Has Trump set the peace ball rolling?

        US President Donald Trump left Israel on Tuesday afternoon, 23 May 2017, after a visit lasting just 28 hours. In the words of the leader in the Jerusalem Post the next morning, “his major contribution to the peace process so far has been his successful resuscitation of non-cynical discourse on the prospects of peace. But the truly hard work has barely begun.”

        Widely noticed, and extensively remarked upon, was the fact that throughout his tour of the Holy Land, which included a meeting with PA President Abbas in Bethlehem, the words “Palestinian state,” “two-state solution,” “settlements,” or “embassy” never passed Trump’s lips. What he did say, more than once, was that he firmly believed that peace between Israel and the Palestinians was possible.

        During his meeting with Arab leaders in Riyadh, Trump had been impressed by their apparent willingness to engage with Israel, but they made it clear that normalizing relations between the moderate Sunni states and Israel was dependent on a successful outcome to Israel-Palestinian peace talks. All the same there were indications that a warming of relations could occur earlier, if positive steps were taken by Israel, leading towards a settlement. Media reports in early May 2017, just prior to Trump’s visit, revealed that an unreleased discussion paper had been shared among several Gulf countries which proposed the lifting of some trade restrictions, opening direct telecommunications links, and allowing Israeli aircraft to overfly their countries. Other incentives could include issuing visas to Israeli sports teams and trade delegations for events in Arab states, and opening the region for Israeli trade and business.

         Accordingly – at odds with recent statements by Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu – Trump adhered to the traditional view that a settlement of the Israel-Palestinian dispute was the key to unlocking an unprecedented empowerment of the region. Reflecting the position expressed to him by the Arab leaders, Trump indicated that a peace settlement would bring in its train widespread economic cooperation across the Middle East, including Israel, ushering in an era of industrial, technological and commercial development never previously experienced.

        In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2014 Netanyahu had tentatively proposed an alternative scenario, apparently the exact opposite, that he subsequently repeated on more than one occasion. He said:

        “After decades of seeing Israel as their enemy, leading states in the Arab world increasingly recognize that, together, we and they face many of the same dangers. Principally this means a nuclear-armed Iran and militant Islamist movements gaining ground in the Sunni world…Many have long assumed that an Israeli-Palestinian peace can help facilitate a broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world. But these days I think it may work the other way around – namely that a broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world may help facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace.”

        In fact the two points of view are not chalk and cheese. If the Sunni Arab world had not already realized that they shared vital – indeed existential – interests with Israel, Trump would have found little sympathy among his Arab hosts with the idea of future close cooperation with Israel.

        Netanyahu’s vehement opposition to the nuclear deal concluded between the western world and Iran in 2016 had been music to the ears of many Sunni Arab states, especially those in the Gulf, which had long suffered from Iranian-inspired efforts to destabilise and overthrow their regimes. Iran’s ambitions to dominate the Sunni states of the region and impose its own brand of Shi’ite Islam on them had made that non-Arab, albeit Muslim, state a feared enemy.

        Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not recognize Israel, yet remarks by Israeli minister Israel Katz on 27 February 2017 seemed to let the cat out of the bag. "Yes, there is cooperation between Israel and these countries,” said Katz, “which cannot be discussed in detail. This cooperation is going to be significantly upgraded, because the US is going to lead it. The first goal is to block Iran and push it out of the area."

        Israeli-Arab cooperation across the region is a fact of life. The Israeli and Egyptian military have long been collaborating closely in the Sinai peninsula, fighting jihadist terrorists. Israeli-Jordanian relations blossomed in the autumn of 2016 when the two sides signed a 15-year gas purchase agreement valued at $10 billion, under which Jordan will buy 45 billion cubic meters of gas from Israel. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with his strong Muslim Brotherhood roots, supports Hamas and rarely misses an opportunity to lambast Israel, yet June 2016 saw a formal end to the six-year rift between the two countries following the Mavi Marmara affair, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. In the first quarter of 2017 Turkish exports to Israel increased by 20 percent and Israeli exports to Turkey rose by 45 percent. As for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Israeli technology firms are engaged in secret, extensive business dealings with them. Media reports claim that “trade and collaboration in technology and intelligence are flourishing between Israel and a host of Arab states, even if the people and companies involved rarely talk about it publicly.”

        So Trump has a solid foundation on which to build his Israel-Palestinian peace initiative, should he choose to do so. His next step, if earlier reports are to be credited, is likely to be some form of US-led, but Arab-dominated, conference aimed at setting the parameters of future face-to-face Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Provided with a “regional umbrella”, and encouraged by Trump’s obvious desire and support for a successful outcome, PA President Abbas might at last feel sufficiently protected to engage in meaningful discussions with Israel.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 6 June 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Has-Trump-set-the-peace-ball-rolling-494693

Published in the Eurasia Review, 4 June 2017:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/03062017-has-trump-set-the-peace-ball-rolling-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 8 June 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/06/08/has-trump-set-the-peace-ball-rolling/

                [Next posting Saturday, 10 June 2017 at 8.30 pm GMT]

Rouhani's bitter-sweet triumph

        The 20th of May 2017 was a red letter day for Middle East politics. Not only was Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, re-elected by a substantial majority to a second term of office, but it was the day that US President Trump, on the opening leg of his first foreign tour, landed in Saudi Arabia to a right royal reception and, within hours, was signing a multi-billion dollar deal with his hosts.

        Shortly afterwards the President made a keynote speech to some 50 leaders of the Arab world. In its closing passages he turned to Iran, but you could scour the transcript for any word of congratulation to the re-elected Rouhani. Instead Trump was unremitting in his condemnation of the Iranian regime.

        “From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen,” he said, “Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. For decades, Iran has fuelled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror...Until the Iranian regime is willing to be a partner for peace, all nations of conscience must work together to isolate Iran, deny it funding for terrorism...”

        To what extent has Rouhani been complicit in the regime’s involvement over the years in acts of terror, and its support for terrorist organisations like Hezbollah and Hamas? There is no escaping the conclusion that – moderate though Rouhani can be dubbed in comparison with hardline elements within the Iranian body politic – as Iran’s president for the past four years, and as a leading servant of the state for decades earlier, he bears a heavy share of the guilt.

        An early supporter of Iran’s first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, he was a leading light in the Iranian revolution of 1979 and subsequently held a string of important government posts, controlling aspects of the nation’s defence forces, and acting as security adviser to the president, and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

        And yet Rouhani was never as extreme as the hardline caucus – the guardians of the revolution – that was a permanent feature of the Khomeini administration and has remained so. When in 2005 the presidency was won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose extreme views Rouhani was never afraid to criticize, he resigned as secretary of the security council. Following Ahmadinejad's second term, Rouhani ran for president against several hardline candidates, promising moderation and more engagement with the outside world. He won with more than 50 percent of the vote.

