Iran is losing control

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 April 2025

Syria and Lebanon are slipping from Iran’s grasp. 

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria represented a major geopolitical defeat for Iran​, and ​Syria's interim government has taken decisive steps to curtail whatever hard power ​Iran still possessed within the country.​  

In an interview published by ​the London-based ​​Asharq al-Awsat on December 20, 2024, the new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, stated that his overthrow of Assad had "set the Iranian project in the region back by 40 years."​  In February he said on television that he intends to distance Syria from Iranian influence, and he denounced Iranian proxies as a “strategic threat.” He emphasized that by removing Iranian militias and closing Syria to Iranian influence, he intended to achieve what diplomacy and external pressure had very obviously failed to do.  He was clearly signaling that he intended to realign Syria's relations with much of the world and reduce Iranian influence in the region.

A sign that Iran's powerful foothold in Syria was about to give way occurred on December 8.  As the rebel HTS group overran and captured  Damascus, the Iranian embassy – hurriedly evacuated the previous day – was ransacked.  Armed militants stormed the building and  vandalized it by smashing windows, looting offices, and tearing down portraits of prominent Iranian figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Qassem Soleimani, and Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah. Video footage showed looters removing furniture and documents. 

As a result Iranian military and diplomatic personnel, including members of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), have largely withdrawn from Syria.

As for Lebanon, Iran’s influence has been exercised primarily through Hezbollah, which it has supported financially and logistically ever since the organization was founded in the early 1980s, shortly after the 1979 Iranian revolution.  Since its ceasefire deal with Israel, Hezbollah has been constrained militarily and wounded politically, though not fatally.  The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, signed on November 26, 2024, expired more than two months ago.  It was originally intended to last, with an agreed extension, until February 18, 2025. That date has come and gone, but there has been no move to extend or renegotiate the deal.  It appears to remain in effect by mutual agreement, but with no renewed legal basis.

Though Hezbollah’s capacity to operate independently is increasingly constrained, it remains a significant entity in Lebanon's political landscape.  Acknowledging as much, it is with caution that the newly-elected president, Joseph Khalil Aoun, has begun to reassert the sovereignty of the Lebanese state.  On April 14, in a TV interview on Al Jazeera, Aoun broached the delicate topic of disarming Hezbollah.  With the real danger of civil strife in mind, Aoun declared that demilitarizing Hezbollah would be achieved through negotiation, as part of a national defense strategy, and not through force.

Disempowering Hezbollah means disempowering Iran, about which the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, cannot be too pleased.  But Hezbollah’s morale has collapsed following its substantial military defeat during the 2024 conflict with Israel.  Reflecting this, on April 10 a Hezbollah official informed Reuters that the organization was willing to discuss disarmament.  Its proviso is Israel's withdrawal from five contested areas in southern Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli military strikes.

It was during his inaugural address to parliament on January 9, 2025 that Aoun first pledged to ensure that “weapons will only be in the hands of the state,” a position he has endorsed several times since.  Proceeding with caution, he has announced that implementation of the principle will depend on a “bilateral dialogue” between himself and Hezbollah. Even so, Aoun said the Lebanese army has been confiscating weapons and dismantling unauthorized military facilities in southern Lebanon, as outlined in the ceasefire agreement.

Hezbollah’s future, and with it the extent of Iran’s influence within Lebanon, will probably depend on its ability to adapt to the evolving political environment, engage in constructive dialogue with the state, and redefine its role within Lebanon's national framework. The days of Iran’s dominant influence within the Lebanese state by way of its over-mighty proxy are over.

As indeed are Iran’s use of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria as a military hub and convenient transit route for supplying Hezbollah with weaponry with which to attack northern Israel.

Syria’s interim President Sharaa, who himself led the Sunni militia HTS for eight years, has no time for Shiite Hezbollah.  On March 16, Syria's defense ministry accused Hezbollah of abducting and killing three Syrian soldiers near the Lebanese border. According to the ministry, Hezbollah ambushed the soldiers, took them into Lebanese territory, and executed them. Hezbollah denied any involvement in the incident .

Regardless, Syrian forces shelled areas in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, and the Lebanese army returned fire.  After two days of clashes, with casualties on both sides, Lebanon and Syria agreed to a ceasefire. The agreement was negotiated directly between the defense ministries of the two countries and did not involve Hezbollah. 

Follow-up diplomatic exchanges led to discussions on border demarcation and security coordination, aiming to rebuild trust and stabilize bilateral relations. ​ These, too, were conducted without the participation of Hezbollah.  Clearly its influence on events has been much diminished.  Iran’s proxy is being sidelined.

   It was on April 14, five weeks after Lebanon and Syria agreed on the ceasefire that ended cross-border clashes, that the Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam visited Syria’s interim President Sharaa. 

"This visit will open a new page in the course of relations between the two countries,” said Salam. 

Beyond the talk of mutual respect and restoring trust and good neighborliness, the two leaders also agreed to cooperate in the economic field, signing off on creating a ministerial committee to follow up with issues of common interest. 

The whole episode served to demonstrate growing confidence on the part of the Lebanese, whose delegates seemed no longer in thrall to Hezbollah.  Nor did Iranian interests feature in Sharaa’s effort to establish good relations with his Lebanon neighbor.

Despite these setbacks, Iran is attempting to establish a connection with post-revolution Syria.  So far the new Syrian administration has shown little enthusiasm for opening bilateral relations with Iran.  It is clearly favoring an independent and regionally integrated approach.

Despite its loss of status, Hezbollah retains a good deal of political clout, especially among the Shiite population. But many in Lebanon blame Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, for dragging the country into regional conflicts and provoking Israeli retaliation.

As the Lebanese state grows stronger and Hezbollah weaker, Iran can see its power in Lebanon slipping away.  Meanwhile Assad’s successor as Syria’s president is clearly not inclined to allow Iran much influence in his post-revolutionary country. 

