Turkey and Greece shake hands

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 27 September 2023

           On September 5 the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece – Hakan Fidan and Giorgos Gerapetritis – met in Ankara.  At the subsequent press conference, standing side by side, they announced that a new era of friendly cooperation had dawned between their countries.  

It all began with the summer elections in 2023.  By the end of May Turkey’s Recep Tayyyip Erdogan had won his follow-up poll and was re-installed in the presidential palace.  At the end of June Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis was re-elected in a resounding victory at the polls. The two nationalist leaders were safely back at the helm.   In a move virtually unthinkable only a year before, Erdogan – an incarnation of the “big bad wolf” to many Greeks – phoned Mitsotakis to congratulate him.

This amiable gesture did not come completely out of the blue.  Following the devastating Turkey-Syria earthquake in February, Greece had swiftly responded with assistance, and as a result a relatively friendly climate had been generated.  This had been strengthened when, after a deadly train accident in Greece on May 1 that killed at least 32 people, Erdogan extended his condolences.  His action was echoed by many Turkish citizens who offered support and solidarity via social media.

During their chat on the phone, Erdogan and Mitsotakis, realizing that they would both be attending the NATO summit scheduled to take place in Lithuania in July, agreed to meet on the sidelines for an informal discussion.

That discussion duly took place, and proved surprisingly productive.  The two leaders produced a “roadmap” intended to expand the developing rapprochement between their nations.  They agreed that their foreign ministers would hold talks aimed at fostering confidence-building measures, and that the long-suspended High Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) would be revived.

The HLCC was inaugurated on 14 May, 2010, during a visit of Turkey’s then-prime minister Erdogan to Athens.  It was an attempt to establish a forum where the two countries, almost continuously at odds with each other, could at least discuss their differences.  Over the years four sessions were held, the last in March 2016.  Now the Council was to be revitalized and, it was agreed, by the end of the year Greece and Turkey would be sitting together round the table in Thessaloniki. 

This was the background to the meeting on September 5 between Fidan and Gerapetritis. During their subsequent media conference Fidan thanked Greece for its assistance after the unprecedented earthquakes that had killed more than 50,000 people, and said that Turkey was "ready to help" as Greece battles weeks of deadly wildfires.

Turning to the Turkey-Greece rapprochement they were initiating, Gerapetritis said:

"We don't have our heads in the clouds.  We know that the…passions passed on from generation to generation cannot be erased with one stroke. But we have the disposition and the will to invest in candor and mutual understanding so as to seek common ground, break with established opinions and, where there are disagreements, at least not have them lead to crises." 

Fidan sang from the same hymn-sheet.

"We have entered a new and positive era in our relations with Greece," he said. "We are ready to continue dialogue with our neighbor Greece without any preconditions, and to develop our relations in all fields based on common interests."

Not everyone believed him.  Only three years earlier the two nations had been on the brink of military conflict over sovereignty in areas of the Mediterranean, and related rights to drill for oil in the disputed ocean zones. The Greek and Turkish navies were shadowing each other in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean for much of the summer of 2020, after Turkey sent a survey ship to prospect for oil and gas in waters Greece claims as its jurisdiction under international law.

The dispute rumbled on, exacerbated in Erdogan’s eyes by the emerging Greek, Cypriot, Israeli and Egyptian oil and gas alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, backed by the US.  The relationship soured further when in May 2022 Mitsotakis, during an address to the US Congress, joined a campaign to deny US military jets to Turkey.  Erdogan, furious at the Greek prime minister, vowed never to speak to him again.

          Since then Erdogan has taken steps to repair relations with both Israel and Egypt, while Turkey’s standing in Washington has been greatly strengthened by Erdogan’s agreement to allow Sweden to join NATO.  As part of that deal, the US Congress has promised Turkey dozens of F-16s, with Greece also getting fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets.

          ​​The two foreign ministers confirmed that their respective leaders planned to carry the initiative forward by meeting later in September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly ​in New York.  On Erdogan’s shopping list is his wish to revive Turkey's accession track to the EU. A better relationship with Greece could help that. High among other unresolved issues is delineating the two nations’ exclusive economic zones in the Mediterranean, while way out on the horizon is even the possible reunification of Cyprus.

Meanwhile​ on September 20 the ​long-delayed meeting between Erdogan and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu took place  at Turkish House in New York​, when they came face to face for the first time. ​ The​y discussed regional and international issues, including normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia​, and decided to continue advancing bilateral relations in trade, economic matters and energy.​  The word from the meeting is that Erdogan plans to visit Jerusalem as soon as October. 

          Back in 2016 Israel, Cyprus and Greece forged a tight cooperative relationship spanning a wide spectrum of activities including trade, energy, defense, hi-tech and security.  Netanyahu took advantage of the New York gathering of world leaders to meet up with his Greek and Cypriot partners.  Not to be outdone, Erdogan also organized a discussion with Mitsotakis.  Erdogan is intent on drawing closer to both Greece and Israel to ensure that Turkey is not disadvantaged by this thriving alliance, or perhaps to snatch an advantage by way of a bi-lateral deal with one or other of the partners.  He seems to have decided for the moment to follow Winston Churchill’s famous aphorism:  “Jaw-jaw is better than war-war.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "Are Turkey and Greece allies now?", 27 September 2023:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-760569

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 September 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29092023-turkey-and-greece-shake-hands-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 2 October 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/turkey-and-greece-shake-hands/

Why Egypt needs Israel’s gas

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 September 2023

 

The Egypt-Israel gas deal of the late 1990s-early 2000s has been turned on its head.  Originally conceived as a means of providing Israel with natural gas when it had no domestic supplies of its own, the boot has been transferred to the other foot. On August 23 Israel announced that it has agreed to increase by some 70% its export of natural gas to Egypt, which is contending with rising demand and falling output from its own resources.