        Yet it must be remembered that in Iran the title Supreme Leader means what it says. The regime is strictly controlled, and it would have been impossible for Rouhani to have stood in the presidential election without the explicit support of Ayatollah Khamenei, who must have adjudged him sufficiently mainstream in terms of Iran’s revolutionary orthodoxy. As for his political agenda, Rouhani made no secret of his desire to reopen negotiations with the West on the nuclear issue, linked to the lifting of the sanctions that had crippled the Iranian economy. Khamenei must have felt that a move away from Ahmadinejad’s confrontational tactics might yield some economic and political benefits.

        An easing of sanctions certainly followed the signing of the nuclear agreement, and by adhering strictly to the terms of the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the basis of the nuclear deal – Rouhani ensured that sanctions were progressively lifted. Even Trump signed a sanctions waiver on 17 May. Although by the time of the election economic benefits had not filtered down to the general population, and unemployment remained very high, there was a general feeling that Rouhani had improved the country’s international standing. His liberalisation policy was popular among the upper-middle classes and the intelligentsia.

        The feeling did not extend to the conservative element within Iran’s polity. They had opposed the nuclear deal on two grounds: it would inhibit Iran’s bid for regional hegemony by restricting its development of nuclear power, and opening up Iran to greater interchange with the rest of the world would pose a threat to the integrity of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Indeed, immediately after the signing of the JCPOA, the Supreme Leader made it clear that Iran’s hatred of western democracy was unaffected. “Even after this deal, our policy towards the arrogant US will not change.”

        Scores of potential candidates in Iran’s presidential election were rejected, one by one, by Iran’s Guardian Council, doubtless with the approval of the Supreme Leader. The choice finally offered to Iran’s electorate narrowed to just two – Rouhani and a genuine hardline conservative, Ebrahim Raisi, one of the so-called “principlist” or osulgarayan group of fanatic supporters of the Supreme Leader. Not surprisingly the general perception was that Khameini favoured Raisi – although he was careful never to endorse Raisi publicly.

        Rouhani’s victory, while undoubtedly a personal triumph, must be leaving him decidedly uneasy on a number of grounds. He knows that any efforts he makes to liberalise conditions domestically, or to increase the country’s standing internationally, will be opposed by the enormously powerful hardline elements embedded within the administration. He will be aware that the Supreme Leader, while prepared to allow him another term of office in which to expand foreign investment and ease the domestic economic situation, will permit no policy initiatives that impact on the basic aims of the Iranian revolution – the political domination of the region, the global expansion of Shia Islam, and the eventual overthrow of western democracy.

        Rouhani accordingly must be mulling rather nervously over Donald Trump’s remarks to the assembled Sunni Arab leaders in Riyadh, amounting as they do to a call to arms against Iran. “Until the Iranian regime is willing to be a partner for peace, all nations of conscience must work together to isolate Iran, deny it funding for terrorism...”

        Rouhani hopes that some at least of the other five states which signed the nuclear deal, Russia in particular, will oppose Trump’s push towards Iran’s international isolation. He also hopes, as he declared during the election campaign, to improve relations with at least some of the Sunni Arab states. If he fails in either hope, his triumph will be bitter-sweet indeed.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 27 May 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Rouhanis-bitter-sweet-triumph-494067

Published in the Eurasia Review, 30 May 2017:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30052017-rouhanis-bitter-sweet-triumph-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 2 June 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/06/02/rouhanis-bitter-sweet-triumph/

                  [Next posting:  Saturday, 3 June 2017 at 8.30 pm GMT]

UK peers urge pro-Iran, pro-Palestinian policies

        A year ago, in May 2016, Britain’s House of Lords decided to establish a new International Relations Committee. On 2 May 2017, after six months deliberation, the committee issued its second report: “The Middle East: Time for New Realism”. It is, quite frankly, an astonishing document, imbued with unconcealed hostility towards US President Donald Trump, with the anti-Brexit rhetoric of much of the British establishment, and with downright naïve recommendations, reflecting the consensus of the politically correct, concerning Saudi Arabia, the Iran nuclear deal, and Palestinian sovereignty.

        Roughly reflecting the composition of the House of Lords itself, the 12-member International Relations Committee contains only four Conservatives. The rest are left-wing, liberal or unaffiliated peers. An amalgam of their prejudices informs every aspect of this new report.

        Anti-Trumpism prevails. "The mercurial and unpredictable nature of policy-making by President Trump,” it asserts uncompromisingly, “has made it challenging for the UK government to influence US foreign policy so far, a challenge that is not likely to ease." Based on this assertion, the committee chairman, Lord Howell of Guildford, said:

        "We have a new and uncertain American policy in the region…We can no longer assume America will set the tone for the West’s relationship with the Middle East, and the UK must give serious thought to how our own approach will need to change.”

        The serious thought undertaken by the International Relations Committee boils down, inter alia, to:
        – discounting any pro-Brexit optimism that UK citizens may harbour about negotiating a UK-Gulf trade deal: “the UK's departure from the European Union does not necessarily offer the UK any added advantage”;
        – urging the UK government to “work with Iran, despite US policy, to ensure the stability of the Iran nuclear deal”; and
        – placing the onus of finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute unequivocally on Israel. Accordingly, their logic runs, “the Government should now give serious consideration to recognising Palestine as a state, as the best way to show its determined attachment to achieving the two-state solution.”

        Illogicality permeates the Committee’s stance on Iran. It turns a Nelsonian blind eye to the clear evidence provided to it by a Middle East expert, who spelled out Iran’s unconcealed religious and political ambition to undermine Sunni Arab states and dominate the region. It takes no account of Iran’s record as the world’s leading sponsor of terror, its long history of initiating, promoting and supporting terrorism across the globe aimed at the Western democratic world, and in particular the US and Israel. Nor does it project any likely scenario involving a nuclear-armed Iran in some fifteen years’ time, when nuclear weaponry would become available not only to Iran, but via Iran to the jihadist-minded terrorist organizations it supports.

        On the contrary, the committee’s concern is that Iran might feel frustrated if it is barred from Western markets. It worries that the nuclear deal could be imperilled by “a hostile US administration”, and that US sanctions “remain a serious impediment to attracting new finance and investment into Iran.” As regards what might be done to contain a rampant Iran, the committee throws its hands in the air, but can’t avoid a dig at the US at the same time. “The international community is limited in its capacity to respond to Iranian provocation in the region, but the approach by the US has a dangerous escalatory logic.”

        So, wishing for the moon, the Committee suggests that the “external parties” to the Iran nuclear agreement should “find a way” to form a united and proportionate international position on Iranian actions. When one considers that these “external parties” include not only the US but also Russia and China, the committee’s recommendation becomes so much wishful thinking – a replica of the UN Security Council hamstrung by the veto.