The old order is changing.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "With regime change in Syria and political order in Lebanon, Iran is losing control", 28 April 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-851737

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 May 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/02052025-iran-is-losing-control-oped/

October 7 - The Unvarnished Truth

Published in the Jerusalem Report, issue dated May 5, 2025

        On 18 March 2025 a cross-party group of UK parliamentarians published the results of a deeply researched investigation into Hamas’s terror attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. Their 318-page document records, in fully referenced meticulous detail, the worst atrocity visited on the Jewish people since the Holocaust.

        The investigation was commissioned by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on UK-Israel, now in its tenth year.  Membership of the  APPG encompasses the major political parties and spans both Houses of Parliament – the Commons and the Lords.  The Group noted that on October 7 itself, while the pogrom was actually in progress and before Israel had reacted in any way, anti-Israel pro-Hamas propaganda found its way into worldwide media.  Conspiracy theorists were already seeking to deny that massacres had taken place.  At the same time pro-Palestinian voices were exulting in the assault as a great coup for Hamas.  The sheer illogicality of celebrating events which were at the same time being denied was already in evidence, and has persisted.

Determined to thwart all efforts by anti-Israel or antisemitic sources to instigate “October 7 denial” on the lines of the ever-present Holocaust denial phenomenon, the Group set up a Parliamentary Commission, to be chaired by Lord Roberts of Belgravia – the distinguished historian Andrew Roberts.  Its remit was to undertake a comprehensive examination of the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel.

The Commission started its work in January 2024.  Based upon its scrupulous examination of forensic evidence, the testimony of survivors and released hostages, open-source video footage, and personal observations by commission members in the places where the savagery was perpetrated, the Roberts Report was published 14 months later.  It exposes, in sometimes horrific detail, the premeditated and systematic nature of the attack, disproves false narratives, and underscores the barbarity that Hamas inflicted on innocent civilians.

The report documents atrocities in forensic detail. There was widespread sexual violence.  Victims were raped, gang-raped, and mutilated before being murdered. Some corpses were desecrated.  There were instances of beheadings.  Families were executed in their homes, burned alive in safe rooms, or blown up with grenades.  At Kibbutz Be’eri, 99 civilians were slaughtered; in Kfar Aza, 62 were murdered, including babies in their parents’ arms.  In fact the report devotes a separate section to each of the 30 kibbutzim targeted, and tells their individual stories in detail.  That chapter of the report is followed by no less than 24 pages of closely packed references.

In addition the report deals separately with the attacks on Bedouin villages and camps and with those on the cities of Sderot, Netivot and Ofakim.  The nine military facilities that were attacked also warrant a chapter of their own.   

Hamas used social media as a weapon, filming their killings on body cameras and smartphones, live-streaming the massacres on Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram. They seized victims’ phones to send images of the atrocities directly to the victims’ loved ones, amplifying the psychological terror.

In overseeing the gathering of evidence and its verification, Lord Roberts was well served.   In addition to his seven Commission members, he used the services of five professional historians.

When I spoke to Lord Roberts about how the report was compiled, he told me: “Everything that is in the report has been double checked.”  

His team of historians were able to cross-reference everything.  “Frankly,” he told me, “the report could have been much more gruesome if we had put in things that were true, but that we couldn’t double check.  We wanted it to be so irrefutable and impeccable that we kept a great deal of truly horrible material out because we couldn’t double check it.” 

That includes inside information about when and how Hamas planned the attack.  Minutes of 10 secret meetings involving a small group of Hamas political and military leaders, held  from January 2022 to August 2023, were found by the IDF in Gaza. Verified by The New York Times, they demonstrate the thinking and planning behind the attack.

I asked Lord Roberts whether the timing of the Nova music festival on the very Saturday of the Hamas attack was an appalling coincidence.  Or did Hamas know there was going to be a large gathering of young Israelis on the border?

“There was so much intelligence that Hamas had about everything that was going on in southern Israel,” Lord Roberts told me, “that there is no chance of it being a coincidence.  They knew there was to be a festival and that lots of young people would be going.  Killing young people was a primary aim of the operation.  They wanted to kill and kidnap young people and babies, and they even brought incubators across the border.  Their intelligence was so detailed that for targeted houses they knew which side of the bed the husband and wife slept on.”   

At the Nova music festival Hamas massacred over 370 young people, ambushing fleeing attendees with rifles and rocket propelled grenades.  

Lord Roberts pointed out that it was no coincidence that the majority of the Hamas paragliders had landed close to the festival site.

I asked him whether getting so closely involved with unearthing the details of such savage and barbaric events had affected him personally.  The experience that came first to his mind was his visit to the Kfar Aza kibbutz.  The account of what happened in Kfar Aza on the day of the Hamas attack is on page 100 of the report, which is available in full on line.

“I was shown around by Mandy Damari,” said Lord Roberts.

Mandy’s daughter Emily was shot in the hand and injured by shrapnel in her leg before being blindfolded, bundled into a car and driven to Gaza.  She was held hostage for 471 days before being released on January 19, 2025.

“Mandy showed me the safe room she spent so many hours in, and Emily’s house close by from which she was taken,” said Lord Roberts.  “It was a profoundly moving experience for me because I have a daughter the same age as Emily, and I was able to imagine, if only for a moment, how I would have felt if my daughter, Cassia, had undergone the same ordeal.  I shed some tears then, as well as on several other occasions.  That’s only a normal human reaction.”

He went on to describe British born Mandy Damari as “the bravest woman I have ever met. She’s a tower of strength, and a wonderful woman.”

I asked Lord Roberts about whether the work of his Commission has ended with the publication of his report.  He assured me that its investigation into the events of October 7 would continue.