In the late 1990s, when Israel had to import all its fossil fuel needs, the Israeli government decided to encourage the use of natural gas.  A number of reasons lay behind the decision, cost and environmental impact among them.  It turned to Egypt, and an agreement was hammered out. Israel would be supplied with natural gas, first in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), but later through an undersea branch of the planned Arab Gas Pipeline.  That branch eventually became the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline line running direct from Egypt to Israel. 

From 2008 until the political turmoil in Egypt following the Arab Spring of 2011 the pipeline supplied about half of Israel’s natural gas needs. The next two years were marked by political turmoil in Egypt, and the feeder pipeline in Sinai was sabotaged again and again.  No sooner was the damage repaired and supplies resumed to Israel – and, incidentally, to Jordan, which Egypt was also supplying with natural gas – than a further explosion put the pipeline out of commission.  After no less than fourteen such incidents, the pipeline was shut down.

A few years later Egypt was in the throes of an energy crisis. Rising demand and falling gas and oil output had transformed the country from exporter to importer of both.  Commercial interests spied a profitable opportunity.  Deals in 2018 paved the way for the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline to be reopened, but with the flow reversed so that Israel could supply Egypt with the natural gas it desperately needed.  As from 2020 gas from Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar fields, located off the northern Israeli coastline, were transferred via the pipeline from Ashkelon to Arish in Egypt.

Egypt’s power crisis may have been eased, but it was far from resolved. By June this year  the country was suffering severe power cuts.  First affected were street lamps and some public services. Then, as temperatures began to soar – up to 50 degrees Celsius (122 Fahrenheit) were  recorded – power cuts were imposed, lasting about six hours in some areas.  According to officials, the power outages resulted from exceptional pressure on the energy grid caused by the high demand for electricity to power fans and air conditioning.  By mid-July Egypt’s electricity company was calling  on people to avoid using elevators, in case they were trapped through a power cut. 

Egypt’s prime minister, Mostafa Madbouly, claimed that the networks would soon return to normal, but that in any case steps were in hand to ration electricity consumption.

Egypt, although it was facing growing demand for gas from its 105 million population, saw its own natural gas production decline by 9% year-on-year between January and May 2023, and by 12% compared to the same period in 2021.

It was against this background that Egypt sought, and Israel announced, the increase in its natural gas sales to Egypt.  One factor easing the deal may well be Egypt’s presidential elections, due to be held in February 2024.  Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, would certainly rather face the electorate with the power crisis well behind him.

Sisi was first elected president under Egypt’s 2014 constitution, which provided for presidential terms to last four years, and for no president to serve more than two terms.  He won his second term in 2018, but in April 2019 Egypt's parliament extended presidential terms from four to six years, and in addition Sisi was allowed to run for a third term in the 2024 election.

Explaining the new Egypt-Israel agreement, Israel’s Energy Minister, Israel Katz, said that gas exports to Egypt, currently about 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per annum, will be increased by 3.5 bcm per annum over 11 years.  Israel also intends to expand production from Tamar by 60% from 2026.

"This step will increase the state's revenue and strengthen diplomatic ties between Israel and Egypt," said Katz.

The arrangement is far from the liking of some public figures in Israel.  Some public advocacy groups have warned that Israel could suffer gas shortages as domestic demand rises, and have raised the prospect of environmental damage from heightened offshore activity.  In June, Yogev Gardos, Israel's budget director, said there was an "immediate need for the examination" of export policy.  Israel should urgently review how much natural gas the country should export, he said, to make sure it keeps enough for itself.  In fact back in 2013 Israel set limits on how much could be sold abroad, earmarking around 60% of reserves for domestic use.

Israel is expected to roughly double its gas output over the coming years, and in a letter to the director-general of the Energy Ministry, Gardos said that exporting too much "could endanger Israel's energy security" and lead to higher electricity prices. 

Katz responded to the letter in a robust Twitter post: "Decisions on the gas sector take into account broad policy considerations, such as Israel's standing, and the one who will make the decisions is me - the minister elected by the people. Not the professional echelon."

He could afford to respond straight from the shoulder, for he already knew that Israel’s fourth offshore bidding round, launched in December 2022, had been an outstanding success.  Four groups of companies, adding up to a total of nine companies – five of which were new to the Israeli market –  had bid to explore for additional offshore natural gas fields in Israeli waters.

The three major Israel fields currently in production – Tamar, Leviathan and Karish – have total estimated reserves of 1000 billion cubic meters (bcm).  Four more fields have already been discovered, and are awaiting exploitation – Zeus, Athena, Hermes and Kallan – which taken together amount to an estimated further 108 bcm of natural gas.  With the forthcoming exploration now in the pipeline, Israel’s future, both as regards satisfying its own gas needs and as a remunerative gas exporting nation, seems assured.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and in the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "It is Egypt that needs Israeli natural gas", , 21 September 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-759895Eurasia Review, 22 September 2023

Published in Eurasia Review, 22 September 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22092023-why-egypt-needs-israels-gas-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 26 September 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/why-egypt-needs-israels-gas/

Sisi’s plea to Egyptians: cut the birth rate

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 12 September 2023

On September 5, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi inaugurated the first Global Congress on Population, Health, and Development.  The four-day event was convened to examine the issue of population growth in relation to sustainable development.  Opening the conference, Sisi discussed the topics as they affected Egypt in particular.  He was clear – the balance between population levels and sustainable development was way out of kilter.