        Reinforcing its policy of weak appeasement, the Committee concludes that the external parties “will also have to recognise that Iran has legitimate security interests and needs to be recognised as having a role as a regional power.”

        Regarding the Israel-Palestine issue, the witnesses selected to be heard by the committee were, without exception, out of sympathy with Israel. The committee heard no evidence of any sort critical of past or present Palestinian policies. It did not probe the Palestinian failure during the numerous peace initiatives of the past decades to come to an accord with Israel. It heard nothing of the possible effect of leaving a new sovereign Palestine on the West Bank unprotected against Hamas, nor of the associated security concerns of Israel in that event. In fact the Committee entirely ignores the presence of Hamas in the Gaza strip, ruling some 2 million Palestinians.

        The Committee seems focused on the idea that Israel, in the words of one of its witnesses, “holds all the cards” and that “more political robustness” is needed by the UK. So, roundly condemning past and present settlement construction as “illegal and an impediment to peace”, the Committee asserts that “the balance of power in the delivery of peace lies with Israel. If Israel continues to reduce the possibilities of a two-state solution, the UK should be ready to support UNSC resolutions condemning those actions in no uncertain terms.”

        Moreover the Committee urges the UK government to associate itself with the French-led initiative aimed at obtaining international recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state if no face-to-face talks can be organized. This initiative surely carries within it the seeds of its own failure. If Palestinian leaders know in advance that they will gain international recognition provided there are no negotiations, why on earth should they agree to negotiate? Even given the partial and skewed evidence the committee received, it is difficult to perceive how it can believe that recognizing the Palestinian Authority as a state could advance an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. All the major issues that have frustrated past attempts will remain unresolved – the refugee problem, the status of Jerusalem in general and the holy places in particular, Israel’s security, the future of Gaza, the eternal Hamas-Fatah feud.

        This report is shallow, biased and inadequate. Take it back, my Lords, and try again!

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 20 May 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/UK-peers-urge-pro-Iran-pro-Palestinian-policies-492262

Published in the MPC Journal, 22 May 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/05/22/uk-peers-urge-pro-iran-pro-palestinian-policies/

         [Next posting Saturday, 27 May 2017 at 10.30 pm GMT]

Can deal-maker Trump facilitate Israeli-Palestinian peace?

        US President Donald Trump has one attribute that his greatest friends and most impassioned enemies are agreed on – he is a great deal-maker. Deal-making has been the key to his business success, which has been considerable. And way back in the 1980s he co-authored “The Art of the Deal” which reached number 1 on the New York Times Best Seller list, and stayed there for 13 weeks.

        So when Trump declares, after meeting Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, that he believes he can foster an Israel-Palestinian peace deal, perhaps the world should take notice. On 3 May 2017 Trump remarked: “I’ve always heard that perhaps the toughest deal to make is the deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians; let’s prove them wrong…I think there’s a very, very good chance.”

        Such an undertaking would certainly represent a challenge for this master in deal-making, but nothing in his business career suggests that Trump is one to duck a challenge. In fact the Trump-Abbas meeting was an object lesson in how a successful deal-broker might manage the preliminary stages of a particularly complicated and delicate operation. Take two small, yet highly significant, indicators.

        How often do you see the president of the United States position himself in front of any flag other than the Stars and Stripes? But examine the photographs of Trump and Abbas at the media conference that followed their one-on-one discussions. The leader standing in front of the American flag is Abbas; Trump is placed in front of the flag of the putative state of Palestine. Trump agreed to this symbolic gesture, it is reported, at the specific request of the PA.

        On the other hand, scrutinize every word said publicly by Trump during Abbas’s visit, and you will fail to find one mention of a Palestinian state or any reference to the two-state solution. Prominent member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's Executive Committee, Hanan Ashwari, remarked afterwards: "He made sure he never mentioned Palestine — you noticed that, yes?"

        So, on the one hand he accorded Abbas every honour feasible, real and symbolic; on the other he bowed to the susceptibilities of the Israeli government, leaving open the possible process of setting up a viable new peace negotiation and also any desired outcome.

        As far as the deal-making process is concerned, the rumour is that, soon after his forthcoming trip to the Middle East scheduled for mid-May, Trump will seek to convene a regional summit. The Los Angeles Times reports that Trump “hopes to enlist some Sunni Muslim Arab allies in crafting a deal. Several, especially among the Persian Gulf states, have quietly signaled a willingness to cooperate with the administration — and, by extension, with Israel — in exchange for tougher actions against their common enemy, Shiite Muslim Iran.”

        Tzipi Livni, once Israel’s foreign minister, and chief Israeli negotiator in the last attempt at peace talks, recently wrote that while it usually takes two to tango, “in our case, we may need a few more dancers.”

        “The United States,” she wrote, “will undoubtedly be a central player for such an agreement, but we should not underestimate the role of the pragmatic, moderate Arab states.”

        In point of fact, the Arab world’s involvement would be a vital necessity if three cardinal factors are to be successfully addressed – internal Palestinian political tensions, Hamas rejectionism, and Israel’s vital security interests.

        The PA has painted itself into a political corner. Vying with Hamas on the one hand, and extremists within its own Fatah party on the other, the PA leadership has spent decades making heroes of those who undertake terrorist attacks inside Israel, promulgating anti-Israel and anti-Semitic propaganda in the media and the schools, and reiterating the message that all of Mandate Palestine is Palestinian. The end-result of its own narrative is that now no Palestinian leader dare sign a peace agreement with Israel unilaterally. The political backlash, to say nothing of the personal fear of assassination, has made it impossible. For any new peace initiative to become a viable possibility, the PA leadership would have to be provided with cover from other Arab states.

        Trump referred to this regional approach in his joint press conference with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 15 February 2017. The journal, Al-Monitor, reports that prior to the Trump-Netanyahu meeting the US administration had held discussions with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan about a “regional umbrella” to possible Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

        From the Israeli perspective, a Palestinian state created on pre-Six Day War boundaries, however much modified by land swaps, simply will not do. Almost certainly Hamas, which is intent on Israel’s destruction, would gain power sooner or later, either through elections, or by way of a violent coup as it did in Gaza, and the new state would become a Gaza-type launching pad for the indiscriminate bombardment of Israel. Once administering a sovereign Palestine. the PA leadership would be extremely worried at the prospect of losing power to Hamas. Like it or not, they would need stronger defences against “the enemy within” than their own resources could provide.

        New “out-of-the-box” thinking is required. One neglected possibility is an initiative, backed by the US, the Arab League and Israel, aimed at bringing two new legal entities into existence simultaneously – a sovereign state of Palestine and a three-state confederation of Jordan, Israel and Palestine.

        A confederation is a form of government in which constituent states maintain their independence while amalgamating certain aspects of administration, such as security, commerce, or infrastructure. A Jordan-Israel-Palestine confederation would be dedicated above all to its own defence and that of its constituent sovereign states, but in addition to cooperating in the fields of economic development, infrastructure and trade.