“It’s a process,” he said.  “We will get more when hostages are released, and when further evidence comes to light.  Using teeth and bones they found somebody as recently as June 2024.  So this is absolutely not a finished product.”

I asked if there would be a further report.

“If enough new evidence comes forward,” said Lord Roberts.

By recording in scrupulous detail Hamas’s barbarous attack of October 7, Lord Roberts and his Commission have rendered an invaluable service to the victims and survivors, to those who perished in the onslaught and their families, and to future historians.  Their report is so detailed, so verified, that it will stand as a truthful and factual record  of what occurred, and a perpetual refutation of any attempt to downplay or deny what actually happened on that fateful October 7, 2023.

Chat GPT informs us:  "As of now, there is no publicly available information indicating that the BBC has reported on the publication of a "7 October Parliamentary Commission report." A search of BBC News archives and other reputable sources does not yield any articles or reports specifically covering such a publication."

Published in the Jerusalem Report, issue dated May 5, 2025.  https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-852236

Published in the Eurasia Review, 25 April 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/25042025-october-7-the-unvarnished-truth-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 25 April 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/october-7-the-unvarnished-truth/

Why Iran is talking

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 April 2025 

              

        In a nutshell, the Iranian regime wants an end to the sanctions that have crippled its economy while keeping an eventual nuclear arsenal very much in view, while US President Donald Trump is seeking an agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

To this end Iran and the US held talks in Oman on April 12.  ​Afterwards Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told state television they had taken place in a "productive, calm and positive atmosphere."  Both parties agreed that a second round would take place one week later, which indeed they did on April 19, in the Omani embassy in Rome.  Araghchi told Iranian​ TV that the talks had been "constructive" - which probably means that Iran is getting its way on developing a civil nuclear power program while it waits for Trump to complete his term in the White House.   Meanwhile the parties agreed to meet again in the coming week.

Trump would no doubt assert that the talks are  going well because he ha​s warned Iran that the US would use military force if a deal was not reached.  Moreover, despite Iran repeatedly saying it would not negotiate under pressure, even as preparations for the ​first meeting were in hand the US moved more warships and stealth bombers to the region and imposed more sanctions on individuals and companies supplying Iran with weaponry.

Th​at first meeting was not precisely what Trump had requested in his letter to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He proposed face-to-face talks leading to a deal to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.  This, he asserted, would avert possible military strikes by the US and Israel.  However Khamenei authorized only indirect discussions between the parties.

Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a cabinet meeting on March 30, confirmed that in reply to Trump’s letter Iran had rejected face-to-face talks.  However, he revealed, he had written that "the road to indirect negotiation is left open."

That is how the meeting was organized.  Al-Monitor reports that it took place in a luxury hotel in Muscat.  According to Iranian spokesman, Esmail Baghael, each delegation had its separate room and messages were exchanged via Oman's foreign minister.

The whole process went well until a mischievous gremlin intervened, causing a tempest in a teapot – or, as the British have it, a storm in a teacup.

When, after nearly three hours, the indirect talks ended, the delegations left their separate rooms and, as chance would have it, met on the way out.  The two delegation heads – Araghchi and Trump's Middle East envoy, Steven Witkoff – came face to face, and chatted briefly.

“It was very normal,” said Araghchi. “When we were leaving, the two groups ran into each other and we spoke for a few minutes… we have always respected diplomatic politeness while encountering American diplomats.”

However when news of the encounter reached Iran, hardliners were appalled.  Hamid Rasaei, an Iranian MP, reminded Araghchi that the Supreme Leader had authorized indirect talks only.

“Mr Araghchi, you had permission for indirect negotiations,” he declared. “This was not a normal encounter at all.  You could have left the place later… and not meet.”

Other hardline commentators viewed the direct contact as potentially undermining Iran's negotiating position.

The Iranian government, seeking to downplay the incident, emphasized how limited the face-to-face exchange had been, with no photographs taken.  State-affiliated media outlets largely echoed this view of the affair.  The fact that there has been no official statement from Khamenei, no censure or public reprimand, indicates his tacit agreement that the encounter should not affect the continuation of the negotiations.

This episode, together with a variety of other factors, indicates that Iran is extremely keen to come to an agreement with the US and be free of the heavy burden of sanctions that has crippled its economy for years, particularly those targeting oil exports and financial institutions.  The consequential currency devaluation and inflation have eroded public purchasing power, while oil price volatility has heavily reduced government revenues.

Domestic instability is another burden the regime has had to cope with.  The country has seen repeated waves of unrest, first over the deteriorating economic situation, and most recently after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, following her arrest by the morality police for wearing her hijab “incorrectly”.  These widespread protests demonstrate the regime’s declining legitimacy among its own population.  The government may believe that a deal with the US which lifts the sanctions would improve domestic conditions and reduce the risk of more unrest.

Iran is clearly in a weakened state compared with the recent past.  It spent decades building an empire of satellites, funding and arming them – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and countless jihadist militias.  Most have been severely depleted in the past few years by Israeli and Western action, and Iran’s influence, once based on its militarized outreach, has been much reduced.  At the same time Iran’s economic difficulties have limited its ability to fund them.

These and related factors go some way toward explaining why, despite his long-standing resistance to negotiations with the US, Khamenei has allowed the current talks to take place.  He has consistently placed a high priority on regime survival, and has a track record of permitting diplomacy as a tactic.  A major precedent was the negotiations back in 2015 leading to the original nuclear deal, concluded with then-US President Obama in the lead.  Khamenei regards negotiation as an occasional tactical necessity, not as a strategic shift of Iran’s fundamental purposes which remain the destruction of Israel and the spread of Shiite Islam across the whole world.

Khamenei often delegates negotiations to elected officials (e.g. the president or foreign minister) while keeping a critical distance. This allows the regime to test waters diplomatically without appearing weak.  It also allows him to blame failures on negotiators should talks collapse.  The regime is thus able to claim any deal was done on Iranian terms, not under Western pressure.

