Video version
International politics are subject to strange twists and
turns. By one such convolution the
future of Syria’s Kurdish population and of its president, Bashar al Assad, have
become intertwined.
There are several other signs of
this shift in political direction. A few weeks ago the SDC announced that, as part
of ongoing efforts to reach a “democratic” solution to the crisis in Syria, it intends
to open an office in Damascus. And
the day before the SDC delegation travelled to the Syrian capital, it announced
that
Kurdish forces were ready to join any military operation by government
forces in the northern governorate of Idlib aimed at retaking the Kurdish area
of Afrin. Afrin was captured by
Turkish-backed troops in March 2018, as part of a drive by Turkey’s President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan to prevent the Kurds from dominating Turkey’s southern
land border.
North-eastern Syria, although
suffering the effects of current Turkish efforts to destabilize the region, as
well as the consequences of past Islamic State (IS) occupation, is under
Kurdish administration. Known as Rojava,
the area covers some 27 percent of what used to be sovereign Syria. There is, therefore, a pragmatic political
rationale for both Assad and the SDC to seek an accommodation.
In bringing Rojava under Syrian
government administration, Assad, who now
controls some 58 percent of old Syria, would effectively be regaining some 85
percent of pre-civil war Syrian territory.
As for the Kurdish administration in Rojava – known since 2012 as the
Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS) – they are not seeking independence, but a degree
of autonomy. They perfectly understand
that if Assad decides to grant it, a huge chunk of territory would be placed
under government control but, just as important, Assad’s regime in general, and
himself as its President, would acquire substantial additional political
support − and that Assad will need all the support he
can muster, if Russian and UN pressure forces a presidential election on him as
part of a peace deal. In short, both
parties stand to gain from an accord.
The 2 million Kurds in Syria,
accounting for 15 percent of the population, had aspired before the civil war
to nothing more than a degree of autonomy – an aspiration always denied them. Under
the regime of the two Assads systematic discrimination and repression was
mainly their lot. Some
300,000 were denied citizenship and deprived of fundamental rights. Although
revolts occasionally erupted, they were quickly crushed.
The internal uprising against Assad’s regime in 2011 gave the Kurds
their opportunity. As the civil war inside Syria descended into a
maelstrom of separate conflicts, up in the north the Syrian Kurds were battling
and defeating the IS, successfully winning back large areas of Kurd-inhabited
territory.
Today the Kurdish-occupied region is ruled under a federal and
democratic constitution – the "Charter of the Social Contract" − which provides for all citizens to
enjoy gender equality, freedom of religion and property rights. In a poll
organized in September 2017 voters elected leaders for about 3,700
"communes" spread across the regions of northern Syria where Kurdish
groups have established autonomous rule.
Although the Syrian government has not formally recognized the DFNS
or the validity of its elections, Assad has clearly perceived the advantages he
could gain from coming to an accommodation with his Kurds. Last September Walid Muallem, Syria's foreign
minister, said that his country was open to the idea of greater powers for the
country's Kurds. They ”want a form of autonomy within the framework of the
borders of the state," he said. "This is negotiable and can be the
subject of dialogue." He indicated – presumably with the
acquiescence of Russia – that discussions could begin once the civil conflict
had ended.
The SDC delegation to Damascus may be the start of that process.
This change of tactic on the part of the Syrian government is anathema to Erdogan. The degree of autonomy that Syria’s Kurds seem
likely to attain can only reinforce the Kurds in Turkey in their separatist
demands. This explains Erdogan’s incursion in January 2018 into the
region around Afrin, and the Kurds’ willingness to join with Assad’s forces in helping
chase Turkish forces out of Syria.
A Kurdish legislator, Omar
Usi, who sits in the national parliament in Damascus, recently said the
government wanted the Kurds to "facilitate the entry of the Syrian army
and the return of state institutions into Kurdish-majority areas east of the
Euphrates.” In return, it was offering
"constitutional recognition for the Kurdish community and its cultural
rights."
Would this be sufficient to
satisfy Kurdish aspirations? Under the
“Charter of the Social Contract” the Rojava administration has implemented much
of the liberal left-wing ideology of its main Kurdish component, the YPG (People's
Protection Units), including strict equality for women in all public offices. The Kurdish flag, and images of jailed PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan (or “Apo”, that is, “uncle”) are ubiquitous. But Apo has been confined to the infamous
Imrali Island prison by Turkey’s Erdogan, Assad’s sworn enemy. With a shared enemy, and perceived advantages
from cooperation, the outcome of the current negotiations could well be a
continued Assad presidency, sustained by Kurdish support.
Published in the Eurasia Review, 6 August 2018:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/06082018-the-kurds-and-assad-analysis/
Published in the MPC Journal, 9 August 2018:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2018/08/09/the-kurds-and-assad/
No comments:
Post a Comment