“During the 1950s,” said Sisi, “the gap between state resources and population growth was approximately 10-12 percent, and the population ranged between 19 and 20 million people. The gap was not large.”

Since 2000 Egypt’s population has grown by 40 million and now stands at 105 million people.  Its birth rate is currently 2 million per annum.  Available resources, said Sisi, dictated that Egypt has to reduce that by no less than 80 percent, that is to no more than 400,000 births per year.

Sisi picked up on a reported remark by his health and population minister, Khaled Abdel Ghaffar, that “having children is a matter of complete freedom”.  He was scornful.  Leave the freedom to choose their family size to people who potentially do not know the extent of the challenge?  “The whole of society and the Egyptian state will pay the price,” he said. “We must organize this freedom, otherwise it will create a catastrophe."

Hinting that Egypt could emulate China’s one-child policy (abandoned in 2016), since China “succeeded in their population control policy,” he added that other African countries should also adopt population control measures, since the continent lacks sufficient resources to sustain its surging population. 

“For example,” he said, “on the African continent, within a few years, we will reach more than 1.6 billion people, and the resources in Africa [abundant though they are]…cannot take care of it all.”

When Egypt’s health minister Ghaffar took the stage,

he was careful to by-pass the remark his president had rejected about freedom of choice on family size, and maintained that the problem of a growing population is Egypt’s greatest challenge, both now and in the future.

“It hinders the wheel of economic growth,” he said, “and eats up all development returns, which affects the level of services provided to citizens and their standard of living. This requires us to work to achieve a balance between economic growth and population growth to ensure the … well-being (of) all.”

Ghaffar was unequivocally in favor of Egypt’s official line on population control.  He stressed the state’s commitment to implementing a population program aimed at achieving a balance between population growth rates and the resources available to the state, within the framework of achieving sustainable development.

“Family planning,” he announced, “is the largest investment project that, if Egypt adopts it, will bring it profits and benefits, as every pound the state spends on family planning saves 151.7 pounds in return.”

This first Global Congress on Population, Health and Development provided a rare opportunity for researchers and policy makers from across the world to exchange first-hand information on the relationship between population, health and sustainable development. The conference brought together decision-makers, health ministers from different countries, ambassadors, international partner agencies, UN and USAID, banking entities, entrepreneurs and the media.  It is no surprise that the Global Congress is scheduled to become an annual event, probably to be staged – as this one was – in Egypt’s prestigious new capital city, as yet only partially constructed and unnamed, but unofficially dubbed the New Administrative Capital.

It might be tempting, if cynical, to perceive a connection between the presidential plea to reduce the nation’s birth rate on resource grounds, and the state’s lavish funding of prestige projects.  First announced in 2015, Egypt’s new capital has been under construction for years, at an estimated cost of more than $50 billion.  It is one of a whole variety of megaprojects being built by Sisi’s government at enormous cost, and the Egyptian government is deeply in debt.  

The new capital, about 28 miles southeast of Cairo, is designed in part to relieve Cairo’s crumbling infrastructure, and is planned to house more than six million residents. Government administrative headquarters will be moved there.  It is already home to the tallest building in Africa (the 77-floor Ionic Tower), to a huge presidential palace, and to dozens of ministry buildings, schools, hospitals, mosques, and churches.

Over-population of the planet has long been a concern for some thinkers and scientists.  Since 1804, the global human population has increased from 1 billion to 8 billion.  Among the factors causing this are medical advances and improved agricultural productivity. According to the most recent UN projections, the "global population is expected to reach 9.7 billion in 2050 and 10.4 billion in 2100."  

The good news is that the UN's projections predict that human population will peak at around 10.4 billion people, before decreasing in line with falling fertility rates worldwide.

On July 10, the UN published a discussion document on the implications for planetary health and sustainability of a global population in excess of 8 billion. 

Brought down to basics, humanity’s impact on the earth’s environment is measured by the number of inhabitants, how much each person consumes and the technology used to meet that level of consumption. If average global consumption were on a par with the levels of today’s high-income countries, the planet could not support even its current population.  The highly resource-intensive patterns of consumption in developed countries are not sustainable or replicable on a global scale. Population growth amplifies such pressures.

Developing nations such as Egypt and the other states of the African continent are acting wisely in recognizing that unrestricted population growth, if unmatched by an equivalent increase in resources, would deal a body blow to hopes of sustainable development.

In such an environment, initiatives such as Sisi’s Global Congress on Population, Health, and Development make perfect sense.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post on-line titled: "Sisi's plea to citizens: cut Egypt's birth rate", 12 September 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-758565 

Published in Eurasia Review, 15 September 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/15092023-sisis-plea-to-egyptians-cut-the-birth-rate-oped/#:~:text=Since%202000%20Egypt's%20population%20has,than%20400%2C000%20births%20per%20year.

