Iran’s last effective proxy

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2026

With Hamas and Hezbollah substantially weakened, Iran is increasingly relying on the Houthis as its principal remaining proxy capable of exerting sustained military and economic pressure on the US and its regional partners.  Currently, as a complement to Iran's campaign in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis are attempting to exploit their control of the Bab al-Mandab strait, situated at the foot of the Red Sea and controlling access to the Suez Canal. 

Simultaneously with harrying the shipping in the strait, they are striking targets in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with Iran, whose 2023 pact with Saudi has been consigned to the trash. 

On February 28, 2026, in response to the US-Israeli attack, Iran launched missiles and armed drones against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, mainly because they harbored US bases, but also to punish and deter both Saudi and other governments for their close connection to the US.

Iranian strikes were reported to have hit energy facilities in Saudi, including igniting a fire at the Ras Tanura oil refinery. The Prince Sultan Air Base was also targeted by drone attacks, then and later.

On July 16, Reuters, citing multiple regional and Iranian sources, reported that Iran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab strait.  The directive to do so would be given if the US struck Iran's power grid or energy infrastructure.

Although the order was described as a contingency directive, the Houthis reportedly began positioning missiles and drones near the strait while awaiting any further authorization.

Four days later, on July 20, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree appeared on television to announce that "a maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy" would be imposed immediately.

He described it as an "eye for an eye" measure, in response to what the Houthis called Saudi Arabia's long-running blockade of Yemen, and a recent attack on Sanaa’s International Airport.

The result is a second maritime chokepoint, augmenting Iran’s pressure on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.  The Houthis are targeting Saudi oil exports and commercial tankers using Saudi ports, thus attempting to close off the principal alternative export route available after disruptions in Hormuz.  The operation as a whole is, in effect, a joint effort by Iran and its Yemeni ally to exert maximum pressure on global oil markets.

A few days later, in response, the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen.

In short, Iran-Saudi rivalry is being fought out mainly on the Houthi front, the crisis is being sustained by Houthi military action, and the Saudi coalition clearly regards the Houthis as part of Iran’s regional leverage network.

But Saree’s TV address clearly revealed that, from the Houthi’s point of view, two wars are overlapping, and in taking up the fight, the Houthis are killing two birds with one stone.  Saree referred to Saudi Arabia’s “blockade” of Yemen, and its strike against the airport at Sanaa, once Yemen’s capital.  So in attacking Saudi Arabia the Houthis are not only acting in direct support of Iran, but they are also striking at the ally of their main opponent in Yemen’s long-running civil war – the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

Since 2014 the Houthis, having overthrown the official government, have controlled Sanaa and much of north-western Yemen. That government – now based principally in Aden – continues to be recognized by the UN and receives military and financial backing from Saudi Arabia.

Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was alarmed at the prospect of Iran gaining a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula, and in 2015, with the civil war at its height, intervened militarily.  He formed a coalition whose declared objective was to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and prevent the emergence of an Iranian-aligned regime on his country’s southern border.

Although a UN-brokered truce in 2022 substantially reduced cross-border fighting, it never resolved the underlying political conflict. The Houthis retained control of the capital and most of Yemen's population centers in the northwest, while the recognized government retained international legitimacy but exercised authority over only part of the country.

Accordingly, from the Houthi perspective, Saudi Arabia remains not merely a regional rival, but the principal foreign military supporter of its domestic enemy.  Conversely, from Riyadh's perspective, the Houthis are an armed insurgent movement backed by Iran that displaced Yemen's legitimate government.

Most intelligence services and academic experts now reject earlier characterizations of the Houthis as merely "Iranian puppets."  They are currently seen more as partners with overlapping interests but independent agendas.  Iran provides support because the Houthis advance Tehran's regional interests, while the Houthis, retaining significant autonomy in decision-making, accept support because it enhances their military and political position.  Both sides derive substantial benefits.

Particularly since October 7, Iran has reportedly supplied the Houthis with missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology, including training, intelligence and financial support, and diplomatic backing.  The Houthis, meanwhile, provide Iran with pressure on Saudi Arabia and on Red Sea shipping, leverage against Israel and a relatively inexpensive means of projecting regional influence.

            Two possible developments might cause the mutually beneficial partnership to disintegrate. The first, and perhaps the more plausible, would be a decisive weakening or collapse of the Iranian regime following a renewed US military campaign, should a future Trump administration conclude that Tehran remained irredeemably hostile and that diplomatic options had been exhausted. Such an outcome could deprive the Houthis of their principal source of advanced military technology, training, and political backing, forcing them to pursue a more independent course.

          A second, less likely possibility would arise if sustained efforts by Hans Grundberg, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, succeeded in bringing the principal parties to the civil war into meaningful negotiations, securing a durable ceasefire and a comprehensive political settlement. Were the Houthis to become stakeholders in a recognized governing arrangement, their incentives could shift toward economic reconstruction, international legitimacy, and stable regional relations, reducing the strategic value of close alignment with Iran.

          For the moment, though, the liaison is firm, and the Houthis have become Iran's only major proxy capable of exercising direct international pressure by threatening world oil supplies.