In short Khamenei allows talks when the regime is under existential pressure, when he can control and frame them, and when he can avoid blame if talks fail or claim success if they work.

The current round of negotiations with the US are not signs of a change of heart on the part of the Iranian regime or its Supreme Leader.  ​They are a calculated survival tactic.  ​Accordingly not much credence can be placed on any agreement Iran might make to abandon its decades-long pursuit of a nuclear arsenal​.  As long as that regime survives it will not abandon its cardinal objective - or the means to achieve it.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Why Iran has agreed to sit  down for nuclear talks", 21 April 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-850821

Yemen and the Houthis – the human cost

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 April 2025

 Yemen is at the epicenter of national and international interests at odds with each other and battling for supremacy.  At the heart of the turmoil is Iran, financing and weaponizing the Houthis in order to establish both a strong Shia presence on the Arabian peninsula, and a continued front against Israel to replace the weakened Hezbollah and Hamas.  The burden of suffering has fallen on the hapless people of Yemen.  They continue to bear the human cost.

Today’s catastrophe started in the sadly misnamed “Arab spring” uprisings of 2011. Inside Yemen they resulted in mass protests against the long dictatorial rule of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.  He was forced to step down in favor of his vice-president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.  In 2015 Hadi sponsored a revised constitution for Yemen that proposed a federal system split between northerners and southerners, but the Iran-backed Houthi rebels rejected it.

The Houthis are a fundamentalist Shia group.  The ex-president, Saleh, although a Sunni Muslim, decided to collaborate with them in a bid to return to power. It was through Saleh that the Houthis were able to gain control of most of the Yemeni military, including its air force. As a result, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, they overran large tracts of the country, including the capital city, Sana’a.

   Saudi Arabia, determined to prevent Iran from gaining a foothold on the Arabian peninsula, formed a coalition to support Hadi’s government, and intervened in March 2015 to beat back the Houthis. The internal struggle for power has continued ever since.

A significant moment came in April 2020, when a body calling itself the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was formed, declaring that south Yemen was breaking away from the national government and would henceforth rule itself. 

This unilateral declaration did not come out of the blue.  Back in 1967 South Yemen became an independent communist state backed by the USSR.  It was only in 1990, with the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, that South Yemen agreed to unite with the north to form the Unified Republic of Yemen.

The utter chaos within the country provided those so minded with a golden opportunity to restore an independent South Yemen. Since then a UN-engineered truce between the warring parties was achieved but never renewed, Yemen has staggered on, much of its people subsisting in abject poverty. 

Three main groups are fighting each other – the Houthis, the internationally recognized government, and the STC – but other smaller bodies are also involved including local militias, tribal forces, remnants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS.

Since Hamas’s bloody assault into Israel on October 7, 2023 Yemen has also become the base for the Houthis’ military effort in support of Hamas.  At Iran’s behest, the Houthis virtually declared war on October 19, 2023, when they launched missiles and armed drones at Israel. They have since attacked dozens of merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea that they declare, often erroneously, to have some connection with Israel. 

The retaliatory bombing, drone and missile attacks by US, UK and other national forces on Houthi missile sites and its military infrastructure have only added to the misery of the population.

On March 25 the UN children’s agency (UNICEF) pinpointed precisely this Houthi-controlled western coastal area of Yemen as being on the verge of a catastrophe due to the lack of food and water.

“Half of all children under five are acutely malnourished,” UNICEF official Peter Hawkins told reporters. “Among them, over 537,000 suffer from severe acute malnutrition (SAM)—a condition that is agonizing.  Equally alarming, 1.4 million pregnant and lactating women are malnourished, perpetuating a vicious cycle of intergenerational suffering.”

The next day Yemen’s looming disaster was highlighted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which warned of a widening chasm between rising humanitarian needs and the funding needed to alleviate them.

The IRC, founded in 1933 at the request of Albert Einstein, is a global humanitarian organization that provides emergency aid, long-term assistance, and advocacy for refugees and displaced people worldwide.

The IRC estimates that in 2025 some 19.5 million people in Yemen will need humanitarian assistance and protection – 7% more than in 2024.  Yet, it emphasizes, the humanitarian response remains critically underfunded. The estimated humanitarian budget of $2.47 billion is just 5% funded so far.

In 2024, just over half of what was required was actually delivered, forcing aid agencies to scale back essential support such as food distribution, and limit access to clean water and other services.

Caroline Sekyewa, IRC’s Country Director in Yemen, said: “For ten years, Yemenis have endured relentless conflict, economic collapse, and limited access to lifesaving health and nutrition services. Humanitarian aid has been their lifeline. For donor governments to consider reducing or removing that support is not just short-sighted, but puts millions of lives at risk... After a decade of crisis, political solutions and economic recovery are now needed more than ever to secure long-term stability. Yet the fact is that today, aid is what stands between life and death for millions."  

So the IRC is calling for renewed donor support to match the scale of the need. 

“2025 must be a turning point in this crisis,” said Sekyewa, “ With needs steadily increasing, we call upon all donors to step up and ensure that this year’s humanitarian needs and response plan is fully funded.”  

Meanwhile UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, continues his efforts to establish a lasting ceasefire in Yemen.  

In January 2025, his office conducted a series of political dialogues in Aden involving civil society representatives, political parties, and other actors to foster an inclusive peace process. ​ Nothing of substance was achieved.

