More than a year after the Hamas-Israel ceasefire, Gaza is in a state of suspended animation.
According to the Trump
peace plan, Hamas should by now be well advanced towards demilitarization and
relinquishing its role in Gaza’s governance. Yet the process remains stalled,
and Hamas retains both its weapons and control of up to 35% of the territory,
principally in western Gaza and the central and southern coastal belt.
Most of Gaza’s population is concentrated in this area, which includes Gaza
City, Deir al-Balah and parts of the Khan Younis coastal region.
However, Hamas’s authority is
neither uniform nor uncontested. Other militias, such
as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), are still active, and while
Hamas retains armed networks and influence in parts of the populated area,
its ability to govern and operate is constrained by the IDF.
In its effort to inhibit further
Hamas aggression, Israel exercises military control over roughly two-thirds of
the Gaza Strip. Its boundary is marked by what is known as the Yellow
Line. Originally established as the position to which Israeli forces were to
withdraw under the October 2025 ceasefire, the line is marked in some locations
by concrete blocks painted yellow, placed about 200 meters apart.
Although not precisely
delineated, the Yellow Line effectively separates the area under Israeli
military control from the areas where Palestinians are living. Its
future significance depends on whether it turns out to be a temporary military
demarcation or a de facto border.
Reports from UN agencies describe continuing violence, the failure of Hamas and other
militias to disarm, and a shortage of essential equipment and
supplies. A full account by Reuters on October 6, confirmed by a
report on November 7, found that Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal,
and reconstruction had largely stalled.
So although a framework exists,
and some of its first-phase objectives were achieved, the transition to a
stable political and security order has not yet materialized. The main issues
that would create a lasting settlement remain unresolved.
Meanwhile on October 10 the Jerusalem Post reported a senior Israeli official claiming growing tensions between the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, where its affairs are run by Ali al-Amoudi, and its leadership abroad, headed by Khalil al-Hayya.
The report did not specify
what the competing positions were, but the official said Israeli
intelligence had identified signs of Hamas attempting to rebuild its
military capabilities. There were indications that it was planning
to confront IDF troops along the Yellow Line, but also the anti-Hamas
militias and armed clans of which, according to recent research, there are at
least five operating in Israeli-controlled parts of Gaza.
"Hamas is supposed to hand over its weapons,” said the official. “I don't see that happening. And there is no intention to do so."
If the impasse continues, the
present unsatisfactory situation could become permanent. Israel would
continue to control most of the territory, Hamas would retain a residual armed
and political presence in parts of the remaining inhabited area, and civilians
would remain displaced and dependent on humanitarian aid.
That outcome would amount to a
victory for neither Hamas nor Israel; neither side would
have achieved its stated objectives, and civilians
would continue to bear the heaviest cost. “Ceasefire” would become
a permanent label for an unresolved conflict.
A comprehensive plan to stabilize
Gaza, address the devastation caused by the war and begin the enormous task of
reconstruction has been endorsed in principle by all the parties, including
Hamas. The problem is that implementation has stalled on some of its most
difficult provisions.
The proposed path forward was to
maintain the ceasefire – now increasingly fragile – and establish a Palestinian
civilian administration. Hamas would be disempowered as the governing
authority, and a proposed technocratic Palestinian committee, operating under
international oversight, would take responsibility for public services and
civilian governance. That transition is still only in the early stages of
implementation, and in July Hamas announced the dissolution of its own
governing body to make way for it – a move Israel dismissed as a stunt. But the
committee remains in Cairo, and has yet to enter Gaza and take up its
responsibilities.
The plan also envisaged the
disarmament of Hamas, and this has proved one of the major sticking points. In
July Hamas formally accepted a roadmap setting out a phased process, but Israel
rejected its sequencing, insisting that disarmament must precede its full
military withdrawal. Hamas demands Israeli withdrawal and progress
towards reconstruction before it surrenders its weapons. Disagreements also
remain over the form and supervision of any weapons handover.
Under the plan an
International Stabilization Force (ISF) would be established to oversee aspects
of disarmament and facilitate the transition. Several countries have committed
troops, but the force has not become operational as envisaged, and has yet to
deploy on the ground.
Further Israeli military
withdrawal and substantial reconstruction are intended to follow progress on
security and governance. Neither has advanced significantly and Gaza remains
caught in a precarious stalemate. The framework for a transition exists,
but the political agreement and practical arrangements needed to implement it
remain elusive. The deadlock following Israel's general election makes an
early breakthrough even less likely.
Three developments could lift Gaza
out of its prolonged stalemate.
A copper-bottomed and enforceable
security agreement, if it could be negotiated, would serve the interests not
only of Israel, but of the Palestinians. Israel needs credible guarantees
against further attacks by Hamas; Palestinians need protection from Israel’s
necessary operations against Hamas, and a credible prospect of an end to
indefinite displacement. That must involve the genuine disarmament of
Hamas.
In addition Hamas must be removed
from governance, and a viable Palestinian alternative established.
Finally, to be resolved the Gaza
situation requires sustained international pressure and practical assistance.
The US, Arab states and other international actors would need to coordinate
security guarantees, humanitarian access, reconstruction funding and the
political transition.
There is an old adage: “Man
proposes; God disposes.” On this occasion Gaza, its people and the world
need the two to work hand in hand.
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