        Such a solution, based on an Arab-wide consensus, could absorb Palestinian extremist objections, making it abundantly clear that any subsequent armed opposition from whatever source, Hamas or Fatah, would be disciplined from within, and crushed by the combined and formidable defence forces of the confederation.

        A confederation of three sovereign states, dedicated to providing high-tech security but also future economic growth and prosperity for all its citizens – here is a viable game-plan for deal-maker Trump to consider.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 12 May 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Can-deal-maker-Trump-facilitate-Israeli-Palestinian-peace-490551

Published in the MPC Journal, 19 May 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/05/19/can-deal-maker-trump-facilitate-israeli-palestinian-peace/

         [Next posting Saturday , 21 May 2017 at 10.30 pm GMT]

Hezbollah and the balance of power in Lebanon

                                                       The flags of Lebanon and Hezbollah   

        Lebanon’s president, Michel Aoun, is a fervent Hezbollah supporter; Lebanon’s prime minister, Saad Hariri, most certainly is not. Hariri’s position is scarcely surprising, since he has every reason to believe that back in 2005 his father, Rafik, was brutally assassinated by Hezbollah operatives, acting on the orders of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad.

        Why should it matter what either of Lebanon’s leading figures think of Hezbollah? Because that organization has succeeded in infiltrating so deeply into Lebanon’s body politic that it has become a virtual “state within a state”. It not only directly runs a range of social, health, infrastructure and media services, but its heavily armed military wing conducts itself much like an independent army. Its political bloc, designated “March 8”, holds 57 of the 128 seats in Lebanon’s parliament.

        In short, although plainly and obviously subject to outside foreign control in the shape of both Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has gained a tenacious grip on the internal power structure and functioning of the Lebanese state. The fact that it has been designated a terrorist organization by, inter alia, the Arab League (of which Lebanon is a member) has not affected its position as a major political player within Lebanon.

        It was around 1980 – the exact date is disputed – that Hezbollah planted itself in the soil of Lebanon, a state torn apart by civil conflict. Drawing its inspiration from the extremist Shia-based philosophy expounded by Iran’s first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomenei, Hezbollah declared that its purpose was to oppose Western influences in general and Israel’s existence in particular. It backed its vision with a string of notorious terrorist actions, such as the suicide car bombing of the US embassy in Beirut in 1983, and the blowing up of the United States Marine barracks six months later.  Hezbollah was born in blood, fire and explosion.

        Sparked by clashes between Palestinian and Christian militias, civil war had erupted within Lebanon in 1975. This small country, divided in beliefs and weak by design, was easy prey for its totalitarian neighbor, Syria. President Hafez al-Assad invaded and all but annexed it. The end of the war in 1990 did not end Syria’s military occupation. The Taif Agreement at the conclusion of hostilities required the disarmament of every militia in Lebanon, but Bashar al-Assad, who had by then taken over from his father as Syria’s president, left Hezbollah in place, partly because it was a useful ally in Syria’s conflict with Israel.

        Lebanon’s “March 14 Alliance” is a coalition of politicians opposed to the Syrian régime and to Hezbollah – March 14, 2005 was the launch date of the Cedar Revolution, a protest movement triggered by the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, earlier that year. The echoes of Hariri’s cold-blooded slaughter have continued to reverberate through Lebanese politics. Hariri had been demanding that Hezbollah disband and direct its thousands of fighters to join Lebanon's armed forces. This demand has become ever more insistent since Hezbollah began fighting in Syria alongside Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in support of Bashar al-Assad. A large segment of Lebanese opinion hates Assad and favors toppling him.

        In a recent interview on Egyptian television, Lebanon’s President Aoun described Hezbollah’s armed forces as a “complement” to the Lebanese army, and “an essential part of Lebanon’s defense." Adverse reactions came swiftly, from the UN and from within Lebanon.

        Farhan Haq, a spokesman for the UN secretary-general, reminded Aoun of the UN Security Council resolutions that “clearly call for the dissolution and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Keeping arms in the hands of Hezbollah and other armed groups outside the state framework would limit Lebanon’s capacity to exercise its sovereignty and full authority over its geographical area.”

        Fares Soueid, secretariat coordinator of Lebanon’s anti-Hezbollah March 14 coalition, tweeted: “If Aoun believes that Hezbollah is able to protect Lebanon, why don’t we call on Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah’s leader) to move into the presidential palace?”

        Lebanon’s Future Movement, led by Prime Minister Hariri, issued a statement confirming its commitment to the UN resolutions which preserve Lebanon’s sovereignty and security: “The Lebanese State’s arms are the only legitimate weapons in Lebanon.”

        On 21 April 2017 Hezbollah organized a media tour in south Lebanon. The next day, Prime Minister Hariri visited the area and heavily criticized the appearance of Hezbollah armed militants in the UN buffer zone meant to be free of Hezbollah presence. "What happened yesterday is something that we, as a government, did not order and do not accept.“

        A week later, on 27 April, a Hezbollah arms supply hub in Syria, close to Damascus International Airport, was attacked from the air and destroyed. Fahad al-Masri, head of the National Salvation Front in Syria, said that the strikes targeted arsenals of weapons and munitions that had arrived recently from Iran. “A large portion was to support Hezbollah and the other armed militias belonging to Iran in Syria,” he said, adding, “there was also qualitative and strategic weaponry to be transferred to Lebanon to bolster Hezbollah’s military arsenal.”

        Al-Masri characterised the strike as a “blessed” blow on Hezbollah by Israel. Israel does not usually comment on action it takes in Syria, but in a radio interview minister Israel Katz appeared to confirm Israel’s involvement: "The incident in Syria corresponds completely with Israel's policy to act to prevent Iran's smuggling of advanced weapons via Syria to Hezbollah." He was referring to prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s earlier statement: “whenever we receive intelligence that indicates an intention to transfer advanced weapons to Hezbollah, we will act."

        Slowly, perhaps too slowly, leading elements among Lebanon’s opinion formers are coming to recognize that Israel is not their enemy. Their true antagonist is the malign organism that has taken root within their own body politic – Hezbollah – and that, in this, they are at one with Israel. Indeed, to think what may have seemed unthinkable only a few years ago, Israel could prove a staunch ally in helping Lebanon reassert itself as a fully sovereign state.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 5 May 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Hezbollah-and-the-balance-of-power-in-Lebanon-489876

Published in the Eurasia Review, 11 May 2017:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/09052017-hezbollah-and-the-balance-of-power-in-lebanon-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 7 May 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/05/07/hezbollah-and-the-balance-of-power-in-lebanon/

                  [Next posting: Saturday, 13 May 2017, at 8 pm GMT]

What will Erdogan do with supreme power?