In January 2024, the Security Council issued a resolution demanding that the Houthis cease their attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. After continued violations, Grundberg urged the Security Council in October 2024 to unite in halting the attacks. A second resolution followed in January 2025. Both resolutions were ignored

Yemen, a country spread across the base of the Arabian peninsula, was described by the Romans as “Arabia Felix” – happy, fortunate Arabia – an epithet that would certainly not apply in more modern times.  Its present situation, and that of its population, is dire.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Yemeni people continue to bear burden of weaponization of Houthis", 14 April 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-849767

Published in Eurasia Review, 18 April 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/18042025-yemen-and-the-houthis-the-human-cost-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 21 April 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/yemen-and-the-houthis-the-human-cost/

 

The Qatar conundrum

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 April 2025

On April 2, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Qatar as “a complex country”.  The epithet seems a trifle inadequate.  Qatar is close to mirroring  Winston Churchill’s famous description of Russia –  “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”

Dubbed “the wild card of the Middle East”, Qatar makes for an intriguing case study.  This  stand-alone and gas-rich Gulf state – the wealthiest country in the world on a per capita basis –is best known to the general public as having won the hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in somewhat dubious circumstances. 

Qatar has long pursued a foreign policy that appears self-contradictory to the world in general, and positively infuriating to its Arab neighbors.  While offering itself as a key US ally in the Middle East, it has also consistently backed hardline Islamists — from Hamas in the Gaza Strip, to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, to wild-eyed jihadists in Assad’s Syria.

 “We don’t do enemies,” a one-time foreign minister of Qatar once said. “We talk to everyone.” 

This policy, pursued with determination over the past thirty years, is a long-term effort to become a major player on the world stage.  It has succeeded.   From a standing start Qatar became central in a variety of delicate negotiations. For example it played a vital role in the events leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.

Collaborating closely with the US, Qatar acted as mediator between the Taliban and what was left of the previous Afghan administration to assist the evacuation of tens of thousands of people — including US citizens and contractors.  As a direct result, on March 10, 2022, then-President Joe Biden formally confirmed his grant to Qatar of the status of “major non-NATO ally”.  

 During the current Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza Qatar has, together with Egypt and the US, helped negotiate the complex deals that have led to the release of hostages captured by Hamas.   

Perhaps the fact that Hamas has been largely financed by Qatar for years goes some way to explaining Qatar’s influence on them. Qatar began transferring  large sums of money to Hamas after the conflicts in Gaza of 2012 and 2014.  In 2018, Israel permitted Qatar to send $15 million per month to Hamas nominally to cover civil servant salaries, and provide humanitarian aid and economic relief.  Between 2018 and 2021, Qatar sent over $1 billion to Gaza.  

On March 5, 2025, the State of Qatar issued a statement refuting claims that linked Qatari aid to the Hamas attack on Israel of October 7, 2023.  It emphasized that all aid provided by Qatar to Gaza—including food, medicine, and electricity—was delivered with the full knowledge, support, and supervision of both current and previous Israeli administrations and their security agencies. It asserted that no aid was ever delivered to Hamas's political or military wing.

   Qatar’s bid for global status can, perhaps, be traced back to 1995 when Sheik Hamad al-Thani ousted his father, who was on an extended summer vacation in Europe, and pronounced himself Emir. Surviving a countercoup backed by Saudi Arabia, Sheik Hamad set out to convert Qatar into a high-powered modern state.

His first big achievement was to launch the Al Jazeera television news network.  Al Jazeera claimed from the start that its journalists and editors provided an objective service independent of state control – a claim often contested over the years, and with reason.  

 In 2002, when the US military began pulling forces out of Saudi Arabia, the emir offered his country as a home for the US Central Command’s forward headquarters.  Ever since, Qatar has hosted a large US military presence, one of the biggest in the region, at Al Udeid Air Base.

Yet as the Arab Spring dawned in 2011, with popular revolutions toppling dictators and autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, the emir had no hesitation in allowing hardline members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, as well as other jihadists, to establish a presence in his capital, Doha. 

In 2013, Sheikh Hamad voluntarily abdicated in favor of his son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, making it a rare instance of voluntary succession in the Arab world.

In pursuit of its self-imposed policy Qatar’s tactics have sometimes puzzled, sometimes enraged, its neighbors. Its persistence in openly hosting Islamists, and especially prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood – a proscribed organization in Egypt –  led Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain on June 5, 2017 to break off diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose a trade blockade.  This was the second time that Qatar was sanctioned by its neighbors.  Saudi, the UAE and Bahrain first took this step in March 2014.

For three-and-a-half years Qatar withstood the worst that the alliance could inflict, and in January 2021 diplomatic relations were restored without any concessions on Qatar’s part.  In the interim Qatar had transformed itself into a major diplomatic player, and the country had grown into an important commercial hub.

Qatar has sought to expand its global influence through diplomatic outreach, high-profile visits, and media engagement. The country's leadership has used wealth, soft power, and global platforms to enhance its international standing.

Over recent years Qatar has hosted a broad range of influential figures, including world leaders and politicians.  It has attracted business leaders and investors through events like the Qatar Economic Forum.  Recently, despite its historical support for Palestinian causes, it has even succeeded in persuading Jewish leaders to visit.  One notable example was in 2017, when Qatar hosted a delegation of prominent American Jewish leaders, including officials from the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

Qatar has invested heavily in media influence, using in particular its own Al Jazeera Network, one of the most widely recognized news outlets in the Arab world.  It also uses Western PR firms and lobbyists, spending millions on lobbying efforts in the US and Europe to help shape a favorable public perception of Qatar.

The extent to which Qatar’s actions are morally questionable depends on perspective.   From Qatar’s view they are strategic diplomacy, using wealth to build alliances and protect national interests. In critics’ view they are manipulative, seeking to whitewash its authoritarian governance and its engagement with terrorists. 