Published in the MPC Journal, 20 September 2023:
https://mpc-journal.org/sisis-plea-to-egyptians-cut-the-birth-rate/

Syrian protesters: "Assad must go"

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 5 September 2023

The last two weeks of August saw southern Syria rocked by popular anti-government protests, including a strike by many shops demonstrating against constant increases in the price of basic goods.  Starting as widespread demands for economic reform, the mass demonstrations soon morphed into calls for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad and the overthrow of his regime.

On August 28 protesters gathered in the southern city of Sweida, home to much of the country’s Druze minority. Video shared by Sweida24, a news and media website, showed several hundred people gathered in a central square waving Druze flags and chanting slogans, including “down with Bashar al-Assad.”

The protests were triggered by the government's decision on August 16 to cut fuel subsidies, but the major underlying factor was the non-stop decline in the value of the Syrian pound (or lira) that has been imposing an ever-increasing financial burden on household budgets.  The Syrian pound has been declining throughout the summer, hitting a succession of historic lows. It finally achieved a threefold depreciation on its late-2022 valuation, converting on the black market – always a premium on the official rate – at 15,000 to the dollar.  In March 2011, just after the Arab Spring protests began in Syria, the exchange rate was 47 Syrian pounds to the dollar.

UN statistics reveal that at least 90 per cent of Syrians live in poverty, and over 60 per cent of the population struggle to secure their daily food needs. With international sanctions imposed on the government, and Syria’s main oil fields controlled by US-backed Kurdish forces, the whole population is subject to frequent and prolonged power cuts, which have obviously contributed to the growing frustration.

Throughout the political, military and humanitarian turmoil of the past decade, Assad has received consistent support from certain areas in Syria – for example the Mediterranean coastal region around Latakia, the ancestral homeland of the minority Alawite sect to which Assad himself belongs.  But now the dissent has spread even there.  In a rare act of defiance, Alawite protesters recently closed down branches of the Baath party, expelled government officials, and tore down posters of Assad.

And yet, despite a clearly deteriorating situation, media reports indicate that government security forces have been instructed to lie low, while to date the government itself has issued no official statements about the mushrooming protests.  One explanation is that, in order to avoid prejudicing his recent return to the Arab League, Assad may be exercising an uncharacteristic restraint.  He doubtless has in mind that he was expelled in 2011 for the ruthlessness he exhibited when clamping down on  Arab Spring anti-government protests.  He would not relish history repeating itself in that regard.

                     Assad rejoins Arab League, May 2023

He probably believes that, sustained by Iran and Russia and the Arab family of nations,  his grip on power is unshakable and that he can outride the storm of protest. But the situation is fluid, and an unexpected development is always possible.

   On August 28 The New Arab, a pan-Arab news website working out of London, reported that a new opposition group calling itself "The 10th of August Movement" has been launched in Syria, and that many of its founders and supporters are drawn from Assad’s Alawite sect.  The organization, while proclaiming that it supports peaceful, non-sectarian resistance, nevertheless calls for the ousting of the Assad regime.

The new body, which says it has thousands of members within regime-held areas, asserts that it is a new type of Syrian opposition, having learned from the violent aftermath of the 2011 Syrian uprising.  That ruthless defense of the Assad regime, they remember, included the use of chemical weapons against groups of Syrians actively opposed to the government, plus horrific collateral death and injury to innocent civilians. 

Although the 10th of August Movement is in its infancy, it has laid out a structured plan for achieving its revolutionary objective.  It claims that in less than a month it has spread right across Syria, encompassing a wide range of sects and ethnicities, and it professes to have a "cell" in every city in Syrian regime territory.  The New Arab reports that it has started to make inroads among the army and the country's security services. Members of different security branches, the news site claims, frustrated with the economic and political situation, are reaching out to the movement to offer their support.

The new organization has links with at least five other underground opposition groups across Syria. Like them, it will have to contend with the huge security apparatus that sustains Assad’s regime.  Syrians are regularly arrested for posting on social media or voicing anti-government opinions. The government has not publicly acknowledged the existence of the 10th of August Movement, but on August 21 the Syrian news medium, Enab Baladi, reported a wave of arrests in Latakia and other areas once considered loyal to the regime, targeting members of the movement.

The launch of the Movement was accompanied by a statement demanding, among other things, that the government raise the minimum wage to at least $100 a month; provide electricity for at least 20 hours a day (the current average is three in most areas); and release some 136,000 political prisoners.

These are practical measures that could relieve the hardship currently being endured by those living in Assad-ruled Syria.  But the movement has a far more fundamental aim – a hopeful future for all Syrians.  Given the lessons of history, and the chaos Assad has inflicted on the country, the 10th of August Movement concludes that this can be achieved only by waving farewell to Bashar al-Assad and his regime. 

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 5 September 2023, and in the Jerusalem Post on-line under the title: "Practical measures could relieve the hardship of Assad-ruled Syria":
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-757579

Published in Eurasia Review, 9 September 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/09092023-syrian-protesters-assad-must-go-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 11 September 2023

https://mpc-journal.org/syrian-protesters-assad-must-go/

Sudan – a battlefield for rival warlords

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 29 August 2023 

          A vicious power struggle within Sudan’s military leadership has led to a nationwide civil conflict and a huge humanitarian problem.  “The situation,” UN agencies declared on August 16, “is spiraling out of control.”