                                                           

        The news from Turkey following the referendum on 16 April is worrying. The coup attempt on 20 July 2016, in which rogue troops commandeered fighter jets and tanks to bomb parliament, led the Turkish cabinet to declare a six-month state of emergency. On 19 January, as the six months drew to a close, the state of emergency was extended for a further three months. Now, following the referendum, the Turkish cabinet has once again added three months to the extraordinary powers permitted the president and his government under the terms of the emergency legislation.

        The actions taken by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan under the emergency powers may provide a template of what life will be like when Turkey is transformed from a parliamentary to a presidential republic. For example, in what appears to be a fresh political crackdown, thousands of opposition activists have been arrested for protesting the referendum result.

        Under the new constitution proposed by Erdogan the role of prime minister will be scrapped and the president will become the head of the executive, as well as the head of state. He will be given sweeping new powers to appoint ministers, prepare the budget, choose the majority of senior judges and enact certain laws by decree. The president alone will be able to announce a state of emergency and dismiss parliament, which will lose its right to scrutinize ministers or propose an inquiry.

        Erdogan argued that the reforms he sought would streamline decision-making. Decision-making is certainly streamlined when judicial independence and press freedom have been stifled and political opponents imprisoned. An all-powerful president will be akin to a dictator on the lines of a Hitler or a Stalin. On 13 March a Council of Europe inquiry expressed “serious concerns at the excessive concentration of powers in one office... It is also of concern that this process of constitutional change is taking place under the state of emergency.”

        Erdogan’s presidential ambitions go back a good few years. The events of 2013, when he held the post of prime minister, may have crystallized them. Twice during the course of the year violence directed largely against Erdogan and the party he leads, the AKP, broke out on the streets of Turkey’s major cities. The underlying cause in both cases was a widespread perception that Erdogan had become too dictatorial in attempting to end Turkey’s role as a model of secularism in the Muslim world.

        Over the course of summer 2013 opposition built up within Erdogan’s own party, the AKP. This centered around followers of Fethullah Gulen, an influential Turkish cleric who lives in the US. Gulen was once one of the AKP's main spiritual leaders, preaching a blend of moderate, business-friendly Islam that helped the party rise to power. His dispute with Erdogan and the AKP leadership arose over a government decision to shut down the large network of private schools that the Fethullah Gulen community, or Hizmet Movement, operated.

        Gulen had followers at high levels in the Turkish establishment, including the judiciary, the secret service and the police force. Early in December 2013 Erdogan was furious to discover that, for more than a year and unknown to him, the police had been engaged in an undercover inquiry into corruption within the government and the upper echelons of the AKP. By the end of the year Erdogan’s own son had been named in the widening corruption investigation. Erdogan declared the police investigation a plot by foreign and Turkish forces to discredit his government ahead of local elections in March 2014.

        Those elections were the key to unlocking Erdogan’s ambitions. Returned to office, Erdogan was able to change the constitution to allow him to remain as prime minister beyond his statutory three terms. Subsequently he was able to stand for president in 2014, and then to imbue the office – once largely ceremonial – with increased powers. Now he can go the whole hog and turn his long-held dream of gaining supreme power into reality.

        Erdogan blames Fethullah Gulen for inciting the coup attempt in July 2016, and he has been exacting a ruthless revenge on those accused of having links with Gulen. 170 media outlets have been shut down, including 29 publishing houses, 3 news agencies, 45 newspapers, 16 TV stations, 23 radio stations, and 15 magazines. 1,577 university deans have been forced to resign, while 2,700 judges, 163 admirals and generals and 24,000 teachers and Interior Ministry employees have been fired.

        Blanket repression of any sort of opposition to Erdogan has marked the months of the emergency. It certainly marked the referendum campaign itself, when the “No” camp faced unprecedented difficulties in trying to get its message into the media.
     
        Turkey has been knocking on the EU’s door for decades, but the requirements laid down for entry have consistently proved too onerous for Turkey to achieve. Now, in view of the Erdogan government’s human rights abuses of the past year, allied to his own desire to re-introduce the death penalty, it seems that both the EU and Turkey are backing away from the idea altogether. Exacerbating the situation, the European Commission recently called for an investigation into alleged voting irregularities in the referendum.

        So presidential Turkey seems likely to put its EU application on the back burner, and to consolidate its strong position within the Sunni Muslim world. That presupposes continued opposition to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and thus an anti-Iran line in the Middle East. Despite US support for some anti-Islamic State groups linked to Kurdish separatists, a re-empowered Erdogan will be largely on side with the US, and also with the Gulf States and Israel, with which he has recently patched up his quarrels of the past decade or so.

        History teaches us that absolute power is what dictators and autocrats have traditionally sought but that, in the process of obtaining and exercising it, they almost invariably bring about their own undoing. Will Erdogan buck the trend?

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 28 April 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/What-will-Erdogan-do-with-supreme-power-489270

Published in the Eurasia Review, 28 April 2017:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/28042017-what-will-erdogan-do-with-supreme-power-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 2 May 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/05/02/what-will-erdogan-do-with-supreme-power/

                       [Next posting:  Saturday 6 May at 9 pm GMT]

Egypt's economic tightrope

                                                           

        Egypt’s government, under the leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is firmly wedged between a rock and a hard place – on the one hand the danger of economic collapse; on the other simmering popular discontent, which could descend into open revolt, at the steps being taken to relieve the problem.

        How did the country get itself into this predicament? The short answer is that revolutions cost money, and since February 2011 Egypt has sustained not one, but two full-scale political and social upheavals.

        The first upsurge of popular anger was generated by opposition to the repressive regime maintained for thirty years by Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, but fanned into flames by the Arab Spring already raging across the Middle East. Mubarak was forced from office. In subsequent elections the Muslim Brotherhood – a politico-religious movement long banned for subversion and plotting to overthrow the government – won a majority in parliament and also the presidency, in the person of Mohamed Morsi.

        The Muslim Brotherhood rule had lasted for less than two years before the Egyptian public realized that Morsi was systematically using his mandate to seize authoritarian powers. The last straw was perhaps a proposed new constitution which included legislative and executive powers beyond judicial oversight. It seemed clear that Morsi was well on his way to imposing a profoundly undemocratic regime on the country. Consequently the coup engineered by the Military Council against the government gained as much popular support as that which had swept Mubarak from power.

        In acting as they did the military had a motive of their own. According to a Reuters report on 2 July 2013: "Army concern about the way President Mohamed Morsi was governing Egypt reached the tipping point when the head of state attended a rally packed with hardline fellow Islamists calling for holy war in Syria" – in other words, a military alliance with Islamic State (IS) to defeat President Bashar Assad and absorb Syria into the then mushrooming Islamic caliphate. Unlike the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, most Egyptians – even the profoundly religious – are not jihadists.

        The military coup executed by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi could have led to a quick economic collapse, but the Gulf states hastened to provide financial support to maintain the new regime. Their direct financial aid ended in 2015, and since then Egypt’s economic difficulties have worsened.