In fact Qatar’s pursuit of influence through these methods and others is not unique.  It is in line with the practice of other Gulf states. Perhaps, though, Qatar is rather more dynamic in its quest than others. And perhaps it occasionally oversteps that line – so difficult sometimes to discern – between acceptable and questionable practice.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "Qatar's contradictions: Islamist terror ties and Western military alliances", 7 April 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-849055

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 April 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/12042025-the-qatar-conundrum-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 13 April 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/the-qatar-conundrum/

Turkey in turmoil

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 31 March 2025

        On March 19 the popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, was arrested just as he was about to register to run in Turkey’s next presidential election. At the same time, in a series of coordinated raids, more than 100 individuals were detained, including journalists and business figures. The charges ranged from corruption to alleged links to terrorism.

        Despite a government ban on street gatherings, thousands of people began to rally in protest against Imamoglu’s detention, accusing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of a blatant attempt to remove the man likely to be his main opponent in the next presidential election.

        Prosecutors announced that Imamoglu had been arrested for "establishing and managing a criminal organization, taking bribes, extortion, unlawfully recording personal data and rigging a tender." In addition to this shopping list of alleged crimes and misdemeanors, Imamoglu also faced allegations of "aiding an armed terrorist organization", namely Turkey’s proscribed Kurdish autonomy party, the PKK.


        The next day government media announced that the police were investigating the Imamoglu family’s construction business on a separate suspicion of financial irregularities. Imamoglu is being harried on another front. A day before his arrest, Istanbul University announced it was revoking Imamoglu's degree due to alleged irregularities, a measure which, if upheld, would put his ability to run as president in doubt. According to the Turkish constitution, to hold office presidents must have completed higher education.

        As mass protests against Imomaglu’s detention erupted across the nation, on March 23 he and four of his aides were, by order of a Turkish court, imprisoned pending trial.

        Now Turkey is in turmoil. The Turkish government has been unable to control the popular defiance of its clampdown on street gatherings. Each day tens of thousands of people have been taking to the streets in cities and towns across the nation, denouncing Imamoglu’s detention as politically motivated and a further step away from the democratic origins of modern Turkey. As March drew to an end the protests continued to erupt, day after day.

        Last year Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered a major defeat in local and mayoral elections. It seems obvious to many that the current moves are aimed at removing serious contenders ahead of the next presidential election. However, since it is not scheduled until 2028, one might ask why the issue has surfaced so early. There is a very good reason.

        In the 2017 constitutional referendum which transformed Turkey’s system from a parliamentary to a presidential one – a change championed by Erdogan and his AKP party – a president may serve a maximum of two terms, but there is an exception. If parliament calls for an early election during a president’s second term, that president is allowed to run for a third term.


        The year scheduled for the next Turkish presidential election is 2028. Nominally it should mark the end of Erdogan’s second consecutive term, and he would not be eligible to run again. However, should the parliament (which has a three-fifths AKP majority) call for early elections, Erdogan would be able to seek another term.

        İmamoğlu has accused the government of “weaponising the judiciary” to stay in power, and his Republican People’s party (CHP) called his detention “a coup against the next president”. A message posted on his X account called on judges and prosecutors to “stand up and take action against a handful of your colleagues who are ruining the Turkish judiciary, disgracing us before the whole world and destroying our reputation . . . You cannot and must not remain silent”.

        Erdogan's actions against Imamoglu are part of a broader crackdown on opposition figures in Turkey – a campaign that has intensified in recent months, targeting various political adversaries and dissenting voices.

        Since March 19 some 2000 people have been arrested, among them at least seven journalists, presumably on account of their political opinions. Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency recently reported that Turkish police are detaining people for posting messages on social media that allegedly incite unrest. On March 27, BBC news reporter Mark Lowen was arrested, detained and deported after covering the public protests.

        Erdogan has been on television to accuse the opposition of blowing Imamoglu’s arrest out of all proportion. It will be up to the courts, he said, to determine if the allegations against him are valid, but “they know full well that all of it is true”.

        Imamoglu has been a thorn in Erdogan’s flesh for many years, but back in the 1990s, during Erdogan's tenure as Istanbul's mayor, their relationship was cordial. In those days a young Imamoglu hosted Erdogan at his family's restaurant, ”on the house”.

        Imamoglu, always popular with the public, decided to try his luck in the 2019 election for mayor of Istanbul. it was a bold, almost cheeky, move because not only had Erdogan virtually started his political career as Istanbul’s mayor, but the post had subsequently been held consistently by members of Erdogan’s AKP party.

        Shattering all predictions, Imamoglu won the election, albeit by a very narrow margin – 28,000 votes in a city with more than 10 million voters. The ruling AKP immediately challenged the results, alleging irregularities and fraud.

        Under pressure from the AKP, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) took the unprecedented step of annulling the election and ordered a re-run –a decision heavily criticized both within Turkey and internationally. It backfired spectacularly.

        On June 23, 2019, Imamoglu inflicted a stunning defeat on Erdogan and the AKP. He won the re-run election by a much larger margin – some 800,000 votes (54.2% vs. 45%). This was widely interpreted as a significant blow to Erdogan’s political dominance. His famous and well-remembered remark came back to haunt him: "Whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey."

        To safeguard his future he is now clearly taking the sort of pre-emptive steps open to him in a country that retains vestiges of its secular democratic past. Yet he appears more vulnerable than for many a year both economically and politically.

        The Turkish lira has experienced a sharp depreciation, plunging to a record low of 42 to the US dollar, its most substantial decline since July 2023.
Simultaneously, the Istanbul stock market has been facing considerable losses. Moreover recent public opinion surveys show that Erdogan's approval ratings are in decline – overall 55%of Turkish adults hold an unfavorable opinion of him.

        Yet when it comes to elections, Erdogan has consistently demonstrated the ability to intimidate his opponents and rally his supporters.