Living conditions within Sudan have deteriorated to such an extent that, according to the UN, since April more than a million people have fled to neighboring countries. Chad, South Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia are only four of the adjacent states which have each accepted tens of thousands of refugees. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) said on August 16  that the fighting has also displaced more than 3.4 million people inside the country.  There is an acute lack of food, fuel, water, medicine, and electricity.

Following weeks of tension, fighting broke out on April 15 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  The direct trigger was an incident on April 12. On that day, the RSF dispatched 100 armed vehicles equipped with anti-aircraft guns and other weapons to Merowe Air Base in northern Sudan.  They claimed to have received "information that the Egyptian Air Force was sending fighter jets to the base to attack the RSF.”  The result was a standoff with the SAF, the nation’s armed forces, in the city of Merowe, and on the 15th the two militias clashed in the capital, Khartoum.

Nothing is more bitter than the falling out of old comrades. The two protagonists in the power struggle are  Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, and his deputy in the military command but also leader of the RSF, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti,  They were once close allies.

In April 2019, the democratic revolution in Sudan led to the collapse of the 30-year-long regime of Omar al-Bashir.  In the transitional democratic government that followed, Burhan became head of the ruling Sovereignty Council, representing the military arm in the country's civilian-military collaborative administration.  He was powerful but, as he saw it, not powerful enough.

Burhan’s role, which was perfectly legitimate, was embedded in the power-sharing agreement of August 2019 between the military and the civilian element within Sudan, known as the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a loose coalition of civilian groups.        Under that agreement the powers concerned pledged themselves to move the country in an orderly fashion toward democracy, and to parliamentary elections in 2023. 

However, popular feeling had grown increasingly impatient with the obvious lack of progress toward any form of democracy, and with the administration’s failure to deal with the country’s severe economic problems.  On October 22, 2021 national frustration erupted in a mass protest in the capital, Khartoum, in support of civilian rule.

Together Burhan and Dagalo orchestrated a military coup and took over control of the country.  Three days later Burhan dissolved the country's civilian cabinet, arrested prime minister Abdalla Hamdok and other leading figures, and declared that the country was under military governance. 

The grab for power did not last long.  Widespread opposition ranging from the Arab League to the US Secretary of State was too great.  Burhan pulled back, reinstated Hamdok and pledged to “maintain the path of the democratic transition.”

It was not long before Burhan was challenged by his deputy in the Council of Generals, Dagalo.  Dagalo, who had spent some 20 years in the RSF, now headed the paramilitary force.  He had built it up into a powerful militia that had intervened in conflicts in Yemen and Libya.  The RSF has been accused of human rights abuses, including the massacre of more than 120 protesters in June 2019. Such a strong force outside the army was seen as a source of instability in the country, and Burhan’s plan to take over control of the RSF by merging it with the nation’s formal armed services was the main bone of contention between the two erstwhile colleagues.

Reports indicate that the fighting has reduced Khartoum to an urban battlefield. Across the city RSF forces have commandeered homes and turned them into operational bases. The army, in turn, has been firing artillery on residential areas from both the air and ground.

“The remains of many of those killed have not been collected, identified or buried,” the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said.

What do the two protagonists say they want?  Dagalo has said, in a series of tweets, that he and the RSF are "fighting for the people of Sudan to ensure the democratic progress for which they have so long yearned".  Given the brutal track record of the RSF, many find this message hard to believe.  Burhan has said he supports the idea of returning to civilian rule, but that he will hand over power only to an elected government.  It is likely that both are also mesmerized by the lure of power, and the wealth and influence that go with it.

Meanwhile the UK, US and EU have all called for a ceasefire and talks to resolve the crisis.

Sudan, of course, is nominally one of Israel’s new Arab partners under the Abraham Accords.  Where does this chaotic state of affairs leave its normalization deal with Israel?

It was in February 2020 that Israel’s then-prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met Burhan, head of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, in Uganda, where they agreed to normalize the ties between the two countries.

An initial agreement on October 23, 2020 saw Sudan removed from the US government list of countries promoting terrorism, and on January 6, 2021 in a quiet ceremony in Khartoum, Sudan formally signed up to the Abraham Accords. 

Just how substantive is the Israel-Sudan normalization deal? The then military leadership under Burhan that concluded the deal with Israel was acting perfectly legitimately on behalf of the state of Sudan.  Whatever the outcome of the conflict between Burhan and Dagalo, Sudan is a nation in transition, on a rocky road to parliamentary elections intended to usher in full democratic civilian rule.  Once the conflict is brought to an end, parliamentary elections held and civilian rule restored, a democratic government could either endorse or renounce the nation’s membership of the Abraham Accords.

Which way the chips will eventually fall is anybody’s guess.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 29 August 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-756615

Published in Eurasia Review, 2 September 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/02092023-sudan-battlefield-for-rival-warlords-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 6 September 2023

https://mpc-journal.org/sudan-a-battlefield-for-rival-warlords/

Lebanon on a knife-edge

 Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2023

The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is due to expire at the end of August.  The Security Council is expected to debate the situation on the Lebanese-Israeli border shortly, and to renew UNIFIL’s mandate. As for the situation on the  border, it is best described as volatile.

In early May, a tent appeared more than 100 feet south of the Blue Line, the contentious border monitored by UNIFIL.  UN forces observed individuals repeatedly crossing from Lebanon into the contested area.  By June 17, a second tent was spotted, and UNIFIL asked the Lebanese army to remove them.  One was taken down, the other stayed.