        In the past six years, the Egyptian currency has lost more than 70 percent of its value. On the day that Mubarak fell, you could buy one US dollar with 5.8 Egyptian pounds; today a dollar costs some 18 Egyptian pounds. At the end of 2010, Egypt’s foreign debt was $34.7bn. By the end of 2016 it had reached an all-time high of $67.3bn.

        It was this rapidly deteriorating economic situation that led to Egypt’s application in 2016 to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for some form of financial assistance. The IMF is notoriously rigorous in the conditions it imposes before agreeing to disburse its resources. Eventually the IMF was satisfied that the program of policies and structural reforms presented by the Egyptian government would indeed address the problems afflicting the country. Accordingly, on 11 November 2016 the IMF formally approved a three-year loan of about $12bn to support the government’s economic reform program. The arrangement was to be subject to five reviews over the course of the loan period.

        The IMF believes that the program “will help Egypt restore macroeconomic stability and promote inclusive growth. Policies supported by the program aim to correct external imbalances and restore competitiveness, place the budget deficit and public debt on a declining path, boost growth and create jobs while protecting vulnerable groups.”

        The IMF concerns itself with popular discontent only in so far as social unrest might disrupt the tough fiscal and economic action it requires of its debtors. In negotiating with the EU over Greece’s parlous state, for example, the IMF’s main concern is to safeguard the structural reforms needed to tackle the country’s huge debts. It is doubtful whether the IMF is worried overmuch by the simmering unrest evident in Egypt since the Sisi government started implementing its program.

        In fact daily life has been disrupted by inflation and soaring prices. Inflation is currently running at around 30 percent. Everything imported is in short supply, from medicine, to sugar. Food prices have risen by some 40 percent; imported staples such as flour, rice, and coffee have increased by up to 80 percent.

        The journey towards economic recovery will be lengthy and painful, but it has already started. The economy grew by 4.3 percent last year, and it’s projected to grow by 5.4 percent by 2019. Exports are up by 25 percent, while the country’s trade deficit has fallen by 44 percent. Foreign investment is needed to help get Egypt back on its feet, but it is being inhibited by the succession of terror attacks engineered by jihadists intent on overthrowing the Sisi administration. The attacks on two Coptic Christian churches on Palm Sunday which killed 44 people, were the latest in a sustained effort by extreme Islamists to destroy Egypt’s tourist industry, which normally accounts for 12 percent of the country’s GDP.

        Egypt is among the top recipients of US military and economic assistance. Prior to Sisi’s meeting in Washington with President Trump on 3 April 2017, all US aid packages were being evaluated as part of the new administration's push for dramatic budget cuts to diplomacy and development. From Trump’s warm endorsement of the US-Egypt relationship and his declared strong support of the Egyptian people, it seems clear that the $1.3bn military aid package, and the hundreds of millions of economic assistance that Egypt receives annually from the US are not under threat.

        Now Sisi must keep his nerve, stick to the rigorous financial reforms demanded by the IMF, and ride out the consequent fall in popularity ratings. A survey at the end of 2016 showed that Sisi’s popularity had declined by a half since taking power. The survey asked respondents what they wanted Sisi to do in 2017. Decreasing prices was the first choice of 35 percent of those questioned. On present evidence they are likely to be disappointed.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 21 April 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Egypts-economic-tightrope-488591

Published in the Eurasia Review, 23 April 2017:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/23042017-egypts-economic-tightrope-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 25 April 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/04/25/egypts-economic-tightrope/

      [Next posting:  Saturday 29 April at 9 pm GMT]

Saudi Vision 2030 one year on

                   The Riyadh metro, scheduled to open in 2019, will be a 6-line network with 85 stations

        The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is such an established feature of today’s Middle East that it comes as something of a surprise to realize that it is less than a hundred years old. It was only in 1932 that Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, after a 30-year political and military struggle against local warlords and the Ottoman empire, named the area that he had conquered “Saudi Arabia”, and proclaimed himself its first king. 

        It was doubtless with an eye to the eventual centenary celebrations of the monarchy and the kingdom that in April 2016 Saudi’s dynamic young deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, launched Saudi Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to revitalize the nation. If it succeeds, by 2032 Saudi Arabia will have been transformed from its current dependency on oil revenues into a modern, thriving, entrepreneurial society, its prosperity underpinned by flourishing industrial, financial, economic and commercial sectors.

         Saudi Vision 2030 has been described as a “neo-liberal blueprint”. It envisages, among hundreds of initiatives, privatizing entire sectors of the economy, cutting subsidies, courting investors at home and abroad, streamlining government services, and going public with the national oil company, Saudi Aramco.

        The plan is partly a response to the dramatic fall in oil prices post-2014. “We will not allow our country ever to be at the mercy of… commodity price volatility or external markets,” the deputy crown prince has said.

        A number of factors contributed to the drop in oil prices. The rate of growth of economies such as China, India and Brazil began to slow, and with it their demand for oil. Meanwhile the US and Canada began increasing their efforts to produce oil themselves. In the US private companies began extracting oil from shale formations, using the process known as fracking, while Canada began extracting from Alberta's oil sands, the world's third-largest crude oil reserve. As a result the two North American countries were able to cut their oil imports sharply, putting further downward pressure on world prices.

        Russia also pressed ahead. Its oil extraction in 2016, an increase of 2.5 percent on the previous year, set an all-time record.

         Saudi Arabia itself contributed to the fall in the oil price. Faced with letting prices continue to drop or cutting production, and thus ceding market share, Saudi kept its production stable. It reckoned that low oil prices offered less of a long-term disadvantage than giving up market share. But the policy took its toll. In 2015 alone Saudi’s net foreign assets fell by $115 billion, and they continued to fall throughout 2016. The rate of the drawdown prompted the International Monetary Fund to warn that Saudi’s reserves could be exhausted within five years, assuming oil prices remained low and public spending was not curtailed. Saudi’s low oil price policy undoubtedly sharpened awareness of the need to reduce the country’s reliance on oil revenues.

         One of the key issues Saudi Vision 2030 aims to tackle is unemployment. With nearly three-quarters of the population under the age of 30, Saudi Arabia faces a potentially huge rise in the number of young people coming into the job market in the next few years. Diversifying the economy, and thus employing more domestic labor, will depend in part on expanding Saudi Arabia’s manufacturing base. For example, whereas Saudi Arabia currently imports 98 percent of its military needs, one of Vision 2030’s ambitious goals is to manufacture 50 percent of all military gear and hardware, including sophisticated aircraft, inside the kingdom.

         Saudi Vision 2030 also plans to expand its less robust industries through direct investment. The country’s sovereign wealth fund – the Public Investment Fund (PIF) – is slated to lead this effort, and the proposed transfer to the Fund of Aramco shares would boost its resources to some $2 trillion, making it the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world. These huge assets will be used to fund development projects under the plan.