        The first stage of his winning strategy is clearly in progress.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Turkey in trouble:  Erdogan's arrest of Imamoglu is the first move in a power grab", 31 March 2025:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-848172

A brighter future for Syria’s Kurds?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 24 March 2025

It is now common practice to refer to Ahmad al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president.  Following the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad, Sharaa was appointed on January 29, 2025 by the Syrian General Command – the collective leadership of the rebel factions that had coordinated Assad’s overthrow.  Tasked with forming a temporary legislative council and overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, he was given a timeline of up to three years to rewrite the constitution, and up to four to hold elections.

Al-Sharaa is not a man to let grass grow under his feet.  He decided to start the process by producing an interim constitution.  On March 13 he signed a 44-article document, possibly pointing the way toward the new draft constitution when it finally emerges for consultation.

The interim document commits the nation’s governance to unity and inclusivity, and explicitly pledges to maintain freedom of opinion and expression.  It establishes a People's Committee to function as an interim parliament, and extends the timeline for organizing elections from four to five years.  

Despite the claimed good intentions of the new leadership, skepticism persists among religious and ethnic minorities about ​how inclusiv​e the new structure ​will be – fears possibly enhanced by the ruthlessness with which Sharaa crushed an insurgency launched on March 6 by local militias loyal to Assad.  Rights groups say that hundreds of civilians, mostly from the Alawite minority sect to which Assad belongs, were killed in retaliatory attacks.  Conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite adherents of Islam – which this was – can be truly brutal and bloody.

One minority group, however, has real cause to rejoice at al-Sharaa’s declared commitment to inclusivity in the new Syria – the Kurds.

Back in 2012, with Syria's civil war in its early stages, ​government forces ​were withdr​aw​n from ​facing ISIS in the north​ and deployed to counter the anti-Assad rebels​​.  Kurdish forces​ flooded in to fill the power vacuum and began attacking ​the ISIS caliphate.  By 2014-2015, with ISIS ​in retreat, the Kurds’ battle for Kobani drew US support. Soon after, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurdish troops, was established with American backing to complete the defeat of ISIS.  In 2019 the SDF captured the final ISIS stronghold in Baghouz.

Now the SDF governs a large, semi-autonomous region in north-east Syria called Rojava.   ​Most of its population, numbering up to 4 million, ​are of Kurdish origin​ ​though it also accommodates a variety of other sects.  It occupies ​some 25% of what was originally sovereign Syria.

On March 10, three days before Sharaa signed his new interim constitution, he signed a formal agreement with the SDF leader, General Mazloum Abdi.  It stipulates that the Kurdish-led SDF is to be integrated into the nation’s military forces. In addition the agreement calls for the integration of all “civil and military institutions” in north-eastern Syria.

That commitment has potentially vast implications.  The “civil institutions” in north-eastern Syria encompass the semi-autonomous Rojava region, and include oil and gas fields, border crossings and airports.  Syria’s new constitution, when it eventually appears, could propose a situation akin to that in Iraq, where a Kurdish-majority area has been recognized as a federal entity and accorded autonomy within the constitution.  

Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the Kurds of Iraq had pressed for autonomy, if not independence. In 1970, after years of conflict, the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders reached an Autonomy Agreement, but it was never fully implemented.  Following the 1991 Gulf War, a US-led coalition granted the Kurds virtual autonomy, and this status was ratified after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

In 2005, the new Iraqi constitution formally recognized the Kurdistan Region, which stretches across the north of the country, as an autonomous federal entity with its own government, parliament, and security forces (the Peshmerga). The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was granted authority over internal matters, while Baghdad retained control over foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy.

That something similar could eventually be offered to the Kurds of Syria becomes a real possibility with the agreement reached between al-Sharaa and the SDF.  Such an outcome would be a nightmare from the point of view of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey, a long-time supporter of the rebel movement that overthrew the Assad regime – the HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) – now has strong political influence with al-Sharaa, its leader.  Erdogan no doubt hopes to use it to control his perennial Kurdish problem by continuing to occupy the swaths of Syria that he has overrun.  But despite his dominant political position in post-Assad Syria, it is far from certain that he will be able to do so.

   Erdogan has consistently viewed the People's Protection Units (YPG), the dominant force in the SDF, as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group that has been a constant political irritant with its demand for Kurdish autonomy within Turkey.

Accordingly in 2016 Erdogan instituted Operation Euphrates Shield, capturing an area  in north Syria.  He followed this two years later with Operation Olive Branch during which he overran Afrin.  In 2019, after the US announced its withdrawal from parts of northern Syria, he launched Operation Peace Spring, establishing a so-called "safe zone" on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border.  He aimed to use it to resettle Syrian refugees currently in Turkey.

 Erdogan has more or less annexed all the areas he has overrun.  They are now governed by Turkey-backed local councils, use the Turkish lira as currency, and are heavily influenced by Turkish infrastructure projects, including schools, hospitals, and post offices.  It is doubtful if these could survive a new Syrian constitution.

Even more disturbing from Erdogan’s point of view, is that Rojava in northern Syrian abuts the KRG in northern Iraq, and that the idea of their amalgamating at some point in the future to form a Kurdistan Free State becomes a real possibility.

 The implications for Turkey of such a development would be profound, and present Erdogan with one of the biggest geopolitical challenges of his presidency. The most likely scenario would be for him to take a hardline military approach, but this could come at the cost of worsening Turkey’s relations with its allies and deepening domestic unrest.

Meanwhile it certainly looks as though Kurdish autonomy could be recognized and ratified in Syria’s new constitution.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "How can there be a brighter future for Syria's Kurds?", 24 March 2025
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-847213

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 March 2025:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/29032025-a-brighter-future-for-syrias-kurds-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 30 March 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/a-brighter-future-for-syrias-kurds/

Egypt’s power play

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 March 2025

Egypt is currently playing a crucial role in two of the most significant efforts related to the Gaza conflict.