The unstable situation along the border is kept under constant review. The Lebanese and Israelis hold a UNIFIL-chaired meeting every five to six weeks to discuss military issues, including violations along the Blue Line. The arrangements are egg-shell fragile. No media are allowed; the generals do not shake hands; the food is provided by the Italian UNIFIL contingent – and, to avoid suspicions of any sort, even the bottled water is Italian.

UNIFIL spokesman Andrea Tenenti described the scene as “two sides sitting in a very small room, on very uncomfortable chairs.”

The fact that the meetings take place regularly, and that there have been 17 years of relative stability is, to Tenenti, a sign that neither side has an appetite for conflict. “Both sides are in a way keen to solve the contentious issues,” he said, “but everyone wants to solve it in their own way.”

Meanwhile within Lebanon the Hezbollah organization continues to wield its huge military power in support of its Iranian paymasters.  With help from Iran’s IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), Hezbollah in engaged in retrofitting old missiles with guidance systems and building new precision-guided missiles. In December 2018 Israel discovered and sealed tunnels dug from Lebanon under the Blue Line for the express purpose of carrying out attacks within Israel.

Since then Hezbollah has fired antitank missiles at an Israeli military ambulance, launched a drone at an Israeli offshore gas platform, and allowed Hamas to fire rockets at Israel from Hezbollah-controlled areas in Lebanon.

On August 9 a Hezbollah arms truck overturned on the mountainous road leading through the Christian town of Kahale in Lebanon. 

To prevent residents from seizing the truck and its contents, Hezbollah personnel on board opened fire, killing a Kahale resident and wounding another.  A shoot-out followed, and one Hezbollah member was also killed.

Just a few weeks ago the respected Washington Institute published a devastatingly frank assessment by its counterterrorism and intelligence academic expert, Matthew Levitt, concerning the deep-rooted troubles that are paralyzing Lebanon.

“Let’s be clear,” he writes, “corruption is at the heart of Lebanon’s economic and political crises. This economic and political rot is deeply entrenched and is protected by powerful political bosses across the spectrum… yet no Lebanese party presents a greater security threat to Lebanon domestically, and to its neighbors in the region, than Hezbollah – in part because Hezbollah is the de facto militant enforcer of the corrupt political system from which it and other sectarian political parties benefit.”

There could be no greater evidence of Hezbollah’s overwhelming power within the state than its success in frustrating all attempts to investigate the circumstances surrounding the devastating explosion in Beirut port in August 2020. 

Time and again when evidence emerged pointing the finger at one or other Hezbollah figure, the investigation was frustrated. Once the investigating judge was dismissed; at other times individuals summoned to appear refused to attend the court; time and again the investigation has been subject to appeals. 

It became crystal clear that the Hezbollah-supporting members of the government were deliberately thwarting the investigation. With two judges pointing the finger at certain Hezbollah-supporting ministers and officials, the suspicion must arise that leading national figures were involved in the circumstances leading to the explosion. Meanwhile the investigation has stalled, while the UN Human Rights council calls in vain for its speedy conclusion.

These circumstances mirror the enormously protracted judicial proceedings to establish the facts behind the assassination of Lebanese politician, Rafik Hariri, on February 14, 2005. 

Obfuscation, the murder of an investigator and the non-appearance of named Hezbollah witnesses resulted in the inquiry lasting 16 years, and the eventual conviction in absentia of Hezbollah operatives.

The Lebanese population is well aware of the venality at the heart of its society.  Back in November 2022 the Washington Institute commissioned a poll to assess the public’s opinion of the situation. Ninety-seven percent of respondents said the Lebanese government was doing too little in response to three key economic concerns. First, reduce the level of corruption in economic and public life. Second, meet people’s needs for an acceptable standard of living. And third, address the burden of taxes and other obligations in a fair way.

“Unfortunately,” observed Levitt, “Lebanese political bosses’ prescription for addressing such concerns is not political or economic reform, but doubling down on their respective power and patronage systems.”

   Lebanon has been without a president since Michel Aoun’s term ended on 31 October 2022, with opposing political blocks unable to agree on a compromise candidate. The presidential vacuum is compounded by the fact that Lebanon’s government remains in caretaker status.

The last attempt to set up a presidential election was on June 14.  Neither of the two candidates—Jihad Azour and Suleiman Frangieh—received sufficient votes in the first round.  To win, a candidate needs a two-thirds majority (86 votes) of the elected parliamentarians, so a quorum of 86 members of parliament is necessary for a valid ballot. On 14 June, after the first session members from Hezbollah and its allied Amal Movement withdrew, leaving parliament without the necessary quorum and preventing a second round from taking place.

Beset by venality, corruption and self-interest at every level — political, economic and social — and with no obvious means of regeneration, Lebanon teeters on the brink of collapse into chaos.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled "Lebanon sits on a knife's edge, hovering above disaster" on 21 August 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-755503

Published in Eurasia Review, 25 August 2023:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/25082023-lebanon-on-a-knife-edge-oped/?

Published in the MPC Journal, 28 August 2023:

https://mpc-journal.org/lebanon-on-a-knife-edge/

The pursuit of peace in Yemen

Yemen is in the midst of a nine-year civil conflict which has left 80 percent of the population – some 24 million people, including almost 13 million children – in urgent need of aid and protection. Acknowledged by the UN to be “ the largest humanitarian crisis in the world,” more than 14 million people in Yemen are in acute need.  Starvation is widespread.  UNICEF (the UN’s Children’s Fund) reports that as 2022 ended, around 2 million children under the age of 5 were experiencing starvation-induced wasting, severely in more than 500,000 cases.