        In the retail sector national Saudis represent just 20 percent of the workforce. Under Vision 2030 retailers can for the first time be completely foreign-owned, and this reform could create one million new retail jobs as early as 2020. In addition to expanding youth employment, the plan seeks to raise the percentage of women in the overall workforce by 2030 from 22 to 30 percent.

        One early success story arising from Vision 2030 is the Riyadh metro, an impressive $20 billion project already under construction. EU Commissioner for Transport Violetta Bulc visited the project, an integrated urban rail and bus system, in January 2017. She described it as “the biggest global project in urban mobility.”

        “The timeframe is very demanding,” she said, “but so far they’re keeping to the deadlines well.” It is scheduled for completion in 2019.

        Bulc believes her delegation laid the foundation for the EU to work more closely with Saudi Arabia on the implementation of Vision 2030, leading to further trade, business and investment exchanges.

        Britain’s prime minister, Theresa May, included Riyadh in her first overseas trip after triggering Bexit, running the risk of criticism from human rights and left-wing activists who want Britain to cut military ties with the Saudis over allegations of war crimes in Yemen. Her trip underlines her commitment to investing in Britain’s long-standing alliance with the Saudis and other Gulf states.

        She has personal experience of the importance of Britain’s relationship with the Saudis from the six years she spent as home secretary, where part of her brief was to oversee the operations of MI5, the UK’s domestic security service. Over the years, Saudi intelligence officials have provided information that has helped thwart a number of major terrorist attacks against Britain, including the plot to blow up a number of flights from Heathrow to the US.

        But it is trade not security that weighs heaviest on Theresa May’s mind at the moment. Having closer ties with the Saudis offers post-Brexit Britain a new world of economic opportunity outside the confines of the EU. Under Vision 2030 the Saudis are planning to develop a whole range of new industries and technologies, spending trillions of dollars and creating a wealth of commercial opportunities that Britain will be eager to exploit. 

        Saudi Vision 2030 is only just off the launching pad. The hugely ambitious project will doubtless run into problems as it proceeds. To keep it on track will require a sustained effort, and as a start a conference scheduled for early May 2017 in Riyadh plans to analyse progress achieved in its first year. The plan as a whole may never be realized fully, but the imagination that inspired it is surely to be applauded.

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 16 April 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Saudi-Vision-2030-one-year-on-488112

Published in the Eurasia Review, 18 April 2017:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/19042017-saudi-vision-2030-one-year-on-oped/

Published in the MPC Journal, 18 April 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/04/18/saudi-vision-2030-one-year-on/

          [Next posting: 22 April 2017 at 8.30 pm GMT]

Turkey’s referendum: will Erdogan win supreme power?

                                                           

        Since mid-July 2016 Turks have been living in a state of emergency, subject to the sweeping powers permitted the president and his ministers in this situation. Triggered by the coup attempt on 20 July, in which 240 soldiers, police and civilians were killed trying to stop rogue troops who had commandeered fighter jets and tanks to bomb parliament, the state of emergency was extended on 19 January 2017 for a further three months.

        Officially, therefore, the emergency comes to an end on 19 April, but by then Turkey may be facing a quite different emergency, the biggest perhaps since Kamel Ataturk swept away the Ottoman sultanate in 1922. For three days earlier, on 16 April, Turkey will have voted in a referendum on whether to grant its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, supreme powers, changing Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential republic.

        Under the new constitution that Erdogan is asking the Turkish nation to endorse, the role of prime minister would be scrapped and the president would become the head of the executive, as well as the head of state. He would be given sweeping new powers to appoint ministers, prepare the budget, choose the majority of senior judges and enact certain laws by decree. The president alone would be able to announce a state of emergency and dismiss parliament, which would lose its right to scrutinize ministers or propose an inquiry.

        Erdogan argues that the reforms he seeks would streamline decision-making and avoid the unwieldy parliamentary coalitions that have hamstrung Turkey in the past. The problem is that while a presidential system works well in a country with proper checks and balances like the United States, in Turkey, where judicial independence and press freedom have plummeted, an all-powerful president would be akin to a dictator on the lines of a Hitler or a Stalin. On 13 March a Council of Europe inquiry expressed “serious concerns at the excessive concentration of powers in one office... It is also of concern that this process of constitutional change is taking place under the state of emergency.”

        Erdogan’s presidential ambitions go back a good few years. The events of 2013, when he held the post of prime minister, may have crystallized them. Twice during the course of the year violence directed largely against Erdogan and the party he leads, the AKP, broke out on the streets of Turkey’s major cities. The incidents precipitating the protests may have been different, but the underlying cause was essentially the same – a widespread perception that Erdogan had become too dictatorial and too arrogant in attempting to end Turkey’s role as a model of secularism in the Muslim world.

        In May 2013 popular fury was triggered by a terse government announcement that a shopping mall was to be built on Gezi Park, one of the last green public spaces in the centre of Istanbul. Over the course of the summer, though, a more dangerous opposition built up within Erdogan’s own party, the AKP. This centered around followers of Fethullah Gulen, an influential Turkish cleric who lives in the US. Gulen was once one of the AKP's main spiritual leaders, preaching a blend of moderate, business-friendly Islam that helped the party rise to power. His dispute with Erdogan and the AKP leadership arose over a government decision to shut down the large network of private schools that the Fethullah Gulen community, or Hizmet Movement, operated.

        Gulen had followers at high levels in the Turkish establishment, including the judiciary, the secret service and the police force. Early in December 2013 Erdogan was furious to discover that, for more than a year and unknown to him, the police had been engaged in an undercover inquiry into corruption within the government and the upper echelons of the AKP. By the end of the year Erdogan’s own son had been named in the widening corruption investigation. Erdogan undertook a major cabinet reshuffle, describing the police investigation as a plot by foreign and Turkish forces to discredit his government ahead of local elections in March 2014.

        Those elections were the key to unlocking Erdogan’s ambitions. The AKP party had to retain its political lead. It did so and, returned to office, Erdogan was able to change the constitution to allow him to remain as prime minister beyond his statutory three terms. Subsequently he was able to stand for president in 2014, and then to imbue the office – once largely ceremonial – with greatly increased powers. If he succeeds in the forthcoming referendum, he will have realized his long-held dream of supreme power.

        Erdogan blames Fethullah Gulen for inciting the coup attempt in July 2016, and he has been exacting a ruthless revenge on those accused of having links with Gulen. 170 media outlets have been shut down, including 29 publishing houses, 3 news agencies, 45 newspapers, 16 TV stations, 23 radio stations, and 15 magazines. 1,577 university deans have been forced to resign, while 2,700 judges, 163 admirals and generals and 24,000 teachers and Interior Ministry employees have been fired.