   As a mediator, along with the US and Qatar, of the arms-length discussions between Israel and Hamas, Egypt has hosted many rounds of ceasefire and prisoner exchange negotiations.  Now, strengthened by its central role in the ceasefire talks, it has master-minded a detailed $53 billion reconstruction initiative for Gaza, which has received strong backing from Arab nations, western governments and the UN.  It has provided a credible alternative to US President Trump’s “Riviera of the Mediterranean” concept, which proposed the displacement of most of Gaza’s Palestinian population into neighboring Arab states.

In late 2023, Egypt did allow the immigration into Egypt, via the Rafah crossing, of a limited number of foreign nationals, dual citizens, and wounded Palestinians.  Subsequently, however, it has strongly opposed extending this program, holding firmly to the belief that Gazan citizens should not be displaced from their homeland.  Early in February Israel accused Egypt of expanding its military presence near the border, perhaps to guard against an influx of refugees from Gaza.  Egypt said its soldiers were there to fight extremists, who are certainly active in the Sinai peninsula.

Total rejection of the idea of displacing large numbers of Gazan citizens lies at the heart of Egypt’s proposals for post-war Gaza. Egypt is shaping the region’s response to the crisis and positioning itself at the forefront of regional diplomacy, making it a central actor in shaping the future of Gaza and broader Middle East stability.

Egypt’s initiative would carry real conviction if it emanated from an economically flourishing nation state, but Egypt is not flying high on the domestic front.  It is one of the world's most indebted emerging markets. Servicing its debts, especially to the IMF and Gulf states arising from previous financial rescue packages, is a major burden. 

As a condition of accepting these loans, Egypt's president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was obliged to restrict public spending and impose heavier taxes. This resulted in soaring inflation and the persistent depreciation of Egypt’s currency.  This, at least, Sisi has been attempting, with some success, to remedy.

Egypt’s annual inflation rate in 2020 was about 5.4%.  By 2023 it had surged to some 34%, and in September 2024 it peaked at 38%, plunging large parts of the population into real penury.  Since then it has been brought under control, and is now declining.   A Reuters poll projects that the inflation rate in February will have fallen to 14.5% - much too high for comfort, but on the correct trajectory.

As for the Egyptian pound, in 2022 its trading rate was about E£16 to the dollar.  In 2023 it traded at around E£31.  By the end of 2024 the Egyptian pound had devalued to E£50.64 per US dollar.

However Sisi is succeeding in reversing the downward economic spiral.  As of March 2025, Egypt's economic indicators show definite signs of improvement. Its GDP growth rate recorded 3.5% in the first quarter of the fiscal year 2024/2025, reflecting the positive impact of economic reform policies.  Looking ahead, the ratings organization Moody's Analytics forecasts a 5% growth for Egypt's economy by the fiscal year 2025/2026, with average inflation expected to fall to 16% in the next fiscal year, before further decreasing to 13% by 2026.

Sisi's political standing at home, at a particularly low ebb during the worst of the economic hardship, has not yet shown much sign of improvement.  Egypt’s enhanced international standing, following from acceptance by the Arab world and the UN of its plan for Gaza’s future, may start to turn the popularity ratings in Sisi’s favor.

 What could effect a sea change in both Sisi’s and Egypt’s standing would be for its economic development program, Egypt’s Vision 2030, to achieve some of its goals in the next five years.

 Saudi Vision 2030, the ambitious program to revolutionize Saudi Arabia economically and socially, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has received a fair degree of publicity.  Egypt’s Vision 2030, about which much less has appeared in the media, is no pale copy.  On the contrary, it was launched in February 2016, two months before MBS announced his plan for Saudi Arabia.

 Egypt's Vision 2030 is a long-term economic development program aimed at achieving sustainable growth and improving the country's global competitiveness. It focuses on key areas such as economic diversification, infrastructure development, education, healthcare, and environmental sustainability. The plan aligns with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and aims to position Egypt as a leading economy in the region by enhancing investment and digital transformation.

Despite Egypt’s economic difficulties in recent years, the program has achieved a degree of success  With a population of 115 million, Egypt has been capitalizing on its skilled workforce, prime location, and rich resources to strengthen its position as a key economic hub within Africa.

A key component of Vision 2030 is the Digital Egypt strategy, focusing on fostering artificial intelligence and digital innovation.  In 2024 Egypt’s tech sector recorded a 16.8% year-on-year growth. 

Central to the program is Egypt’s construction sector, growing at an annual rate of 7.4%.  Vision 2030 has driven several ambitious projects, including New Alamein City,

the high-speed rail and urban railway networks, critical seaport and road infrastructure, and the $45 billion New Administrative Capital.  This massive urban development project, intended to house some 6.5 million people eventually, is designed to ease congestion in Cairo and serve as the country’s new government and financial hub.  Estimated to cost over $58 billion, it was started in 2015. Government offices began to relocate there in 2024, while the designated business district, which contains Africa’s tallest skyscraper, the Iconic Tower, is growing rapidly.  A new rail and monorail system connects it to Cairo, and an international airport is under construction.

Vision 2030 envisages 42% of Egypt’s energy coming from renewable sources by 2030.  Prioritizing wind, solar, and green hydrogen production, the country is expanding its renewable capacity to 45,000 megawatts from projects already under construction.

In 2024, Egypt attracted 15.7 million tourists, breaking its own record for the second consecutive year. Sherif Fathy, Minister of Tourism & Antiquities, projects that Egypt is on track to reach 30 million tourists by 2030.

With its own multi-million development program showing every sign of succeeding, Egypt is particularly well placed to master-mind an international effort to reconstruct Gaza.  Its plan has been widely endorsed.  Will that be enough to see it launched?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Egypt's Gaza strategy: Ceasefire talks and a bold reconstruction plan", 18 March 2025:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-846247

Published in Eurasia Review, 21 March 2025:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/21032025-egypts-power-play-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 27 March 2025:

https://mpc-journal.org/egypts-power-play/