On one level, the situation in Yemen is a product of the fault line that runs through Islam – the Sunni-Shia divide.  The main protagonists are, on the one hand, the Shia Houthi rebels supported by Shi’ite Iran and, on the other, the UN-recognized Sunni government aided on the ground by Saudi Arabia and its eight-nation Sunni Muslim coalition. 

For a fair part of the 20th century there were two Yemens, created by political events – a monarchy in the north and a republic in the south, which for a long time was a communist regime aligned with the old Soviet Union. A succession of conflicts between them resulted in 1970 in a dominant north and a subdued south, the two never fully at peace with each other.  In 1978 Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of North Yemen.  The collapse of the USSR in 1990 triggered the unification of the two Yemens as the Republic of Yemen with Saleh as president.

Saleh, autocratic and unpopular, was soon facing an ever-growing insurgency from Zaydi Shii’ites calling themselves Houthis after their charismatic leader, Hussein al Houthi.  In 2011 Saleh became a victim of the so-called Arab Spring. Mass popular protests forced him to step down in favor of his vice-president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Saleh, hoping to regain power,  allied himself with his former enemies, the Houthis.  Strengthened by Yemeni forces still loyal to Saleh, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Houthis overran large tracts of the country, including the capital city, Sana’a. 

Saudi Arabia, alarmed at the prospect of Iran extending its footprint into the Arabian peninsula, intervened in March 2015 to beat back the Houthis.  Saudi’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), assembled a coalition of Arab states, obtained the diplomatic backing of the US, UK, Turkey and Pakistan, and launched a series of air strikes against the rebels.

The unconventional Saleh-Houthi partnership came to an abrupt end on December 2, 2017, when Saleh went on television to declare that he was ready to enter into dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition.  This volte-face was to end in tragedy. On December 4, Saleh's house in Sana'a was besieged by Houthi fighters.  Attempting to escape, he was killed.

The Houthis, emboldened, started firing ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia. The political situation was further complicated in 2017.   

Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, a former army commander and governor of Aden, and the vice-president of the UN-recognized government of Yemen, announced that under his leadership the eight governorates in the south, including Aden, were unilaterally declaring independence.   With the strong backing of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Zoubadi established a form of governance which he called the Southern Transitional Council (STC).   

Meanwhile UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg had been hard at work.  Painstakingly, he put together  a truce between the government and the Houthis which came into effect in April 2022.  Extended twice, it resulted in the longest period of stability in Yemen since the start of its civil war. 

Although it came to an end on October 2, and the Houthis refused to renew it, Grundberg reported in May 2023 that it was continuing to deliver benefits, such as the entry of fuel and other commercial ships via the Hudaydah port, and commercial flights to and from the capital, Sana’a.

Grundberg said that his diplomatic efforts with representatives of the government, the Houthi rebels and other players were continuing, and that he was encouraged by the positive and detailed discussions.

“There is clear determination on all sides,” he said, “to make progress towards a deal on humanitarian and economic measures, a permanent ceasefire and the resumption of a Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices.”

Although sporadic military incidents continue to occur, said Grundberg, hostility levels were significantly lower than before the truce. 

“But the fragility of the military situation, the dire state of the economy and the daily challenges facing the Yemeni people, provide us with constant reminders of why a more comprehensive agreement between the parties is so vital.”

He was adamant that Yemen’s myriad challenges required an inclusive Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices. 

The ambitions of the strongman in the south, Zoubaidi, accord only loosely with Grundberg’s hopes. In an interview with the UK’s Guardian newspaper in June Zoubaidi maintained that the west has to accept a new reality in which Yemen’s north is controlled by the Houthis, and the south is run by his separatist STC.  The planned talks on the country’s future, he said, had to be reconfigured to meet that new reality – including placing the issue of a separate southern state at the foreground of the discussions.

In short, he is attempting to cut the UN-recognized government out of the picture.

The STC, he said, would like to revert to the period between 1967 and 1990 when Yemen was divided in two with a separate socialist state in the south. Zoubaidi visited the UK recently and attempted to convince Britain’s Middle East minister, Tariq Ahmad, that he and a separate southern Yemen state were the key to unlocking peace. 

In fact what Yemen needs is a return to a unified structure, democratic elections, and an inclusive government.  The future of Yemen largely depends on the Houthis. Do they wish to remain an outlawed militia permanently, or would they prefer to become a legitimate political party, able to contest parliamentary and presidential elections and participate in government?  The same considerations apply to the STC.  Zoubadi seems to favor a two-state Yemen.  Can he be persuaded to a unified federal structure?

          In fact UN Resolution 2216 does embrace the idea of a democratic federally united Yemen.  Backed by a UN peace-keeping force, a lasting political deal would involve the end of the Saudi-led military operation, the active involvement of the Houthis, the integration of the STC, however nominally independent, into a united Yemen, and probably a major financial commitment by Saudi Arabia to fund the rebuilding of the country. Can Grundberg bring about negotiations aimed at a peaceful transition to a political solution for a united Yemen?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online as "How can peace return to Yemen?". 15 August 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-754743

Published in Eurasia Review 18 August 2023:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/18082023-the-pursuit-of-peace-in-yemen-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 19 August 2023
https://mpc-journal.org/the-pursuit-of-peace-in-yemen/

What might a written constitution for Israel propose?