        The referendum that would effectively confirm sweeping powers like these in Erdogan’s hands is already under way. On 27 March Turkish citizens started to vote at airports and borders in Turkey, as well as in Turkish diplomatic missions in Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Denmark. Voting will start in other countries in due course. All voting outside the country will end on 9 April, with the main referendum vote taking place on 16 April in Turkey itself.

        On present indications, Erdogan is not assured of a favorable outcome. Of 28 recent public opinion polls, 12 predict a ‘no’ vote and eight ‘yes’. But the gap has been narrowing. Gezici Research has found that while the ‘no’ camp was ahead in January by 58 to 42 percent, when early voting began on 27 March its lead had reduced to just 51 percent. This no doubt reflects the fevered efforts by Erdogan’s AKP party in the last few weeks before the referendum. While the “no” campaign is having a hard time getting its message past the AKP’s pressure on media outlets, the “yes” campaign has bought massive TV, radio, newspaper and billboard ads. 

        Will Turkey’s opposition maintain its momentum and carry the day? Or will Erdogan reverse the tide and finally reach his long-held objective of accruing supreme autocratic power in his own hands?

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 April 2017:
http://ow.ly/BuQn30aIn0Y

          [Next posting: Sunday 16 April, 2017 at 8 pm GMT]

Is BDS winning?

                                                   

                                                         

        The life cycle of many enterprises can best be described as a parabola – an arch-like curve, like an object thrown high in the air which falls back to earth. From a slow start they often gain considerable momentum, reach an apogee, and then decline. Is the anti-Israel Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement following this pattern? Born in 2005, it grew rapidly in influence, penetrating university campuses across the free world, local governments, trade unions, churches, and even supermarkets and concert halls. It reached what seemed like a high point in 2015, a decade after it began. Since then opposition has hardened, and it has suffered a series of reverses. Are they significant, or is it still on the up and up?

        Many of BDS’s liberal-minded supporters, especially perhaps churches such as the Presbyterian Church, the Church of Scotland and the World Council of Churches, but also left-wing and liberal bodies across the globe, including some Jewish organizations, subscribe to the campaign because they support a Palestinian state within pre-1967 borders, and oppose the frozen status quo which has perpetuated the Israeli occupation of the West Bank since the Six Day War.

        “Useful idiots” is a term often wrongly attributed to Lenin. It describes people who support a cause whose goals they are not fully aware of, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause to promote it. The unpalatable truth is that many BDS supporters are, all unwittingly, the “useful idiots” of a movement whose leaders regard the whole BDS enterprise merely as a stepping stone towards an officially unacknowledged objective – Israel’s destruction. Were they aware of this, very many BDS supporters would not subscribe to it. The scales fell from the eyes of the United Methodist Church in May 2016, when it voted to withdraw from the umbrella organization promoting BDS in the United States.

        The term “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” first made its appearance in a declaration issued in July 2005 by an amalgam of Palestinian organizations. It condemned Israel in a succession of emotive trigger-terms (colonialist, ethnic cleansing, racial discrimination, occupation and oppression), drew a direct parallel between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and apartheid South Africa, and called for a similar world-wide response from all “people of conscience.”

        Neither that original BDS document, nor the movement that developed from it, have time for the nuances of a highly complex situation. There is no reference to the unanimous decision by the League of Nations in 1923, later ratified by the United Nations in 1947, that the Jewish people had the right to establish a national home in the land of their origin, side by side with an Arab state. The BDS view of the founding of Israel is that “the state of Israel was built mainly on land ethnically cleansed of its Palestinian owners”.

        This implication of malevolent intent, and indeed action, by Israel omits any reference to the fact that Israel’s original boundaries were actually set in the UN-sponsored 1949 armistice agreements with Egypt and Jordan, following the unsuccessful attack by Arab armies on the nascent state.

        On equally shaky ground, the BDS declaration defines the outcome of the 1967 Six Day War as “Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West Bank”, implying that Israel acquired it in the course of an aggressive war. There is no indication that Israel overran the West Bank only in the course of defeating the Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian armies that had banded together to annihilate it.

        Based on foundations as uncertain as these, what precisely does the BDS movement claim that it wants to achieve?

        According to a recent interview with the BDS founder, Omar Barghouti, BDS has three objectives: ending Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories since 1967; ending what BDS terms “Israel’s system of racial discrimination against its Palestinian citizens”; and respecting the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes – “refugees” as defined by UNWRA, the UN organization dealing specifically with the Palestinian issue.

        The UNWRA definition of “refugee” uniquely includes not only the original 850,000 Palestinian Arabs displaced during the Arab-Israel war of 1948, but all their descendants generation after generation. The number has consequently mushroomed to around 7 million – all of them, apparently, entitled to return to their original family dwellings. How 7 million people could be accommodated in the living space once occupied by 850,000 is left unexplained, and for a very good reason. The call, clearly, is intended to swamp Israel with eponymous “refugees” to the point where the Jewish state ceases to exist as such.

        Unlike the leaders of the movement, many BDS apologists are quite unequivocal about their desire to eliminate the state of Israel. Pro-BDS author Ahmed Moor writes: “”BDS does mean the end of the Jewish state.” Or As’ad Abu Khalil: “The real aim of BDS is to bring down the state of Israel.” And John Spritzler: “I think the BDS movement will gain strength from forthrightly explaining why Israel has no right to exist.” And BDS activist Anna Baltzer: “We need to wipe out Israel.”

        Over and above this, BDS has recently latched itself to a social theory that has become very popular with the politically correct – intersectionality, the idea that all forms of discrimination are interlinked. Into these intersecting forms of oppression, BDS has injected the anti-Israel cause. As a result, groups considering themselves oppressed increasingly perceive Israel as part of the oppressive global power structure, and Palestinians as fellow victims.

        This concept has penetrated many US and UK radical student movements and other left-wing groups. BDS has convinced many activists that you cannot fight for any cause – women's rights, academic freedom, anti-racism – without acknowledging that Israel is oppressing Palestinians. In short, intersectionality offers BDS an acceptable way of wielding the classic anti-Semitic weapon – linking every perceived evil in the world to the Jews.

        Inevitably the reality behind the BDS façade is emerging – that its leaders have no interest in a two-state solution, that all the talk of freeing the Palestinians from their colonialist apartheid oppressors masks its true objective, which is to overthrow the state of Israel. This is why some 20 US states have passed anti-BDS legislation, while others are in the process of doing so, why the British government has prohibited procurement boycotts by all UK public authorities, why in 2016 the Paris municipality barred city departments and city-affiliated organizations from fostering ties with the BDS movement .

        BDS cannot continue fooling the world indefinitely. Has it begun its fall to earth?

Published in the Jerusalem Post on-line, 1 April 2017:
http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/A-Mid-East-Journal/Is-BDS-winning-485795

Published in the MPC Journal, 10 April 2017:
http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/04/10/is-bds-winning/

           [Next posting: 8 April 2017 at 8.30 pm GMT]