 September 2023

 

The Egypt-Israel gas deal of the late 1990s-early 2000s has been turned on its head.  Originally conceived as a means of providing Israel with natural gas when it had no domestic supplies of its own, the boot has been transferred to the other foot. On August 23 Israel announced that it has agreed to increase by some 70% its export of natural gas to Egypt, which is contending with rising demand and falling output from its own resources.

In the late 1990s, when Israel had to import all its fossil fuel needs, the Israeli government decided to encourage the use of natural gas.  A number of reasons lay behind the decision, cost and environmental impact among them.  It turned to Egypt, and an agreement was hammered out. Israel would be supplied with natural gas, first in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), but later through an undersea branch of the planned Arab Gas Pipeline.  That branch eventually became the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline line running direct from Egypt to Israel. 

From 2008 until the political turmoil in Egypt following the Arab Spring of 2011 the pipeline supplied about half of Israel’s natural gas needs. The next two years were marked by political turmoil in Egypt, and the feeder pipeline in Sinai was sabotaged again and again.  No sooner was the damage repaired and supplies resumed to Israel – and, incidentally, to Jordan, which Egypt was also supplying with natural gas – than a further explosion put the pipeline out of commission.  After no less than fourteen such incidents, the pipeline was shut down.

A few years later Egypt was in the throes of an energy crisis. Rising demand and falling gas and oil output had transformed the country from exporter to importer of both.  Commercial interests spied a profitable opportunity.  Deals in 2018 paved the way for the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline to be reopened, but with the flow reversed so that Israel could supply Egypt with the natural gas it desperately needed.  As from 2020 gas from Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar fields, located off the northern Israeli coastline, were transferred via the pipeline from Ashkelon to Arish in Egypt.

Egypt’s power crisis may have been eased, but it was far from resolved. By June this year  the country was suffering severe power cuts.  First affected were street lamps and some public services. Then, as temperatures began to soar – up to 50 degrees Celsius (122 Fahrenheit) were  recorded – power cuts were imposed, lasting about six hours in some areas.  According to officials, the power outages resulted from exceptional pressure on the energy grid caused by the high demand for electricity to power fans and air conditioning.  By mid-July Egypt’s electricity company was calling  on people to avoid using elevators, in case they were trapped through a power cut. 

Egypt’s prime minister, Mostafa Madbouly, claimed that the networks would soon return to normal, but that in any case steps were in hand to ration electricity consumption.

Egypt, although it was facing growing demand for gas from its 105 million population, saw its own natural gas production decline by 9% year-on-year between January and May 2023, and by 12% compared to the same period in 2021.

It was against this background that Egypt sought, and Israel announced, the increase in its natural gas sales to Egypt.  One factor easing the deal may well be Egypt’s presidential elections, due to be held in February 2024.  Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, would certainly rather face the electorate with the power crisis well behind him.

Sisi was first elected president under Egypt’s 2014 constitution, which provided for presidential terms to last four years, and for no president to serve more than two terms.  He won his second term in 2018, but in April 2019 Egypt's parliament extended presidential terms from four to six years, and in addition Sisi was allowed to run for a third term in the 2024 election.

Explaining the new Egypt-Israel agreement, Israel’s Energy Minister, Israel Katz, said that gas exports to Egypt, currently about 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per annum, will be increased by 3.5 bcm per annum over 11 years.  Israel also intends to expand production from Tamar by 60% from 2026.

"This step will increase the state's revenue and strengthen diplomatic ties between Israel and Egypt," said Katz.

The arrangement is far from the liking of some public figures in Israel.  Some public advocacy groups have warned that Israel could suffer gas shortages as domestic demand rises, and have raised the prospect of environmental damage from heightened offshore activity.  In June, Yogev Gardos, Israel's budget director, said there was an "immediate need for the examination" of export policy.  Israel should urgently review how much natural gas the country should export, he said, to make sure it keeps enough for itself.  In fact back in 2013 Israel set limits on how much could be sold abroad, earmarking around 60% of reserves for domestic use.

Israel is expected to roughly double its gas output over the coming years, and in a letter to the director-general of the Energy Ministry, Gardos said that exporting too much "could endanger Israel's energy security" and lead to higher electricity prices. 

Katz responded to the letter in a robust Twitter post: "Decisions on the gas sector take into account broad policy considerations, such as Israel's standing, and the one who will make the decisions is me - the minister elected by the people. Not the professional echelon."

He could afford to respond straight from the shoulder, for he already knew that Israel’s fourth offshore bidding round, launched in December 2022, had been an outstanding success.  Four groups of companies, adding up to a total of nine companies – five of which were new to the Israeli market –  had bid to explore for additional offshore natural gas fields in Israeli waters.

The three major Israel fields currently in production – Tamar, Leviathan and Karish – have total estimated reserves of 1000 billion cubic meters (bcm).  Four more fields have already been discovered, and are awaiting exploitation – Zeus, Athena, Hermes and Kallan – which taken together amount to an estimated further 108 bcm of natural gas.  With the forthcoming exploration now in the pipeline, Israel’s future, both as regards satisfying its own gas needs and as a remunerative gas exporting nation, seems assured.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "It is Egypt that needs Israeli natural gas", , 21 September 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-759895Eurasia Review, 22 September 2023

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 September 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22092023-why-egypt-needs-israels-gas-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 26 September 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/why-egypt-needs-israels-gas/