 Published in the Jerusalem Post weekend magazine, 11 August 2023

It has taken 75 years, and a wave of civil protest unparalleled in the history of the State of Israel, for the nation to recognize that from its very beginning it has been living with a flaw in its system of governance.  A slow-burning fuse was built into the very foundation of the state, and it has finally caused an explosion. 

Most people now realize that the clash of public opinion in Israel has arisen largely because, over time, the distinction between the legislative and the judicial roles within the system of governance has become increasingly blurred.  

Why did this occur?  Because Israel’s legislature from the foundation of the state was conceived as uni-cameral.  In other words, there was never provision for a second legislative chamber to be responsible for scrutinizing proposed legislation and suggesting amendments that would, if necessary, render new laws less "unreasonable".  Consequently the judiciary has over time been forced, in addition to its main functions, to assume the role that belongs to the second chamber in a bi-cameral legislature.  The judiciary’s primary role is to uphold the law, to interpret and amend it, to try those accused of crimes, and to defend the rights of individuals or organizations if they have been treated unlawfully. 

Israel is undoubtedly a vibrant democracy, but it lacks a written constitution.  Much comment during the past weeks of upheaval has centered on the idea that serious effort be devoted to producing one, so that the roles of the legislature and the judiciary can be clearly defined.  Britain, the main source of Israel’s common law, also lacks a written constitution. Its unwritten constitution, however, is based on over a thousand years of precedent.  Its second legislative chamber — the House of Lords – springs from the ancient feudal system headed by the nobility.  Today its main function in the UK's "Mother of Parliaments" is scrutinizing and amending proposed legislation emanating from the House of Commons.  The Senate, in the very different US system, performs something of the same function.

Israel has no such ancient precedent to draw on.  Though sophisticated judicial institutions feature in the Bible and in what we know of the ancient kingdoms of Judah and Israel, democratic institutions do not.

Suppose a constitutional committee were established charged with producing a written constitution for Israel.  It would, of course, incorporate most current institutions and much current practice, but its recommendations might well include changing Israel's legislature from uni- to bi-cameral.  Such a proposal would, of course, also have to suggest how a second legislative chamber could be established. 

Britain’s House of Lords in its present configuration is far from satisfactory.  Reforms over the years restricted, and finally abolished, the power of the Lords to overrule the will of the elected House of Commons.  Then non-hereditary peers created for their lifetime, known as life peers, were introduced. Finally in 1999 the government completed a deal with the Lords to remove most of the hereditary peers. The relevant  Act left only 92 hereditary peers in a House of Lords that numbered close to 800. These 92 were elected from among those who had a right to be members of the House of Lords as a result of their hereditary status. This arrangement was intended as a temporary holding measure until the second stage of reform was completed.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed, and still 92 hereditary peers take their seat among over 700 appointed members.  In the  interim many a weird and wonderful proposal for reforming the House of Lords, including abolishing it altogether, has seen the light of day.

Britain’s problem stems from the fact that, even though vetted by a high-powered committee, the non-hereditary members of the House of Lords are appointed by prime ministers, either in office, or as a right when they leave office.   This is increasingly seen as an unacceptable way of determining who should serve in the nation’s legislature.

A much-touted alternative is to elect members to the second chamber, as is the case with the US Senate.  The downside to this idea is that such a  system would create a rival center of power to the House of Commons.  In any dispute each House could claim electoral legitimacy, and stalemate would result.  Proposed alternatives include devising some acceptable system of appointing suitable people to serve in the second chamber for a given period.  Regional councils charged with suggesting worthy candidates is one idea.

Perhaps this is the direction that Israel should go, if a bi-cameral legislature were agreed to be an acceptable way to proceed constitutionally.  Even so, a second legislative chamber is far from a cure-all.  Despite Britain’s bi-cameral legislature, powerful voices have been declaring for some time that the judiciary has been exceeding its proper function by venturing too far into the political arena.  Or, as Britain’s prestigious Prospect magazine put it a while ago: “The judiciary has made a slow march to the heart of politics.“

A notable example occurred in 2019, a few weeks before Brexit, when the Supreme Court ruled that Prime Minister Boris Johnson had acted unlawfully when he advised the Queen to suspend parliament, and that therefore the legislature had not been prorogued and parliament was still sitting.

Speaking from within a system where a second chamber is fulfilling its scrutinizing function, Lord Sumption, a Supreme Court judge from 2012 to 2018, believes that the British judiciary has been accruing unjustifiable powers. He holds that parliamentary scrutiny is generally perfectly adequate to protect the public interest in the area of policy‐making, and indeed is the only democratically legitimate way of doing so.

He believes that for those concerned with the proper functioning of democratic institutions, the judicial resolution of inherently political issues is difficult to defend because judges are not accountable to the public for their decisions.

In 2021 Neil Rogachevsky published a previously untranslated speech by David Ben Gurion, delivered in Israel’s first Knesset to the committee charged with drafting a constitution which never materialized.  Ben Gurion said: “I don’t think it’s possible to delegate authority to the court to decide whether the laws are kosher or not.”

These are indeed complex matters to consider, but consider them Israel must, if the nation is to resolve the issue that has split national opinion asunder.

Published in the Jerusalem Post weekend magazine, 11 August 2023:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-754336